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From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of
the Declaratory Principles of International
Environmental Law
DR. RANEE KHOOSHIE LAL PANJABI*
I. INTRODUCTION
In just seven years our planet Earth will enter a new century.
Whether or not it survives the next hundred years will depend largely on
the effectiveness of international and national efforts in the next few
years. The depletion of the ozone layer protecting the planetary environ-
ment, the befouling of air, the pollution of water, the erosion of soil, the
destruction of forests, the contamination of the oceans-these are but a
few of the host of environmental problems which have to be tackled ur-
gently if the planet is to continue to provide a haven for our species and
for all the other millions of life forms whose existence is imperilled by the
activities of Man. There is now a terrifying realization among millions of
environmentally conscious people around the world that these problems
are so vast, overwhelming and pervasive that governments may not be
able to act in time to restore the Earth, to save the world for future
generations.
Fortunately, the growing environmental awareness and recognition of
the urgency of the problem has generated a determination in thousands
of people world-wide to undertake this task. Never has humanity faced
greater obstacles or been more challenged to come up with adequate solu-
tions. Yet never have so many people of different races, religions and
ways of life been prepared to face the challenge as they now appear to be.
There can be little doubt that environmentalism is the major politi-
cal, economic and social issue of the 1990's. This cause commands the
type of grass-roots support around the planet which few other ideas have
evoked in the long history of Mankind. Environmentalism has achieved
the status of a philosophy few would dare to question or oppose. It may
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well become the primary ideology of the post-Cold War world. If govern-
ments can respond adequately to the demands of their people, the human
species may yet be able to salvage the only viable home it has. The prob-
lem lies not in the acceptance of environmental concerns but in the im-
plementation of environmentalists' programs for clean-up. A planet facing
debilitating recession in its richest nations and grinding poverty in its
poorest cannot yield the resources and the funds to clean up the environ-
ment. An emphasis on short-term necessity may push aside the long-term
interest which dictates that the Earth must be cleansed of its foul air and
water if the human species is to survive.
The global concern about the problems of the environment has
evoked two major world conferences in the past two decades. The first
was held at Stockholm, Sweden in 1972; the second, in June, 1992 at Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil. These two conferences have been successful in generat-
ing global concern about environmental deterioration but have not yet
resulted in action to match the level of international awareness and con-
cern. The problem is that rhetoric about the environment is far easier to
produce than action, and international forums tend on occasion to degen-
erate into "rhetoric-fests," where world leaders spout all the proper
phrases but then go home and often fail to implement their internation-
ally-formulated promises.
Because environmentalism has now become a political issue, it has
fallen prey to the vicissitudes of political expediency and is often a victim
of the fact that democratic governments-those most attuned to environ-
mental awareness-are often short-lived and subject to electoral changes.
Thus, the very situation which encourages free choice in democracies ap-
pears to militate against the implementation of long-term solutions of
clean-up which alone can save the planet. This is why it is so important
to raise environmentalism above the level of party politics and make it an
issue of national and international significance, not only in terms of
promise and commitment but in terms of action and implementation.
The numerous nations which participated in the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio were
aware of the chasm between rhetoric and real action which is an inevita-
ble aspect of environmentalism. It was assumed at both conferences that
the creation of blueprints of principle would emphasize the significance of
environmental concern. The acceptance by all nations of a body of princi-
ples could form an initial step to encourage not merely national measures
to curb pollution but international treaties to alleviate the global environ-
ment. Both conferences paid particular attention to the formulation of
these principles which were to guide and chart a path for Mankind. The
Stockholm Conference produced the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, which consists of a preamble
and twenty-six principles. The recent conference at Rio resulted in ac-
ceptance of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which
has a brief preamble and twenty-seven principles.
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This article will attempt to provide an in-depth comparison of these
two international documents with a view to discerning the significance of
each and the differences in emphasis in the two decades from the 1970's
to the 1990's as demonstrated in these instruments. As the Rio Declara-
tion specifies the significant directions for the next few years, the empha-
sis will be on this instrument of international endeavor. World opinion on
the priorities, successes and weaknesses of the Rio Declaration is relevant
to a full understanding of its significance. It must be pointed out that
length constraints limit the degree to which every aspect of the compari-
son can be explored. Nor can every principle in each declaration be ana-
lyzed. That project would require a book in terms of length. The focus
will be on the Rio Declaration as it stands and not on the process by
which it was created.
Although both international conferences produced other instruments
for acceptance and signature,' the formulation of bodies of principles was
significant in establishing the fact that environmentalism is not merely an
issue of political and economic concern. The Stockholm and Rio Declara-
tions have brought a new dimension to the tone of environmentalism by
generating an awareness that these issues over-ride the more mundane
considerations which prompt ordinary political action. The declarations
signify a universal acceptance of and acquiescence in the primary, funda-
mental fact that environmentalism is a matter of values. It may not be
too early to call it the new ethic of the 1990's. Inspired by the pain of
millions who suffer daily from the effects of environmental pollution, the
declarations serve to remind the leaders of the planet both about the seri-
ousness of the problem and about the need for dramatic measures to alle-
viate the lot of those who have been victimized. Even though both decla-
rations fall short of reflecting the moral authority which initially inspired
them, they form a useful charter and benchmark for future direction.
Although cynics may argue that such pronouncements of principle
are hopelessly naive, an exercise in futility, more honored in the breach
than in the observance, the very fact that so many nations could after
intense deliberation formulate these principles is indicative of the univer-
sality of awareness concerning the many facets of the environmental
problem. The skepticism of those who witnessed the non-implementation
of most of the Stockholm principles is akin to the pessimism of those who
1. The Stockholm Conference resulted in Action Plan for the Human Environment
and resolutions on World Environment Day, Nuclear Weapons Tests and the Convening of
a Second Conference on the Human Environment. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972).
The delegates attending the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, as it was popularly called, ac-
cepted the massive detailed formulation of specific environmental plans called Agenda 21,
agreed to a non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus
on the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests (see
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1, June 13, 1992), signed the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (see U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II/Add.1)), and the more
controversial Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822 (1992), which the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America refused to sign.
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daily decry the fact that Mankind appears not to heed or follow the
teachings of the great religious leaders. However, few of those who lament
the religious deficiencies of modern citizens would be in favour of discard-
ing the great body of religion and philosophy that has been produced for
the benefit of Mankind. Similarly, the inadequate implementation of en-
vironmental principles ought not to daunt or deter us from realizing their
inherent significance and relevance.
An emphasis on legal principle can be very useful in the international
realm where there is yet no supra-national sovereign power to control
states. While acknowledging that nation states are still in a virtual state
of nature with respect to the exercise of power, few would dispute the fact
that international law daily erodes the realm of that natural sovereignty
and circumscribes it with treaties, trade agreements, United Nations reso-
lutions and a plethora of good faith accords. William Thorsell has written
about the "erosion of sovereignty that has been accelerating since the
1970's. ' '" Iraq learned the hard way that unilateral aggression simply does
not pay when its invasion of Kuwait was challenged by international mili-
tary intervention. States which choose to behave like renegades risk being
treated as pariahs. The people of Iraq continue (at time of writing) to
suffer the consequences of the actions of their dictator Saddam Hussein.
By a curious twist of fate, it was left to Saddam Hussein-the present
champion of irresponsible national sovereignty-to demonstrate the im-
portance and dire necessity for an international approach to environmen-
tal concerns. By flooding the Persian Gulf with oil and by blowing up over
seven hundred Kuwaiti oil wells-an act which befouled the air all the
way to India-he demonstrated the international impact of ecoterrorism
and underscored the need for universal measures to save the planet. If
governments are not yet willing to surrender their sovereign powers for
the environmental benefit of all inhabitants of this planet, it is imperative
that at the very least they be reminded constantly both of their obliga-
tions and of their responsibilities in this regard. A short body of easily
comprehensible principles serves a useful purpose as an environmental
beacon guiding nations and their citizens toward greater environmental
awareness. Hopefully, the realization of the dimensions of the problem
will generate further efforts to practice environmental protection.
Nationalism is today the single largest obstacle to global environ-
mentalism. The "us" against "them" mentality generated by nationalism
breeds a reliance on narrow perspectives based on self-interest and the
immediate expedient requirements of a sovereign state. The international
outlook, on the other hand, favors a long-term, less self-centered ap-
proach. The problem is that while environmental agreements are interna-
tionally formulated, they have to be nationally implemented. Hence, what
should be achieved with universal benefit in view is often subsumed to
2. William Thorsell, A New Chapter in the Decline and Fall of National Sovereignty,
GLOBE AND MAne (Toronto), Dec. 26, 1992, at D6.
3. Hatred, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1992, at 31.
VOL. 21:2
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
the self-interest of the sovereign state. The fact is that today, despite the
plethora of international agreements, treaties and the existence of the
United Nations and its numerous bodies, sovereign states are still essen-
tially in a state of nature with respect to their relations with each other.
This unfortunate reality makes decisive action in the environmental field
extremely difficult. Given the existence of so many nations on this planet,
the best that one can hope for is that many of them will be inspired by
their own environmental rhetoric and by their international commitments
to take the necessary steps to clean up their own area of the planet. The
principles of environmentalism may be formulated on the large interna-
tional stage. Regrettably, the materialization of these principles takes
place in the narrower national sphere. Therein lies the biggest obstacle
and the greatest challenge for environmentalists.
Another facet of the problem was explained by Frances Cairncross
writing in The Economist:
Nature is no respecter of national boundaries. Across those dotted
lines on the globe, winds blow, rivers flow and migrating species walk
or fly. The dotted lines may carve up the earth, but the sea and the
atmosphere remain open to all, to cherish or plunder. When people in
one country harm that bit of the environment they assume to be
theirs, many others may suffer, too. But how, and how much, can
countries make their neighbours change their ways?4
The limitations of the present political structure of the planet with
its multitude of small, medium and large nation states certainly slows the
pace of environmental activity. The vast disparity of resources, wealth
and population between these many states adds to the problem. But as
Maurice Strong, Secretary-General of UNCED commented:
We do not have a central world government, and if we are going to
insist that you set up a central world government and a central world
gendarmerie before you deal with environment problems, the planet
will be dead. We have to work with the system we've got, which is
nation states working together through the United Nations, which is
the only global organization that can perform that function.,
The World Commission on Environment and Development proposed
in its report, Our Common Future, that:
Building on the 1972 Stockholm Declaration ... there is now a need
to consolidate and extend relevant legal principles in a new charter to
guide state behaviour in the transition to sustainable development...
. The charter should prescribe new norms for state and interstate be-
haviour needed to maintain livelihoods and life on our shared planet,
4. Frances Cairncross, The Environment: Whose World Is It, Anyway?, EcONOMIST,
May 30, 1991, at 5.
5. Leader of Rio Conference Predicts Success, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, May 29, 1992,
at 3 (an interview of Maurice Strong, Secretary General of the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development).
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including basic norms for prior notification, consultation, and assess-
ment of activities likely to have an impact on neighbouring states or
global commons.'
The call to create new normative structures was timely and valid.
However, the implementation of this challenge would not be easy. Dennis
Lloyd commented: "Law... cannot but be a reflection-however partial
and imperfect-of the society in which it operates, and if that society
contains inherent contradictions these will be manifested in the fabric of
the law itself."7 Prior to the publication of Our Common Future, the
United Nations General Assembly had accepted the World Charter for
Nature in 1982.8 The World Charter for Nature and the Stockholm Dec-
laration have been appropriately called "decennial touchstones in the
area" of international environmental law.9
Ten years after the World Charter for Nature and five years after the
initial publication of Our Common Future, the task of creating a body of
principles of international environmental law was still formidable, given
the diversity of interests, both national and regional which sought repre-
sentation for particular points of view. The environmentally conscious de-
veloped world envisaged an Earth Charter which in Howard Mann's opin-
ion "would be readable, understandable and accessible to everyone, (i.e., a
document that was not a typical U.N. resolution) but [that] would pro-
vide an important tool for the shaping of public opinion on, and support
for, the concept of sustainable development.' 10 According to A.O. Adede,
during the pre-UNCED process, the United Nations Working Group's
priorities were to make the principles short and concise, with an inspiring
and appealing text which would be "easily understood by the general
public."' If both the Stockholm and Rio Declarations appear less than
perfect in terms of their inspirational value, it could equally be suggested
that they at least address the primary concerns of the majority of govern-
ments represented at the two environmental conferences. Although the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations have not been categorized as legally
binding, their acceptance at both conferences was by no means easy. The
discussions and debates over principle drew forth the full panoply of ar-
gument on the North-South divergence, the developed versus developing
conflict and the rich nations against the poor nations. That so much
thundering rhetoric accompanied the formulation of declarations never
meant to be legally binding indicates that delegates at both Conferences
6. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 332
(1989).
7. DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 225 (1985).
8. The vote was 111-1 in favor of passage. See G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
9. Howard Mann, The Rio Declaration, 86 PROC. A.S.I.L. 406 (John Lawrence Har-
grove ed., 1992).
10. Id. at 409.
11. A.O. Adede, International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio-an Over-
view of Past Lessons and Future Challenges, 22 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 88, 100 (1992).
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were keenly aware of the ultimate significance of creating a body of envi-
ronmental principles. Principle can be the precursor of law, provided it
evokes sufficient public support and generates a type of moral authority
of its own. A body of international legal principles can also, over the
course of time, be assumed by some of its proponents to be acceptable as
customary law.12 Even though the Stockholm and Rio Declarations may
not bind nations in the legal sense, they do oblige them morally to respect
the ideas as indicators of a universal consensus about the priorities of
environmentalism. Representing Thailand at UNCED, Dr. Chulabhorn
Mahidol reminded delegates that the Rio Declaration would "have a very
strong political and moral force."1
The differing priorities of the developed world for environmentalism
and the developing world for development were reflected in the long and
rather bitter debates which resulted in the rather choppy and less than
inspirational text of the Rio Declaration.
The original idea among the developed countries was to produce a
ringing declaration in Rio which 'kids all over the world could hang on
their bedroom walls.' But then the developing countries rather un-
helpfully pointed out that many of the children in their part of the
world don't have bedrooms."
The proposed Earth Charter became "a graphic symbol of the North-
South divide,' 1 5 and was converted into a more pedestrian, rather wordy
declaration which the world accepted with a somewhat resigned sense of
inevitability. Bowing to the inescapable force of international political re-
ality, the head of the Canadian delegation and Personal Representative of
the Canadian Prime Minister at Rio, Arthur Campeau described the final
declaration as "a document suitable for' bureaucrats." 0
The delegates even argued at Rio about the status of the Rio Decla-
ration. The United States was in favor of placing the body of principles as
a preamble to the detailed Agenda 21 document. 17 As Agenda 21 is also
not legally-binding, this idea would appear to have some logic. However,
Agenda 21 is also unlikely to be read widely or perused by the general
public. It has been criticized as a "750-page document of unsurpassed UN
verbosity, intended to be the world's work programme for sustainable de-
12. For a perception of the Stockholm Declaration's customary law status see Mann,
supra note 9, at 405-14.
13. Professor Dr. Her Royal Highness Princess Chulabhorn Mahidol, Personal Repre-
sentative of the King of Thailand, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environ-
ment and Development (June 5, 1992).
14. Frank McDonald, If This is Progress, We're in Deep Trouble, IRISH TIMES, June 11,
1992, at 7.
15. Lucia Mouat, Earth Summit in Rio Faces Complex Issues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Mar. 27, 1992, at 7.
16. Geoffrey York & James Rusk, PM Urges Action to Save Species, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), June 2, 1992, at A3.
17. Lucia Mouat, Small Steps to Saving the Planet, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Mar. 12,
1992, at 3.
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velopment."18 Attaching the Rio Declaration to Agenda 21 might well
have ensured its consignment to oblivion in future years. The indepen-
dent status of the Declaration guarantees it a wider audience. It has also
been suggested that this status gives it "the effect of what many describe
as 'soft law.' "19
The Stockholm Conference had raised public awareness about our
ailing planet, and the Rio Summit extended this interest worldwide as
television and radio carried its message to the far ends of the earth. The
Stockholm Conference attracted only two heads of government, Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme.
2 0
The Earth Summit at Rio drew over one hundred heads of state and gov-
ernment.21 Dr. Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental Defense Fund
explained that "[y]ou can't be treated as a world leader on any issue
without being a player on the environment."2 As Brad Knickerbocker
commented in The Christian Science Monitor, "[s]ince the last gathering
convened 20 years ago, both the seriousness of global environmental
problems and general awareness about them have increased dramatically,
as has the level of human suffering due to related poverty. '2 In 1972, the
U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European allies boycotted the Stockholm Con-
ference because the German Democratic Republic could not participate
equally with other member nations.24 At Rio there was more global par-
ticipation both at the governmental and non-governmental level, reflect-
ing the seriousness of environmental degradation and possibly also illus-
trating the effectiveness of the Stockholm Conference in heightening
international awareness of the problem.
The following comparison of the two documents of principle
2 5 will
include quotations in italics from both with appropriate references. The
clauses of the two documents have been grouped on the basis of sub-
headings which explain the essential subject matter of the various princi-
ples. Those portions of the principles which are relevant to the theme of
the sub-heading will be quoted. Occasionally, an important principle may
be repeated as it may require analysis under different sub-headings. It
was felt that this method of proceeding was preferable to following one or
other document seriatim in view of the fact that the two documents
18. Bargain Not a .Whinge, TimES (London), June 1, 1992, at 15.
19. Mouat, supra note 17.
20. Summary Report of the Seminar Convened by the Canadian Department of Exter-
nal Affairs and International Trade and the Department of Environment, Meech Lake, Que-
bec, Dec. 8-9, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Summary Report of Canadian DEA].
21. Reuter, Earth Summit: Saving the World Had its Lighter Moments, VANCOUVER
SUN, June 15, 1992, at A9.
22. William K. Stevens, Lessons from Rio, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 1992, §1, at 10.
23. Brad Knickerbocker, World Leaders Gather at Rio for Earth Summit, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 2, 1992, at 1.
24. Summary Report of Canadian DEA, supra note 20.
25. For the Stockholm Declaration, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/114 (1972). For the Rio
Declaration, see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
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merge and diverge continually. For the reader's convenience, the full text
of the two declarations is included as an Appendix to this article.
II. POPULATION
The Stockholm Declaration underlined the significance of the popu-
lation issue. Its preamble stated:
The natural growth of population continuously presents problems on
the preservation of the environment, and adequate policies should be
adopted, as appropriate, to face these problems. (Stockholm Declara-
tion, Preamble 5).
The body of the Stockholm text was however, rather vague with respect
to specific solutions for a problem which was already recognized as funda-
mental by most member states of the United Nations.
Demographic policies which are without prejudice to basic human
rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned
should be applied in those regions where the rate of population
growth or excessive population concentrations are likely to have ad-
verse effects on the environment or development, or where low popu-
latio'n density may prevent improvement of the human environment
and impede development. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 16).
In a very real sense it could be argued that the implementational
failures of Stockholm in a variety of areas propelled and galvanized the
frenzied activity before Rio. The intervening two decades have not been
kind or benign for either the planet or for its dominant species. The
world's population, three and a half billion2" at the time of the Stockholm
Conference had risen to approximately five and a half billion2 7 by the
time delegates gathered in Rio for the Summit. It is interesting to note
that the first United Nations Conference on Population held in Rome in
1954 had projected a world population figure of three and a half billion by
1980.28 In light of those predictions, the actual figure is even more alarm-
ing. "Between 1950 and 1985, world population grew at an annual rate of
1.9 per cent compared with 0.8 per cent in the half-century preceding
1950."" In the present decade, it is estimated that the earth has to feed,
house and clothe an additional ninety-two million people each year,
eighty-eight million of them inhabiting the developing world.30 The
United Nations estimates that world population will reach seven billion
26. WADE ROWLAND, THE PLOT TO SAVE THE WORLD 13 (1973).
27. GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 29, 1992, at Al.
28. ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 31.
29. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 99 (citing
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROS-
PECTS: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS AS ASSESSED IN 1984 (1986)).
30. Sandra Postel, Denial in the Decisive Decade, cited in STATE OF THE WORLD: A
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 3, 191 (Linda
Starke ed.)(relying upon POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 1991 WORLD POPULATION DATA
SHEET (1991)).
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by the year 2010.1 Although the crisis had escalated in seriousness over
the twenty year period, the delegates at Rio were even less capable of
decisive action than their predecessors at Stockholm.
The failure of the Rio Declaration to mention the population issue in
precise and clear terms was perceived as a fundamental flaw. Hence what
was excluded from the body of principles was as important as what was
ultimately included. James Brooke of the New York Times suggested that
"[c]lauses in documents concerning population growth were watered
down after closed-door lobbying by delegates from the Vatican and Saudi
Arabia, both for religious reasons.""3 This criticism is echoed by Christo-
pher Young who asserted that "[t]he Vatican, with support from Muslim
fundamentalist countries, fought successfully to draw the teeth from any
declaration about the need for population control, on which other at-
tempts at worldwide environmental progress may well depend. Heavy
lobbying by the Catholic Church has managed to remove any direct men-
tion of family planning or population control from the relevant Earth
Summit documents." s8
The position of the Catholic Church was ably presented at the Earth
Summit by His Eminence Angelo Cardinal Sodano, Secretary of State for
the Vatican and by Archbishop Renato R. Martino, Apostolic Nuncio and
Head of the Holy See Delegation to the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development. Asserting that the position of the Holy
See "regarding procreation is frequently misinterpreted, 3 4 Archbishop
Martino insisted that "the Catholic Church does not propose procreation
at any cost."'3 5 He specified that "[w]hat the Church opposes is the impo-
sition of demographic polices and the promotion of methods for limiting
births which are contrary to the objective moral order and to the liberty,
dignity and conscience of the human being.
36
While conceding that "[e]veryone is aware of the problems that can
come from a disproportionate growth of the world population,' 37 Cardinal
Sodano emphasized the linkage between the poverty of the many and the
wastage of resources by the few. Echoing Pope John Paul II, the Cardinal
reminded delegates at U.N.CED that "the pollution of the environment
and risks to the ecosystem do not come primarily from the most densely
31. James Rusk, Summit to Stress Resource Limitations, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
May 20, 1992, at A2.
32. James Brooke, The Earth Summit; Rich Nations Offer Money, But Small Ones
Raise Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, §1, at 10.
33. Cristopher Young, The Earth Summit: Mulroney's Stand Politically Correct,
EDMONTON J., June 5, 1992, at A13.
34. H.E. Archbishop Renato R. Martino, Apostolic Nuncio, Head of the Holy See Dele-
gation, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
(June 4, 1992).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. His Eminence Angelo Cardinal Sodano, Secretary of State of the Vatican, State-
ment at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 13, 1992).
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populated parts of the planet." 8 Statistical analyses support the Cardi-
nal's position. At the present time eighty-five per cent of the world's in-
come is enjoyed by a mere twenty-three per cent of its population." Mau-
rice Strong who organized UNCED and served as Secretary General for
both international conferences, highlighted the serious inequity between
the rich and poor nations by pointing out that a child born in the devel-
oped world would consume twenty to thirty times more of the planet's
resources than a child born in a developing nation.4 The per person en-
ergy consumption of Europeans is ten times that of Africans. North
Americans consume twenty times the energy utilized by Africans." It was
not unnoticed that the position of the religious leaders was sympathetic
to and in tune with the attitude of many developing nation delegates.
Glenn Godfrey, Attorney General for Belize, denied that overpopulation
is one of the main causes of environmental degradation and insisted that
"poverty is caused not by a growing population, it is caused rather by the
failure of the developmental process to distribute the wealth . .. in a
socially just manner. 4 2 An editorial published in The Times (London),
was critical of the Holy See:
[w]hat the Vatican has done, with a hint of mischief making for its
own purposes, is to orchestrate the voice of Third World resentment
towards such Western demographic arrogance. But it would have been
far more honest to have let the argument come to the surface at Rio
than to try to forestall it by diplomatic pressure. 8
In fairness it has to be noted that developing nations are keenly aware of
the serious nature of their population problem. Pakistan's Prime Minis-
ter, Nawaz Sharif, agreed that "[d]eveloping countries must assume their
full share of responsibility in limiting population growth to manageable
levels."""
There was considerable finger-pointing and mutual recrimination
prior to and during the Earth Summit at Rio. The considerations on
world population control fell victim both to the influence of religious tra-
dition and to North-South wrangling. Eugene Linden put the matter in
appropriate, if gloomy, perspective: "if human numbers and consumption
continue to rise unabated, there is little hope for the other creatures with
whom we share the earth and a high probability of catastrophe for hu-
manity itself.' 45 British Prime Minister John Major emphasized the con-
38. Id.
39. Postel, supra note 30, at 4.
40. Michael McCarthy, Brazil Offers to Host New Green Institution, TIMES (London),
June 4, 1992, at 11.
41. Brad Knickerbocker, The World From... Rio de Janeiro, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 10, 1992, at 3.
42. Glenn Godfrey, Attorney General for Belize, Statement at United Nations Confer-
ence on the Environment and Development (June 5, 1992).
43. The Pope and Birth Control, TIMES (London), May 19, 1992, at 13.
44. James Brooke, supra note 32, at 10.
45. Eugene Linden, Summit To Save the Earth; Population: The Uninvited Guest,
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sequences of ignoring the population crisis by stating that the Rio process
"has no chance of success if we do not do much better in our efforts to
slow the growth of population." He added that in failing to take such
measures the Earth would destroy itself."' Despite the lengthy discussions
which preceded Rio, the best the delegates could agree on was:
To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for
"all people, States should.., promote appropriate demographic poli-
cies. (Rio Declaration, Principle 8).
Clearly, in tackling the most basic and fundamental social, economic and
environmental problem facing the planet, the delegates at Rio regressed
from the vague ambiguities agreed to at Stockholm. Time referred to this
as "perhaps the worst example of bureaucratic obfuscation."4
III. POLITICAL CAUSES
The historic chasm between North and South-a chasm founded in
their shared imperial past-rose to haunt delegates at both Stockholm
and Rio. As the victims of decades of economic deprivation, the develop-
ing nations inevitably focussed on the legacy of colonial rule and its rela-
tion to environmental degradation. Their former imperial masters, now
enjoying the status of developed countries, were less anxious to bring
these political issues of the past to the surface in what had been termed
an "environmental discussion." In the end the South won, to an extent.
Both declarations referred to the political issue uppermost in the minds
of the delegates from the developing world.
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and ade-
quate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits
a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility
to protect and improve the environment for present and future gen-
erations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating
apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other
forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and
must be eliminated. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 1).
The concern was expressed again in Principle 15 of the Stockholm
Declaration:
Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbaniza-
tion with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the environment and
obtaining maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for
all. In this respect projects which are designed for colonialist and
racist domination must be abandoned. (Stockholm Declaration, Prin-
ciple 15).
TIME, June 1, 1992, at 54.
46. Robin Oakley & Micheal McCarthy, Major Promises Pounds 1OOm More for Green
Projects, TiMEs (London), June 13, 1992, at 1.
47. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Summit to Save The Earth; Rich vs. Poor, TIME, June 1,
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Colonialism with its consequences was still clearly a priority on the
agenda of international problems insofar as developing nations were con-
cerned. As Dr. W.K. Chagul, Tanzania's Minister of Economic Affairs and
Development Planning, commented: "The evils of apartheid, racial and
colonial oppression, far from being irrelevant, are at the very core of envi-
ronmental problems in Africa due to the degradation they cause to the
human resources by taking away the rights of the many and thereby
bringing benefits to only a minority." s Latin American nations echoed
the complaints of the Africans by arguing that "the 'economic imperial-
ism' of multi-national corporations, based in the U.S. and elsewhere, was
depriving them of effective control of their economies, and resulting in
the rapaciously wasteful spoliation of their resource bases, carried out
under absentee managers who had no real concern for the local
environment." '4 9
By the time the Rio Conference occurred in 1992, the emphasis of
the political concerns of developing nations had adjusted to a more
marked concentration on the fate of the Palestinians, particularly those
in the occupied territories under Israeli rule. In the preliminary planning
phases for UNCED, it became evident that "the conference was to be as
much about the North-South dialogue between the rich and the poor as it
was about the environment." ' The North-South dialogue zeroed in on
the Israeli occupation of Arab land to highlight an issue which is a sore
point with proponents and opponents of Israeli actions with respect to its
Middle East neighbors. The Arabs and the Palestinian representatives in
particular were anxious to incorporate some form of condemnation of op-
pression and occupation into the Rio Declaration. Farouk Kaddoumi,
Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, stated at UNCED that "[p]rograms aimed at environmental upgrad-
ing are closely related to the necessity of removing all forms of oppres-
sion. '"" Mr. Kaddoumi emphasized the consequences of Israeli control
over Palestinians: population over-crowding, deforestation, reduction of
the area of cultivable land, overgrazing, reduction of available water sup-
plies, use of herbicides by settlers in the Occupied Territories, soil ero-
sion, and desertification. 2 The Palestinian delegate concluded that the
condition of occupation precluded the fulfilment of sustainable develop-
ment.5" The Syrian Vice-President, Abdul-Halim Khaddam, included Is-
raeli activities in Lebanon in his denunciation of Israel's environmental
48. ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 52.
49. Id. at 53.
50. David D. Newsom, Paving the Road to the U.N. Environmental Conference, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 1992, at 18.
51. Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Develop-
ment (June 11, 1992).
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record."' At time of writing this article, the whole world is watching the
fate of more than four hundred Palestinians (a number of them profes-
sors and physicians), who were deported by Israel, rejected by Lebanon,
and who are at this moment living in makeshift camps in a "no man's"
land between the two countries.5 Their plight in adjusting to conditions
without any modern amenities has caught global attention and has no
doubt garnered more sympathy for the Palestinian cause, a consequence
probably unforeseen by the Israeli government when it issued the depor-
tation orders. The expulsions were an Israeli retaliation "for the murder
of a paramilitary border guard by the Palestinian fundamentalist Hamas
movement." '
During the Rio preparatory process, Israel objected strenuously to
the attempt to castigate its policies in the Occupied Territories in the
drafts of the statement of principle."7 At UNCED, however, the Israelis
were more positive in tone. Conceding that "conflicts and dispute all over
the world prevent genuine cooperation, 58 Dr. Uri Marinov, Director Gen-
eral of Israel's Ministry of the Environment, reminded delegates of the
environmental discussions which formed part of the on-going Middle East
peace process and suggested that "[tihe environmental negotiations of the
current peace talks should be used first for environmental purposes; but
the opportunity they present as a basis for overcoming political contro-
versy should not be ignored."'
According to The Times (London), the Americans brokered a deal on
this Middle Eastern controversy over the Rio Declaration: "A deal was
struck by the Americans on Israel's behalf ... by which the reference will
be removed from the summit's giant work programme, Agenda 21, while
remaining in the declaration." 60 The controversial clause in the Rio Dec-
laration read:
The environment and natural resources of people under oppression,'
domination and occupation shall be protected. (Rio Declaration,
Principle 23).
The satisfaction of the developing nations was expressed by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates. Rashid Abdullah Al-
54. Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Vice-President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Statement at
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 12, 1992).
55. Patrick Martin, Exiles Find Vindication in No Man's Land, GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec.
31 1992, at A.
56. Fury Over Israeli Expulsions, 147 MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, WASH. POST WEEKLY 1
(Dec. 27, 1992).
57. Michael McCarthy & Robin Oakley, Green Charter Agreed at Rio, TIMES (London),
June 12, 1992, at 7.
58. Dr. Uri Marinov, Director General of the Israeli Ministry of the Environment,
Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 3,
1992).
59. Id.
60. McCarthy & Oakley, supra note 57, at 7. See also UNCED: Rio Conference on
Environment and Development, 22 ENV'T POL'Y AND L. 204 (1992).
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Noaimi informed colleagues at UNCED that his nation welcomed "the
principle contained in the agreed declaration of the Conference pertain-
ing to the need to provide protection for the environment and natural
resources of the peoples suffering from oppression, domination and
occupation."61
IV. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental pol-
icies .... (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21).
It is evident that most developing nations, having suffered years of
foreign exploitation and rule, are still wary of international phraseology
which they believe may restrict the exercise of their recently-acquired in-
dependent status. This hesitancy was evident at Stockholm. During the
lengthy process which resulted in the formulation of the Stockholm Dec-
laration, the delegation from the People's Republic of China (then a new
member of the United Nations6") proposed its own series of principles
which included the following rather significant clause: "Any international
agreement should respect the sovereignty of all countries. No country
should encroach on another under the pretext of environmental protec-
tion."" The Chinese suggestion is reflected in the Stockholm Declaration.
The emphasis on national sovereign rights was by no means exclu-
sively a developing world concern. The Canadian delegation presented a
draft of principles for incorporation in the Stockholm Declaration. The
first of those principles reads: "Every state has a sovereign and inaliena-
ble right to its environment, including its land, air and water and to dis-
pose of its natural resources. '6 4 It is apparent that Canada "played a cen-
tral role in the drafting of Principle 21. "65 Although the United Nations
Charter bases the Organization "on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members, '"66 one wonders whether the frequent restatement of
national sovereignty is really necessary in light of the growing realization
that environmental catastrophe is a global concern and will require inter-
national efforts to alleviate the plight of its victims. It would appear that
all nations rich and poor are anxious to preserve their national rights
even while conceding to the global nature of the problems they are
61. Rashid Abdullah AI-Noaimi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emir-
ates, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June
9, 1992).
62. See United Nations Document General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), Oct. 25,
1971, concerning the recognition of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of
Taiwan from membership in the World Organization.
63. ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 93.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Summary Report of Canadian DEA, supra note 20, at 7.
66. U.N. Charter art. 2.
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tackling.
The rather wordy tribute to national sovereign rights in an interna-
tional document of principles was interestingly repeated almost verbatim
in the Rio Declaration. The only difference was the addition of two signif-
icant words in the Rio version:
..the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies... (Rio Declara-
tion, Principle 2)(emphasis added).
With the inclusion of developmental policies, the Member States of the
United Nations underscored the twin objectives of UNCED - namely en-
vironment and development. They also raised this principle to the second
in ranking order, possibly signifying its importance.
In view of the fact that the Rio Declaration in its preamble reaf-
firmed the Stockholm Declaration and specifically sought to "build upon
it," (Rio Declaration, Preamble, 3), the restatement verbatim of the
principle of sovereign rights in the 1992 document would appear to be
redundant. Its very presence in both formulations suggests the signifi-
cance of the issue of national sovereignty to Member States of the United
Nations.
As the world has collectively intervened militarily to free Kuwait
from Iraqi aggression and has intervened humanely to feed the starving
in Somalia, a declaration justifying and emphasizing the primacy of na-
tional sovereignty would appear to be almost regressive in terms of the
universalist ideals of the Earth Summit. At time of writing, developed
nations of Europe and North America are coming under increasing pres-
sure to intervene in Bosnia to force the Serbs to stop killing the residents
of Sarajevo. As William Thorsell commented, "[a]t the UN, the principle
of self-authorized intervention in the 'domestic affairs' of nations for
'higher' purposes is emerging ad hoc."'6
7
Simultaneously, there is a definite back-lash from both developing
and developed nations which find safety in clinging to the trappings of
nationalism and are loath to concede to the new internationalism which
accompanies environmental concerns. The Editor of Environmental Pol-
icy and Law explained the situation at UNCED very lucidly:
The problems of national sovereignty came again to the fore. Clearly,
when world responsibility is accepted for environmental danger, some
States have difficulty in accepting that this will also entail giving up
some of their rights and accepting new responsibilities. On the one
hand, this is understandable. On the other, all states have to accept
that we have only one earth and that such sensitive aspects can only
be solved with compromise on both sides.68
67. Thorsell, supra note 2, at D6.
68. Wolfgang E. Burhenne & Marlene Jahnke, Introduction to 22 ENVry. POL'Y & L.,
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The addition of "developmental" considerations in the Rio Declara-
tion and its placement in tandem with environmental policies also sig-
nalled a new effort at integration of the two concepts: a perception devel-
oped in the light of events arising from the Stockholm Conference when
it became apparent from the plethora of subsequent discussions, analyses
and conferences held on numerous facets of these issues that the inter-
connection had to be stressed. It is now obvious that over-development in
some countries has resulted in environmental degradation while under-
development in others has also caused environmental decline. The World
Commission on Environment and Development expressed this realization:
Environment and development are not separate challenges; they are
inexorably linked. Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating
environmental resource base; the environment cannot be protected
when growth leaves out of account the costs of environmental destruc-
tion. These problems cannot be treated separately by fragmented in-
stitutions and policies. They are linked in a complex system of cause
and effect.69
The difficulty lies, not so much in realizing this interconnection in theory
but in keeping it in the forefront in practice. The practice of such inte-
grated thinking will require considerable effort and adjustment of policies
in the realm of resource management and business in every nation on
Earth.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Having deferred substantively in both documents of principle to the
primacy of national sovereign rights, the delegates were equally eager to
demonstrate their commitment to the concept of international coopera-
tion. Realizing that environmental restoration cannot proceed exclusively
in the national sphere, the Member States of the United Nations pledged
themselves to seek universalist solutions to the serious crisis of planetary
decline. A study of both declarations illustrates the tacit adherence to the
idea of international cooperation in environmental matters. The move-
ment from Stockholm to Rio is indicative of mounting world apprehen-
sion because, of environmental degradation and therefore reflects not so
much a new trend but a more specific sense of direction.
A growing class of environmental problems, because they are re-
gional or global in extent or because they affect the common interna-
tional realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations and
action by international organizations in the common interest. The
Conference calls upon Governments and peoples to exert common ef-
forts for the preservation and improvement of the human environ-
ment, for the benefit of all the people and for their posterity.
(Stockholm Declaration, Preamble, No. 7).
The Stockholm Declaration called for
69. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 37.
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International co-operation ... in order to raise resources to sup-
port the developing countries in carrying out their [environmental]
responsibilities. (Stockholm Declaration, Preamble 7).
These appeals for international effort and cooperation were echoed in
Principle 24:
International matters concerning the protection and improve-
ment of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit
by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation
through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate
means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and elimi-
nate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities con-
ducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the
sovereignty and interests of all States. (Stockholm Declaration, Prin-
ciple 24).
It is interesting to note that in the very principle stressing the need for
cooperation, mention had to be made once again of the importance of
state sovereignty.
At Rio, delegates included a brief mention of the concept of coopera-
tion in their Preamble:
With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global part-
nership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among
States, key sectors of societies and people .... (Rio Declaration, Pre-
amble, para 4),
and also in the Preamble:
Working towards international agreements which respect the in-
terests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental
and developmental system. (Rio Declaration, Preamble, para 5).
The concept of international cooperation was spelled out in far
greater detail in the Rio document, possibly because the experience of
two decades between Stockholm and Rio had made this matter of critical
importance. Hence while governments around the world reiterate their
commitment to national rights, they are now keenly aware of their mu-
tual vulnerability when facing, ecological crises. "Major disasters-Valdez,
the Brazilian forests, fisheries, Chernobyl, 3-mile Island, the Gulf War
and droughts in Africa-have added sharpness and urgency to the world's
concern."7 The pace of these disasters appears to have intensified. One
hundred and ninety-three people were injured when dioxin leaked in
Seveso, Italy in 1976.7' An accident at a chemical plant in 1979 in Novosi-
70. Geoffrey Bruce, A Review of the Stockholm Conference of 1972, Of Some Signifi-
cant Developments in the Environment Since 1972, and of Some Major Challenges and
Opportunities for Canada in Preparing for UNCED in 1992, in Summary Report of Cana-
dian DEA, supra note 20, at 24.
71. HELEN CALDICOTT, IF You LOVE THIS PLANET 76 (1992).
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birsk, U.S.S.R. killed three hundred peoples.7 Leakage in 1984 at a pesti-
cide plant in Bhopal, India resulted in the death of approximately two
thousand five hundred people.7" Although disasters of this nature occur
within national boundaries, as the Chernobyl example shows, the conse-
quences can be international. The world is waking up to the fact that
although we may not be under nuclear threat at the moment, there are
other potentially serious and life-threatening dangers lurking in every na-
tion of this planet. There is more consensus now than there was in 1972
that "[i]nternational agreement is the best way to solve environmental
problems that transcend national borders. '74
Despite the many environmental agreements and treaties which have
marked the two decades between Stockholm and Rio, few would dispute
the fact that "[tihe world's environment is more degraded and is less sta-
ble than it was 20 years ago."'75 The Worldwatch Institute has estimated
that earth has lost approximately five hundred million acres of trees since
1972, "an area roughly one-third the size of the continental U.S."17 6
Equally catastrophic, for the growth of food crops, the world has lost
about five hundred million tons of topsoil, "an amount equal to the tilla-
ble soil coverage of India and France combined. '77 Food production per
capita declined in ninety-four countries between 1985 and 1989.78 Al
Gore, Vice-President of the United States, has commented that
"[m]odern industrial civilization, as presently organized, is colliding vio-
lently with our planet's ecological system.
7
1
9
Environmental degradation is proceeding at an alarming pace in both
developed and developing nations. No country is immune from the im-
pact of damage to ecosystems. The shared problem makes cooperative ef-
fort the only viable alternative. The World Commission on Environment
and Development recognized the new reality:
Until recently, the planet was a large world in which human activities
and their effects were neatly compartmentalized within nations,
within sectors (energy, agriculture, trade), and within broad areas of
concern (environmental, economic, social). These compartments have
begun to dissolve. This applies in particular to the various global 'cri-
ses' that have seized public concern, particularly over the past decade.
These are not separate crises: an environmental crisis, a development
crisis, an energy crisis. They are all one.80
Cooperation at Rio was framed along fairly precise lines. Although
72. Id.
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75. Bruce, supra note 70.
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the language of the Rio Declaration is more bureaucratic than visionary,
it is probably more useful than the more nebulous pronouncements which
were formulated at Stockholm. Inevitably, the theme of cooperation un-
derlies both documents. The more specific content of the Rio Declaration
is indicative of the more serious attention paid to environmental coopera-
tion since the 1970's.
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's
ecosystem. (Rio Declaration, Principle 7)
Having stressed the concept of global partnership-implying joint respon-
sibility-the Rio Declaration went on to outline the areas wherein this
cooperation should occur:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open inter-
national economic system that would lead to economic growth and
sustainable development in all countries, to better address the
problems of environmental degradation. (Rio Declaration, Principle
12)
The recognition of the need for more justice in the distribution of the
economic benefits was not merely an act of deference to developing na-
tions. It reflects a growing realization in the developed, richer nations
that the so-called Third World is set on a developmental course, regard-
less of the environmental consequences, simply because these poor na-
tions have no other choice if they are to give their present populations
some kind of decent life. As Al Gore has suggested: "Rapid economic im-
provements represent a life-or-death imperative throughout the Third
World. Its people will not be denied that hope, no matter the environ-
mental costs. As a result, that choice must not be forced upon them."81
One of the great challenges of the post-Rio process, already underway,
will be the implementation of this principle in the cause of global sustain-
able development and hopefully, a cleaner environment.
VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE
The Rio Declaration urges States to cooperate to prevent trans-
boundary pollution.
States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and sub-
stances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to
be harmful to human health. (Rio Declaration, Principle 14)
This issue is of more than academic concern, especially since the recent
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada,
81. GoRE, supra note 79, at 279.
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the United States of America and Mexico.8" Newsweek, referring to a sur-
vey by the government of the United States, stated that "four of five
American companies operating plants across the border in Mexico admit-
ted they were there to take advantage of weak environmental laws."8 It
will take an enormous amount of government-to-government persuasion
to ensure that the economic boom now proceeding in Mexico does not
result in an environmental catastrophe.
In 1986, an accident at a nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, U.S.S.R.
killed at least twenty-five people -and sent radioactive fallout across Eu-
rope.8 4 "Current estimates predict anything from 14,000 to 475,000 cancer
deaths worldwide from Chernobyl. No one will ever know for certain."'85
The reaction to this disaster at UNCED was strong and the language of
the principles more firm than is normal for such documents:
States shall immediately notify other States of any natural di-
sasters or-other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harm-
ful effects on the environment of those States. Every effort shall be
made by the international community to help States so afflicted,
(Rio Declaration, Principle 18)
and this further provision:
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant
information to potentially affected States on activities that may
have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and
shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.
(Rio Declaration, Principle 19)
The mandatory nature of the language is very significant both in terms of
the concerns expressed and with respect to the precise obligations placed
on Member States of the United Nations regarding their responsibilities
should such an event occur. The Rio language carries more punch than
the milder provision on toxic substances included in the Stockholm
Declaration:
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and ihe
release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the
capacity of the environment to render them harmless; must be halted
in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted
upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the peoples of all countries
against pollution should be supported. (Stockholm Declaration, Prin-
ciple 6)
The Stockholm Declaration followed the approach of opting for the fur-
82. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Address at the Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment, Harvard University (Dec. 10, 1992).
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ther creation of international law to deal with transboundary pollution:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdic-
tion or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
(Stockholm Declaration Principle 22)
This provision was repeated in the Rio Declaration:
States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more deter-
mined manner to develop further international law regarding liabil-
ity and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction. (Rio Declaration Principle 13)
The problem of transboundary environmental damage was interest-
ingly enough linked both at Stockholm (Principle 21) and at Rio (Princi-
ple 2) with the emphasis on national sovereign rights, already discussed
above under the sub-heading "national sovereignty." Accordingly, the fol-
lowing provision appeared in the Stockholm Declaration:
States have.., the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21)
This part of Principle 21 was repeated verbatim in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration. The linkage of sovereign rights and national responsibilities
was largely credited to Canada's active participation at Stockholm. As the
Canadian government explains:
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration represented a water-
shed in international environmental law in acknowledging the sover-
eign right of states to exploit their own resources and the responsibil-
ity of states "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Canada played a
central role in the drafting of Principle 21. The conceptual framework
provided by Principle 21 has been applied successfully by Canada in
other negotiations, and is the legal foundation of virtually every inter-
national environmental agreement and legal instrument concluded
since Stockholm."
VII. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT
The provisions on development were of primary importance to dele-
gates at both conferences because although the principles were not
deemed to be legally binding, there was an implicit feeling that the more
the South could wrest in developmental assistance promises from the
86. Summary Report of Canadian DEA, supra note 20, at 7-8.
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North, the more likely was it that the Declarations could be utilized to
hold the rich nations accountable for their lapses with respect to sharing
the world's wealth equitably. Both Declarations highlight the importance
of development for the poorer nations and acknowledge the primacy of
that concept. Indeed it could even be suggested with a degree of justifica-
tion (albeit a trace of exaggeration) that the Rio Declaration is almost a
sustainable development charter for the South. There are at least six
principles in the Rio Declaration which deal specifically with the concerns
of developing nations. The Stockholm Declaration includes the subject in
its Preamble and in approximately six of its principles, though arguably,
both documents are filled with indirect references which apply to the
poor and rich nations.
It is important to stress that developmental priorities are reflected in
the Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1986 which specifies that "[s]tates have the
primary responsibility for the creation of national and international con-
ditions favourable to the realization of the right to development. 8 7 The
South could argue at Rio that it was simply acting in line with the princi-
ples of the Declaration on the Right to Development. The following prin-
ciple incorporated into the Rio Declaration illustrates this point:
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations. (Rio Declaration, Principle 3)
The nations of the South, in their rush to development, threaten to
destroy the global environment even more vigorously than the North did
in its somewhat slower industrial revolution. Self-interest in both North
and South now dictates an approach which would assist Southern devel-
opment in a manner that is not environmentally degrading so that the
atmosphere, the air and the water of the entire planet can ensure the
future survival of people in all parts of the globe. The South now holds a
crucial card in its favor and has played it to the hilt in continually re-
minding the North that developed nations contribute most of the pollu-
tion of the planet, consume most of the resources and generate most of its
waste, while developing nations shoulder most of its economic backward-
ness, its degrading poverty and its enormous debt load.88
The shared imperial past of Northern and Southern nations has left
a legacy of inequitable distribution of the world's limited wealth. Political
subjugation resulted in economic exploitation. Southern resources and
87. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, Art. 3.1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/41/SR (1986). See also Ranee
K.L. Panjabi, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. (1989)(reviewing James Crawford ed., THE RIGHTS OF PEO-
PLES (1986)).
88. For a strong example of the South's position see the CSE Statement on Global
Environmental Democracy To Be Submitted to the Forthcoming U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, India.
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markets were critical to the industrial development of imperial nations
like Britain and France. In the past, the South had no choice but to con-
tribute to the prosperity of the North. In fact, its contribution to North-
ern affluence still outweighs the foreign aid it receives from developed
nations. The World Bank estimated that at the end of 1991, the total
debt stock of developing nations was $1281 billion. 9 This crippling debt
burden can be traced back to the 1970's when sudden increases in oil
prices and low interest rates induced many developing nations to borrow
from the rich nations. As interest rates rose in the 1980's, these countries
found it increasingly difficult to meet their debt obligations. "Between
1973 and 1980, Third World debt increased by a factor of four, to $650
billion."90 The consequences to the environment are dramatic:
Rising poverty and the desperate attempts of Third World countries
to earn hard currency carry not only a heavy human and economic
cost but also an environmental one. Many indebted nations rely on
their natural resources-whether timber or minerals like copper-to
raise foreign exchange from trade .... Environmental resources are
being exhausted just to pay debt.9
Although Official Development Assistance to the South totalled a signifi-
cant $49.7 billion by 1988, there was still a "massive, perverse redistribu-
tion of income," because the outward flow from Southern nations ex-
ceeded by about $8 billion the total official development assistance
payments.2 UNICEF estimated that about half a million children in the
developing world died in 1988 because "social progress in Third World
countries has been stalled or reversed by crushing debts and falling reve-
nues." 93 Clearly, the South is still subsidizing the high standard of living
in the North. It was inevitable that the delegates at Rio would have to
confront this issue-the most fundamental in the North-South dia-
logue-in formulating all the agreements which were produced at that
conference.
At Stockholm in 1972 delegates realizing that global environmental
degradation was a consequence of industrialization in the North and
under-development in the South, believed that narrowing the gap be-
tween the rich and poor nations was one important solution.
In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are
caused by under-development. Millions continue to live far below the
minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of
adequate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sani-
89. Government of Canada (United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment Reports), Debt Conversion Initiative to Promote Sustainable Development, June,
1992.
90. CAn icoTr, supra note 71, at 130.
91. BEN JACKSON, POVERTY AND THE PLANET 96-97 (1990).
92. IVAN L. HEAD, ON A HINGE OF HISTORY 42-44 (1991).
93. Charlotte Montgomery, Children Paying Foreign Debt Load With their Lives,
UNICEF Says, GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 21, 1988, at A9.
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tation. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts
to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to
safeguard and improve the environment. For the same purpose, the
industrialized countries should make efforts to reduce the gap be-
tween themselves and the developing countries. In the industrialized
countries, environmental problems are generally related to industri-
alization and technological development. (Stockholm Declaration,
Preamble 4)
Unfortunately, the ideals of Stockholm failed to materialize. Jean
Charest, Canada's Minister of Environment, reminded delegates at the
Rio Earth Summit that in the past "thirty years, income disparities be-
tween the North and the South have grown from twenty times to sixty
times." He commented that "this trend is simply not sustainable." By
1992, the escalation of the world's economic problems made for sharper
reactions at Rio. This time actual blame was assigned to the rich nations:
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The de-
veloped countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in
the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command. (Rio Declara-
tion, Principle 7)
The nations of the South could justify their somewhat rancorous mood at
Rio with plenty of statistical evidence. To compare the situation with re-
spect to two prominent nations, the United States of America and India:
the U.S.A, with five percent of the world's population, consumes twenty-
five percent of its energy, emits twenty-two per cent of all CO2 produced
and accounts for twenty-five per cent of the world's GNP9 5 On the other
hand, India, with sixteen per cent of the world's population, uses a mere
three per cent of its energy, emits three per cent of all CO2 produced and
accounts for only one percent of global GNP;" and India is by no means
among of the world's poorest nations. For in that type of comparison, the
disparities would be far greater. From the perspective of the North-South
divide, the North "which has 25 percent of the world population, con-
sumes 70 percent of the planet's energy, 75 percent of its metals, 85 per-
cent of its wood." 97
To understand the shift in mood over the two decades between
Stockholm and Rio, one could compare the gentle suggestion in the
Stockholm Declaration:
The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in
such a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion
94. Jean Charest, Minister of Environment for Canada, Statement at United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (June 11, 1992).
95. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 47, at 2.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Begley, supra note 78, at 36.
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and to ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all
mankind. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 5)
with the far more strident tone in the Rio Declaration:
To achieve, sustainable development and a higher quality of life
for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption .... (Rio Declaration, Prin-
ciple 8)
Critics derided the weakness of the Rio provision calling for the elim-
ination of unsustainable patterns of development. Frank McDonald of
The Irish Times referred to the "watered-down reference to the conten-
tious issue of over-consumption by the rich North."98 He also pointed to
the use of the milder word "should" rather than "shall" in Principle 8 of
the Rio Declaration and commented that this "tells its own tale about the
nit-picking at the core of UNCED." 99 It has to be remembered however,
that the United States of America, whose consumer society was upper-
most in the mind of those who supported Principle 8, was itself strenuous
in rejecting any condemnation of its affluent way of living. American dele-
gates insisted "over and over that 'the American life-style is not up for
negotiation.' "100 Given that approach by the world's only remaining su-
perpower, the inclusion of any provision on life-style limitation may be
deemed a bold and progressive development. The South may not have
won entirely at Rio but its rhetoric was strident. Indian environmentalist
Maneka Gandhi pointed out that one western child consumes as much as
one hundred and twenty-five eastern children do. She concluded that
"nearly all the environmental degradation in the east is due to consump-
tion in the west." 101
If the developing nations could be said to have a "wish list" at Rio,
there are indications of their desires in the Rio Declaration. The eradica-
tion of poverty was primary:
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of
eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable
development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of liv-
ing and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the
world. (Rio Declaration Principle 5)
Among developing nations there are also disparities with respect to
income, resources and degree of development. Inevitably the poorest of
these nations have elicited universal compassion, compassion most re-
cently illustrated in the United Nations operation to feed the starving
people of Somalia. The leading role played by the United States of
America in this operation "Restore Hope" is in sharp contrast to the
98. McDonald, supra note 14, at 6.
99. Id.
100. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 47, at 42.
101. Begley, supra note 78, at 36.
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somewhat self-centered positions espoused by American delegates at Rio,
positions which drew criticism from delegates and the media alike. At
Rio, delegates agreed that:
The special situation and needs of developing countries, particu-
larly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable,
shall be given special priority. (Rio Declaration, Principle 6)
At Stockholm, delegates assumed that one solution to such grinding pov-
erty was price stability:
For the developing countries, stability of prices and adequate
earnings for primary commodities and raw material are essential to
environmental management since economic factors as well as ecologi-
cal processes must be taken into account. (Stockholm Declaration,
Principle 10)
Unfortunately, the intervening two decades saw little or no improvement
in this regard. In fact, the poorest nations of the world have few alterna-
tives to primary commodity trading. In 1972, a year after the Stockholm
Conference, oil-producing countries in the Middle East combined to raise
the price of oil which skyrocketed from a little over one dollar a barrel at
the beginning of the 1970's to approximately forty dollars in 1979.102 Na-
tions involved in commodity production of tin, coffee and cocoa 03 also
attempted to cash in on what appeared to be a new global economic
structure of more equity and fairness in trade. Their enthusiasm was to
be short-lived. The lack of diversity of many developing economies-part
of the imperial heritage which geared these economies to the particular
needs of the colonial power-meant that often these nations, short of for-
eign exchange, tended to overproduce their major agricultural commodity
to earn ready cash. This led to gluts and other problems as Northern
nations, anxious to protect their own farming sector, protected them-
selves against commodity imports."0 4 As Ivan Head explains:
In the countries of the South... there is in all-too-many instances an
overwhelming dependence on a single economic activity. Simply
stated, most economic eggs are in one basket. And to make depen-
dence even more keen, more often than not those eggs assume the
form of a single agricultural commodity-coffee, cocoa, sugar, sisal,
ground-nuts, etc.-or a single mineral-tin, copper, gold, as
examples.10°
Slower growth and a world recession have also led to a decline in the
North in demand for some commodities from the South."'6 Ivan Head
describes the consequences of such undiversified economic systems:
102. JACKSON, supra note 91, at 65.
103. Id.
104. See HEAD, supra note 92.
105. Id. at 46.
106. See JACKSON, supra note 91, at ch. 4.
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Should world prices collapse in one of these commodities, or should
access to a major market be blocked, the results can be catastrophic.
If the bulk of foreign exchange earnings is derived from that product,
government income falls, social programs suffer, all related economic
activity (transportation, processing, etc.) stagnates, and the country
finds itself in desperate circumstances. This is the reality of an un-
diversified economy. This is the disadvantage of a seller in a buyer's
market. 0 "
Should the North succeed in developing a more equitable trading
system to encourage developing nations to diversify economically and to
export goods which the North no longer manufactures, there is a possibil-
ity that less Northern funding will have to be allotted for aid projects in
those nations.
Developing nations in their "wish list" also included the following
provision:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open inter-
national economic system that would lead to economic growth and
sustainable development in all countries, to better address the
problems of environmental degradation. (Rio Declaration, Principle
12)
The developing nations also feared that environmentalism could become
another means of justifying trade restrictions on imports into the North
from Southern nations. This was a major concern at Rio. Malaysia put up
a stiff resistance against all attempts at environmental labelling of South-
ern products. The Malaysians defeated these green labelling plans which
would have enabled consumers to avoid timber from rain forest sources.
As the South does not generally use eco-labelling on products from the
North, the Malaysians were able to convince delegates that such practices
by the North would establish a double standard.'0 8 In response to South-
ern apprehensions, the following terms constituted a second paragraph to
Principle 12:
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to
deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures ad-
dressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as
far as possible, be based on an international consensus. (Rio Declara-
tion, Principle 12)
The last sentence of Principle 12 in the Rio Declaration is somewhat
more precise than the following rather vague provision in the Stockholm
107. HEAD, supra note 92, at 46. 46.
108. Interview with Dr. Lim Keng Yaik, Malaysian Minister of Primary Industries (Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Corporation's News Network: B.B.C. News and Current Affairs (during
June 1992)).
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Declaration:
International matters concerning the protection and improve-
ment of the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit
by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing. (Stockholm Decla-
ration, Principle 24)
Some of the Rio formulations, though weak from an environmental
point of view, have more clarity than the cloudy promises undertaken by
Member States at Stockholm. With respect to world trade and environ-
mental policies, Stockholm's submission:
The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not
adversely affect the present or future development potential of de-
veloping countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better
living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by
States and international organizations with a view to reaching agree-
ment on meeting the possible national and international economic
consequences resulting from the application of environmental mea-
sures. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 11)
VIII. DEVELOPMENT: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
High on the South's "wish list" is the issue of science and availability
of technology. The developing nations are well aware that their economic
situation precludes the investment in research and development which
continues to afford a safely comfortable future for the economies of the
North. In a world in which technology becomes obsolete so quickly, sus-
tained commitment to scientific research has become the key to economic
progress. The South has always demanded that the North accord it the
benefits of this technology so that it can also develop at a pace acceptable
to its burgeoning population. This issue was as important at Stockholm as
it was at Rio. The repetition and emphasis on this matter underscores the
feeling among the poorer nations that they have been deprived by the
rich nations not merely of the past and the present but of their future as
well. Hence the issue of technology transfer was on occasion specified and
sometimes inferred in the Stockholm Declaration.
Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of un-
derdevelopment and natural disasters pose grave problems and can
best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of
substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a
supplement to the domestic effort of the developing countries and
such timely assistance as may be required. (Stockholm Declaration,
Principle 9)
The Declaration further provides:
Science and technology, as part of their contribution to eco-
nomic and social development, must be applied to the identification,
avoidance and control of environmental risks and the solution of en-
vironmental problems and for the common good of mankind. (Stock-
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holm Declaration, Principle 18)
It is followed by this surprisingly specific principle:
Scientific research and development in the context of environ-
mental problems, both national and multinational, must be pro-
moted in all countries, especially the developing countries. In this
connexion, the free flow of up-to-date scientific information and
transfer of experience must be supported and assisted, to facilitate
the solution of environmental problems; environmental technologies
should be made available to developing countries on terms which
would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an
economic burden on the developing countries. (Stockholm Declara-
tion, Principle 20)
Additionally, Principle 12 called for additional international technical
and financial assistance for developing countries.
Unfortunately, emphasis in a body of principles, albeit an interna-
tional code of principles, was no guarantee of performance by member
nations who acceded to the Stockholm Declaration. In the intervening
two decades between Stockholm and Rio, developing nations found that
access to western technological advances was neither easy nor cheap. In
1980, eight years after the Stockholm promises, developing countries paid
approximately two billion dollars in fees and royalties mainly to indus-
trial countries. 1° 9 Although there is widespread support for the sharing of
technology, there is an important obstacle which prevents widespread ful-
filment of this Stockholm aspiration. Industrial countries have evolved
elaborate legal systems for protecting the patent rights of inventors and
discoverers. The fact that many of these are in private hands makes it
"difficult for governments to transfer them on noncommercial terms."11
Because of the importance of proprietary rights in industrialized so-
cieties, patent protection arguably acts as an incentive for the develop-
ment of new technology. 1" The statistics bear out the significance of this
point: in 1980, "industrialized market economies accounted for 65 per
cent of the world total of patents granted, and the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe held 29 per cent."'1 2 Developing countries held a mere six
per cent of global patents with many being granted to non-residents." 3
There is a crying need for a sharing of the world's scientific resources. As
the World Commission on Environment and Development has explained,
[t]he promotion of sustainable development will require an organized
effort to develop and diffuse new technologies, such as for agricultural
109. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
WORLD DEVELOPMENT THIRD SURVEY (1983).
110. Hilary F. French, Strengthening Global Environmental Governance, in STATE OF
THE WORLD 1992 165 (Linda Stark ed., 1992).
111. Id.
112. COMMONWEALTH WORKING GROUP, TEcHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1985).
113. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 87.
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production, renewable energy systems, and pollution control. Much of
this effort will be based on the international exchange of technology:
through trade in improved equipment, technology-transfer agree-
ments, provision of experts, research collaboration and so on.'14
Vice-President Elect of the United States, Albert Gore, has called for the
"rapid creation and development of environmentally appropriate technol-
ogies- especially in the fields of energy, transportation, agriculture,
building, construction, and manufacturing-capable of accommodating
sustainable economic progress without the concurrent degradation of the
environment," and for the quick transfer of this information to all nations
especially the developing nations. 115 He does, however, stress the impor-
tance of more secure protection for patents,1 " in view of the fact that
"the dissemination of new, appropriate technologies will likely be critical
to our success in saving the environment."" 7 It will be interesting to see
whether the Clinton Presidency will implement these ideas. The Ameri-
can people have apparently voted for a new environmental consciousness
in Washington. Should this transpire, academics may, in another two de-
cades, be lauding the fact that the government of the world's most power-
ful nation fulfilled this commitment made at Rio:
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-
building for sustainable development by improving scientific under-
standing through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge
and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and trans-
fer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies. (Rio
Declaration, Principle 9)
Although the operative word was 'should' and not the stronger 'shall',
given the political climate resulting from the North-South divide at Rio
and the somewhat controversial stance adopted by the American govern-
ment of President George Bush,"' this provision for technological trans-
fer was probably the best that could be achieved. E-Hyock Kwon, Minis-
ter of Environment for the Republic of Korea, reflected the South's
perceptions at Rio when he insisted that "[t]he policies, information and
technologies for sustainable development should be available and accessi-
ble to all countries."" 9
IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTALLY-SAFE DEVELOPMENT
At Stockholm delegates concluded that the key to successful per-
114. Id.
115. GORE, supra note 79, at 306.
116. Id. at 320-321.
117. Id. at 318.
118. The United States refused to sign the Bio-Diversity Treaty because of a perceived
threat to its biotechnology industry. This action earned it much criticism at Rio and around
the world.
119. E-Hyock Kwon, Minister of Environment, Republic of Korea, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 11, 1992).
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formance of development projects with an environmental focus was
through the concept of planning, mainly to be exercised at the national
level.
Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling
any conflict between the needs of development and the need to pro-
tect and improve the environment. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle
14)
The concept of "planning" was applied to the issues of human settle-
ments and urbanization:
Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbaniza-
tion with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the environment and
obtaining maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for
all. (Stockholm Declaration Principle 15)
and to resource management:
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources
and thus to improve the environment, states should adopt an inte-
grated and co-ordinated approach to their development planning so
as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect
and improve the human environment for the benefit of their popula-
tion. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 13)
Planning for environmental improvement was to be a fundamental task
of nation states:
Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the
task of planning, managing or controlling the environmental re-
sources of States with the view to enhancing environmental quality.
(Stockholm Declaration, Principle 17)
Although the concept of planning has now in some minds acquired a
socialist tinge-social democracies like Nehru's India engaged in elabo-
rate five year economic plans as did communist states like
U.S.S.R.-there was clearly a need in the 1970's for each state to produce
a coherent system for tackling environmental concerns. In the 1970's the
concept of planning was the method resorted to by many of the newly-
independent nations who utilized this idea to develop their fledgling
economies. However, planning was easier than performance. As the 1970's
and 1980's wreaked economic havoc on many developing nations, the
guiding concepts of the Stockholm era had to be trimmed to the realities
of the new economic world order which illustrated that economic success
came not from massive governmental action plans, but from the operation
of free market forces.
The concept of planning was not repeated in the Rio Declaration.
Instead, more specific duties were assigned to national governments:
1. States shall enact effective environmental legislation. (Rio Decla-
ration, Principle 11)
2. States shall develop national law regarding liability and compen-
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sation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage.
(Rio Declaration, Principle 13)
It is important to note that this obligation was also included in Principle
22 of the Stockholm Declaration.
Transboundary waste disposal, now a serious threat to many socie-
ties, was prohibited-albeit somewhat mildly-at Rio:
3. States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and sub-
stances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to
be harmful to human health. (Rio Declaration, Principle 14)
4. National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisa-
tion of environmental costs. (Rio Declaration, Principle 16)
5. Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall
be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a signif-
icant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a deci-
sion of a competent national authority. (Rio Declaration, Principle
17)
6. States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disas-
ters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful
effects on the environment of those States. (Rio Declaration, Princi-
ple 18)
7. States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant in-
formation to potentially affected States on activities that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall
consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith. (Rio
Declaration, Principle 19)
The obligations at Rio, if adhered to by Member Nations of the
United Nations, do form a cohesive body of environmental guiding princi-
ple. It is clear that Rio moved ahead of Stockholm in specifying the du-
ties of governments.
X. DEVELOPMENT: THE APPREHENSIONS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS
In 1972 the Brazilian delegation argued that "environment is a con-
spiracy of the rich to keep us in a state of happy savagery. ' 120 No nation
reflects the change in mood from the 1970's to the 1990's as clearly as
Brazil. Brazil's transformation from the bete noire of Stockholm12 to the
welcoming host at Rio dramaticly illustrates the fact that developing na-
tions have now realized that environmental concerns are their problem
and not merely some Northern fad.
Confrontation erupted at Stockholm over Brazil's plan to construct a
dam on the Pirana River, which it shares with Argentina. Brazil argued
that developing nations could not afford the luxury of environmental pro-
tection and lobbied strongly against a draft principle which stated: "Rele-
120. Summary Report of Canadian DEA, supra note 20, at 4.
121. ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 53.
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vant information must be supplied by states on activities or developments
within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever they believe, or
have reason to believe, that such information is needed to avoid the risk
of significant adverse effects on the environment in areas beyond their
national jurisdiction.' 12 2 This principle, originally numbered 20, "was to
be the only section of the Declaration on the Human Environment tabled
and left for debate in the next meeting of the General Assembly.' 23
When in late 1972, the United Nations General Assembly approved the
Stockholm decisions, Principle 20 of the draft Declaration was not re-
inserted into the final text and "had been effectively erased."' 2
The consultative principle was adopted at Rio:
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant in-
formation to potentially affected States on activities that may have
a significant adverse transboundary effect and shall consult with
those States at an early stage and in good faith. (Rio Declaration,
Principle 19)
Developing nations were initially quite skeptical about the proposed
environmental gathering at Stockholm. Development and escape from
crippling poverty were uppermost in the minds of Southern governments,
not environmental clean-up and conservation. As Wade Rowland
comments,
[wihen the proposal for an environment conference was first broached,
opinion among the developing nations ranged from an assumption
that problems relating to the environment were a concern for the
highly-developed nations alone ... to a belief that the developed na-
tions were using environmental doomsday predictions as a racist de-
vice to keep the non-white third world at a relatively low level of
development.'22
The convening of a conference of scientists and development experts
from the South at Founex, Switzerland in June, 1971 served to bring the
developing nations on board in support of the Stockholm agenda.' 6 The
meeting at Founex "had a major impact in expanding the international
environment agenda beyond concerns about conservation and pollution to
wider issues including flows of development assistance, trade and devel-
opment."'2 7 The integration of development and environment had not yet
occurred but this linkage was inevitable once scientific research confirmed
the serious nature of global environmental decline. Participants at
Founex reported that "developing countries must view the relationship
between development and environment in a different perspective. In their
122. Id. at 53-54.
123. Id. at 55.
124. Id. at 135-136.
125. Id. at 47.
126. Id. at 48.
127. Summary Report of Canadian DEA, supra note 20, at 4.
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context, development becomes essentially a cure for their major environ-
mental problems. ' '1 28 This awareness that the developing world had a dif-
ferent set of priorities was to become central to the formulation of both
the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. It was this consciousness of differing
roles which made the creation of both bodies of principle a rather delicate
balancing act. If the ultimate instruments were not completely satisfac-
tory to anyone that in itself was a reflection of the level of compromise
which had to be accepted for universal agreement.
The most serious apprehension of the South was that environmental
concerns would impede development in the poor nations. Hence it was
imperative to ensure that this did not happen. At Stockholm one way to
ensure this was to keep on restating developing nation priorities. Hence,
in the Stockholm Declaration, environmental deficiencies were attributed
to condition of underdevelopment. (Principle 9). The requirements of de-
veloping nations for stability of prices and adequate earnings for pri-
mary commodities and raw materials were deemed essential to environ-
mental management. (Principle 10). Most important was the following
caution:
The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not
adversely affect the present or future development potential of de-
veloping countries. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 11) . . . Re-
sources should be made available to preserve and improve the envi-
ronment, taking into account the circumstances and particular
requirements of developing countries. (Stockholm Declaration, Prin-
ciple 12)
Clearly, the Stockholm Declaration conceded much to the developing
nation agenda in attempting to meet the apprehensions of these nations
about the possible economic threat posed by Northern concerns about
environmentalism.
At Rio, the process begun at Stockholm went even further. Devel-
oped countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the in-
ternational pursuit of sustainable development (Principle 7). The rich
were put on notice to eliminate unsustainable patterns of production
and consumption (Principle 8). The South has consistently stressed the
fact that it is Northern wasteful processes which are leading to environ-
mental degradation. This discussion was no less vehement at Rio than it
was at Stockholm. Indeed by 1992, the Southern delegates were armed
with twenty years of depressing statistics to demonstrate both that Stock-
holm measures had by and large failed and that the North had created
even more environmental problems in the two decades between the
conferences.
The success of the South in including its agenda into the Rio Decla-
ration can be gauged by the extent of criticism levelled at the final prod-
128. Founex Report, cited in, ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 49-50.
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uct emerging from the long and bitter negotiating sessions which occurred
over the creation of this body of principles. There was a clear feeling that
environment had been subordinated to development.12 9
The South's apprehensions concerning its ability to keep up with
Northern environmental standards and possible resulting discrimination
if it failed to do so were, to some extent, palliated by recognition that:
Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities
should reflect the environmental and developmental context to
which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be in-
appropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other
countries, in particular developing countries. (Rio Declaration, Prin-
ciple 11)
This principle may be compared with its Stockholm predecessor
which stated:
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the
international community, or to standards which will have to be de-
termined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the
systems of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced
countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social
cost for the developing countries. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle
23)
The South also insisted that trade policy measures for environmen-
tal purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. (Rio
Declaration, Principle 12)
Finally, on this issue of development, from Stockholm to Rio, the
world progressed from endorsing the essential need for development to
accepting development as a human right.
Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a fa-
vourable living and working environment for man and for creating
conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the
quality of life. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 8)
At Rio nations agreed that:
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations. (Rio Declaration, Principle 3)
The version above was accepted after amendment of the draft sponsored
by Pakistan and China which referred to the inalienable right to develop-
ment of poor nations.'3 0
Despite the criticism levelled often justifiably at the vagueness of the
129. York & Rusk, supra note 16, at 3-4.
130. Id.
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Rio Declaration, there can be no doubt that for the world's poorest and
most dispossessed, it at least affords recognition that their present eco-
nomic state of deprivation has not gone unnoticed by the world. Teatao
Teannaki, President of the Republic of Kiribati, stated that he was "par-
ticularly pleased to note that recognition is given to special needs of the
least developed and those most vulnerable to environmental problems."13'
In inching its way toward recognition of the validity of the human right
to development (with environmental safeguards) the world has taken an
initial step towards alleviation of the plight of millions alive today and
millions more yet to be born.
XI. CONSERVATION
The Stockholm Declaration, in its rather lengthy preamble, expresses
the concern which brought delegates from many nations to Sweden to
deal with the problems of the environment:
The protection and improvement of the human environment is a
major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic de-
velopment throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the peo-
ples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. (Stockholm
Declaration, Preamble, 2)
Both Declarations have ambiguous, if well-intentioned principles
which because of their vagueness appear to decline to the level of
platitudes.
The natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land,
flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural
ecosystems must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future
generations through careful planning or management, as appropri-
ate. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle. 2)
This principle is followed by an equally vague pronouncement:
The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources
must be maintained and, wherever practicable, restored or improved
(Stockholm Declaration, Principle 3)
and this rather nebulous principle:
The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in
such a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion
and to ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all
mankind. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 5)
Collectively these appear to be classic examples of United Nations "in-
ternationalese," a language of promises without commitments. It was left
to the delegation of the United States to present the positive aspect of
Principle 2 (above) in the Stockholm Declaration. The American delegate
131. Teatao Teannaki, President of the Republic of Kiribati, Statement at United Na-
tions Conference on the Environment and Development (June 13, 1992).
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declared the provision to be of "notable importance. 1 ' 32
Realization of the weakness of these principles prompted the dele-
gates at Rio to attempt to be more specific in terms of actions to be un-
dertaken to achieve the Stockholm principles. This attempt was not
successful:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to con-
serve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's
ecosystem (Rio Declaration, Principle 7),
and this provision:
[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development pro-
cess and cannot be considered in isolation from it. (Rio Declaration,
Principle 4)
The critical issue of conservation underlies all attempts at environ-
mental improvement in every nation of the world. The failure of the Rio
Declaration to produce a forthright pronouncement urging the world in
the direction of conservation was a serious weakness. Conservation is un-
doubtedly the key to environmental success for the future. If we manage
to conserve the earth's resources now, we can possibly progress towards
the universally accepted goal of sustainable development.
XII. POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
One of the unforeseen results of the Industrial Revolution was the
fact that the movement to produce and sell inexpensive manufactured
goods to growing numbers of consumers implied that certain invisible
costs of this revolution were borne by society as a whole. Minerals were
often strip-mined and the earth destroyed in the frenzy to gain raw
materials. Agricultural land was rapidly gobbled up by the ever-growing
urban and suburban concrete jungles which became the norm in much of
North America and Western Europe. Factories polluted the air and
tainted the water. Frequently, they were situated next to rivers and lakes
into which sewage was regularly dumped without much thought of future
consequences. Municipal sewage systems were also constructed to dump
raw waste into oceans. Eventually this decades-long activity caught up
with Mankind. The realization then set in that industrialists in particular
had made free use of air and water supplies to pollute and befoul them at
no cost to themselves. These were hidden costs which the entire national
community and eventually the entire planetary community would pay. As
Ben Jackson comments:
The stress on economic growth as the goal for development also fails
to take account of the future impact of present actions. It places the
emphasis on profitable living now without considering the
132. ROWLAND, supra note 26, at 100.
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price-environmentally (and therefore probably economically)-to be
paid later. For many environmentalists the greatest weakness of the
'more growth' solution is its failure to anticipate the future threat to
the environment.' "
In terms of past actions which have resulted in pollution, the clean-
up costs are staggering. "Estimates of the cost of remedial steps world-
wide to overcome the effects of pollution range as high as U.S. $300 bil-
lion annually. ' I s" The implementation of an environment-oriented agenda
worldwide will entail not merely clean-up of past problems but action to
prevent future pollution. Prior to the Earth Summit, Maurice Strong sug-
gested that the costs to implement the ambitious Rio program would
amount to an annual sum of $625 billion, with approximately eighty per
cent of the costs being borne by developing nations, supplemented by an
annual sum of $125 billion from the developed nations. Strong explained
that as development assistance already totalled approximately $55 billion,
another $70 billion would be required. 3 5
The irresponsible consumption of air and water has resulted in much
of the damage which the world now has to remedy. However much na-
tions may balk at Strong's figures, the harsh reality is that the world will
pay for pollution, either now or later. The World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development explained the problem:
Air and water have traditionally been regarded as 'free goods,'
but the enormous costs to society of past and present pollution show
that they are not free. The environmental costs of economic activity
are not encountered until the assimilative capacity of the environment
has been exceeded. Beyond that point, they cannot be avoided. They
will be paid. The policy question is how and by whom they will be
paid, not whether. Basically, there are only two ways. The costs can
be 'externalized'-that is, transferred to various segments of the com-
munity in the form of damage costs to human health, property, and
ecosystems. Or they can [be] 'internalized'-paid by the enterprise.
The enterprise may invest in measures to prevent the damages and, if
the market for its product allows, pass the costs along to the con-
sumer. Or it may invest in measures to restore unavoidable dam-
age-replanting forests, restocking fish, rehabilitating land after min-
ing. Or it may compensate victims of health and property damage. In
these cases too, the costs may be passed on to the consumer. 13 6
A growing realization that costs must rise to pay for past pollution
has been balanced with a determination to ensure that in future polluters
and not entire populations bear the burden of their actions. As Ivan Head
comments: "The age-old practices of discharging wastes into flowing
streams, and fumes into the atmosphere to be blown away by prevailing
133. JACKSON, supra note 91, at 180.
134. HEAD, supra note 92, at 91.
135. Leader of Rio Conference Predicts Success, supra note 5, at 3.
136. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 220-221.
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winds, are now subject not just to criticism but, increasingly, to censure
and judicial constraint. '"1 3' The polluter pays principle is the logical con-
sequence of such thinking. The aim of the policy is to force manufactur-
ers to internalize environmental costs and transfer these to their prices of
products.138 Member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD based in Paris) agreed in 1972, the year
of the Stockholm Conference, to adhere to the "Polluter Pays Principle"
(PPP) in their environmental policies. 139
The success of incorporating environmental costs into product prices
has been largely in the developed nations where industries have been able
to afford conversion to safer methods of manufacture and where consum-
ers have been able to afford the higher prices. The developing nations
have not been as successful particularly with respect to their exports be-
cause environmental "costs continue to be borne entirely domestically,
largely in the form of damage costs to human health, property, and eco-
systems."""0 Nor is this situation seen as seriously dangerous by a number
of developing nation governments.
At Stockholm, some developing nations demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to shoulder the financial burden of environmentally unsafe pro-
duction possibly because this would blunt their competitive edge in world
trade. The idea that they could be compensated for trade losses was re-
jected by the leading developed nations like the United States, Canada
and Britain.'" "Developing nations . . . argued loud and long that to ex-
pect the indigents of the world to accept financial responsibility in envi-
ronmental trade upsets, on exactly the same basis as the wealthy indus-
trial nations, was not only unfair but palpably absurd. The developing
nations had their backs to the wall as it was."'14 2 Given this defensive
stance, it was almost inevitable that at Stockholm states emphasized that:
The environmental policies of all states should enhance and not
adversely affect the present or future development potential of de-
veloping countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better
living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by
States and international organization with a view to reaching agree-
ment on meeting the possible national and international economic
consequences resulting from the application of environmental mea-
sures. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 11)
Aside from a provision that States shall co-operate to develop further
the international law regarding liability and compensation for the vic-
137. HEAD, supra note 92, at 91.
138. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 221.
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tims of pollution, (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22) there was no ad-
herence to the Polluter Pays Principle in this instrument prepared in
1972.
By 1992, the mood had changed as the developing nations became
increasingly aware of the hidden costs of their -competitive trading edge in
certain commodities and products. The social consequences were visible
from Africa to Southeast Asia. Hence at Rio the following principle was
adopted:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internal-
isation of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments,
taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in princi-
ple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest
and without distorting international trade and investment. (Rio Dec-
laration, Principle 16)
Delegates at Rio went further to prevent states from risking the environ-
ment and using the justification that there was scientific uncertainty
about the dangers posed by their activities:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainly shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. (Rio Decla-
ration, Principle 15)
Whether or not these provisions will be implemented globally remains to
be seen. Certainly, in the post-Rio process now underway, it is critical
that world public opinion monitor potential polluters in every nation to
ensure that the Polluter Pays Principle is implemented. Although nations
are not legally bound by the principles of Rio, in this instance, the moral
commitment might well be enforced by citizens whose vigilance may be
the only way to ensure that all of society does not continue to suffer from
the actions of a few.
XIII. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
Environmental improvement is unlike any other major issue because
it demands the commitment and action of every man, woman and child
on this planet. Because environmental decline is caused by people, the
clean-up and prevention of pollution demand the active and continuing
participation of citizens in every nation. Hence it is even more a people's
issue than it is a governmental one. Although the restoration of major
polluted sites requires government funding and action, the prevention of
pollution involves a thoughtful consideration about the fate of the planet
in each and every human being who inhabits it. Environmental conscious-
ness has grown on this planet because of the dedication of thousands of
men and women in every nation who have created, from a grass-roots be-
ginning, a movement which is now global and which can now compel gov-
ernments to act according to its aspirations. Delegates at Stockholm were
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aware of the significance of the popular factor in raising environmental
concerns:
To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance
of responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and
institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts.
Individuals in all walks of life as well as organizations in many
fields, by their values and the sum of their actions, will shape the
world environment of the future . . . The Conference calls upon
Governments and peoples to exert common effort for the preserva-
tion and improvement of the human environment, for the benefit of
all the people and for their posterity. (Stockholm Declaration, Pre-
amble 7)
Environmentalism became a serious obligation for the individual:
Man bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations. (Stockholm Declara-
tion Principle 1)
This rather vague exhortation followed:
The just struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollu-
tion should be supported. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 6)
The most useful method specified was to be education about environmen-
tal concerns.
Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation
as well as adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is
essential in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion
and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities
in protecting and improving the environment in its full human di-
mension. It is also essential that mass media ... disseminate infor-
mation of an educational nature, on the need to protect and improve
the environment in order to enable man to develop in every respect.
(Stockholm Decree, Principle 19)
In the twenty years between the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment and the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, the level of public involvement has escalated to
the point at which governments appear to be led-some might say "drag-
ged"-towards environmental consciousness by their populations. Even
though the high-minded intentions of the Stockholm Conference did not
materialize as successfully as delegates had hoped, the sheer scope of en-
vironmental enthusiasm was given a tremendous boost by the Conference.
The level of popular support for the cause of averting planetary decline
spawned its own growth industry in terms of volunteer non-governmental
organizations devoted to environmental concerns, media attention to the
topic, investigative reporting of governmental failures in safeguarding
against pollution, and committees of concerned business men who became
quickly aware of the need to cater to this growing phenomenon or be boy-
cotted and financially destroyed by it. Prime Minister John Major of the
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United Kingdom commented at UNCED on this dramatic development:
"The environment is no longer the specialist concern of a few-it has be-
come the vital interest of us all." '1 4
The galvanized public support for the environmental cause has also
been a direct consequence of the fact that governments have dragged
their feet over their Stockholm commitments and the problems of global
pollution have escalated to almost catastrophic levels. His Majesty the
King of Sweden, addressing the opening of UNCED, emphasized this con-
cern when he reminded delegates about the uneven progress following
Stockholm's great promise: "There has been great environmental im-
provement on the local, national and regional levels, while the global
threats are more serious than ever.' ' 4 4 The recognition that environmen-
tal success-or what there was of it-was largely because of local initia-
tive, also underscored the significance of involving the public in not only
the debate but in the performance of environmental clean-up. At Rio del-
egates decided to forge a new global partnership
[wJith the goal of establishing a new and equitable global part-
nership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among
States, key sectors of societies and people .... (Rio Declaration, Pre-
amble, 4)
There was clearly a recognition, brilliantly stated by Maurice Strong, that
"the 'carrying capacity' of the Earth could only sustain present and fu-
ture generations 'if it is matched by the caring capacity of its people and
its leaders.' 1,145 Accordingly, delegates included the following important
principle in the Rio Declaration:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. (Rio Declaration, Princi-
ple 10)
It was important not merely to encourage public involvement. It was
felt to be equally important to enable the people to gain information
about environmental concerns from public authorities. There is a growing
realization that governments might attempt to block public access to in-
formation about risks to health. The way in which the government of
U.S.S.R. handled the Chernobyl disaster is only one of the more glaring
and obvious examples of the manner in which governments seek instinc-
tively to conceal rather than reveal their mistakes. "A secret Soviet de-
cree prohibited doctors from diagnosing illnesses as radiation-induced.' 4 6
Such cover-ups can, as occurred after the Chernobyl incident, have both
143. John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Statement at United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (June 12, 1992).
144. His Majesty, the King of Sweden, Statement at United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (June 3, 1992).
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national and international consequences. Probably, with that example in
mind, at Rio delegates decided:
At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access
to information concerning the environment that is held by public au-
thorities, including information on hazardous materials and activi-
ties in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in deci-
sion-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making information widely available.
Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including
redress and remedy, shall be provided. (Rio Declaration, Principle 10)
The mandatory tone of this provision makes it a prime example of
the kind of language which should have been included throughout the Rio
Declaration. It is in the forthright formulation of such provisions that the
Rio Declaration moved the world in a progressive direction. Although the
non-binding nature of this instrument poses some problems for any indi-
vidual or group challenging secretiveness in a government, the very fact
that this principle exists, in such strong language serves notice on govern-
ments that the new world order includes openness and free public access
in matters of public interest. Had the entire declaration been formulated
in such pungent tones, it could have "provided a vision of how the people
of the world could survive together in the next century." ' ,
The concept of a global partnership attracted considerable attention
at Rio. The Indonesian delegate, Dr. Emil Salim made the point that the
Rio Declaration "should ... pave the way ... to forge a new global part-
nership between nations and peoples, a partnership in which rights and
obligations are equitably shared by all, a global partnership based on a
renewed and improved division of labor between nations and an equally
improved sharing of benefits and efforts between people." '48 The goal of
the partnership would be sustainable development and proper manage-
ment of the planet's resources. 4 9
However worthwhile an exercise it may be, the framing of provisions
about global partnership will not automatically guarantee success for the
goals of environmentalism. As Vincent Perera, Sri Lanka's Minister of
Environment and Parliamentary Affairs, explained, "UNCED . .. marks
the establishment of the global partnership. But the test of the partner-
ship is in its implementation.' 50
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XIV. WAR AS A SOURCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
The environmental group Greenpeace produced a critique of the Rio
Declaration in which it alleged that in the creation of the declaration sub-
stance became immaterial as the desire to write a text became the driving
force.151 Nowhere is this point more evident than in the provision about
warfare. Twenty years earlier, delegates at Stockholm had agreed that:
Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear
weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive
to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on
the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons. (Stock-
holm Declaration, Principle 26)
Frank McDonald, writing in The Irish Times, commented: "Twenty
years later, under pressure from the US which fought for the exclusion of
all 'Stockholm-type language' on this issue," 152 the Rio Declaration
merely and mildly suggested that
Peace, development and environmental protection are interde-
pendent and indivisible, (Rio Declaration, Principle 25),
and that
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
States shall therefore respect international law providing protection
for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its
further development, as necessary. (Rio Declaration, Principle 24)
States were also urged to
resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropri-
ate means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
(Rio Declaration, Principle 26)
Greenpeace commented: "If this is progress, we are in deep, deep
trouble."' 5 '3
An old African proverb states that when two elephants fight, it's al-
ways the grass that gets hurt.'' Although the existence of a nuclear de-
terrent kept the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union, from direct confrontation during the Cold War, each superpower
patronized a number of client states: smaller, often poor nations whose
petty conflicts with neighboring countries escalated and became part of
Cold War politics. Each superpower armed its client states and fought its
Cold War rival to the last drop of blood shed by the men and women of
developing nations. No region of the world was exempt from this war by
proxy which became the norm during the Cold War, in Latin America,
151. McDonald, supra note 14.
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the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Having a nuclear umbrella
did not mean that there was less war and less misery in the world. War
only became a game which rich nations played at the expense of poor
countries. Between the Cold War years of 1945 and 1989, one hundred
and twenty-seven wars were fought on this planet and "[a] 11 but two of
them have been in or between developing countries."' 5 Occasionally, the
superpower was itself dragged into the fray, as the United States was in
Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan.
The decade of the 1980s may well be recorded as one of the most
brutal in this or any other century. It was a decade of wars .... The
decade just past has seen the lengthy slaughter of the Iraq-Iran War
as well as bloody civil wars-many of them surrogate conflicts sup-
ported or sponsored by superpower champions-in Afghanistan, An-
gola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Lebanon,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan. It
is estimated that in all these wars the death count exceeded 4
million.156
Whether the wars were civil or regional or international, the price
paid in terms of human life and environmental destruction was always
severe. Growing realization of the direct and indirect costs of war
prompted delegates to urge UNCED in the direction of denunciation, if
not renunciation of warfare. Dr. Zvonimir Separovic, representing the new
Republic of Croatia, told delegates that "[w]ar is highly detrimental to
human wellbeing, to the human environment and development." He re-
minded delegates of the devastation war had caused in the former Yugo-
slav territory and urged the Earth Summit to consider the "aggressive
nature of human behaviour expressed in violence against other human
beings and the environment in the form of war." Indicating that his coun-
try's contribution to UNCED "is centred on the environmental impact of
war," Dr. Separovic insisted that the Rio Declaration "include a condem-
nation of war and express concern for the irreparable consequences of war
operations," as well as a call for "international action against a new kind
of crime which might be called ecocide.'
' 57
Warfare also diverts the resources and funds of both developed and
developing nations away from health, education and environmental clean-
up-progressive, worthwhile avenues-to unproductive devastation which
exacerbates human misery and environmental degradation. The World
Commission on Environment and Development commented that
"[c]ompetitive arms races breed insecurity among nations through spirals
of reciprocal fears. Nations need to muster resources to combat environ-
mental degradation and mass poverty. By misdirecting scarce resources,
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arms races contribute further to insecurity. 1 8 The amounts involved in
military research, production and consumption, if directed to environ-
mental and human concerns could have a dramatic and immediate im-
pact. Approximate estimates would suggest that global military spending
had already reached $1000 billion by 1986.' "Annual military spending
is still greater than the combined income of half of humanity."1
6 0
Developing nations, where most of the wars and consequent death
and environmental degradation occur, continue to divert increasing
amounts of their scarce resources to the military. "Since 1960, developing
countries have increased their military expenditures at a rate that is
double the rise in per capita income. As a percentage of GNP, developing
countries dedicate 1.6 per cent to health care, compared to 5.2 per cent to
military expenditures." '' In human terms, military expenditure and debt
servicing in the developing world (according to UNICEF estimates), cost
each family in those poor nations approximately four hundred dollars per
year. 6 2 Weapons imports from the North cost developing countries ap-
proximately $39'billion per year.'6 " "In 1988, military spending in poor
countries totalled $145 billion."' 6 4 By the time the World Commission on
Environment and Development contributed to the debate on this and re-
lated issues, the global arms trade, much of it in the developing world,
had consumed over three hundred billion dollars.'65 Though there was
much wringing of hands over this situation and the consequent loss of
resources for more productive uses, delegates at Rio were unable to agree
on a firm principled stand against warfare and its consequences. With
respect to this provision, the situation at Rio was clearly a regression
from the formulation agreed to at Stockholm. It was left to a delegate
from the Middle East - an area which has recently witnessed the horrors
of environmental warfare to view the warfare provision in an optimistic
light. Rashid Abdullah Al-Noaimi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
United Arab Emirates, informed delegates at Rio that his nations wel-
comed the principle "enunciated in the Declaration ... which calls upon
states to respect the rules of international law which provide for the pro-
tection of the environment in times of armed conflict."' 66 One can only
hope that the type of environmental havoc wrought on the Persian Gulf
by Saddam Hussein will not be repeated in other conflict-ridden parts of
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the world.
XV. PROVISIONS UNIQUE TO THE STOCKHOLM DECLARATION
Although we have thus far compared and on occasion contrasted the
principles which emerged from both environmental conferences, it is in-
teresting to note the moments where the two documents diverge com-
pletely because these areas are also indicative of trends and tendencies of
each era and also illustrative of particular weaknesses in the particular
declaration which failed to enunciate those principles. The present analy-
sis will concentrate on the principles themselves rather than the
preambles.
A. Oceanic Pollution
The issue of oceanic pollution was considered at Stockholm and the-
following principle adopted:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the
seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health,
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. (Stockholm Declara-
tion, Principle 7)
Twenty years of oceanic pollution continued despite this high-
minded principle. The issue of oceanic pollution is now so serious that it
can be considered a global catastrophe in the making. There is hardly an
ocean now which does not regularly receive sewage and waste. As Philip
Elmer-Dewitt commented:
Anyone who has been near the seashore lately-or listened to Jac-
ques-Yves Cousteau on TV-knows that the oceans are a mess, lit-
tered with plastic and tar balls and rapidly losing fish. But the gar-
bage dumps, the oil spills, the sewage discharges, the drift nets and
factory ships are only the most visible problems. The real threats to
the oceans, accounting for 70% to 80% of all maritime pollution, are
the sediment and contaminants that flow into the seas from land-
based sources- topsoil, fertilizers, pesticides and all manner of indus-
trial wastes. 67
The most apparent form of pollution in the world's oceans occurs
when ships carrying oil run aground, an event which is happening with
alarming frequency. Recently, the whole world is watched the horror of
oil pouring from the wrecked tanker, the Liberian-registered Braer, which
ran aground and crashed on January 5, 1993 on the southern tip of Main-
land, the largest of the Shetland Islands, approximately one hundred and
sixty kilometres north-east of Scotland." 8 The ship was carrying about
167. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 47, at 44.
168. Alan Freeman & Rheal Seguin, Oil Spill Raises Concern in Canada, G£OBE AND
MAIL, Jan. 7, 1993, at 1, and Associated Press, Scotland Counts Cost of Oil Spill to Envi-
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ninety-three million litres of oil on its journey from Norway to Canada.
All this oil spilling into the ocean would be "twice the amount that was
dumped when the Exxon Valdez hit a reef in Alaska on March 24,
1989. '69 Although these dramatic oil spills catch global attention, it also
has to be remembered that oil pollution of the oceans goes on continu-
ously. According to the United Nations, "about 600,000 tons of oil enter
the oceans each year as a result of normal shipping operations. '"1 0 It has
also been estimated that about six and a half million tons of litter are
cast into the world's oceans annually.1 7 1
There is no dearth of international agreements to protect the oceans.
The Antartica Treaty signed in 1959 and a subsequent Agreement of 1991
protect that fragile region with regulation of waste disposal and marine
pollution."2 Best known of the plethora of treaties is the 1982 Law of the
Sea Treaty which is "the product of more than a decade of often conten-
tious negotiations.""17 3 Participating states are expected to control diverse
sources of ocean pollution, "including discharges and runoff from cities
and agriculture, ocean dumping of wastes, releases from boats, oil explo-
ration and drilling, mining, and air pollution deposited in the ocean."'"7
This controversy-dogged convention also requires "express prior approval
by the coastal state for dumping in the territorial sea, in the EEZs [Ex-
clusive Economic Zones], and onto the continental shelf .... States also
have an obligation under the Law of the Sea to ensure that their activities
do not injure the health and environment of neighbouring states and the
commons."" 5 A decade after its completion, the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion had still not entered into force because the implementation required
ratification by sixty signatory nations. Environmentalists, like Hilary
French, have suggested with respect to some provisions that "the position
of the U.S. government was the biggest obstacle.""16 Despite this opposi-
tion, a number of the provisions of the convention have been accepted as
customary international law and are implemented by various nations,
17 7
"with positive effects on fish stocks, ocean pollution, and freedom of the
seas." 
8
Sixty-seven nations have signed on as contracting parties to the Con-
ronment, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 7, 1993, at A6.
169. Associated Press, Scotland Counts Cost of Oil Spill to Environment, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Jan. 7, 1993, at A6.
170. Scott Stevens et al., Global Resources and Systems at Risk, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, June 2, 1992, at 10.
171. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 47, at 46.
172. FRENCH, supra note 110, at 156.
173. Id. at 158.
174. FRENCH, supra note 110, at 158 citing Douglas M. Johnston, Marine Pollution
Agreements: Successes and Problems, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, (John
E. Carroll ed., 1987).
175. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 272.
176. FRENCH, supra note 110: at 159.
177. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 274.
178. FRENCH, supra note 110, at 159.
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vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (more commonly referred to as the London Dumping
Convention). This convention was established in 1972, the year of the
Stockholm Conference, and entered into force in 1975. 79 The convention
prohibited the dumping of radioactive and other forms of dangerous
waste into the ocean. It now "outlaws dumping of all forms of industrial
waste by 1995; a ban on ocean incineration of wastes is to take effect by
the end of 1994. s180 Clearly, the post Stockholm process was not very suc-
cessful in protecting the oceans from either deliberate dumping or acci-
dental pollution. This is an area where very tough international law is
called for, law which stiffens penalties and liabilities to such a point that
shipping companies are deterred from using any but the most seaworthy
ships. A very stringent regime of fines for deliberate polluters is one pos-
sible solution. Nations have to be made to abide by their pledge to up-
hold the London Dumping Convention. This commitment states that con-
tracting parties will "take all practical steps to prevent pollution of the
sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable to create
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to
damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea."1 81
If the Braer disaster in Scotland increases public awareness, it could re-
sult in more "aggressive action to prevent oil spills, increase inspection of
foreign ships and improve emergency preparedness."
'1 2
At the Rio Conference in 1992, there was awareness of the serious
nature of global pollution of the oceans. Kinza Clodumar, Minister of Fi-
nance for the Republic of Nauru in the Central Pacific, called for "an
immediate and permanent ban on the deliberate dumping of all toxic
materials into the oceans, including especially radioactive wastes."' 83 The
delegate from Nauru reminded his colleagues at the Earth Summit that
dumping at sea accounts for only a fraction of ocean pollution. Three
fourths of ocean pollutants enter directly from land, either in runoff
or through the air .... Ocean pollution from land based sources is an
issue that is central to the health of the biosphere. The global commu-
nity can ignore the issue only at its increasing peril.'"
A delegate from a maritime nation thousands of miles from Nauru was
similarly concerned. Thorbjorn Berntsen, Minister of Environment of
Norway, emphasized the particular attention his nations has paid to deg-
radation of the marine environment. He proposed the curbing of land
based pollution, strengthening of rules and inspection routines applicable
179. Minister Praises Contribution of London Dumping Convention in Protecting
Marine Environment, British Information Services, Ottawa, Nov. 12, 1992.
180. FRENCH, supra note 110, at 156.
181. British Information Services, supra note 179.
182. Freeman & Seguin, supra note 168, at 1.
183. Kinza Clodumar, Minister of Finance, Republic of Nauru, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 9, 1992).
184. Id.
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to global shipping and a permanent moratorium on ocean dumping of ra-
dioactive waste. The Norwegian delegate also pointed out that "contami-
nated nuclear production sites and potential runoff from more or less cas-
ually selected land based deposits represent a threat to the marine
environment.' 85 There was an evident and widespread interest in prohib-
iting ocean dumping and controlling the level of ocean pollution.
Unfortunately, this obvious level of concern did not translate into
any specific recommendations which were incorporated into the Rio Dec-
laration. There were no provision in that instrument which specifically
addressed the issue of the oceans, although it could be argued that the
various principles on transboundary pollution might be applicable. Given
the seriousness and escalation of the problem, and despite the existence
of several international treaties and the plea of the World Commission on
Environment and Development ("the most significant initial action that
nations can take in the interests of the oceans' threatened life-support
system is to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention"""), inclusion of a pre-
cise formulation on the oceans in the Rio Declaration would have been
not only appropriate but timely. In this very important matter, Rio
demonstrated a regression from the stand taken at Stockholm.
To be fair to the delegates at Rio, the issue of the oceans does form
an important chapter of the enormous document, Agenda 21.187 In early
April 1992, delegates attending the Fourth Session of the Preparatory
Committee for UNCED "agreed to strengthen existing global agreements
aimed at controlling land-based sources of marine pollution-fertilizers,
pesticides, and the like, which account for more than two-thirds of ocean
pollution. They have also agreed to improve collection of data on both
marine resources and damage from pollution."' 8 Simultaneously with the
global meeting in Rio, a smaller group of delegates representing twenty-
nine countries attended a Vessel Traffic Service symposium in Vancouver,
Canada. The symposium addressed concerns and solutions for ship-source
pollution. The remedies for this problem ranged from improved surveil-
lance to enhanced management competence to better communications be-
tween nations. 189
The necessity for inclusion of a provision specifically related to
oceans in the Rio Declaration can hardly be underestimated. The declara-
tion is likely to be the most widely-read of all the formulations to emerge
from that enormous conference. If, as its creators hope, the declaration
serves as an inspiration for future action, exclusion of the issue of the
oceans cannot be justified.
185. Statement by Thorbjorn Bernsten, Minister of Environment of Norway, UNCED,
Rio, June 4, 1992.
186. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 274.
187. See Chapter 17, Agenda 21, United Nations Document, UNCED, Rio, 1992.
188. Stevens, supra note 170, at 10.
189. Alan Daniels, Sea Summit Targets Polluters: 29 Nations Attending Vancouver,
VANCOUVER SUN, June 9, 1992, at D2.
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In the Earth's wheel of life, the oceans provide the balance. Covering
over 70 per cent of the planet's surface, they play a critical role in
maintaining its life-support systems, in moderating its climate, and in
sustaining animals and plants, including minute, oxygen-producing
phytoplankton. They provide protein, transportation, energy, employ-
ment, recreation, and other economic, social, and cultural activities. 90
B. Wildlife
In Earth in the Balance, a thought-provoking analysis of the planet's
environmental problems, Vice-President Al Gore commented that "we are
creating a world that is hostile to wildness, that seems to prefer concrete
to natural landscapes."1 9' In creating and spreading our cement jungle
civilizations, the human species has exhibited not merely its primacy in
the biological scheme of things, but its capacity ruthlessly to destroy the
natural habitat of countless thousands of species which share the Earth
with us. Although environmental action plans propel us to clean and clear
the air, atmosphere, water, and land which we have degraded, environ-
mental awareness counsels us to remember the damage we do every day
to these millions of large and small inhabitants of the planet whose very
survival is unfortunately in our all-too callous hands. The ultimate ethic
of environmental consciousness is to learn again to perceive ourselves not
as the masters of the Earth but as one of its life forms. Our survival now
depends on a merging of the actions, awareness, and consciousness im-
plicit in a commitment to environmental goals.
At the Stockholm Conference, delegates pointed us in the right
direction:
Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage
the heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely imper-
illed by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation in-
cluding wildlife must therefore receive importance in planning for
economic development. (Stockholm Declaration, Principle 4)
This significant principle had matured by the time the Earth Summit
met at Rio, into an international treaty-the Convention on Biological
Diversity' 9 2-which was signed and is currently being ratified by a num-
ber of nations. The concept of wildlife has also been enlarged to include
life forms in their original pristine natural habitat and considerable at-
tention is now being paid to the preservation of the homes of insects,
animals and plants, not merely for idealistic purposes, but because some
of the genetic material carried by these varied species could provide innu-
merable medical and scientific benefits for human use in the future. "We
do not know, to within the nearest 20 million, how many species there
190. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 262.
191. GORE, supra note 79, at 26.
192. See United Nations Document, "Convention on Biological Diversity," June 5,
1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818, 822 (1992).
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really are on earth," comments Paul Harrison.1 It is incumbent on the
human species to ensure the survival of at least the majority of the esti-
mated four to thirty million species.1"9 Yet, "[tihere is a growing scientific
consensus that species are disappearing at rates never before witnessed
on the planet."1 95 If we estimate the existence of about thirty million spe-
cies today, we may annually be destroying about seventeen thousand five
hundred of these life forms. '9
The destruction of species is caused by a combination of human need
and greed. The burgeoning human population is pushing into the natural
habitats of other species, altering the environment so drastically that no
other species can co-exist in the same space. In Kenya, the population is
"pressing so hard on parks that protected land [a mere six percent of this
territory] is steadily being lost to invading farmers."197 As Mrs. Rahab
Mwatha of the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya commented: "We are
awakening to the fact that if Africa is dying it is because her environment
has been plundered, overexploited, and neglected." 1 8 The rise in human
population has generated extraordinary demands for food and has almost
decimated the once abundant Atlantic fisheries off Newfoundland in the
East of Canada. In Latin American and parts of Asia, deforestation,
brought on by expanding population and the urge to develop, takes a
daily toll in species extinction. 99
It was realized at the Stockholm Conference that "protection of
habitat is the single most effective means of conserving diversity, ' '20 0
hence the mention of habitat in Principle 4 (above). Although nations can
take credit for preparing and signing an international Convention on Bi-
odiversity at the Earth Summit, it is significant to note that there was no
provision pertaining to this all-important issue in the Rio Declaration.
Given the ramifications and implications of the threat of species extinc-
tion which is occurring relentlessly every day, it might have been wise to
lay emphasis on this matter in the Rio Declaration in order to bring it to
public attention. The fact that there is now atreaty in existence and that
numerous governments have signed it hardly solves the problem of the
survival of species on this planet. The international convention is only an
initial step in a very long process. The inclusion of a provision on bi-
odiversity in the Rio Declaration could have served to popularize the con-
193. PAUL HARRISON, THE THIRD REVOLUTION, ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION AND A SUS-
TAINABLE WORLD 59 (1992).
194. Id. at 59.
195. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 148.
196. Caldicott, supra note 71, at 96 citing Edward 0. Wilson, Threats to Biodiversity,
Sc. AM., Sept. 1989, 108-16.
197. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 153.
198. Id. at 154 (quoting statement from Mrs. Rahab W. Mwatha, The Greenbelt Move-
ment, (WCED Public Hearing, Nairobi, Sept. 23, 1986)).
199. See John C. Ryan, Conserving Biological Diversity, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1992
(Linda Starke ed., 1992).
200. Id. at 24.
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cept of species conservation and made it more of a people's issue than it
is at the present time. The issue of biodiversity may be too specific for
the general principles incorporated into the Rio Declaration. The primacy
of the issue, however, and the fact that the declaration is a veritable
hodge-podge of articles, some of which are more precise than others,
would argue in favor of its inclusion.
While it could be suggested that the biodiversity treaty made the
principle redundant, it is also important to remember that the Declara-
tions at Stockholm and Rio are intended to serve as signposts for all the
people of the planet. It would have been worthwhile in such an instru-
ment to include an issue which is of crucial importance environmentally,
economically, -and in the long term for the survival of our human species
as well. The existence of a binding treaty in international law ought not
to preclude adherence to the general principle of species conservation in a
document such as the Rio Declaration. It is likely that in future years, far
more people will read the Rio Declaration than the treaty on Biodiversity.
If the point of the Declaration was to inform, encourage and enthuse at
the popular level, so important a feature of environmental concern ought
to have been included with no prejudice to the legally binding commit-
ments entered into by nations which signed the Biodiversity Convention.
XVI. PRINCIPLES UNIQUE TO THE Rio DECLARATION
A. Women
If international instruments can be considered a reflection of the
times in which they are formulated, then the Rio Declaration bowed to
the inevitable in recognizing the significance of women to society and to
the environmental movement. The twenty years since Stockholm have
witnessed the implementation in most areas of the developed world of the
women's revolution with its resulting shift in attitudes among both men
and women about their roles and importance in society. With this revolu-
tion has come a growing awareness of the injustice of the past treatment
of women and a consequent determination to rectify that situation. Un-
fortunately, the improvement in the condition of women has been mixed,
when the subject is viewed internationally. In developing countries, the
poorer, uneducated women still suffer a life-long burden caused simply by
their gender. Such burdens can range from female infanticide in China to
occasional widow burnings in India. Garrick Utley of NBC television re-
ported that recently in Somalia some women accused of adultery had
been stoned to death.01 Child marriage, lack of education, heavy domes-
tic toil and often grinding physical farm labor are the fate of thousands of
women around the world. It was therefore timely and fitting that dele-
gates at the Earth Summit endorsed the following principle for inclusion
in the Rio Declaration:
201. Garrick Utley (NBC Evening News, Jan. 9, 1993).
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Women have a vital role in environmental management and devel-
opment. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sus-
tainable development. (Rio Declaration, Principle 20)
There was widespread support for inclusion of a provision concerning
women. Margaret Shields, Director of the United Nations Research and
Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, reminded delegates at
UNCED that:
Women are not new to environmental concerns. They are the peo-
ple who must walk further to collect fuel if an area is deforested. They
are the people most affected by pollution of water supplies when they
or their families become ill as a result. In rural areas, women are often
placed at greatest risk from the use of dangerous products and not
only women but also their infant and newborn children. Most impor-
tant, women are the people who could make an essential contribution
to any debate about the fundamental realities of environmental degra-
dation. They are the ultimate consumers of environmental manage-
ment decisions. 0 2
The problems of women in developing nations were mentioned at Rio
and in the process leading up to the Earth Summit but were not specifi-
cally addressed in the Rio Declaration. In 1986, Mrs. King, representing
the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya, told the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development that:
women are responsible for between 60 to 90 percent of the food pro-
duction, processing, and marketing. No one can really address the
food crisis in Africa or many of the other crises that seem to exist here
without addressing the question of women, and really seeing that
women are participants in decision-making processes at the very basic
all the way through up to the highest level.20 3
The role of women as a vital labor force in Latin America, Asia, and Af-
rica 2 4 has long been recognized, but the rather vague formulation pro-
duced about women in the Rio Declaration failed to address this issue in
any specific manner.
Given the amount of publicity and media attention generated by the
Earth Summit, it would have been worthwhile to emphasize-if only for
popular consumption-certain key areas of environmental and social con-
cern with respect to women. This is probably why Princess Sonata
Chhoden Wangchuck, representing the King of Bhutan at UNCED, em-
202. Margaret Shields, Director, United Nations Research and Training Institute for
the Advancement of Women, Statement at United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (June 9, 1992).
203. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 124
(quoting Statement from Mrs. King, The Greenbelt Movement, (WCED Public Hearing,
Nairobi, Sept. 23, 1986)).
204. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 124-
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
phasized, "the recognition of the role of women, particularly rural women,
in sustainable development is crucial as women are motivated by their
primary concern to improve their families' quality of life." Pointing out
that "too few women are involved in decision-making processes of envi-
ronmental management and policy making," Princess Sonam Wangchuck
expressed her delegation's view that "women's role in leadership and
community-based participation must be vital components of sustainable
development strategies." 0 5 The delegation from Thailand was headed by
a Princess who is also a professor, Dr. Chulabhorn Mahidol. It was fitting
that in her statement to UNCED she stressed that women "must play an
equal partnership role in the integration of environment and
development. '"20 6
In March 1992, British Overseas Development Minister, Lynda
Chalker, called for a "change in attitudes towards women in developing
countries," and indicated that this would be "a high priority in the Brit-
ish aid programme."2 °7 Thorbjorn Berntsen, Norway's Minister of Envi-
ronment, proposed particular efforts to include women in decision
making. 08
Bella Abzug, Co-Chair Women's Environment and Development Or-
ganization, reported to the plenary at UNCED about the activities of
women's groups at preparatory meetings, action which resulted in the in-
clusion of a principle about the role of women in the Rio Declaration. Ms.
Abzug also emphasized the fact that UNCED's mandate directed Secre-
tary-General Maurice Strong to "ensure that women's critical economic,
social and environmental contributions to sustainable development be ad-
dressed . . .as a distinct cross-cutting issue in addition to being main-
streamed in all the substantive work and documentation.""" It is quite
apparent that the women's issue aroused international concern and
interest.
Not everyone, however, was satisfied with the resulting principle
which became part of the Rio Declaration. The Canadian Participatory
Committee of Non-Government Agencies, which advised on the declara-
tion was highly critical of the final document. With reference to the prin-
ciple on women (quoted above), the Committee commented that "as writ-
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ten, the principle is vacuous."21 0 This is probably justified criticism, but
in evaluating the progress from Stockholm to Rio, the existence of a ref-
erence to women's participation is illustrative of forward movement, how-
ever minimal the actual distance travelled.
B. Indigenous People
In a world of incredibly fast change and rapid destruction of the old
in favor of the new, we have in the twenty years since Stockholm begun
to realize both the value and the vulnerability of those groups whose pref-
erence is an alternate lifestyle more in tune with nature than the frenzied
pace that industrialized civilization normally allows. The indigenous peo-
ple of the world have suffered a cruel and undeserved fate at the relent-
less hands of majority cultures which have either victimized them by de-
liberate genocide or by economic deprivation. Indigenous people are
found in North America, in Australia, in the Amazon Basin, in Cen-
tral America, in the forests and hills of Asia, in the deserts of North
Africa, and elsewhere .... The isolation of many such people has
meant the preservation of a traditional way of life in close harmony
with the natural environment. Their very survival has depended on
their ecological awareness and adaptation. But their isolation has also
meant that few of them have shared in national economic and social
development; this may be reflected in their poor health, nutrition, and
education.2 11
There is now a greater awareness of and sensitivity towards the needs
of such cultures. It is now mainstream thinking in North America not to
view them as obstacles to development, but to perceive them as impor-
tant contributors to civilizational harmony. Indigenous people form part
of the rich tapestry of human culture and in protecting their right to life
and their cultural heritage, the world is finally recognizing its debt to its
own past. At Rio, delegates endorsed the following principle:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local com-
munities have a vital role in environmental management and devel-
opment because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States
should recognise and duly support their identity, culture and inter-
ests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of
sustainable development. (Rio Declaration, Principle 22)
The United Nations has also proclaimed 1993 as the International
Year for the World's Indigenous People.2"' However, despite the interna-
tional action involved in formulating the universal declaration on indige-
nous rights,2"3 tribal people continue to be slaughtered in countries like
210. York & Rusk, supra note 16.
211. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 114.
212. International Year of the World's Indigenous People, U.N. GAOR, 45 Sess.,
Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/164 (1991).
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Guatemala. Rigoberta Menchu, winner of the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize for
her work on behalf of indigenous people in Guatemala, has revealed to
the world the tragedy of her people: one hundred thousand have died in
the past three decades and over forty thousand have vanished.2" Indige-
nous people in a number of nations from Canada to India are agitating
for recognition of their status, for an end to their marginalized existence
at the outer perimeters of society. Realistically, indigenous leaders like
Menchu admit: "I don't think we can have an indigenous nation, alone in
the world, at the end of the 20th century." ' However, it is now widely
recognized that extinction is not their inevitable fate nor is it their only
alternative. In recognizing the worth of groups which live harmoniously
with nature, we are only belatedly admitting that "[t]he Aboriginal view-
point corresponds closely with the ecological perspective.216 As Richard
Falk comments: "In a fundamental sense, indigenous peoples preserve
and embody alternate life-styles that may provide models, inspiration,
guidance in the essential work of world order redesign, an undertaking
now primarily associated with overcoming self-destructive tendencies in
the behaviour of modern societies. '21 7
It is significant that the principle in the Rio Declaration is rather
general and vague with respect to the role of indigenous peoples. States
are not mandated to support nor to recognize them. The more mild word
"should" is used. There is no mention of the inherent rights of indigenous
people, nor is there any recognition of their right to political identity
within the nation state. The committment (if it can be called that) is so
ambiguous, that it is uncertain how states should support their identity,
culture and interests. However, despite its obvious weakness, the provi-
sion carries the world a step forward from Stockholm in according inter-
national recognition to the world's indigenous people. "Perhaps ironically,
the growth of modern communications and transportation has interna-
tionalized the struggle of indigenous peoples in the last decade or so. '
Perhaps, there is now a growing consciousness that we must look to our
indigenous roots to find alternate ways of living and create lifestyles
which are sustainable and healthy for our planet. Time is running out for
humanity. The indigenous people by their suffering serve to remind us
about the fate of fragile life forms and by their resilience give us hope
that all may not yet be lost. This point was dramatically made at UN-
CED by Ji Chaozhu, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations De-
partment of Economic and Social Development, who quoted from Native
American Chief Seattle's statement of 1855: "Whatever happens to the
214. Graham Fraser, Nobel Peace Prize Opens Doors for Menchu, GLOBE AND MAIL,
Nov. 13, 1992, at A7.
215. Id. at A7.
216. Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES 23 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 19.
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earth, happens to the people of the earth. Man did not weave the web of
life: he is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to
himself."""0
XVII. CONCLUSION
After the intensive, often feisty negotiating sessions which resulted in
the Rio Declaration, most delegates attempted to put a positive face on
the result of their wrangling. Hans Alders, Minister of Environment of
the Netherlands, commented:
We see the Declaration as a sound basis for the much needed develop-
ment of international law, and therefore endorse it as it stands. The
Declaration not only reaffirms the Declaration of Stockholm, but it
takes matters further, as indeed it should. New important elements in
this Declaration are the principle of responsibility for future genera-
tions, the precautionary principle, the principle of informed participa-
tion in decision-making, the recognition of the rights of indigenous
peoples and the importance of youth and the role of women in manag-
ing the environment. It is our task to ensure that these principles will
be embodied in all future national and international legal and policy
instruments.2 20
Not all delegates were willing to perceive progress from the brutal
negotiating sessions which had preceded the final production of the decla-
ration. Giorgio Ruffolo, Italy's Minister for Environment, admitted that
he was not happy with some of the formulations in the Declaration.22 '
At the end, the environment/development conflict was evident in the
way delegates perceived the final product of their deliberations. The
South had fought hard to achieve a development-oriented declaration.
The North, more fragmented and less unified than the developing na-
tions, found its concept of an Earth Charter converted into a statement
emphasizing the primacy of development in a number of provisions. This
was precisely what the South wanted. As Dr. Emil Salim, Indonesia's
State Minister for Population and the Environment, stated,
[b]ecause the objectives of our Conference include both the environ-
ment and development, both aspects must be reflected in the Rio Dec-
laration. Therefore, while affirming the responsibility to undertake
global environmental action, the Declaration must also affirm the
right of nations to pursue development. Only in this way will we be
able to counter the destructive potential of environmental degradation
219. Ji Chaozhu, United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Department of Economic
and Social Development, Statement at United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
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and the equally terrible potential of global social and political
upheavals.2 22
The Rio Declaration did not satisfy all Southern nations. The Prime Min-
ister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, believed that it had been
"watered down upon insistence from the powerful and the rich. '223
For the North, there was much dissatisfaction with the Rio Declara-
tion. In framing their initial concept for an Earth Charter, the Canadians
sought inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "But
with the watered-down Rio declaration, 'the visionaries came up against
the lawyers and bureaucrats, and the lawyers and bureaucrats wori.' ",224
The problem, as the Canadians saw it, was that developing nations "cam-
paigned for a declaration that would have endorsed their right to develop
with little environmental constraint, while blaming the rich for the
world's environmental problems. ' 22 The Canadian Participatory Com-
mittee of Non-Government Agencies commented that "some of the prin-
ciples are so gaseous as to dissolve upon examination. '122 The Austrian
delegate was more optimistic. Ruth Feldgrill-Zankel, Austria's Minister of
Environment, agreed that "it may appear deplorable that the Rio Decla-
ration did not turn out to be an inspired and inspiring document compa-
rable to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." However, she felt
"confident that we will all live to see the elaboration of a true Earth
Charter. In the meantime, we consider the Rio Declaration as an impor-
tant cornerstone and will give the serious consideration to it in our own
decision making process. '227 Speaking on behalf of the European Commu-
nity, Portugal's Minister of Environment, Carlos Borrego, acknowledged
the fact that the Declaration contains "many important principles recog-
nized for the first time at the global level," and stated that it reflected "in
a balanced way the various interests and concerns both of developing and
developed countries."22 'The fact that the Declaration drew fire from
both North and South is indicative of the fact that it probably passed the
test of a document reflecting true consensus. No one was totally happy
with it but equally it was more or less acceptable to all nations. The dele-
gate from Sri Lanka, Environment Minister Vincent Perera, suggested
that developed nations ought to view the developing countries with "em-
222. Dr. Emil Salim, State Minister for Population and the Environment of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Developement (June 5, 1992).
223. Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 13, 1992).
224. York & Rusk, supra note 16.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Ruth Feldgrill-Zankel, Minister of Environment of Austria, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 5, 1992).
228. Carlos Borrego, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources for Portugal,
Statement at United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 3,
1992).
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pathy and understanding. Perhaps if they had done so during the prepar-
atory process the lead up to UNCED would have been smoother and less
tortuous."' 2 9 Conceding that the Declaration had not lived up to expecta-
tions, the delegate from Nauru, Kinza Clodumar, saw the significance of
"nations . . . for the first time sitting down together to consider collec-
tively problems of environment and development at the global level." 30
Although it appears at first glance to be a document geared to the
Southern agenda, in a very real sense, most Northern nations achieved
their major objectives in the Rio Declaration. The British hoped to en-
shrine as fundamental principles, the precautionary approach, the pol-
luter pays principle, and the idea of public access to information.2 3 1 This
was largely achieved, albeit not in the stirring fluent language initially
envisioned by the developed countries. The government of Sweden
stressed the importance of the polluter pays principle, the precautionary
approach and the responsibility of nations to ensure that internal activi-
ties do not endanger the environment of other countries. 232 Norway fa-
vored the polluter pays principle and an open and fair international trad-
ing system, and insisted that "environmental concerns must not be used
as a pretext to introduce discriminatory trade practices. '23
It was left to the Japanese to place the Rio Declaration in proper
perspective by calling it a "significant first step in our efforts towards
sustainable development. ' 23 " Dr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany,
suggested that it was part of a solid foundation for further measures .1
With an eye on the future, Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco
Silva proposed that "[t]he Rio Declaration will have to serve as a basis
for the establishment of new relations between all parties concerned,
whether public or private, which will, in a responsible manner, have to
provide answers appropriate to the challenge facing us. '36 Nations were
obviously already gearing to the post-Rio process even as the endless
parade of dignitaries marched past the eyes of delegates and cameras
from around the world. "The principles inscribed in the Rio Declaration
will serve as benchmarks for future progress," stated Denmark's Minister
229. Vincent Perera, Minister of Environment, Sri Lanka, Statement at United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (June, 1992).
230. Kinza Clodumar, Minister of Finance for Republic of Nauru, Statement at United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (June 9, 1992).
231. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (London) Issue 25/92 (June 29, 1992).
232. Sweden: National Report to UNCED, 1992, Ministry of the Environment, Swe-
den, 1991, 12.
233. Thorbjorn Berntsen, Minister of Environment of Norway, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 4, 1992).
234. Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan, Address at United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development (June 13, 1992).
235. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Statement at
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 12, 1992).
236. Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal, Statement at United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (June 12, 1992).
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for the Environment.28 7 Jordan's King Hussein urged nations to exert
"greater efforts to perfect" the imperfect Summit agreements. 3s Singa-
pore's Minister for the Environment, Dr. Ahmad Mattar, declared confi-
dently that "the adoption of the Rio Declaration will bring about a new
world ethic towards our living environment." ' 9
Canada has taken the initiative in resuscitating the initial vision of
an Earth Charter, a vision which had faded when the competing interests
of North and South resulted in the somewhat disjointed body of principle
which we have been examining. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulro-
ney suggested that "the idea of an Earth Charter of environmental rights
and responsibilities, which has slipped beyond our grasp at Rio, should be
revived. 2 40 Mulroney proposed that an Earth Charter be completed by
1995, in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. 4 1 The
Canadian initiative would utilize the existing Rio Declaration as a basis
for a "visionary 'Earth Charter' that would integrate these principles.
2 42
Speaking in Hull, Quebec during Environment Week 1992, the Canadian
Prime Minister declared: "Just as the Helsinki Accords set a point of ref-
erence for human rights and responsibilities, so an Earth Charter would
set benchmarks for environmental rights and responsibilities." 4 " It will
be interesting to see whether this Canadian initiative is implemented or
whether it will fall victim as did the Stockholm and Rio Declarations to
the national and financial priorities of Member States of the United
Nations.
It is imperative that the process of formulating principles of interna-
tional environmental law continue in years to come. There is an obvious
need for environmental law to become part of the everyday consciousness
of men, women and children around the world. Environmental regenera-
tion cannot be accomplished without extensive public enthusiasm and
participation. It is simply not a matter which can be left to governments.
If anything, Stockholm and Rio both demonstrated that governments are
often far behind their populations in terms of heightened awareness of
the significance of this issue. By coming to Stockholm and Rio with the
old baggage of national sovereignty and developing versus developed
country conflicts, the bureaucrats and politicians ultimately betrayed the
237. Per Stig Moller, Minister of Environment of Denmark, Statement at United Na-
tions Conference on the Environment and Development (June 9, 1992).
238. His Majesty King Hussein I of Jordan, Statement at United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development (June 5, 1992).
239. Dr. Ahmad Mattar, Minister for the Environment, Singapore, Statement at United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (June 11, 1992).
240. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, Statement at United Nations Confer-
ence on the Environment and Development (June 12, 1992).
241. Id.
242. Canada and the Earth Summit: Achievements, United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992.
243. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, Address at the Canadian Museum of
Civilization, Hull, Quebec (June 1, 1992).
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idealistic vision which ought to have been incorporated in both instru-
ments of principle. Time alone will tell whether the people will be able to
recapture the vision from the politicians and create an Earth Charter
which will impel and enthuse all five and half billion of us to work to save
this planet.
APPENDIX I
Rio DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
PREAMBLE
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
HAVING MET at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992,
REAFFIRMING the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm of 16 June 1972, and
seeking to build upon it,
WITH THE GOAL of establishing a new and equitable global partner-
ship through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key
sectors of societies and people,
WORKING TOWARDS international agreements which respect the inter-
ests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental and de-
velopmental system,
RECOGNISING the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth,
our home,
PROCLAIMS that:
PRINCIPLE 1
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable develop-
ment. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with
nature.
PRINCIPLE 2
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
PRINCIPLE 3
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.
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PRINCIPLE 4
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protec-
tion shall constitute an integral part of the development process and can-
not be considered in isolation from it.
PRINCIPLE 5
All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of erad-
icating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable develop-
ment, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better
meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.
PRINCIPLE 6
The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly
the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be
given special priority. International actions in the field of environment
and development should also address the interests and needs of all
countries.
PRINCIPLE 7
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In
view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation,
states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the interna-
tional pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and fi-
nancial resources they command.
PRINCIPLE 8
To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for
all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic
policies.
PRINCIPLE 9
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building
for sustainable development by improving scientific understanding
through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by en-
hancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technolo-
gies, including new and innovative technologies.
PRINCIPLE 10
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each indi-
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vidual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the envi-
ronment that is held by public authorities, including information on haz-
ardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity
to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and en-
courage public awareness and participation by making information widely
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, in-
cluding redress and remedy, shall be provided.
PRINCIPLE 11
States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental
standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the envi-
ronmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards ap-
plied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted eco-
nomic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing
countries.
PRINCIPLE 12
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open interna-
tional economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustaina-
ble development in all countries, to better address the problems of envi-
ronmental degradation.
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environ-
mental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country
should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an
international consensus.
PRINCIPLE 13
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensa-
tion for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States
shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to
develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their
jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
PRINCIPLE 14
States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relo-
cation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that
cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to
human health.
PRINCIPLE 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
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shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainly shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation.
PRINCIPLE 16
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.
PRINCIPLE 17
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a
competent national authority.
PRINCIPLE 18
States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters
or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on
the environment of those States. Every effort shall be made by the inter-
national community to help States so afflicted.
PRINCIPLE 19
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant infor-
mation to potentially affected States on activities that may have a signifi-
cant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with
those States at an early stage and in good faith.
PRINCIPLE 20
Women have a vital role in environmental management and develop-
ment. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable
development.
PRINCIPLE 21
The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should
be mobilised to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable
development and ensure a better future for all.
PRINCIPLE 22
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communi-
ties have a vital role in environmental management and development be-
cause of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should
recognise and duly support their identity, culture and interests and en-
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able their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development.
PRINCIPLE 23
The environment and natural resources of people under oppression,
domination and occupation shall be protected.
PRINCIPLE 24
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States
shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the envi-
ronment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further develop-
ment, as necessary.
PRINCIPLE 25
Peace, development and environmental protection are interdepen-
dent and indivisible.
PRINCIPLE 26
States shall resolve all their environmental dispute peacefully and by
appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
PRINCIPLE 27
States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of
partnership in the fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declara-
tion and in the further development of international law in the field of
sustainable development.
APPENDIX II
DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972,
Having considered the need for a common outlook and for common
principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the human environment,
Proclaims that:
1. Man is both creature and moulder of his environment, which gives
him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual,
moral, social and spiritual growth. In the long and tortuous evolution of
the human race on this planet a stage has been reached when, through
the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the
power to transform his environment in countless, ways and on an unprece-
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dented scale. Both aspects of man's environment, the natural and the
man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic
human rights - even the right to life itself.
2. The protection and improvement of the human environment is a
major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic develop-
ment throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the
whole world and the duty of all Governments.
3. Man has constantly to sum up experience and go on discovering,
inventing, creating and advancing. In our time, man's capability to trans-
form his surroundings, if used wisely, can bring to all peoples the benefits
of development and the opportunity to enhance the quality of life.
Wrongly or heedlessly applied, the same power can do incalculable harm
to human beings and the human environment. We see around us growing
evidence of man-made harm in many regions of the earth: dangerous
levels of pollution in water, air, earth and living beings; major and unde-
sirable disturbances to the ecological balance of the biosphere; destruc-
tion and depletion of irreplaceable resources; and gross deficiencies harm-
ful to the physical, mental and social health of man, in the man-made
environment, particularly in the living and working environment.
4. In the developing countries most of the environmental problems
are caused by under-development. Millions continue to live far below the
minimum levels required for a decent human existence, deprived of ade-
quate food and clothing, shelter and education, health and sanitation.
Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to develop-
ment, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and im-
prove the environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized coun-
tries should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves and the
developing countries In the industrialized countries, environmental
problems are generally related to industrialization and technological
development.
5. The natural growth of population continuously presents problems
on the preservation of the environment, and adequate policies and mea-
sures should be adopted, as appropriate, to face these problems. Of all
things in the world, people are the most precious. It is the people that
propel social progress, create social wealth, develop science and technol-
ogy and, through their hard work, continuously transform the human en-
vironment. Along with social progress and the advance of production, sci-
ence and technology, the capability of man to improve the environment
increases with each passing day.
6. A point has been reached in history when we must shape our ac-
tions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environ-
mental consequences. Through ignorance or indifference we can do mas-
sive and irreversible harm to the earthly environment on which our life
and well-being depend. Conversely, through fuller knowledge and wiser
action, we can achieve for ourselves and our posterity a better life in an
environment more in keeping with human needs and hopes. There are
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broad vistas for the enhancement of environmental quality and the crea-
tion of a good life. What is needed is an enthusiastic but calm state of
mind and intense but orderly work. For the purpose of attaining freedom
in the world of nature, man must use knowledge to build, in collaboration
with nature, a better environment. To defend and improve the human
environment for present and future generations has become an impera-
tive goal for mankind - a goal to be pursued together with, and in har-
mony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of world-
wide economic and social development.
7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of
responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institu-
tions at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. Individuals
in all walks of life as well as organizations in many fields, by their values
and the sum of their actions, will shape the world environment of the
future. Local and national governments will bear the greatest burden for
large-scale environmental policy and action within their jurisdictions. In-
ternational co-operation is also needed in order to raise resources to sup-
port the developing countries in carrying out their responsibilities in this
field. A growing class of environmental problems, because they are re-
gional or global in extent or because they affect the common international
realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations and action by
international organizations in the common interest. The Conference calls
upon Governments and peoples to exert common efforts for the preserva-
tion and improvement of the human environment, for the benefit of all
the people and for their posterity.
II
PRINCIPLES
States the common conviction that:
Principle 1
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this
respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation,
discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domi-
nation stand condemned and must be eliminated.
Principle 2
The natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land, flora
and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems
must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations
through careful planning or management, as appropriate.
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Principle 3
The capacity of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must
be maintained and, wherever practicable, restored or improved.
Principle 4
Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the
heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely imperilled by a
combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation including wildlife
must therefore receive importance in planning for economic development.
Principle 5
The non-renewable resources of the earth must be employed in such
a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion and to
ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all mankind.
Principle 6
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the re-
lease of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capac-
ity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order
to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosys-
tems. The just struggle of the peoples of all countries against pollution
should be supported.
Principle 7
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by
substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea.
Principle 8
Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favour-
able living and working environment for man and for creating conditions
* on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life.
Principle 9
Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of un-
derdevelopment and natural disasters pose grave problems and can best
be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substan-
tial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement to
the domestic effort of the developing countries and such timely assistance
as may be required.
Principle 10
For the developing countries, stability of prices and adequate earn-
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ings for primary commodities and raw material are essential to environ-
mental management since economic factors as well as ecological processes
must be taken into account.
Principle 11
The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not ad-
versely affect the present or future development potential of developing
countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better living condi-
tions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by States and inter-
national organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meeting the
possible national and international economic consequences resulting from
the application of environmental measures.
Principle 12
Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the en-
vironment, taking into account the circumstances and particular require-
ments of developing countries and any costs which may emanate from
their incorporating environmental safeguards into their development
planning and the need for making available to them, upon their request,
additional international technical and financial assistance for this
purpose.
Principle 13
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and
thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and
co-ordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that
development is compatible with the need to protect and improve the
human environment for the benefit of their population.
Principle 14
Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any
conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect the
environment.
Principle 15
Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbanization
with a view to avoiding adverse effects on the environment and obtaining
maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for all. In this re-
spect projects which are designed for colonialist and racist domination
must be abandoned.
Principle 16
Demographic policies, which are without prejudice to basic human
rights and which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned,
should be applied in those regions where the rate of population growth or
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excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse effects on
the environment or development, or where low population density may
prevent improvement of the human environment and impede
development.
Principle 17
Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of
planning, managing or controlling the environmental resources of States
with the view to enhancing environmental quality.
Principle 18
Science and technology, as part of their contribution to economic and
social development, must be applied to the identification, avoidance and
control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental
problems and for the common good of mankind.
Principle 19
Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as
well as adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is essential
in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible
conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and
improving the environment in its full human dimension. It is also essen-
tial that mass media communications avoid contributing to the deteriora-
tion of the environment, but, on the contrary, disseminate information of
an educational nature, on the need to protect and improve the environ-
ment in order to enable man to develop in every respect.
Principle 20
Scientific research and development in the context of environmental
problems, both national and multinational, must be promoted in all coun-
tries, especially, the developing countries. In this connexion, the free flow
of up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience must be
supported and assisted, to facilitate the solution of environmental
problems; environmental technologies should be made available to devel-
oping countries on terms which would encourage their wide dissemination
without constituting an economic burden on the developing countries.
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the re-
sponsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.
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Principle 22
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law re-
garding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or con-
trol of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
Principle 23
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the in-
ternational community, or to standards which will have to be determined
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of val-
ues prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of stan-
dards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
Principle 24
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of
the environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all coun-
tries, big or small, on an equal footing. Co-operation through multilateral
or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effec-
tively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental ef-
fects resulting from activities conducted in all sphere, in such a way that
due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all states.
Principle 25
States shall ensure that international organizations play a co-ordi-
nated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection and improvement of
the environment.
Principle 26
Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear
weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to
reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the
elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.
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The Movement of Persons: The Practice of
States in Central and Eastern Europe Since
the 1989 Vienna CSCE
DANIEL C. TURACK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The February 7, 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union stipu-
lates that it will enter into force on January 1, 1993 if all twelve member-
states ratify the Treaty by the end of 1992. In June 1992, Denmark re-
jected the Treaty in a popular vote, while French voters approved it in
September 1992. The Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal are in
the process of ratification by their respective parliaments. Discussions are
still underway in the political structures of the remaining seven members.
The Maastricht Treaty envisages a common immigration policy that will
create important changes involving freedom of movement, a topic beyond
the range of this article. However, all of the present European Economic
Community members are also members of the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and a common immigration policy
for the twelve members of the projected European Union will affect the
free movement of the citizenry of the other CSCE European members.
This article examines the CSCE commitments and especially the
state practices of the Eastern European members and the Soviet Union
before its disintegration.
II. THE CSCE PROCESS
Pursuant to the process established under the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act,' the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
ended its Vienna follow-up meeting on January 19, 1989 with the adop-
tion of a Concluding Document.' Both the Vienna Concluding Document
and the earlier Madrid Concluding Document,3 adopted at the Madrid
* Capital University Law School
1. All 33 of the European states, excluding Albania, plus Canada and the United States
signed The Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1293 (1975). See
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(Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977).
2. The Vienna Concluding Document, reprinted in 10 HUM. RTS. L.J. 270 (1989). On
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Document of the Vienna Follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and co-opera-
tion in Europe of January 15, 1989, 10 HUM. RTS. L.J. 259 (1989).
3. The Madrid Concluding Document, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1398 (1983).
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follow-up meeting4 in 1983, contain language that has strengthened and
added to the human rights commitments stated in the Helsinki Final Act,
especially with respect to human contacts. In the so-called "Basket III,"
entitled Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, the Participating
States undertake to implement and respect the principle "that everyone
shall be free to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country" in fulfillment of the Helsinki Final Act, and the Madrid and
Vienna Concluding Documents. Today, the CSCE is a key vehicle at the
forefront of shaping post-Cold War Europe.
The Vienna Concluding Document contains thirty-three paragraphs5
concerning human contacts and freedom of movement. There is a positive
commitment to find solutions to existing backlogs of human contacts
cases within six months and specific time-frames for processing applica-
tions pertaining to travel abroad, family meetings, family reunification,
and binational marriage. Exceptions to freedom of movement, such as na-
tional security, are to be treated as "exceptions" in practice, and not as
the rule. All State laws and regulations concerning movement by persons
within and between States are to be published and accessible. Secrecy
issues concerning national security are not to be applied arbitrarily and
are to be applied within strictly warranted time limits. Finally, individu-
als denied their travel rights may receive information concerning any ad-
ministrative decisions and notice of judicial remedies against such
decisions.
Political events during 1989 and 1990 brought a dramatic transfor-
mation in Eastern Europe with the collapse of Soviet Communism and a
redrawing of the map of Europe. Geopolitical changes occurred in the au-
tumn of 1989 and in 1990 that saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the death
knell of the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic, the
disappearance of that State on October 3, 1990, and the "velvet revolu-
tion" in Czechoslovakia. The CSCE process continued with the Copenha-
gen Meeting on the Human Dimension during June 5-29, 1990. For the
first time, Albania attended as an observer' when the thirty-five CSCE
Participating States met.
In the preamble of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting,7 the
4. On the Madrid Follow-Up Conference, see generally, Essays on Human Rights in
the Helsinki Process (A. Bloed & P. Van Dijk, eds.,1985); J. Sizoo & R. TH. JURRJENS,
CSCE DECISION-MAKING: THE MADRID EXPERIENCE (1984).
5. The Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 2, at 282-286.
6. Observer status was requested by Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania but only
Albania was accorded observer status. See Erika Schlager, The Procedural Framework of
the CSCE: From the Helsinki Consultations to the Paris Charter, 1972-1990, 12 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 221, 226-228 (1991).
7. The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimen-
sion of the CSCE, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990); 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 232 (1990); 8
NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 302 (1990). For a discussion on this meeting see Thomas Bu-
ergenthal, The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order For Europe, 11 HUM. RTs.
L.J. 217(1990); Bloed, Successful Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
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"participating states welcome with great satisfaction the fundamental po-
litical changes that have occurred in Europe. . . ." They recognize that
pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring re-
spect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms. " The Partici-
pating States reaffirmed that "they will respect the right of everyone to
leave any .country, including his own, and to return to his country. . .."
So dramatic were the political events in Europe during 1989 and 1990 and
the democratization of Eastern Europe that the heads of the Participat-
ing States decided to convene a second summit' of the CSCE process in
Paris during November 19-21, 1990. It was not a meeting at the highest
level envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act or in the previous CSCE deci-
sion. The fruit of the Paris Summit was the signing of the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe. 0
The preamble of the Charter acknowledges that the assemblage was
"at a time of profound change and historic expectations." It recognizes
that "the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new area of de-
mocracy, peace, and unity in Europe. Ours is a time for fulfilling the
hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast
commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental
freedoms ... "I
Under the sub-heading of "Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of
Law," the signatories "affirm without discrimination, every individual has
the right to . .. freedom of movement ... ."" In the section entitled
"Guidelines for the Future," under the sub-heading "Human Dimen-
sions," the Charter reiterates that "[i]n accordance with our CSCE com-
mitments, we stress that freedom of movement and contacts among our
citizens . . . are crucial for the maintenance and development of free soci-
eties and flourishing cultures. We welcome increased tourism and visits
among our countries."'
Both under the section of the Charter creating "New Structures and
institutions of the CSCE Process" and in the Supplementary Document
CSCE, 8 NETHERLANDS Q. Hum. RTS. 235 (1990).
8. See generally HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT To LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE (1987).
9. The Heads of State or Governments of the 35 Participating States attended and
signed the Final Act at Helsinki in 1975. The unification of the two German States was
based on the Treaty on the Unification of Germany, August 31, 1990, which entered into
force on October 3, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 457(1991); the Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany signed on Sept. 12, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990)
and entered into force on March 4, 1991, with the ratification by the last signatory, the
Soviet Union.
10. The Charter For a New Europe And Supplementary Document, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 193 (1991). For a comment on the Charter, see Stephen Roth, The CSCE "Charter of
Paris For A New Europe": A New Chapter In the Helsinki Process, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 373
(1990).
11. 30 I.L.M. 193 (1991).
12. Id. at 193-194.
13. Id. at 199-200.
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to the Charter, the signatories undertook to have follow-up meetings
every two years, as a rule, to take stock of developments, to review imple-
mentation of the commitments, and to consider further steps in the
CSCE process.'
The Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE took place between September 10 and October 4, 1991, with all
thirty-eight States participating. Two innovations appear in the Conclud-
ing Document. One is the statement that "[tihe States taking part em-
phasize that questions of human rights, basic freedoms, democracy and
the rule of law are a matter of international concern." Innovative in this
statement is that "'democracy" and "rule of law" are mentioned in juxta-
position to "human rights" and "basic freedoms." The second innovative
statement is the observation that "the obligations adopted in matters
concerning the human dimension in the CSCE are not exclusively an in-
ternal affair of the State concerned."' 15 Hence, a CSCE State that in-
fringes upon human rights can expect other CSCE States to get involved
in what formerly had been claimed as a matter of internal affairs.
III. STATE PRACTICE
Only the highlights of state practice involving international travel
will be addressed here. The German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) ceased
to exist as an independent State on October 3, 1990 through unification 6
with the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result, no attempt will be
made in this article to recount the historic events that impacted freedom
of movement in the G.D.R.'7
14. Id. at 207. The next Follow-up CSCE Conference was to open in Helsinki on March
24, 1992.
15. GERMAN TRIBUNE, Oct. 20, 1991, at 1.
16. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990,
signed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, France, the
Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186
(1990).
For the legal and historical processes involved in German Reunification, see Albrecht
Randelzhofer, German Unification: Constitutional And International Implications, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 122 (1991); Ryszaro W. Piotrowicz, The Arithmetic of German Unifica-
tion: Three Into One Does Go, 40 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 635 (1991); Gregory V.S. McCurdy,
German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of Germany's Rapid Progress Towards
Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253 (1990); Frans G. Von Der Dunk & Peter H.
Kooijmans, The Unification of Germany and International Law, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 510
(1991); Jochen Frowein, The Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 152
(1992); Wilms, The Legal Status of Berlin after the Fall of the Wall and German Reunifi-
cation, 51 Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 470 (1991);
Jochen Frowein, German Revisited, id., at 333; Hailbronner, Legal Aspects of the Unifica-
tion of the Two German States, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 18 (1991); Kearley, German Division and
Reunification, 1944-1990: An Overview via the Documents, 84 L. LIBR. J. 1 (1992).
17. On September 10, 1989, the Government of Hungary, defying its 1967 agreement to
prevent G.D.R. citizens from traveling to the West without authorization, allowed East
Germans to head West. William Doerner, Freedom Train; As Thousands of its Citizens
Flee to West, East Germany Celebrates a Bitter 40th Birthday, TIME, Oct. 16, 1989, at 38.
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The democratization process in the formerly communist Eastern Eu-
ropean States and the former Soviet Union has caused the nationals of
these States to seek asylum' s in other States. This has, in turn, spawned
new problems for the potential countries of asylum. These countries have
created legal barriers to prevent "economic refugees" from entering their
territories. Issues pertaining to asylum will not be addressed in this
article.
A. Albania
Albania was the most restrictive European communist country. The
ordinary Albanian citizen was prevented from travel outside the country
from the time it became a Communist State in 1944. It finally began to
extricate itself from long isolation on May 8, 1990 when it announced a
series of new laws as part of a liberalization plan, including a law stating
that any Albanian has the right to a passport for foreign travel.' 9
In early July 1990, thousands of Albanians sought asylum in nine em-
bassies in Tirana, Albania's capital.2 0 Within a week the United Nations
worked out an agreement for the evacuation of more than 6,000 asylees to
leave the country.2 By early November, more than 25,000 Albanians had
left the country legally, essentially for foreign travel but realistically with-
The mass exodus gathered momentum and led to the East German Government decision to
open the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9th, but this dramatic gesture was too late to stem the desire
of all Germans in both countries to unite. On the exercise of the right to travel by G.D.R.
-citizens, see T. Magstadt, Ethics and Emigration: The East German Exodus, 1989 (Car-
negie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1990); John A. Zohlman IV, The German
Question of Reunification: An Historical and Legal Analysis of the Division of Germany
and the 1989 Reform Movement in the German Democratic Republic, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L.
291, 307-311 (1990).
18. See As Ethnic Albanians Join the Exodus Greeks are Appealing for Help, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991, at A6; Celestine Bohlen, Europeans Confer on Emigration Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, Sec. 1, at 9; Paul Lewis, As Soviet Borders Open, the West
Braces for an Economic Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991, at D4; Kate Holder & Rebecca
Brown, Refugees From East Unsettle West, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1991, at
18; New, Stricter Asylum Ordinance takes effect July 1, The Week in Germany, July 5,
1991, at 6; Alan Riding, France Unveils Strict New Rules on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1991, at A5; British Information Service, "Political Asylum," 21 SURV. oF 'CURRENT AFF.
247 (July 1991).
19. See David Binder, Albania Dropping Curbs On Worship And Ban On Travel, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al.
20. N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at A7 and July 5, 1990, at A10. The European Community
called on the Albanian Government to allow those seeking asylum safe passage out of the
country; N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1990, at A48; N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1990, at Al. The number of
Albanians crowded into the embassies was now estimated at 3,000-5,000, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8,
1990, at AS. The first group of Albanians allowed to leave the country were flown to Czecho-
slovakia, see N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1990, at Al; Burton Bollag, 51 Albanian Refugees Recall
Repression and Hope of Asylum, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1990, at A12.
21. See Paul Lewis, U.N. Said to Be Near Deal For Exit of 6,000 Albanians, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1990, at A8; Clyde Haberman, To Albanians, 'Ciao Italia!' Means Haven,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, at Al.
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out any intention of returning.22 Before the year's end, hundreds of ethnic
Greek-Albanians illegally crossed into Greece seeking political refuge.23
The first two days of the new year only saw an increase in the number of
Albanians pouring into Greece along the 100-mile common border.2" As a
result, the Greek Prime Minister had to declare a state of emergency in
the border area."
Meanwhile, Yugoslavia, which had given asylum to more than 1,000
Albanians in 1990, decided to discontinue its policy and forcibly handed
over asylum seekers to Albanian authorities to face imprisonment for ille-
gally leaving their country.2 6 With Yugoslavia and Greece being less than
receptive to potential Albanian illegal emigres, attempts were made to
leave illegally to Italy in February 1991.
27
A new wave of mass flight to Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia began on
March 4, 1991. By the week's end, an estimated 20,000 Albanians had
reached Italy.28 In an attempt to stem the tide of illegal emigration, the
President of Albania imposed martial law in the country's ports29 and in-
troduced democratic political changes. Subsequently, Italy pledged about
22. See David Binder, In Albania, Communist Stronghold, The Grip Appears to Be
Loosening, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A8.
23. See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at 4.
24. See Thousands of Albanians Flee to Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1991, at A3.
25. See Paul Anastasi, Athens Is Alarmed Over Refugees From Albania, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1991, at A3; Paul Anastasi, Albanians Still Stream Into Greece Though Athens Asks
Them to Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,1991, at A3; Paul Anastasi, Albanians in Greece Vow No
Return, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at A3. The Greek Prime Minister attempted to secure an
amnesty from the Albanian Government to the refugees who would return to ease the prob-
lem but Albania initially refused, see Paul Anastasi, Greek-Albanian Talks Stall Over Eth-
nic-Minority Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A5. The next day an agreement was an-
nounced for the amnesty as well as an Albanian commitment to allow its ethnic Greeks to
visit Greece. Many of the ethnic Greeks then used that agreement to leave the country
permanently, as they distrusted their government, see Paul Anastasi, Athens Chief Is
Cheered by Greeks in Albania, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1991, at A5; N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991,
at A6.
26. See Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslavia Returns 368 Escapees To Albania, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 1991, at All.
27. See Albanians' Efforts to Flee Sets Off Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991 at A3.
28. See David Binder, Thousands of Albanians Flee Aboard Ship To Italy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A5; David Binder, Albania Combating Exodus, Clamps Down on a
Port, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1991, at A2; Brenda Fowler, Albanian Refugees Taken to Shel-
ters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at A3.
29. David Binder, 4 Albanians Die as Police Seize Refugee Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1991, at A5. Some 1,500 Albanians were convinced to return when Italy received Albanian
assurance that the returnees would not be persecuted. Id. The Albanian Government sought
to change its image by becoming more democratic. Moves such as restoration of diplomatic
relations with the United States after a 52-year gap and the call for multiparty elections at
the end of March were to give Albanians more of an incentive to remain home. See David
Binder, U.S. and Albania to Restore Full Links, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1991, at A3. See also,
Albania Releases Prisoners But the Dispute Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1991, at A3;
David Binder, Albania Turns In the Throes Of Transition, N.Y. TIMES; Mar. 25, 1991, at
A10; David Binder, 2 Freed Albanian Prisoners Tell of Others Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1991, at A6.
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$50 million in emergency aid to Albania to help cut the number of Al-
banians fleeing to its shores.30
However, in August 1991, another wave of over 18,000 desperate Al-
banians landed in Bari, Italy seeking refuge. Initially, Italy was prepared
to allow about 1,000 Albanians to stay if they qualified for political asy-
lum, while the others were forced to return to their homeland. Ultimately,
even those given temporary sanctuary were deported.31
Other changes in Albania allowed most of the Albanian Jewish com-
munity to emigrate to Israel."3 In addition, Albania was accepted into
CSCE membership on June 19, 1991.
B. Bulgaria
Bulgarian repression of its Muslim minority of Turkish descent be-
gan in its assimilation campaign during 1984 and accelerated in May
1989, when the government's intimidation and religious repression forced
an exodus of Muslims into Turkey.3 3 By the end of June, some 70,000
ethnic Turks were deported from Bulgaria into Turkey.3" Subsequently,
the ethnic Turks were no longer expelled but for the most part were en-
couraged to leave and were issued passports valid only for travel to Tur-
key. The Turkish Government indicated a willingness to accept all of the
estimated 1.5 million Bulgarian Turks. 5 On August 21, after receiving
30. See Italy Pledges $50 Million in Aid for Albania, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1991, at
A10. Thereafter, Albanian asylum seekers were returned to their homeland. See N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1991, at A6.
31. See Clyde Haberman, Italy Moves to Stern Wave of Albanians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1991, at A3; Alan Cowell, Italy Starts to Turn Back Albanian Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1991, at A3; Alan Cowell, Italy's Handling of Albanian Refugees Is Drawing Criticism; N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at A5; For Many Albanians, Freedom Means a Shot at Leaving For-
ever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, at D6.
The Italian Government announced that it would provide emergency food and eco-
nomic aid to help feed the Albanian population and rejuvenate Albanian industry; Albani-
ans Plead for Food, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 13, 1991, at A10; Andrew Mitrovica, Why
Albanians are Fleeing Land They Love, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 14, 1991, at A21; Ferry-
boat with Italian Relief Arrives in an Albanian Port, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at A13.
32. See Wendy Kamm, Joyful Jews From 'Another Planet' Called Albania, N.Y.
TIMES, April 11, 1991, at A4.
33. See Clyde Haberman, Bulgaria Forces Turkish Exodus of Thousands, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1989, at Al. At an earlier date, the U.S. Congress was aware of the oppression of
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. See Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Part I: Na-
tional Minorities In Eastern Europe, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, Hearing before
the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987). A
full account of the Bulgarian repression is found in K.H. KARPAT, THE TURKS OF BULGARIA
(1991).
34. See Sam Cohen, Turkey Starts Diplomatic Offensive, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
June 28, 1989, at 3.
35. See Ted Zang, Jr., Bulgaria's Persecution of the Turks, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, July 24, 1989, at 18; Clyde Haberman, Flow of Turks Leaving Bulgaria Swells to Hun-
dreds of Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, at Al. Those of draft age and tobacco grow-
ers were not allowed to leave. Currency restrictions and the amount of property that could
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about 310,000 Bulgarian Turks, Turkey announced a reversal of its policy
and refused to admit any more Bulgarians without a Turkish visa. Previ-
ously, Turkey had waived its visa requirement, and the Bulgarian Gov-
ernment insisted that it was not expelling anyone since those leaving were
issued three-month tourist visas.31
On September 1, 1989, a new Bulgarian passport law came into force
that enabled Bulgarian citizens the right to obtain a passport valid for
five years and granted amnesty to those who left the country illegally,
though an exit visa was required.3 7 On April 6, 1990, Yugoslavia imposed
a new entry fee on all Eastern Europeans who sought entry for reasons
other than business or package tours, thus requiring $200 worth of Yugo-
slav dinars in any hard currency. The Bucharest Government immedi-
ately retaliated with its own $200 currency purchase requirement for non-
official Yugoslav travelers.3 8
An amendment to the passport law on January 9, 1991 provided that
exit visas were no longer required for Bulgarians wishing to visit 'non-
socialist' countries. No reference was made concerning whether those who
left without a visa after September 1, 1989 or who overstayed their visa
after that date were granted amnesty from the fines associated with those
travel offenses.39 On January 22, 1991, President Bush announced that he
received the necessary assurance from Bulgaria regarding its emigration
policy and waived the Jackson-Vanik Amendment."'
C. Czechoslovakia
After East Germany opened its borders to permit G.D.R. citizens to
travel freely to the West, Czechoslovakia announced on November 14,
1989 that it would no longer require exit visas at the end of the year41 for
be taken out of Bulgaria meant that they arrived in Turkey almost destitute.
36. See Clyde Haberman, Turkey Closing Borders to Refugees From Bulgaria, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1989,at A9; Sam Cohen, Border Closing Stirs Criticism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1989, at 4; Clyde Haberman, Bulgarian Turks: Finding Disillusion with
Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989, at A12. By mid-September, approximately 10,000 of
those who left returned to Bulgaria due to lack of housing and/or employment in Turkey.
37. See Questions and Answers - An Occasional Series of Country Reports: Bulgaria:
The Impact of Reform; 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 288, 296 (1991) [hereinafter Questions and
Answers].
38. See David Binder, Waves of Emigration Are Washing Over Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 1990, at A10.
39. Questions and Answers, supra note 37, at 297.
40. 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 841 (July 1, 1991). A further extension was announced
on June 3, 1991; see Thomas L. Friedman, Bush Clears Soviet Trade and Weighs Role in
London Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at Al. On April 22, 1991, the United States and
Bulgaria signed an Agreement on Trade Relations that provided for nondiscriminatory tariff
treatment. The Agreement went into operation by Proclamation 6307 on June 24, 1991. 27
WKLy. COMP. PRES. Doc. 840 (July 1, 1991).
41. See R.W. Apple Jr., Prague Loosens Restrictions on Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1989, at A13. Two years earlier, the Czechoslovakian Government relaxed hard currency
restrictions to allow its citizens to keep foreign currency in bank accounts earmarked for
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its citizens to travel to the West. At the end of the month, the Govern-
ment announced that it would begin the immediate removal of fortifica-
tions along its 240 mile border with Austria and remove virtually all re-
strictions on travel to the West. Consequently, the only obstacle to travel
was the inability to convert sufficient currency into Western money.2 In
addition, the passport application procedure was simplified.
At the beginning of January 1990, a new law was adopted eliminating
all emigration restrictions of the previous regime. On February 20, 1990,
President Bush, satisfied with Czechoslovakia's emigration policies,
waived the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974."3 In
July, Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany abolished visa
and currency exchange requirements between their countries.4 However,
at the end of October 1990, thousands of Romanians, Bulgarians, and
other refugees became stranded in Czechoslovakia when Western govern-
ments stopped accepting them as refugees due to the liberalization of
their countries' governments. 5
The United States eventually granted temporary most-favored-na-
tion trading status to Czechoslovakia in November 1990. This status be-
came permanent on December 4, 1991.46
During 1991, points along the German-Czech border were used fre-
quently to bring illegal immigrants to the West."
D. Hungary
On March 14, 1989, Hungary became the first East Bloc country to
foreign travel and the funds could be withdrawn without special application. Only a few
days earlier more than 8,000 Czechoslovaks were allowed to travel to the Vatican for the
canonization of Agnes Premyslide. Since Czechoslovaks were able to obtain visas to the
West since 1988, the new gesture may have been an attempt by the leadership to remain in
power.
42. See Henry Kamm, Prague To Scrap Its Fortifiations on Austria Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1989, at Al. Just after the new year, the Czechoslovakian Government re-
quired Western visitors to exchange a minimum of $15 a day at artificially high rates.
43. Exec. Order 12,702, reprinted in 26 WEEKLY COMP PRES. Doc. 276 (Feb. 20, 1990).
The waiver was continued on June 8, 1990, when President Bush informed Congress that
potential emigrants from Czechoslovakia only need a valid passport and a foreign immigrant
visa. Passports were issued routinely for travel to all countries and an exit visa was no
longer required to travel. Also all bilateral family reunification cases were resolved. 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 895 (June 11, 1990).
44. The Week in Germany, July 6, 1990, at 6.
45. See Serge Schmemann, For Emigres From Eastern Europe, Journey Ends Just
Short of West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1990, at A13.
In January 1991, the French Government announced that it would no longer grant po-
litical refugee status to citizens from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the ground
that those countries were now democracies. See Alan Riding, France Imposes a Tighter
Political Refugee Policy, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 14, 1991, at All.
46. 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PRs. Doc. 1757 (Dec. 9, 1991).
47. See Smugglers of Human Contraband Across the Czech Border, THE GERMAN TRIB-
UNE, No. 1488, Oct. 13, 1991, at 15.
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ratify the Optional Protocol" to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, relating to the status of refugees. The revolution across
Central and Eastern Europe during the previous year brought political
and socio-economic changes in Hungary. President Bush announced at
Karl Marx University on July 12, 1989' that once the Hungarian Parlia-
ment passed a new emigration law,50 he would inform Congress that Hun-
gary was in full compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the
1974 Trade Act. This would negate the need for an annual vote by Con-
gress on Hungary's most-favored-nation trading status.
At the end of June 1989, Hungary dismantled its barbed-wire fence
with Austria that had formed part of the "iron curtain" dividing Europe.
On September 11, the Hungarian Government decided to allow East
Germans to cross over its frontier to Austria, and thousands used this
route to escape to West Germany until the G.D.R. cut off exit permits for
travel to Hungary.
During October 1989, the Hungarian Parliament rewrote the consti-
tution, legalized opposition political parties, and proclaimed itself a Re-
public instead of a "socialist republic". 5 Hungary had passed the litmus
test and was granted temporary most-favored-trading status by the
United States.52 Although Hungarians were free to travel abroad, the
amount of convertible currency for travel was curtailed by the Govern-
ment in early November. 3
The summer of 1990 witnessed a great upsurge of both Eastern and
Western European tourists into Hungary, but authorities were most con-
cerned with the 850,000 Romanian tourists who were still in the coun-
try. 4 Hungary also became the destination for thousands of Romanian
ethnic Hungarians and other Romanian nationals. Other East Europeans
used Hungary as the conduit to Western European countries with the re-
sult that in September 1990, Austria assigned army troops to patrol its
border with Hungary and returned illegal immigrants. 55
48. DEPr. OF STATE BULL, Aug. 1989, at 89.
49. Henry Kamm, Bush Extends Support to Hungary And Offers Modest Ecomomic
Aid, N.Y. TiMEs, July 13, 1989, at Al; excerpts from the President's speech are found at
A10.
50. The necessary legislation was passed during October 1989. For a discussion of the
legislation see Francis A. Gabor, Reflections on the Freedom of Movement in Light of the
Dismantled "Iron Curtain", 65 TULANE L. REV. 849, 855-861 (1991).
51. See N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1989, at A8; Oct. 20, 1989, at A10; and Oct. 24, 1989, at Al.
52. See Emigration Laws and Policies of the Republic of Hungary, Message from the
President of the United States transmitting his determination that Hungary meets the emi-
gration criteria for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, pursuant to 19
U.S.C. 2432 (b), 102d Cong. 1st Sess. House Doc. 102-33, Jan. 23, 1991.
53. See Henry Kamm, Most Hungarians Enjoy Freedom From Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1989, at A14.
54. See Celestine Bohlen, Flow of Tourists Shifts in Hungary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1990, at A5.
55. See Serge Schmemann, For Emigres From Eastern Europe, Journey Ends Just
Short of West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1990, at A13. Austria, however, did not reimpose visa
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The Hungarian Government continued its liberal emigration policy
and was rewarded on December 4, 1991 with permanent most-favored-
nation trading status by the United States."6 Meanwhile, the civil war in
neighboring Yugoslavia brought refugees seeking temporary shelter into
the surrounding States, periodically causing the host to resort to extreme
measures. For example, during October 1991, Hungarian border authori-
ties required visitors at Soviet and Romanian borders to prove that they
had sufficient funds to return home before allowing admittance. 57 Since
September 1989, Hungary has supported the emigration of Soviet Jews to
Israel by allowing Budapest to be a transit stop for flights to Tel Aviv
from Moscow, despite occasional acts of terrorism on Hungarian
territory."'
E. Poland
In Poland, a Solidarity-led government took office on September 12,
1989. On November 21, the United States, recognizing that both Hungary
and Poland had made remarkable progress toward becoming free and
democratic societies, announced that it would sharply curtail admission
of their citizens to the United States as political refugees unless there was
well-founded fear of persecution in their home country. 9
The opening of the East German border with West Germany on No-
vember 9, 1989 strained East German-Polish relations. Their common
border had remained closed since 1981 when Poland imposed martial law.
As a result, only those Poles with a formal invitation to East Germany or
who were en route to West Berlin could enter the G.D.R. With the need
for workers in East Germany, about 40,000 Poles were leaving with or
without proper passports to work in the G.D.R.s0
Once borders were opened between East and West Germany, Poles
began to cross the border in record numbers to shop and to smuggle. The
actual numbers became so great that the West Berlin Senate announced
requirements for Hungarians or Czechoslovakians as it did upon Poles on Sept. 7. See Craig
R. Whitney, Surprise for Western Europe: Eastern Kin Come Knocking, N.Y. TImEs, Nov.
15, 1990, at Al. See also Alan Riding, West Europe Braces for Migrant Wave From East,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at A10.
56. 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1757 (Dec. 9, 1991).
57. See Celestine Bohlen, Neighbors Making Budapest Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1991, at AS; Celestine Bohlen, Hungarians Open Hearts and Homes to Yugoslavs, N.Y.
TiMEs, Oct. 18, 1991, at Al.
58. See Hungary Bombing Leaves 6 Wounded, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1991, at A9.
59. This change would bar refugee status to at least 19,000 of the 20,000 Poles and
Hungarians who had filed applications at American embassies and consulates. Only 6,500
refugees were to be admitted into the U.S. in fiscal year 1990. In the previous year, 3,607
Polish and 1,075 Hungarian refugees were admitted. See Robert Pear, Number of Poles and
Hungarians Admitted as Refugees Will Be Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1989, at Al.
60. See Craig R. Whitney, New Measures Strain Poland's Ties to 2 Germanys, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1989, at AS; John Tagliabue, Poles Seeking The Jobs Left By Germans,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1989, at A7.
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in early June 1990 that as of July 1st all Poles entering the city would
require a valid West German visa.61 After German reunification in Octo-
ber 1990, Poland continued to admit former East Germans as visitors
without a visa, while the German Government continued to require visas
for entry by Poles. 2
Due to the great numbers of Romanians coming into Poland and
seeking to stay and trade illegally, Poland counteracted on December 10,
1990 by requiring Romanians to show 200,000 zlotys for each day they
wished to stay. 3 On March 29, 1991, the Benelux countries, France, Ger-
many, and Italy agreed to allow Polish nationals to travel visa-free. 4
By early October 1991, more than four million Soviet citizens had
visited Poland. After May 20, 1991, when Soviet citizens could emigrate
legally, many went to Poland on a valid passport and an invitation from a
Polish citizen to legally work in the country where they earned converti-
ble Polish currency. Officially, Poland could not estimate the total num-
ber of these Soviet guest workers. 5
F. Romania
On June 26, 1989, Romania began to remove the 188-mile barbed-
wire fence that it had erected to prevent its Hungarian minority from
crossing illegally into Hungary. Events in Central and Eastern Europe
during 1989 did not bring any relaxation of freedom-of-movement restric-
tions from the Romanian Government. However, tens of thousands of
Romanians fled illegally to Hungary over the previous two years, includ-
ing the former Olympic champion, Nadia Comaneci, in late November.6 7
Before the year's end, protests against the Government's repression led to
violence, death, and the ouster from power of President Ceausescu.6 8 The
61. See Michael Kallenbach, West Berlin Limits Invasion of Polish Shoppers, CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 5, 1990, at 4.
62. Austria reimposed its visa requirement for Poles on Sept. 7, 1990. See Craig R.
Whitney, Surprise for Western Europe: Eastern Kin Come Knocking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1990, at Al.
63. See For East Europe's Hopeful, Warsaw Glitters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at A7.
64. Under the agreement, Poland agreed to take back its citizens who overstayed the 3-
month travel period or who worked illegally in any of the six countries. See John Tagliabue,
Poles Get Wider Travel Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991, at A2; Stephen Kinzer, Ger-
many Lets Poles in Without Visas, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1991, at A3.
65. See Stephen Engelberg, Lured by Zlotys, Ivan Plays The Model Migrant Worker,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at Al.
66. Rumania Is Said to Remove Fence Along Hungary Border, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1989, at A4. The Romanian response may have been due to the Soviet Union's first public
criticism of an Eastern European ally during the first CSCE sponsored meeting at the Con-
ference on the Human Dimension in Paris. See Steven Greenhouse, Soviets, at Parley on
Rights, Assail Rumania Over Fence, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1989, at 17.
67. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1989, at A19.
68. See David Binder, At Least 13 Are Reported Killed at Protest in Rumania's Capi-
tal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1989, at Al. Romania's 11 days of turmoil are shown on a day-by-
day basis in Reports in Romania, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1989, at All.
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new government adopted a more liberal emigration policy such that West
Germany had to plan for the immigration of an estimated 220,000 ethnic
Germans from Romania.ss Meanwhile, Romanians who applied for emi-
gration to the United States were told that they were no longer eligible
for preferential treatment as immigrants since political repression was no
longer a factor.y
After the fall of the Ceausescu regime, the West became aware of the
plight of thousands of Romanian children who were abandoned and or-
phaned. Nearly 7,000 of these children have been adopted since Decem-
ber 1989 by Western European and American couples. Unfortunately, an
illegal market involving children for sale was created alongside the genu-
ine humanitarian desire to adopt through the legal international adoption
process. By May 23, 1991, Americans had adopted 1,443 Romanian chil-
dren, oftentimes in the face of great obstacles in obtaining the requisite
United States visa for the child. The Romanian Government announced
that as of June 1, 1991 foreign adoptions would be suspended until new
legislation was in place to curtail illegal trafficking of children."
Generally, foreign travel and emigration are no longer restricted for
Romanians. During 1990, the Government issued more than 3.6 million
tourist passports and more than 129,000 emigrant passports. In the case
of the latter, the applicant must prove to be debt-free, comply with regu-
lations concerning termination of employment, and present a customs
Soon after Ceausescu's death, it was disclosed that Israel secretly paid thousands of
dollars for each visa issued to allow Romanian Jews to emigrate to Israel. Ceausescu person-
ally pocketed more than $50 million from this practice. See Clyde Haberman, For Judaism's
Remnant, Coup Is Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1990, at A12. The appearance of
Romania's liberal emigration policy towards its Jewish population brought the added bene-
fit of most-favored-nation status in trade with the United States for many years until Presi-
dent Reagan withdrew the status in February 1988.
From 1978 until the death of Ceausescu, the Bonn Government paid a bounty of ap-
proximately $5,000 (U.S.) for each of the 10,000-15,000 ethnic Germans allowed to emigrate
annually from Romania. See Chuck Sudetic, Ethnic Germans in Romania Dwindle, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1990, at A3.
69. WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 19, 1990, at 1. Some 23,000 ethnic Germans left Romania
in 1989. GERMAN TRIBUNE, No. 1417, April 29, 1990, at 6.
70. See David Binder, Rumanians Fret, "Where Are The Americans?" N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1990, at A9. The ousted Communist leaders in many of the Eastern European coun-
tries and the process of democratization caused new flows of economic refugees. On March
15, 1990, Austria, which had 21,882 East Europeans including approximately 8,000 Romani-
ans in 1989, and 3,500 so far in 1990, changed its admissions procedure requiring visas
before reaching the border and visitors to have the equivalent of $400 in Western currency
to pay for their stay. To avoid the new requirements some 5,000-7,000 Romanians entered
Austria to claim refugee status during the last 24 hours before the deadline. See Paul Lewis,
Romanians Flood Austria as It Restricts Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1990, at A12.
71. See David Binder, U.S. Issues Warning of Obstacles in Adopting Romanian Chil-
dren, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at A2; Romania Halts Adoptions, Pending Law, GLOBE AND
MAIL, May 24, 1991, at A8. On July 27, 1991, the United States Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service announced measures to restrict the adoption of Romanian children. See U.S.
Moves to Curb Adoption of Romanians, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, at 8.
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declaration for goods taken out of the country."2 As Romanian emigration
policy reflected a wide freedom of choice, President Bush waived the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment on August 17, 199111 making Romania eligi-
ble to apply for credit guarantees for commercial imports of U.S. agricul-
tural products. The waiver did not restore most-favored-nation tariff sta-
tus, which Romania renounced in 1988.
G. Soviet Union
On March 8, 1989, the Soviet Union announced that it would accept
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to five
human rights treaties. " At the end of March, the Soviet psychiatric soci-
ety was granted provisional readmission to the World Psychiatric Associ-
ation despite a preliminary report by a group of visiting experts that the
official Soviet practice of confining political prisoners in mental hospitals
had not ended.7 5
The Soviet policy of glasnost impacted travel in a positive way. By
mid-summer, Western diplomats had seen a draft of a Soviet law that
would allow Soviet citizens to leave the country at the invitation of for-
eign business, organization, or individual. There was to be an easing of
the "state secrets" impediment and removal of the 500 ruble exit tax on
emigres to Israel. Moreover, the requirement of an invitation from abroad
for private visits was to be erased. Private travel had already increased
dramatically in the first six months of 1989.76
Before September 1988, Soviet Jews and evangelical Christians were
almost always accorded refugee status by the United States for immigra-
72. President's 29th CSCE Report, Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Apr. 1,
1990-Mar. 31, 1991, U.S. Dept of State, 2 DISPATCH Supplement No. 3, at 32-33 (July 1991).
73. Exec. Order 12,772, reprinted in 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1167 (August 26,
1991).
74. See Paul Lewis, Soviets To Accept World Court Role In Human Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1989, at Al.
75. See Elaine Sciolino, Panel of World Psychiatrists Votes To Readmit Soviets to
Membership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1989, at A2; Bill Keller, U.S. Psychiatrists Fault Soviet
Units, N.Y. TIMs, Mar. 12, 1989, at Al. For a synopsis of the American findings in its
report, see US and USSR Psychiatric Care Practices, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment, Comm. Energy & Commerce, H.R. 101st Cong. 1st Sess. Oct.
2, 1989; Robert Pear, Report Reproaches Soviet Psychiatry, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1989, at
A3. See also Robert Pear, U.S. Psychiatrists Oppose Soviet Members For World Group,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1989, at A15; Michael R. Gordon, Soviet Envoy Tells U.S. of Psychi-
atric Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1989, at A10. The Soviet Union was readmitted on Octo-
ber 18, 1989. Steny H. Hoyer, Psychiatric Abuses Persist in Russia, THE WASH. POST; Aug.
22, 1989, at A19. See generally, Lorri M. Thompson, Soviet Straightjacket Psychiatry: New
Legislation to End the Psychiatric Reign of Terror in the U.S.S.R., 16 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 271 (1990); Richard J. Bonnie, Coercive Psychiatry and Human Rights: An Assess-
ment of Recent Changes in the Soviet Union, 1 CRIM. L. F. 319 (1990).
76. Ann Cooper, U.S. Foresees Rush In Soviet Emigres, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1989, at
Al. On July 26, tourist visas for Israeli visits to the Soviet Union became available for the
first time since 1967. N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1989, at 6.
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tion purposes. Most of the Jews who initially left the Soviet Union had
visas for Israel, but once in Rome or Vienna, they often opted to emigrate
to the United States instead. 7 After the relaxation of Soviet exit restric-
tions, Congress passed bills to make it easier for Soviet Jews and evangel-
ical Christians to emigrate to the United States. However, as the Soviet
door opened wide, the Bush administration announced a new policy to go
into effect on October 1 to choke the flow of these refugees to the United
States.7s The new law imposed a ceiling of 50,000 Soviet refugees for 1990
fiscal year.
7 9
Noting the political changes and the more liberal government policies
regarding freedom of movement among many of the East bloc countries
during the previous three months, and due to its desire for the United
States to remove trade barriers, on November 16 the Soviet Union prom-
ised to revise its law and permit freer emigration for Soviet citizens.8 0 As
a result, Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate during 1989 in record num-
bers. To assist emigrants leaving for Israel, El Al and Aeroflot national
airlines signed an agreement for direct flights between Moscow and Tel
77. Israel was clearly not able to absorb all of the Soviet Jews who emigrated to the
country. See Joel Brinkley, Soviet Jews Finding Israel Short of Jobs and Housing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at Al. Roberta Cohen, Israel's Problematic Absorption of Soviet
Jews, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 60 (1991).
Israel asked the U.S. for loan guarantees to finance construction of housing for the So-
viet emigres. See Robert Pear, Israel Asking U.S. For Aid On Housing For Soviet Emigres,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at A22.
78. See Robert Pear, U.S. Drafts Plans To Curb Admission of Soviet Jews, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, at Al; Robert Pear, Soviet-Refugee Plan Faulted: Critics Say Flow
Will Dry Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1989, at Al. See also Greg A. Beyer, The Evolving
United States Response to Soviet Jewish Emigration, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 30 (1991).
In 1989, nearly 9,000 evangelical Christians traveled to the United States via Austria
and Italy. The new procedure led to great hardships for those emigrating so that the U.S.
had to arrange a special airlift for about 6,000 Soviet Christians in Sept. 1990. See Philip
Shenon, U.S. Begins Airlift of Soviet Christians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1990, at A3.
79. See Lucia Mouat, US Open-Door Policy Shuts Slightly, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 29, 1989, at 7; Robert Pear, Closing The Door Halfway For'Emigrant Soviet
Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, at E3. The U.S. would only be admitting 6,500 refugees
from Eastern Europe during the 1990 fiscal year. See Robert Pear, Bush Seeks Slight In-
crease In Flow of Refugees to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at A12.
Although the U.S. issued about 100,000 visas to Soviet business and professional visi-
tors in 1989, and more than 1,000 visas to Soviet scientists to teach and conduct research at
American institutions, red tape in the U. S. bureaucracy could not keep up with the de-
mand. See Malcolm W. Browne, Visas For Scientists From East Said to Lag Despite Eased
Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at A22.
80. See Robert Pear, Soviets to Liberalize Emigration, Hoping to Gain U.S. Trade
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, at Al. The Soviet Union was successful in reaching a trade
agreement with the European Community on November 27, but the agreement did not con-
fer most-favored-nation status upon the Soviet Union, a status that the Soviet Union was
seeking from the United States, but it would be required to implement the proposed emi-
gration law. See Paul L. Montgomery, Trade Pact For Soviets And Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1989, at Dl; Amy Kaslow & Paul L. Bush, Congress Work To Give Favored Trade
Status to Soviets, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 16, 1989, at 1.
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Aviv to begin in 1990.8' In 1989, the Soviet Union allowed more than
70,000 Soviet Jews to emigrate.82
Another example of greater tolerance by the Soviets for travel by its
citizenry occurred in March 1990 when the Soviet Union concluded an
agreement with Iran allowing Soviet Azerbaijanis to travel to Iran for the
first time since becoming a communist state.83 Along with the new nation-
alism emerging in the Soviet republics, such as the demand for indepen-
dence from the Baltic States and other parts of Eastern Europe, old ha-
treds also emerged.
8 4
As the agreement for direct flights from Soviet cities to Israel did not
enter into operation, the route remained Soviet Union-Hungary-Tel Aviv.
In March, the Soviet Union announced that this route could no longer
used because Hungary was threatened with terrorism from an Islamic
fundamentalist group. Hungary suspended flights to Israel for Soviet
emigrants.8 6 A few days later, Poland responded that it would transport
the Soviet Jews to Israel.8 6
81. See Joel Brinkley, Soviet Jews Leave At A Record Pace, Many For Israel, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1989, at Al. The number of Soviet Jews arriving in Israel for resettlement
alarmed the Arab World that they would displace Palestinians in the occupied territories.
See Alan Cowell, Arabs Warning Against Influx of Soviet Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1990,
at A12. For the Israeli response, see Sabra Chartrand, Jerusalem Says It Has No Policy To
Settle Soviet Jews in West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at A2. On February 4, 1990, on
a visit to Tunis, the Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister indicated that Moscow would not allow
direct flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv. See Joel Brinkley, How Shamir At Home Caused
Storm Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1990, at A12. During 1989, 12,923 Soviet Jews arrived in
Israel. Bruce W. Nelan, Exodus to the Promised Land, TIME, Feb. 12, 1990, at 42.
Interestingly, Israel reported that 12,923 Soviet Jews emigrated to the country while
approximately 15,000 Israelis left permanently. See Joel Brinkley, As Jerusalem Labors to
Settle Soviet Jews, Native Israelis Slip Quietly Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at A3.
82. According to Israel, 71,196 Soviet Jews emigrated in 1989. See Robert Pear, Moscow
Rejects U.S. Plea to Allow Flights to Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at Al.
83. Iran Allowing Travel By Soviet Azerbaijanis, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1990, at A16.
84. See William Korey, A Fear of Pogroms Haunts Soviet Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1990, at A23. Francis X. Clines, Anxiety Over Anti-Semitism Spurs Soviet Warning on
Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al; Frank J. Prial, Survey in Moscow Sees a High Level
of Anti-Jewish Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at A8.
Nor was the hatred confined to the Soviet Union. See Celestine Bohlen, A Survival of
the Past, Anti-Semitism Is Back, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at A10; Celestine Bohlen, The
Romanian Revolution Over, It's Back to Old Hatreds in Transylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1990, at A16. Marvine Howe, Eastern Europe Jews Bring Mixed Reports of the New
Societies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at A15.
85. See Celestine Bohlen, Hungary Halts Emigre Flights After Muslim Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1990, at A18; Joel Brinkley, Soviets to Curb Jews' Flights to Israel, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1990, at A6. One later report indicated that not all Hungarian charter
flights to Israel were discontinued. See Joel Brinkley, Soviet Emigres to Israel Topped
7,000 in March, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1990, at A5.
86. See Frank J. Prial, Poland Promises to Help Soviet Jews Fly to Israel, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1990, at All; Stephen Engelberg, Poland to Let Soviet Jews Fly to Israel From
Warsaw, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1990, at A14. Other countries also were willing to issue transit
visas to Israel bound Soviet Jews. See Celestine Bohlen, Victor in Hungary Sees '45 as the
Best of Times, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at A8 and Youssef M. Ibrahim, Israel Answers
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On June 1, 1990, after receiving assurances from President
Gorbachev on the proposed emigration law and efforts to resolve the cri-
sis over Lithuania's independence, President Bush and the Soviet leader
signed a trade agreement.8 7 Because of the greater numbers of Soviet
Jews emigrating to Israel and Arab concern s ' over these new immigrants
displacing the Arabs in the Israeli occupied territories, President
Gorbachev warned Israel that emigration would be curtailed if Israel did
not pledge to keep Soviet Jews from settling on these lands.8 9 In a sur-
prise move at the end of September, President Gorbachev announced his
approval for direct flights to resume between the Soviet Union and Israel.
Hence, Soviet emigrants would no longer need to arrive via European
transit points.9" Meanwhile, by mid-September 1990, the sharp increase
in applications by Soviet Jews waiting to emigrate to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany brought that country's Interior Ministry to request its
consulates in the USSR to stop processing further applications.9 During
October, the United States announced that it would admit 60,000 Soviet
Soviets, Denies Plans for Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1990, at All.
87. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Trade Accord Holds Many Prizes, But Obstacles to Pas-
sage Remain, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1990, at A7. On June 5, the Soviet Parliament indicated
that it would not take up the emigration bill until September. See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush
Gains Time as Moscow Delays Law on Emigration, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al. See
also Steckelman, Advancing Soviet-American Trade: The Legal Steps Necessary to Fur-
ther Economic Relations, 11 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463 (1990).
88. See Alan Cowell, Arabs Applaud Gorbachev Remark, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1990, at
A3.
89. See Joel Brinkley, Israel Won't Send Soviet Immigrants to The West Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1990, at Al; Joel Greenberg, Israel Bows to Soviet Pressure On Settling
Jewish Emigrants, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 27, 1990, at 6.
Israel was not able to cope with growing numbers of immigrants. See Joel Brinkley, In
Emigre Crush, Tent Towns Sprout for Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at A10; .Joel
Brinkley, On Settling Soviet Jews Israel Not So Clear Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at
A8; Joel Greenberg, Poor Israelis Protest Influx of Soviet Jews, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 18, 1990, at 5; Sabra Chartrand, Taxes Approved by Israeli Cabinet, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990, at A6. Jews were also emigrating to Israel from other countries. See
Clifford Krauss, Ethiopia Says all Jews Are Free to Leave for Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1990, at All.
Perhaps to stem the tide of Soviet emigres to Israel the question was raised as to who
qualified as a "Jew" for immigration purposes. See Abraham Rabinovich, Screening Soviet
Immigrants, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1990, at 18.
The growing number of Soviet emigres to Israel became acute with respect to Israeli-
U.S. relations. See Israel Retracts Pledge to U.S. On East Jerusalem Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1990, at A16. See also Sabra Chartrand, Israel Lags in Housing for Soviet Jews,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at All.
90. Israel Says U.S.S.R. Approves Direct Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A8.
91. WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 12, 1990, at 6. On Oct. 31, the Bundestag in Bonn called for
freedom to emigrate to Germany for Soviet Jews, WEEK IN GERMANY Nov. 2, 1990, at 2. See
also Stephan Kinzer, New Aspiration For Soviet Jews Life in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 1990 at Al. During 1990, over 5,000 Soviet Jews who came to Germany as visitors were
granted residency status. Thousands more completed the necessary visa application for emi-
gration in 1991. See Francine Kiefer, Soviet Jews Emigrate to Germany, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 29, 1991, at 6.
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refugees for the 1991 fiscal year.92 The U.S. change in procedure that al-
lowed Soviet emigrants to leave for the United States directly from Soviet
territory did not function smoothly. For example, under the previous sys-
tem, Soviet Christian fundamentalists were required to have entry per-
mits from Israel in their passports although the United States was the
actual destination. Soviet bureaucratic recalcitrance in October 1990 re-
fused to allow these U.S.-bound emigres to depart.9
Soviet emigres were arriving in Israel in such record numbers that
the Israeli Government was pressed to take unpopular domestic measures
to absorb the newcomers.94 Soviet emigration figures for the year were so
high and the anticipated food shortages in the Soviet Union for the win-
ter so realistic that a change of United States policy on December 12,
1990 was announced by President Bush temporarily waiving parts of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and providing the Soviet Union with $1 bil-
lion in loan guarantees to purchase needed food.95
In January 1991, at an international conference96 sponsored by the
Council of Europe on migrants and refugees, the Soviet Union indicated
that Western European nations could expect as many as 2 million Soviet
92. See Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Will Allow 6,000 More Refugees Next Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1990, at All. During 1990, some 50,000 Soviet refugees came to the United
States, 40,000 of whom came with U.S. federal assistance, and 10,000 with assistance from
private organizations.
93. See Francis X. Clines, 200 on Verge of Soviet Exit Are Stalled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1990, at A3.
94. See Joel Brinkley, Israeli Cabinet Approves Increase in Taxes to Help Immi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1990, at A8; Joel Brinkley, Israelis Go On Strike to Fight a
Tax to Absorb Emigres, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at A3. See also Youssef M. Ibrahim,
Soviet Influx Has the Israelis Building, Fighting and in Awe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at
Al.
In February 1991, what was to become a major irritant in U.S. loan guarantees for hous-
ing Soviet Jews began. See Joel Brinkley, U.S.-Israeli Strains Appear Over Delayed Hous-
ing Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1991, at A10; Joel Brinkley, Israel Asserts New U.S. Aid For
Housing Is Insufficient, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at A2.
On the problems faced by the Soviet newcomers to Israel, see Joel Brinkley, For New
Soviet Immigrants in Israel, Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at Al.
95. See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Lifting 15- Year-Old Ban, Approves Loans For Krem-
lin to Help Ease Food Shortages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at Al; Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Bush's Move Unlikely to Mean Quick Trade Surge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at A22;
Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. and Partners in Accord on Aid to Soviet Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1990, at Al.
By the end of 1990, more than 370,000 emigrants left the Soviet Union including
195,500 Jews and 148,000 ethnic Germans. 12 CRS REviEw 33 (July 1991).
For differing views on the merits of the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see
Bradner, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment To The Trade Act of 1974: Soviet Progress on
Emigration Reform Is Insufficient to Merit A Waiver, 4 GEO. IMMIGE. L. J. 639 (1990);
Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 363 (1990);
Dow, Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 4 HARv.
HUM. RTS. J. 128 (1991).
96. See Celestine Bohlen, Europeans Confer on Emigre Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1991, at Al; Paul Lewis, As Soviet Borders Open, the West Braces for an Economic Exo-
dus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991, at D4.
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citizens to leave their country in search of work once the USSR passed its
new travel law. During early May, the Supreme Soviet began to debate
the long-awaited emigration bill.9 7 Finally, on May 20th, the law was
passed conferring the right of Soviet citizens to travel and emigrate freely
beginning on January 1, 1993.9" This move was regarded with favor by
President Bush who on June 3 exercised his discretion to waive the re-
quirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for twelve more months
and thereby allowing further credit guarantees to the Soviet Union for
additional food purchases.9 In May, Israeli authorities acknowledged that
many Soviet Jews had decided to postpone emigration to Israel because
of conditions in Israel rather than any obstacles preventing their
departure.100
During the Moscow summit in July, President Bush announced that
the June 1990 Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union would be submitted for Congressional approval.' 1
The Agreement entered into force on October 9, 1991.102
In early September, the Soviet Union recognized the independence of
97. See A Free-Emigration Bill Is Debated in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at
A10; Esther B. Fein, Wary of Expense Soviets Debate Bill on Travel and Emigration, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1991, at A6; Esther B. Fein, Soviets Stalling A Bill To Permit Free Emigra-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1991, at Al.
98. For a brief account of how the emigration law was passed, see Parliament Finally
Passes Emigration Law, 43 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 10 (June 19, 1991); On
Procedures For Exit From The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Entry Into The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by USSR Citizens, translated in 43 CURRENT DIGEST OF
THE SOVIET PRESS 14 (July 31, 1991). See also Esther B. Fein, Soviets Enact Law Freeing
Migration And Trips Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1991, at Al. See also Vladimir
Kartashkin, Human Rights And The Emergence Of The State Of The Rule Of Law In The
USSR, 40 EMORY L.J. 889, 900-902 (1991).
Apparently the new passport law's procedure went into effect on July 1, 1991, as over
20,000 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel in June in a rush to leave the country as they
doubted the Soviet bureaucracy's ability to implement the new procedure. See Joel Brink-
ley, Rush of Soviet Immigrants to Israel, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A3.
Several British and American politicians pointed out certain restrictive provisions in
the new Soviet emigration law. See British Information Service, 21 SURVEY OF CURRENT AF-
FAIRS 360-361 (Oct. 1991); Commission on Security and Cooperation In Europe, DIGEST 3
(May 1991).
99. See Thomas L. Friedman, Bush Clears Soviet Trade Benefits and Weighs Role in
London Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at Al. In 1990, the Soviet Union allowed more
than 370,000 citizens to emigrate. See CRS REvIEw, July 1991, at 33. See also Andrew Ro-
senthal, Bush Backs Loans For Soviet Farms Worth $1.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1991, at Al. The waiver to the Soviet Union also applied to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Trade With the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 706 (June 10, 1991).
100. See Serge Schmemann, Jews In Moscow Expect Flow of Emigrants to Israel to
Pick Up Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at Al; Joel Brinkley, Israeli Economy Is Keeping
Many Jews in U.S.S.R., May 5, 1991, at Al; Sabra Chartrand, In Promised Land, Jobs
Don't Match The Dream, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at A4.
101. See Keith Bradsher, Soviet Trade Pact Sent To Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1991, at A13.
102. 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1422 (Oct. 14, 1991).
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the Baltic States. The following week, at the first session of the Moscow
meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania were admitted to membership."°s On December
4, 1991, the three Baltic States received permanent most-favored-nation
trading-status from the United States."0 4
Although Soviet emigration was liberalized during 1991, only 39,000
Soviet refugees came to the United States during the 1991 fiscal year. 05
During the second week of December, when Russia, Ukraine, and By-
elorussia declared themselves the "Commonwealth of Independent
States," Israel braced itself for another wave of immigration before the
end of the year as 70,000 people already had full Soviet permission to
leave and another 30,000 had Israeli entry visas in hand.0 '
IV. IMMIGRATION IN THE FUTURE
The fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and
the desire to bring about economic reforms have caused widespread un-
employment, food shortages, and a race to find a better standard of living
elsewhere. The States of destination of those seeking greener pastures
cannot absorb the population movements. Germany took in 193,000 asy-
lum seekers in 1990, almost half of the 420,000 in all of Western Europe,
and was already host to 5.7 million legal aliens in its territory. Thousands
of asylum-seekers, immigrants, and foreign workers have become the vic-
tims of verbal and physical attack in Germany.17
103. See Craig R. Whitney, Moscow Rights Conference Sees Danger in Nationalism,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept 11, 1991, at A10.
104. 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1757 (Dec. 9, 1991).
105. Fiscal 1991 provided for a maximum of 50,000 Soviet refugees who could settle in
the United States. President Bush authorized the admission of 61,000 Soviet refugees for
fiscal year 1992. See Bush Opens the Door to 142,000 Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991,
at A8.
Aside from Soviet emigration, the end of the cold war saw an increase in the travel to
the United States of thousands of tourists, students, writers, businessmen, and athletes, and
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union of government representatives from the repub-
lics. See Seth Mydans, Seeking Shelter in U.S. After the Soviet Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1992, at Al.
106. Clyde Haberman, Israel Braces for Influx from Slavic Regions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1991, at A8; Clyde Haberman, Israelis Prepare a Mass Airlift of Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1991, at A7.
The beginning of 1992 saw a dwindling of emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel
than for comparable periods in the two previous years for a variety of reasons. See Alan
Cowell, Influx From Ex - Soviet Lands Falling, Israel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at
All; Clyde Haberman, Freer Jews Face Harder Choice: To Leave or to Stay, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1992, at A10; Joel Greenberg, No Milk or Honey for Israel's Emigres, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1992, at A8.
107. See Stephan Kinzer, A Wave of Attacks on Foreigners Stirs Shock in Germany,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al; Stephan Kinzer, German Visits Refugees Amid New At-
tacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at A5; Stephan Kinzer, German Vote Raises Foreigners'
Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A14; Stephan Kinzer, Germans Seek to Protect Foreign-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A12; Politicians Condemn Attacks on Foreigners; Seek
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To check the surge in illegal East-West migration, Berlin hosted a
conference of the ministers of interior at the end of October 1991 with
twenty-seven European nations in attendance. Although the German host
said "[w]e do want freedom of movement and travel in the future, but
that cannot mean the right of residence for everyone,"'0 8 more obstacles
will be created in the path of the movement of persons across interna-
tional boundaries. Already, German politicians have called for common
European immigration policies' 09 and a European asylum regulation." '
Faster Asylum Process, WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 11, 1991, p.1. Bower, Germany Divided
Over Attacks On Refugees, 5 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 815 (1991).
108. See John Tagliabue, Germany Wins Europe's Backing for Tougher Controls on
Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at A6.
109. See Stephan Kinzer, Britain Unswayed on United Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1991, at A15.
110. THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Nov. 22, 1991, at 1.
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Indigenous Peoples' Rights: Mabo and
Others v. State of Queensland1 - The
Australian High Court Addresses 200
Years of Oppression
GERALD P. MCGINLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Australian Aboriginals share the common heritage of indigenous peo-
ples. It is a history of violent dispossession, followed by alternating neg-
lect and paternalism, culminating in belated and bewildered concern.' An
international movement has evolved to rectify these wrongs.' 1993 is to be
the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples" during which
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Adelaide.
1. Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992).
2. See JANINE ROBERTS, MASSACRES TO MINING 13-19 (1981)[hereinafter ROBERTS];
MARC GUMBERT, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR REASON 15-25 (1984); HENRY REYNOLDS, DISPOSSES-
SION (1989)[hereinafter REYNOLDS]. For a discussion of the history and problems of other
indigenous peoples, see Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerg-
ing International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991)[hereinafter Torres].
3. There have been three areas of activity. The International Labour Conference has
produced two conventions, Convention 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June
26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247. In 1989, the Conference adopted a revised version of Convention
107 (Convention 106). See Berman, The International Labour Organization and Indige-
nous Peoples: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107 at the 75th Session of the International
Labour Conference, 1988 THE REviEw 48, 49 (Int'l Convention Jurists 1988); Andree
Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous Rights Under International Law,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 717-20 (1990). Second, in 1972 the U.N. Human Rights Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed a Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the problems of discrimination against indigenous people. The Rap-
porteur, Jose Martinez Cobo presented a final report in 1983. See Study of the Problem of
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/Add. 1-4 (1986-
87)[hereinafter Cobo Report]. In 1985 the U.N. General Assembly established the U.N.
Fund for Indigenous Populations to assist representation of indigenous populations in the
activities of the Working Group. The Fund was established by G.A. Res. 40/131. See Report
of the Economic and Social Council: United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous
Populations, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR 43rd Sess., Agenda Item 12,
U.N. Doc. A/43/706 2 (1988). The third area of activity has been the work of non-govern-
mental organizations. The first meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples met in
Canada in 1975; representative' groups are the Four Directions Council, the Maori Council,
the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service Secretariat, the National Indian Youth
Council, the Indigenous World Association, the International Indian Treaty Council, The
Indian Council of South America and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. See The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Center for Human Rights, Geneva, Fact Sheet No. 9, 3-4 (1990);
Torres, supra note 2, at 151.
4. G.A. Res. 45/164 of 18 Dec. 1990; see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/39 (1991); see also
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the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples' will present
its Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples6 for adoption by the
United Nations. In Australia the Commonwealth government has estab-
lished the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation' and a Royal Commission
into Aboriginal deaths in custody.' A treaty between the Commonwealth
government and the Aboriginal people has also been proposed.'
On the judicial front, in recent years, Aboriginal litigants relying on
the Western Sahara case"0 have challenged the long standing assumption
that Australia was occupied by peaceful possession of terra nullius.
Rather, they argue that sovereignty was acquired by conquest. This has
important legal consequences. In settled colonies (occupation of terra
nullius) applicable English laws are automatically in force on settlement
because there are no pre-existing laws (or rights), whereas conquered or
ceded colonies retain their indigenous laws until the new sovereign alters
them.1 It has generally been assumed that Australia was a settled colony,
the laws of which did not recognize Aboriginal title. 2 As recently as 1979
in Coe v. Commonwealth" two members of the High Court were firmly of
the view that it was fundamental to the Australian legal system that Aus-
tralia was acquired by settlement and not by conquest.'
In June of 1992, in a watershed opinion, the Australian High Court in
Mabo v. Queensland reversed prior authority, and held in a plurality de-
cision that Australia was not terra nullius when occupied and that signifi-
cant pre-settlement indigenous land rights continue to exist under the
common law of Australia. All judges agreed the acquisition of sovereignty
by the Crown was an act of State that could not be questioned in the
municipal courts; 5 nor was it questioned that on gaining sovereignty the
Reed Brody et al., The 42nd Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 260, 286 (1991).
5. Established by E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. Doc. E/82 Supp. 1, at 26 (1982); Douglas
Sanders, The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 406 (1989).
6. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Ninth Session,
43d Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1, Ann.1, Rec. 33 (1991).
7. Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act, 127 AUSTL. C. ACTS 4685 (Cth. 1991).
8. The Commission handed down its report last year. See 1-11 ROYAL COMMISSION
INTO ABORIGINAL DEATHS IN CUSTODY (1991).
9. See Garth Nettheim & Tony Simpson, Aboriginal Peoples and Treaties, 12 CUR-
RENT AFF. BULL. 18 (1989).
10. Advisory Opinion No. 61, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 5 (Oct.16).
11. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 108 (1978)[hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
12. Cooper v. Stuart, [1889] 14 App. Cas. 286; Randwick Mun. Council v. Rutledge, 102
C.L.R. 54 (1959); New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337, 438-9 (1975). See
also Bryan Keon-Cohen, The Makarrata: a Treaty within Australia between Australians,
1985 CURRENT AFF. BULL. 5.
13. Coe v. Commonwealth, 24 A.L.R. 118 (1979).
14. Id. at 129 (Gibbs & Aicken, JJ., concurring). See also Coe v. Commonwealth, 18
A.L.R. 592, 596 (1978)(Mason J.); Re Phillips; Ex parte Aboriginal Development Commis-
sion, 72 A.L.R. 508 (1987).
15. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 20 (Brennan, J.); 72 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.); 92 (Dawson, J.);
142 (Toohey, J.).
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Crown acquired radical or absolute title to all lands in Australia," mean-
ing that under the tenure doctrine all land is held ultimately through the
Crown.1 7 The issue in the case was whether, as had always been assumed,
the Crown had also acquired beneficial ownership over all lands, thereby
extinguishing any pre-existing indigenous rights.
Justice Brennan (with whom Mason, C.J., and McHugh, J., con-
curred) held it to be an untenable position that Australia was occupied as
uninhabited territory because its indigenous peoples were few in number
and of such low social order that it would be idle to impute to them legal
rights. The view that Australia was terra nuflius was based on misinfor-
mation, was racially discriminatory and as such was not in keeping with
contemporary international law or current Australian community val-
ues."8 Although the acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown was not justi-
ciable before municipal courts, the courts did have jurisdiction to deter-
mine the consequences of such acquisition under municipal law. 9 Justice
Brennan considered that no territory inhabited by human beings could be
thought to be terra nullius under the common law of Australia.20 It fol-
lowed from this that certain pre-settlement Aboriginal rights continued to
exist under Australian law. Justices Deane and Gaudron, in a separate
judgment, argued that the original act of State that acquired sovereignty
and radical title to the lands of Australia did not indicate an intention to
also acquire beneficial ownership over unoccupied lands, thereby extin-
guishing Aboriginal title.21 Justice Toohey, in a separate opinion, agreed
with Justice Brennan that it was unacceptable that inhabited land could
be considered terra nullius2  His Honor thought, however, that if land
was in fact occupied, as was much of Australia, the common law protected
the indigenous rights of the occupiers.2" Justice Dawson alone dissented.
His Honor thought that under the common law it mattered not whether
land was acquired by conquest, cession or settlement if the sovereign
manifested an intention to acquire beneficial title to all lands.2 According
to Justice Dawson, nothing in the early history of Australia indicated any
intent on the part of the sovereign to recognize Aboriginal rights.2"
The Court was also divided on the implications that could be drawn
from the decision on the rights of the Crown to extinguish the Aboriginal
title thus recognized. Chief Justice Mason, and Justices Brennan, Dawson
and McHugh held that, absent a clear and unambiguous statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, the Crown could extinguish the Aboriginal title with-
16. Id. at 93 (Dawson, J.).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 26-9 (Brennan, J.).
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 28-9.
21. Id. at 73 (Deane & Guadron, JJ.).
22. Id. at 142 (Toohey, J.).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 368 (Dawson, J.).
25. Id. at 368-9.
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out compensation. Justices Deane, Gaudron and Toohey held to the
contrary. 6
The case is important for what it has to say regarding the rights of
indigenous peoples generally, the concept of terra nullius, the doctrine of
intertemporal law, and the relationship of international law and munici-
pal law.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
27
The action was commenced in the High Court" in 1982 by the plain-
tiffs who are Murray Islanders. Each of the plaintiffs claimed specific par-
cels of land on the Murray Islands. They claimed to hold the land either
under traditional native title, or usufructuary rights over the land, or by
way of customary title. The plaintiffs did not deny the Crown's sover-
eignty over the Islands nor its radical title to the land, but argued that
the immemorial rights of the islanders had not been extinguished upon
the acquisition of sovereignty. To accept this proposition it was necessary
to find, first, that there were such pre-existing rights, which would not be
the case if the Islands were considered terra nullius, and second, that the
rights had not been extinguished by the Crown after annexation.
The Murray Islands of Mer, Dauar, and Waierlie lie at the eastern
end of the Torres Strait. They cover an area of nine square kilometers
and are occupied by the Meriam people, who are Melanesians and num-
ber no more than 1000. The Meriam people are gardeners living in small
villages. Their society was one regulated by customs, taboo, sorcery and
magic. European contact occurred initially at the end of the 18th century
and continued sporadically through to the middle of the 19th century. In
1877 the London Missionary Society established its headquarters on Mer.
The Imperial government in 1872 and 1875 passed the Pacific Islanders
Protection Acts2 9 in order to protect the islanders from blackbirders2 0
The 1875 Act expressly disavowed any territorial claims to the islands,
although the Queensland authorities did exercise some de facto control
over the islands in the 1870's. In 1879 the Queensland Legislature passed
the Queensland Coast Islands Act and the Governor of Queensland acting
under Letters Patent from the Crown, annexed the Murray Islands into
the Colony of Queensland. The Letters Patent used for the 1879 annexa-
tion, however, was ineffective because the Queensland Colony's bounda-
ries had been determined by Imperial legislation; it was therefore neces-
sary to annex the islands by Imperial legislation. This was accomplished
26. Id. at 7 (Mason, CJ. & McHugh, J.).
27. The facts of the case are taken from the judgment of Brennan J. Id. at 6-15.
28. Mabo v. Queensland (High Crt of Aust., Brisbane Office of the Registry, No. B12 of
1982). The case was remitted to the Queensland Supreme Court for a determination of facts.
29. 35 and 36 Vict. Acts c 19; 38 and 39 Viv c 51.
30. The term used for a person or vessel engaged in kidnapping blacks or Polynesians
for slavery.
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by the Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895 (Imp).31 In Wacando v. Common-
wealth82 the High Court rejected an argument that procedural discrepan-
cies had prevented the annexation of the Islands.
In 1985 the government of Queensland attempted to abort the Mabo
case with the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act. This Act pur-
ported to declare retroactively that the intention of the Queensland Coast
Islands Act of 1879 was not only to acquire sovereignty, but also to extin-
guish native title, assuming such title existed. The Act was challenged in
Mabo v. Queensland"3 where a majority " of the High Court held that the
Act offended section 10(1) of the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination
Act (1975) which makes ineffective legislation that prevents racial or eth-
nic groups from enjoying rights, as defined by Art. 5(d) of International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,-"
that are enjoyed by other racial or ethnic groups. 6 For the purposes of
the litigation, the High Court assumed that the rights claimed by the Me-
riam people existed, confining themselves to the issue of whether those
rights had been extinguished by the Queensland Coast Islands Declara-
tory Act.
Proceedings in the Queensland Supreme Court to determine the issue
of fact were finalized in November 1991 and the matter came once again
before the High Court. The various judgements of the Court cover some
170 pages. As is apparent from the, facts the Court could have confined
itself solely to the issue of the status of the Murray Islands. As Justice
Brennan stated:
This court can either apply the existing authorities and proceed to
inquire whether the Meriam people are higher "in the scale of social
organization" than the Australian Aboriginals whose claims were "ut-
terly disregarded" by the existing authorities or the court can overrule
the existing authorities, discarding the distinction between inhabited
colonies that were terra nullius and those which were not.3 7
The Meriam people are different from mainland Australian
Aboriginals in their social organization, culture, racial background and co-
31. 58 & 59 Vict. c 34.
32. Wacando v. Commonwealth, 148 C.L.R. 1 (1981).
33. Mabo v. Queensland, 63 A.L.J.R. 84 (1988).
34. Deane, Brennan, Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ. (Mason C.J., Dawson and Deane, JJ.
dissenting).
35. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
36. 10(1) If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or of a State
or Territory, a person of a particular race, color or national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a
right that is to be enjoyed by persons of another race, color or national or ethnic origin, or
enjoy a right to a more limited extent than persons of another race, color or national or
ethnic origin, then notwithstanding anything in that law, persons of the first mentioned
race, color or national or ethnic origin, shall by force of this section shall enjoy that right to
the same extent as persons of that other race, color or national or ethnic origin.
37. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 27.
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lonial experience.38 Moreover, it could be argued that the 1872 and 1875
Pacific Islanders Protection Acts strongly suggest that the Islands were
not considered terra nullius by the British authorities. Commenting on
such treaties of protection in the Western Sahara case,3 9 Judge Hardy
Dillard noted, "you do not protect a terra nullius." All of the judgments
in Mabo, however, rejected the approach of confining the case to the sta-
tus of the Murray Islands. Justice Dawson agreed that the status of the
Murray Islands could not be determined without first establishing the in-
tention of the Crown with regard to New South Wales. The colony of
Queensland inherited the laws of New South Wales, and it was the laws
of Queensland that were introduced on the annexation of the Murray Is-
lands. It was, therefore, unnecessary to determine whether the Murray
Islands were conquered, ceded, or settled territory, as the Crown had ex-
pressly declared the law to be applied to Queensland and hence the Mur-
ray Islands on the occupation of New South Wales.40
A. The Occupation of Australia as Terra Nullius
Early international law writers were divided on the question whether
territory inhabited by indigenous peoples could be considered terra nul-
lius for the purpose of occupation. Francisco Vitoria,' Grotius,42 and
Blackstone 43 thought that occupied land could only be acquired by con-
quest or cession. Vattel" gave limited recognition of sovereignty to native
peoples while Hyde,45 Oppenheim 4s and Lindley 7 denied recognition of
sovereignty to those whom they classified as backward people. After an
extensive survey of relevant publicists Lindley concluded that:
[E]xtending over some three and a half centuries, there had been a
persistent preponderance of juristic opinion in favour of the proposi-
tion that lands in possession of any backward peoples who are politi-
cally organised ought not to be regarded as if they belonged to no one.
But that, and especially in comparatively modern times, a different
doctrine has been contended for and has numbered among its expo-
nents some well-known authorities; a doctrine which denies that In-
ternational Law recognizes any rights in primitive peoples to the terri-
38. See Beckett, Ownership of Land in the Torres Strait Islands, in ABORIGINES, LAND
AND LAND RIGHTS 202-206 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton eds., 1983).
39. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 124.
40. 107 A.L.R. at 106.
41. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IvRE BELLI RELECIONES 127-28 (J. Bates
trans., 1917)(1964).
42. 2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRi TRES 550 (F. Kelsey trans., 1925).
43. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 107-8.
44. 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
85 (Charles Fenwick trans., 1964).
45. 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 175 (1922).
46. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383-84 (3d ed. 1920).
47. MARK FRANK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1926).
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tory they inhabit, and, in its most advanced form, demands that such
peoples shall have progressed so far in civilization as to have become
recognized as members of the Family of Nations before they can be
allowed such rights.'8
John Westlake argued in 1910 that because indigenous societies were
unable to supply a government suitable for the protection of white men
they could not be given international status.4
9
International Tribunal Awards in the 1920s and 1930s similarly did
not recognize indigenous territorial rights.50 Even when the land was
ceded or conquered and there was a treaty between the indigenous peo-
ples and the colonial power, the treaty had little impact in international
law. Max Huber in the Islands of Palmas case said of such treaties that,
"they are not in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capa-
ble of creating rights and obligations." 51
It was not until 1975 in the Western Sahara case that an interna-
tional tribunal raised doubts about the question whether land occupied
by indigenous people could be considered terra nullius. Vice President
Ammoun in his Separate Opinion considered that the concept of terra
nullius had been employed at all periods to justify conquest and coloniza-
tion and as such stood condemned.5 ' The majority thought, however, that
territory was not terra nullius if it were occupied by peoples having "so-
cial and political organization.""3 This seems to suggest that the Court
considered that there might be territory where the inhabitants do not
have such organization and as such is terra nullius.
The history of the concept of terra nullius and indeed the Western
Sahara case itself illustrates a continuing conflict between lofty ideals
and the practical reality of greed and acquisition. It is an irony that the
Court's Opinion in the Western Sahara case, on which Justice Brennan
relies, that the peoples of the Western Sahara were entitled to self-deter-
mination was ignored by Morocco and Mauritania, who divided the area
between themselves.84
The early history of Australia shows a similar conflict between the
48. Id. at 20.
49. J. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-143 (1920).
50. Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53; Islands
of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928); Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6
R.I.A.A. 173 (1926).
51. Islands of Palmas Case, 2 R.I.A.A. at 858. He did not think, however, that they were
totally without effect internationally in that fulfillment of the obligation may be a basis for
determining whether the colonial power was exercising suzerainty for the purposes of recog-
nition of sovereignty by other states. This point will be returned to later in the text.
52. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 86.
53. Id. at 39.
54. In 1978 Mauritania formally renounced its claims to the Western Sahara and the
entire area was taken over by Morocco. For a general account of the conflict, see J. DAMIS,
CONFLICT IN NORTH-WEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN SAHARA DIsPUTE (1983). See also Franck,
The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976).
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pious hopes of high government officials and the actual practices of the
settlers. Captain Cook, when he visited the east coast of Australia in 1768,
was given instructions to show the natives, "every kind of civility and
regard [and] . . . also with the consent of the natives to take possession
of convenient situations in the country."55 Arthur Phillips, when he was
commissioned to sail the first fleet to Botany Bay, was instructed to treat
the natives with kindness and punish those who unnecessarily interrupted
them in their occupations. He was also commissioned to grant away lands
that were in the Crown's power to dispose of. No direct mention was
made, however, of Aboriginal land rights. 6 As late as 1839 Lord Russell
at the colonial office wrote in a despatch to Governor Gipps in Australia,
"it is impossible that the Government should forget that the original ag-
gression was our own, and that we have never yet performed the sacred
duty . . . to impart to the former occupiers of New South Wales the
blessings of Christianity, or the knowledge of the Arts and advantages of
civilized life. 5 7
Although he found inhabitants, Cook did not seek nor obtain their
consent when he claimed possession of half the Australian continent in
1770."8 After this there followed a period of dispossession, conflict and
extermination." The statement of Mr. Lesina, the Member of Parliament
for Clermon in Queensland in 1901, reflected a typical view at the turn of
the century:
I do not think there is any necessity why we should step out of our
way to preserve the aboriginal population ... the aboriginal popula-
tion of this country must eventually disappear entirely. . . . The law
of evolution says that [they]... shall disappear in the onward pro-
gress of the white man.60
Under these circumstances the High Court in Mabo was faced with a
monumental task in logically holding that Australia w'as not viewed as
terra nullius when first occupied and moreover, that aboriginal rights
continue to subsist.
Justice Brennan thought that if the Crown did have exclusive owner-
ship of all the land in Australia it would mean that the common law ex-
tinguished the land rights of the indigenous people on the first settlement
thereby exposing them to:
deprivation of the religious, cultural and economic sustenance which
55. Secret Instruction Book of the British Admiralty in JOHN BENNETT & ALEX
CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 253-254 (1982)(hereinafter BENNETT & CASTLES].
56. 1 BARTON, HISTORY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FROM THE RECORDS 483 (1989).
57. Despatch No. 62 Lord Russell to Gipps, 21 Dec. 1839 [H.R.A., (1924), i20.439, at
440], cited in Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1, 108 (Dawson, J.).
58. BENNETT AND CASTLES, supra note 55.
59. HENRY REYNOLDS, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER 64-95 (1981); ROBERTS, supra
note 2, at 13-19.
60. Quoted in ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS :A HANDBOOK 109 (Nicolas Peterson ed., 1981).
See also REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
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the land provides, vested the land effectively in the control of the Im-
perial authorities without any right to compensation and made the
indigenous inhabitants intruders in their own homes and mendicants
for a place to live. Judged by civilized standard, such law is unjust
and its claim to be part of the common law to be applied in contem-
porary Australia must be questioned.0'
While accepting that acquisition of territory by a state for the first
time cannot be challenged in the courts, Justice Brennan thought that
the courts could determine the consequences of acquisition of sovereignty
under local law; that the courts could determine the body of law that is in
force in the new territory. This depended on the manner of its acquisi-
tion. How a state acquired territory was governed by international law.
The common law, in accordance with the manner of acquisition, deter-
mined the body of law that applied in the new territory.
His Honor considered acquisition of territory by way of the enlarged
doctrine of terra nullius: namely, that states could acquire territory by
discovery and occupation, although the territory had an indigenous popu-
lation provided that the Aboriginal inhabitants were not organised in a
society that was united for political action. The enlarged doctrine of terra
nullius, however, created problems in determining what law was to be
applied to an occupied territory. Blackstone," for example, was unable to
declare any rule by which the common law became part of territory ac-
quired by occupation that was not uninhabited. Justice Brennan there-
fore, came to the conclusion:
It is one thing for our contemporary law to accept that the laws of
England ... became the laws of (Australia). . . . It is another thing
for our contemporary law to accept that when the common law of
England became the common law of the several colonies, the theory
which was advanced to support the introduction of the common law of
England accords with our present knowledge and appreciation of the
facts.. . . The facts as we know them today do not fit the 'absence of
law' or 'barbarian' theory underpinning the colonial reception of the
common law of England. That being so, there is no warrant for apply-
ing in these times rules of the English common law which were the
product of that theory.63
His Honor then considered the status of the enlarged theory of terra nul-
lius in international law. Referring to the Western Sahara Opinion, par-
ticularly that of Vice President Ammoun, he concluded that the enlarged
notion of terra nullius no longer commanded general acceptance. " It fol-
lowed from this that
[i]f the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified
as terra nullius no longer commands' general support, the doctrines of
61. 107 A.L.R. at 18 (Brennan, J.).
62. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 107.
63. 107 A.L.R. at 26 (Brennan, J.).
64. Id. at 28.
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the common law which depend on the notion that native peoples may
be "so low in the scale of social organization" that it is 'idle to impute
to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law" can
hardly be retained. If it were permissible in the past centuries to keep
the common law in step with international law, it is imperative in to-
day's world that the common law should neither be nor be seen to be
frozen in an age of racial discrimination. . . . The common law does
not necessarily conform with international law, but international law
is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the
common law, especially when international law declares the existence
of universal human rights.65
Thus Justice Brennan's reasoning is, first, that a law based on mistaken
facts should have no application if it leads to racial discrimination and,
second, that as international law no longer accepts the enlarged doctrine
of terra nullius, the current doctrine should be applied in order to protect
indigenous human rights. This second proposition appears to apply the
international law doctrine of intertemporal law to the law of Australia.
In the Islands of Palmas case66 Max Huber considered that for occu-
pation to be effective the Sovereign had not only to show that sovereignty
was acquired in accordance with international law, but also that it was
maintained in accordance with developing international law. 7 Justice
Brennan does not question the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty. How-
ever, the rejection of the expanded concept of terra nullius has, for prac-
tical purposes, diminished what would have been the entitlements of the
Crown under what was thought to be the international and common law
at the time of occupation. As this is achieved by incorporation of contem-
porary international law standards into Australian domestic law, two
questions can be asked: Is the standard applied by Justice Brennan in
fact the contemporary standard? Second, would international- law apply
the contemporary standard of terra nullius? In other words is intertem-
poral law applicable in this situation?
Insofar as the first question is concerned, it is not at all clear that the
Western Sahara case rejects the expanded notion of terra nullius as part
of current international law. The Court, in its Advisory Opinion, seems to
adopt an evaluative test in determining whether the nomadic tribes of the
Western Sahara satisfied the relevant test. The Court concluded, "[iln
the present instance ... at the time of colonization Western Sahara was
inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically or-
ganized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them."6 Jus-
tice Brennan rejects any test of social or political evaluation as being ra-
cially prejudicial and as such inconsistent with international law. His
position accords with that of Vice President Ammoun, who would have
65. Id.
66. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
67. Id. at 839.
68. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 39 (Emphasis added).
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excluded from the concept of terra nullius any inhabited territory. 9
The Western Sahara case was decided in 1975. Since the 70's, how-
ever, numerous declarations,7 0 studies,7' working groups, 2 and state poli-
cies dealing with indigenous concerns73 suggest that an indigenous norm
is in the process of emerging for the protection of indigenous rights, in-
cluding land rights. One focus of this norm relates to the classification of
territory occupied by indigenous people as terra nullius. The Indigenous
Nongovernmental Organizations submitted to the Working Group on In-
digenous Populations Fifth Session a draft declaration asserting that,
"[d]iscovery, conquest, settlement on a theory of terra nullius and unilat-
eral legislation are never legitimate bases for States to claim or retain the
territories of indigenous nations or peoples."'
4
While one might say that a norm is emerging regarding indigenous
peoples' land rights and an aspect of this norm is the rejection of the
enlarged doctrine of terra nullius, can one say that it has emerged so as
to reject the expanded notion of terra nullius? In the development of
international law there is that shadowy period when non obligatory state
69. Id. at 86. It should be noted that some of the judges expressed doubts concerning
the relevance of the terra nullius question to the case in that none of the involved parties
had claimed that the Western Sahara was terra nullius. See id. at 74-75 (Gros, J.); 113
(Petren, J.); 123 (Dillard, J.).
70. See Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Re-
port of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.4 (1981): Resolutions of the Inuit Circumpolar Con-
ference, Annex 1; the Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous
Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere prepared by the International Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations Conference on the Discrimination against Indigenous Populations,
Annex IV; Resolutions of the First Congress of the Indian Movements of South America,
Annex V; Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding the Rights of Indigenous People by
the Seminar on Human Rights in Rural Areas of the Andean Region, Annex VI; Recommen-
dations of the Forth Russell Tribunal on the Rights of the Indians of the Americas, Annex
VII. The San Jose Declaration of 1981, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations: Report of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/21/Add.3, 25 (1983). The Decla-
ration of Principles Adopted by Indigenous Peoples at a prepatory meeting in Geneva, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Report of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations in its Fifth Session, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/22 Annex V (1987). U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, First Re-
vised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/33 (1989).
71. See Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/7 Add. 1-4 (1986); see also ROXANNE ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS (1984).
72. In 1982 the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
73. See generally Torres, supra note 2.
74. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER ET AL., DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, reprinted
in Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/22 Add.1 (1985).
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practice becomes a binding rule of international law. In this process mu-
nicipal courts have an important role to play; perhaps an even greater
role than the international tribunals. Somewhere along the line an indica-
tion of the obligatory nature of the rule must be established. Without
action at this crucial stage international law cannot advance. Lord Justice
Nourse in the Tin Council case7 5 articulated the appropriate course for a
municipal court where an international rule had not solidified:
An uncertain question of international law is one which cannot be set-
tled by reference either to an opinion of the International Court of
Justice or to some usage, custom or general principle of law recognized
by all civilized nations. The authorities show that where it is neces-
sary for an English court to decide such a question... [it] must do so;
being guided by municipal legislation and judicial decisions, treaties
and conventions and the opinions of international jurists; and, where
no consensus is there found by those opinions which are most nearly
consistent with reason and justice.71
This dynamic role is imperative in matters involving human rights.
This is because the claimants often have no means of bringing their cases
before international tribunals or forums where the existence of a norm of
international law may be established. In such situations it is the munici-
pal courts who must bear the burden of articulating the norm of interna-
tional law. Moreover, in the case of indigenous peoples' rights, the courts
of a state with a large indigenous population, such as Australia, have a
particular obligation to articulate the international standard concerning
such people.7
In determining the second question, whether intertemporal law
would apply, the decision of the Court in the Western Sahara case is of
little help. The Court there considered itself bound by the question put
to it by the General Assembly to decide the terra nullius question accord-
ing to the law in force at the time of colonization. 8 Justice Brennan's
intertemporal approach, however, does find support in the separate opin-
ions of Judges De Castro and Forester. De Castro argued that changes to
facts and changes to law could not be ignored in the Western Sahara
case: 7 9 "whatever the existing legal ties with the territory may have been
at the time of colonization by Spain, legally those ties remain subject to
intertemporal law. . ... 80s Judge Forster similarly thought that the Opin-
75. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dept. of Trade, [19881 3 W.L.R. 1033.
76. Id. at 107.
77. As De Visscher has said of the development of customary international law;
"Among the users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than
others, either because of their weight . . . or because their interests bring them more fre-
quently this way." CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 155 (1960).
78. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 38-9.
79. Id. at 169 (DeCastro, J.).
80. Id. at 171. Judge De Castro believed that the issue of terra nullius and existing ties
should have been considered independently.
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ion of the Court minimized, "the social and temporal context of the prob-
lem." ' Philip Jessup, commenting on Huber's conception of intertem-
poral law, found it "highly disturbing" that a state's title to territory
might be affected by the development of international morality. "Every
state would constantly be under the necessity of examining its title to
each portion of its territory in order to determine whether a change in the
law had necessitated, as it were, a re-acquisition." 82 Jessup was concerned
about a state losing its sovereignty over territory by virtue of a new rule
of international law. This is clearly not the situation here. The doctrine,
however, is of general application to customary international law and is
not confined solely to the acquisition of territory.8
Brownlie8 ' and other writers85 have pointed out that the concern ex-
pressed by Jessup, while correct in theory, rarely has a practical effect.
This is because the doctrines of acquiescence, prescription and desuetude
will limit its application. Also, "inter-temporal law has never been applied
where a change in the law has come about in a short time."8 6 With regard
to this latter point it can be said that, from the time of the writings of
Vitoria and Blackstone, the extended doctrine of terra nullius has been
questioned. Certainly since 1945, when the protection of indigenous peo-
ples has been more prominently on the political agenda, acquisition by
way of the extended doctrine has been under attack. With particular re-
gard to Australia, the despatch of Lord Russell to Governor Gipps87 indi-
cated an awareness of the wrong done to the indigenous people of Austra-
lia and, as one does not perform acts of aggression against terra nullius, it
seems relatively clear that since 1839 the idea that Australia was acquired
as terra nullius8 8 was a fiction. This is illustrated by the fact that the idea
that Australia was settled as terra nullius was challenged in the Austra-
lian courts as early as 1836.89 Under these circumstances it can hardly be
said that the abandonment of the extended doctrine terra nullius oc-
curred within a short time. Therefore, it seems that under the circum-
stances international law would call for the application of intertemporal
law in the application of the terra nutlius doctrine insofar as it relates to
the rights of indigenous peoples.
One final question relating to this aspect of Justice Brennan's judg-
ment is the applicability of intertemporal law to municipal systems. This
81. Id. at 103 (Forster, J.).
82. Philip Jessup, The Island of Palmas Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735 (1928). See
also R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1963); W.
VERFELT, THE MIANGAS ARBITRATION 14, 149 (1933).
83. T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285 (1980)[here-
inafter Elias].
84. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1973).
85. Elias, supra note 83, at 286-287.
86. A. ROCHE, THE MINQUIERS AND ECREHOS CASE 83 (1959).
87. See text accompanying note 57.
88. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 124.
89. R. v. Murrell (1836) Legge 72.
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was raised indirectly in the United States,90 the United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany9 in cases involving the applicability of
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity as opposed to the more re-
cently developed restrictive theory. In each case the court indicated that
it would apply the current rule of international law although, in the com-
mon law jurisdictions, there was prior authority adopting the absolute
theory into their law.
While Justice Brennan supported his decision with the incorporation
of contemporary international law standards of terra nullius into Austra-
lian law, Justices Deane and Gaudron in their separate opinion, adopt an
approach more in line with the first strand of Justice Brennan's opinion.
They agreed that the acquisition of sovereignty was unchallengeable in
the municipal courts and also that the common law determined the law
applicable after acquisition; and, referring to United Kingdom author-
ity," they concluded that the common law of the time did recognize in-
digenous title if the territory was occupied. Then after reviewing the his-
torical data they conclude that the act of State establishing sovereignty
over Australia indicated nothing more than an intention to assert radical
title to land in Australia:
[I]t seems to us to be simply not arguable that there was anything in
the act of State establishing the Colony which constituted either an
expropriation or extinguishment of any existing native interests in the
vast areas of land in the new Colony or a negation or reversal of the
strong assumption of the common law that such native interests were
respected and protected under the law .... 94
Their Honors explain the absence of any specific reference to Aboriginal
title in the early documents on the basis that because of a lack of infor-
mation regarding the inhabitants generally,
it was simply assumed either that the land needs of the penal estab-
lishment could be satisfied without impairing any existing interests (if
there were any) of the Aboriginal inhabitants in specific land or that
any difficulties which did arise could be resolved on the spot with the
assent or acquiescence of the Aboriginals.9"
While subsequent acts of dispossession might explain an ambiguity in the
original claim to sovereignty, subsequent acts could not do so when, as in
the case of the Australian settlement, there was no ambiguity regarding
the relevant act of State.96
90. Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
91. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 471 (1977).
92. Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 16 I.L.M. 501 (1977).
93. Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1921] 1 App. Cas.
408; Amodu Tijani, [1921] 2 App. Cas. 409, 410.
94. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 73.
95. Id. at 74.
96. Id.
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Justice Toohey in his separate opinion adopted a slightly different
approach. He agreed with Justice Brennan that it was unacceptable that
land which is in regular occupation should be regarded as terra nullius.9 7
However, His Honor thought that the doctrine of terra nullius had no
application to the case. He argued that because the land was in fact occu-
pied by the Aboriginal people when the Crown obtained sovereignty, the
Crown could only obtain radical title to occupied land, this regardless of
any intentions it mights have had to the contrary:
Immediately on acquisition indigenous inhabitants became British
subjects whose interests were to be protected in the case of a settled
colony by the immediate operation of the common law. The Crown
did not acquire a proprietary title to any territory except that truly
uninhabited.98
These aspects of the judgements are concerned with interpreting histori-
cal data by way of present mores and information concerning indigenous
people. The International Court in the Western Sahara case in deciding
the status of the territory at the time of occupation took a similar ap-
proach and was able to look at information regarding the Western Sa-
hara's legal status and legal ties at other times, if this shed light on the
initial occupation.9
Justices Deane and Gaudron, in their judgment, suggest that if the
Crown officers had been aware of the numbers of Aboriginals on the Aus-
tralian continent, and the sophistication of their culture and social organ-
ization, they would not have considered the territory terra nullius. As
they had no such information, and as there was a strong common law
presumption protecting indigenous title, the act of State acquiring sover-
eignty only extended to the extent of acquiring radical title. The content
of the Sovereign's intention is therefore supplied with hindsight based on
accurate information as to Aboriginals and their society.
Justice Toohey's position was that the Sovereign's intention at the
time was irrelevant if the land was in fact occupied. He then employed
current information regarding Aboriginals and their relationship to the
land to show that the land was in fact occupied on settlement and there-
fore protected by the common law.
Justice Dawson dissented. He thought that the issue of whether terri-
tory is classified as ceded, conquered, or settled was irrelevant for munici-
pal law purposes where the new law which is introduced is expressly de-
clared by the new Sovereign." 0 In Australia, the sovereign had no
intention to preserve Aboriginal title:
97. Id. at 142. His honor also thought that the idea that land which was not in regular
occupation was terra nullius needed great scrutiny. The failure of people to remain in one
spot may be due to the harshness of the climate rather than a lack of attachment to the
land. Id. at 141.
98. Id. at 142.
99. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 38.
100. 107 A.L.R. at 106 (citing Cooper v. Stuart, [18891 14 App. Cas. 286, 291).
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Upon any account, the policy which was implemented and the laws
which were passed in New South Wales make it plain that, from the
inception of the colony, the Crown treated all land in the colony as
unoccupied and afforded no recognition to any form of native interest
in the land. It simply treated the land as its own to dispose of without
regard to such interests as the natives might have had prior to the
assumption of sovereignty. What was done was quite inconsistent with
any recognition, by acquiescence or otherwise, of native title. 101
After considering the historical data, including the early instructions to
governors, the dispossession of the Aboriginal people of their land, and
the creation of reservations, His Honor concluded:
[T]here may not be a great deal to be proud of in this history of
events. But a dispassionate appraisal of what occurred is essential to
the determination of the legal consequences, notwithstanding the de-
gree of condemnation which is nowadays apt to accompany any ac-
count. The policy which lay behind the legal regime was determined
politically and, however insensitive the politics may now seem to have
been, a change in view does not of itself mean a change in the law. It
requires the implementation of a new policy to do that and that is a
matter for government rather than the courts. In the meantime it
would be wrong to attempt to revise history or to fail to recognize its
legal impact, however unpalatable it may now seem. To do so would
be to impugn the foundations of the very legal system under which
this case must be decided.102
In this regard Justice Dawson agrees with Justice Brennan in that the
actual intention of the Sovereign on occupation was to claim all beneficial
ownership of the land in Australia. The difference is that Brennan simply
would not give effect to such an intention based as it was on incorrect
information. As the relevant intention is colored with the knowledge or
lack thereof of Aboriginal culture and numbers together with racial
prejudices prevalent at the time, it is relatively clear that the Crown did
intend to occupy the Australian continent as terra nullius. The intent is
manifest if one compares the instructions of Lord Normanby, the Secre-
tary of State for War and the Colonies, to Captain Hobson, the Crown
negotiator with the New Zealand Maori people - a territory not consid-
ered terra nullius - with those of the Crown officers occupying New
South Wales:
[The Crown] disclaims . . . every pretension to seize on the Island of
New Zealand, or to govern them as part of the Dominion of Great
Britain, unless free and intelligent consent of the Natives, expressed
according to their established usages, shall be first obtained .... All
dealings with the Aborigines for their Lands must be conducted on
the same principles of sincerity, justice, and good faith as must govern
101. Id. at 106-7.
102. Id. at 111. For an account of legislative attempts to reject the terra nullius applica-
tion to Australia, see Andree Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous
Rights Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 743 (1990).
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your transactions with them for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sov-
ereignty of the Islands .... The acquisition of Land by the Crown for
future settlement . . . must be confined to such Districts as the Na-
tives can alienate without distress or serious inconvenience to
themselves." 3
In holding that the intention at the time of settlement was not to occupy
as terra nullius Justices Deane and Gaudron were able to further hold
that the present indigenous rights were not extinguishable by the Crown
without compensatory damages. Justice Toohey reached the same conclu-
sion by a different route. The majority, however, thought that Crown
could extinguish the native title. This raises the question of whether
Mabo is yet another instance of "Indian giving". One more empty prom-
ise. To answer this it is necessary to consider the nature of the interest
recognized and the extent to which it can be protected.
B. The Implications of Mabo
1. The Nature of Indigenous Title
In determining whether the Aboriginal people retained presettlement
rights and interests in their land, Justice Brennan thought that the court
could adopt contemporary notions of justice and human rights if in so
doing it did not fracture the skeleton of principles which gave the com-
mon law its shape and consistency. '0 By this His Honor apparently
meant the recognition of the indigenous interest might run afoul of an
essential doctrine of the common law. An essential doctrine in part being
indicated by whether, if a rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to
the law would disproportionate to the benefit achieved. 05
His Honor considered the doctrine of tenure to be an essential doc-
trine of the common law. 0 6 Recognizing that the Crown only acquired
radical title in the land, so that beneficial ownership lay with the indige-
nous title holders, would not fracture the tenure doctrine. The recogni-
tion of radical title in the Crown was quite consistent with the recognition
of native title to land, radical title was necessary for when the Crown
exercised its sovereign power to grant or to appropriate land within its
territory. Unless this sovereign power is exercised in one of these ways
there was no reason why land within the Crown's territory should not
continue to be subject to native title.10 7
It was only by fastening on the notion that a settled colony was terra
nullius that it was possible to predicate of the Crown the acquisition
103. Normanby to Hobson, 14 Aug. 1839, CO 2091/, 251-81. See also SPEECHES AND
DOCUMENTS ON NEW ZEALAND HISTORY 10 (William David McIntyre & W.J. Gardner eds.,
1971).
104. 107 A.L.R. at 29.
105. Id. at 19.
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id. at 35-6.
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of ownership of land in a colony already occupied by indigenous in-
habitants. It was only on the hypothesis that there was nobody in oc-
cupation that it could be said that the Crown was the owner because
there was no other. If that hypothesis be rejected, the notion that sov-
ereignty carried ownership in its wake must be rejected too.'08
In Milirripum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,10 9 Justice Blackburn of the Supreme
Court of the Northern Territory had held that the Aboriginal relationship
with their land was not of a proprietary nature. This was because, while
the Aboriginals felt that they had obligations towards the land, it was not
an economic relationship whereby they could exclude others or alienate
the land. 10 Justice Brennan thought Aboriginal title constituted a propri-
etary interest when it was possessed by a community that was in exclu-
sive possession of land. It did not matter whether or not the land be-
longed to individuals in the community so long as the community
effectively asserted that none but its members had the right of occupancy
or use of the land. Justice Brennan rejected the view in Milirripum that
alienability was an essential indicia of a proprietary interest. The fact
that individual members of a group enjoyed usufructuary rights over land
did not mean that the Aboriginal community or group did not have a
proprietary interest, which was a burden on the radical title of the
Crown."'
The Aboriginal title, which survived the past 200 years were those
where the clan or group had continued to observe, as far as practicable,
the laws and customs based on the traditions of the group so that the
connection with the land was maintained."' If the clan or group no longer
practiced the customs, then the foundation of the native title had been
abandoned, and could not be revived. Full title had vested in the
Crown."'
Insofar as alienability was concerned Aboriginal title could not be ac-
quired from an indigenous people by one who not being indigenous could
not acknowledge their laws and customs. Similarly, a right or interest
cannot be acquired by a clan or group or member of an indigenous people
unless the acquisition is consistent with the laws and customs of the peo-
ple. Only the Crown can acquire hative interest outside the laws and cus-
toms of the indigenous people, it being an incident of sovereignty that the
Crown alone can accept the surrender of native title.' 14
The rights and interests recognized will be protected by the appro-
priate legal and equitable remedies of the common law and established by
the evidence as to whether the right is proprietary or personal and usu-
108. Id. at 31.
109. Milirripum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971).
110. Id. at 270-73.
111. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 36.
112. Id. at 42.
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id.
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fructuary; and whether it is possessed by community, group or
individual. " 5
Justices Deane and Gaudron adopted a similar approach. They de-
fined native title as being one where the interest under the local law or
custom involved "an established entitlement of an identified community,
group or [rarely] individual to the occupation or use of particular land
and that entitlement. . . be of sufficient significance to establish a locally
recognized [interest] between the particular community, group or individ-
ual and that land."'1 6 The entitlement may be one that correlates to com-
mon law notions of ownership, possession and property or it may not. If it
does not correlate with a common law interest then it may either be
transformed into an interest recognized by the common law or the com-
mon law may be modified so as to accommodate the new interest."7
Whatever the nature of the entitlement, however, it is a personal in-
terest and not a legal or beneficial interest or estate in the land. Following
from this it cannot be alienated outside of the native system except to the
Crown; and it may be extinguished by a grant or other dealing with the
land that was inconsistent with the common law native title."8 As per-
sonal rights they can be extinguished by surrender to the Crown or may
be lost by the abandonment of the connection with the land. Their Hon-
ors were not prepared to decide whether the interest would be lost by
abandonment of the traditional customs and ways of the group. Their
present feeling is that occupancy and use of the land sufficient to main-
tain the interest."9
Justice Toohey took the most radical approach to the nature of the
indigenous title, starting from the premise that it is the presence of the
indigenous people on the land that prevents the Crown from acquiring
beneficial title. It follows from this that presence would be insufficient to
establish title if it were coincidental or truly random, "having no connec-
tion with or meaning in relation to a society's economic, cultural or reli-
gious life." The use of the land must be meaningful as understood from
the perspective of the society. 20 Referring to Sac and Fox Indian Tribes
v. United States,' and Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Af-
fairs, '2 His Honor thought that the proof of occupancy should be by ref-
erence to the demands of the land and the society in question.'23 He did
not think, however, that anything more than established occupancy at
115. Id. at 44.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Id. at 65-6.
118. Id. at 66.
119. Id. at 83.
120. Id. at 146.
121. Sac and Fox Indian Tribes v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (1967).
122. Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, 107 D.L.R.3d 513, 544-45
(1979).123. 107 A.L.R. at 147.
1993
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
time of annexation was needed. His Honor did not see why "long prior"
occupancy was necessary. 2 ' Nor was it necessary that occupancy be ex-
clusive,' 29 except insofar as was necessary to preclude indiscriminate
ranging over land as a basis of title. If more than one band occupied the
land each small group could be said to have title or it was vested in the
larger society. 2 ' His Honor also thought that the inalienability of native
title was open to question, and the characterization of native title as per-
sonal rather than proprietary, "fruitless" and "unnecessarily complex.1
27
Justice Toohey thought that there was power in the Crown to extinguish
traditional title, but there is some authority that suggests consent is
required.128
Justice Dawson, in his dissent, acknowledged that the annexation of
land did not bring to an end those rights which the Crown in the exercise
of its sovereignty chooses to recognize.' 9 His Honor thought that the in-
digenous interest need not correspond with common law notions of prop-
erty. 3 0 The critical question for Justice Dawson was whether the Crown
had accepted the indigenous title either expressly or impliedly. This was
because once the Crown assumed radical title pre-existing title was held
under the Crown and the Crown must accept that title."'
The judgments of the Court in Mabo advance the status of indige-
nous title in Australia to the extent that they now recognize that Aborigi-
nal interests in land need not correspond with common law concepts of
ownership. The extinguishment of Aboriginal interests by an assumed
abandonment because of an absence from the land or the dismemberment
of the group is inappropriate. First, it assumes that the connection with
the land is primarily a physical one. Aboriginals may not have lived on
their lands for years perhaps generations yet continue to have spiritual
links with the land and its sacred sites. Also they may have been absent
from their land due to misrepresentations, false promises and violence.
The abandonment doctrine may ultimately protect only that land which
the white settlers considered insufficiently valuable to be worth the effort
of driving off the Aboriginal people, while at the same time disenfranchis-
ing those who are the most oppressed.
The restriction on alienability may be less significant than it appears.
The indigenous title holders presumably can relinquish their title to the
Crown in return for a grant back of the land in fee simple. Moreover, the
124. Id. at 147-8. This was required in Hamlet of Baker Lake, 107 D.L.R.3d at 546.
125. Id. at 148 (citing United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345
(1941)).
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id. at 151-2.
128. Id. at 151 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 350, 370 (1832)(the crown's title
comprised, "the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell").
129. Id. at 93-4.
130. Id. at 97.
131. Id. at 98-9.
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right to exclude ordinarily includes the right to include. It would follow
that the title holders could grant leases and licenses to their lands, but
cannot alienate it completely. The inalienability of traditional title is a
significant feature of the claims of indigenous people. The World Council
of Indigenous Peoples identified as one of their irrevocable and inborn
rights "inalienable, collective land ownership." '132
2. The Crown's Power to Extinguish Indigenous Title
The defendant in Mabo argued that under the common law, pre-ex-
isting customary rights were extinguished unless expressly recognized by
the Crown." 3 Justice Brennan considered the preferable rule to be that a
change in sovereignty did not extinguish native title,'" and that the in-
digenous inhabitants Were in the same position as inhabitants of a con-
quered territory. In so holding, the Court overruled long standing author-
ity to the contrary. This was necessary to prevent the continued
discrimination against the Aboriginal people. Moreover, it also accorded
with the reality of Australian history. The acquisition of sovereignty did
not encompass beneficial ownership of the land. The Aboriginals were not
dispossessed of their lands by such acquisition, but rather by recurrent
exercises of paramount power to exclude the indigenous inhabitants from
their lands as the colonies expanded. " '
The acquisition of sovereignty, however, carried with it the power to
create and extinguish private rights in the land. The courts could not re-
view the merit of an extinguishment, only its legality. Following United
States" 6 and Canadian 3 7 authority, the exercise of the power must reveal
a clear and plain intention to do so. Such an intention is not revealed by
a law which merely regulates the enjoyment of title. Similarly, a law
which reserves land from sale for the purpose of permitting the indige-
nous to enjoy the native title does not work an extinguishment." 8
Justices Deane and Gaudron rejected the notion that native title was
no more than permissive occupancy which the Crown was lawfully enti-
tled to revoke or terminate regardless of the wishes of those living on the
land. 3 9 This would give the indigenous people no real security as they
132. Special General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples: Declara-
tions and Resolution, reproduced in Cobo Report, supra note 3.
133. 107 A.L.R. at 38 (citing Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rajbai, 42 I.A. 229
(1915); Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India, 51 I.A. 357 (1924); Secretary
of State for India v. Sardar Rustam Khan, I.A. 356 (1941)).
134. 107 A.L.R. at 41.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941); Lipan Apache
Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967).
137. Calder v. A.G. of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 210 (1973); Hamlet of Baker
Lake v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 107 D.L.R.3d 513 (1979); Reg. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th
385 (1990).
138. 107 A.L.R. at 48.
139. Id. at 67-68.
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could be dispossessed at the whim of the executive.' 0 Their Honors
thought that if the Crown wrongfully extinguished native title it would be
obliged to pay compensation."' As native title constitutes a legal right,
the Commonwealth would be obliged to provide just terms for any acqui-
sition. The Racial Discrimination Act also restrains the States and Terri-
tories from extinguishing or diminishing Aboriginal title.'4 2
Justice Toohey thought that the Crown had the power to extinguish
native title by clear and plain legislation.' 4 3 His Honor, however, thought
that there exists a fiduciary duty to ensure that traditional title was not
impaired or destroyed without the consent or against the interests of the
title holders.'4 4  Otherwise the title holders would be entitled to
compensation.' 5
Chief Justice Mason and Justices McHugh'" and Dawson ' 7 agreed
with Justice Brennan on the power of the Crown to extinguish Aboriginal
title without compensation. In practical terms the distinction may not be
as great as it appears. The states may be able to extinguish native title
with a grant to an Aboriginal group. Thus the government of South Aus-
tralia vested in the Pitjantjatjara people some 102,630 square kilometers
(more than a tenth of-the states land area) of their traditional lands.' 8
Such an exercise of power would probably extinguish native title. The
legislation vesting the land was held in Gerhardy v. Brown 49 not to of-
fend the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act because its purpose
was to ensure adequate advancement of certain racial groups requiring
protection under section 8(1) of the Commonwealth Act. Other acts by
the states to extinguish title would probably violate the Act under the
ruling of Mabo v. Queensland.'50 While the Commonwealth government
has the power to extinguish Aboriginal title, it would now be politically
unacceptable for it to do so. In this regard, the Australian Aborigines may
find themselves better off than indigenous peoples whose lands were
taken by cession or conquest.
III. CONCLUSION
Clearly the judgments of the various members of the Court indicate a
strong desire to right the wrongs done to the Aboriginal people. The ap-
140. Citing Attorney General for Quebec v. Attorney General for Canada, [1921] 1 App.
Cas. 406; Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] App. Cas. 576.
141. 107 A.L.R. at 84.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 152.
144. Id. at 156-60 (citing Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 70 D.L.R.4th 185, 482
(1991); Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 384).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 96.
148. Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act No. 20 of 1981.
149. Gerhardy v. Brown, 57 A.L.R. 472 (1985).
150. See generally, supra note 1.
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proaches of the majority show a great deal of ingenuity in resurrecting
rights thought dead and buried for some 200 years. The members of the
Court, however, were hamstrung by precedent and a natural caution not
to go too far. The implications of the case for Australian Aborigines are
not clear. Mabo dealt with land rights. Indigenous people, however, claim
many other rights.' 5' If Australia is no longer to be considered as settled
as terra nullius, how many other indigenous rights have survived? The
answer to this question, in the judgment of Justice Brennan, will have to
be found in the pre-existing rights and whether their recognition will
fracture the skeleton of the common law. Presumably Justices Deane and
Gaudron would answer the question according to the case law relating to
conquered territory. In either case, the question is not easily answered.
From an international perspective the decision must provide a profound
impetus to the claims of indigenous peoples everywhere.
151. Professor Nettheim lists ten specific classes of indigenous claims: physical survival,
cultural survival and cultural identity, sovereignty, self-determination, self-government,
land rights, control of land and its resources, compensation, non-discrimination, and affirm-
ative action. Garth Nettheim, "Peoples" and "Populations" - Indigenous Peoples and the
Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 107, 116 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
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Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The
Imperative to Punish
Louis REN9 BERES*
The United States now has a new president. If he should take his
Constitutional obligations seriously, both the obligations of international
and U.S. law, President Clinton will take the necessary steps to ensure
prosecution of Iraqi crimes committed before, during, and after the recent
Gulf War. The following essay examines these necessary steps against the
background of the Nuremburg prosecutions and the associated concept of
nullum crimen sine poena, no crime without a punishment.
In his opening statement at Nuremberg on November 21, 1945, Chief
U.S. Prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson asked rhetorically: "Did we
spend American lives to capture [twenty Nazi defendants] only to save
them from punishment?" 1 Thus jurisprudentially dramatizing the imper-
ative to prosecute wrongs he describes as calculated, malignant, and dev-
astating.' It also highlighted the irony of other options wherein American
custody would effectively shelter war criminals. Today while still lacking
custody over Iraqi perpetrators of Nuremberg category crimes, Americans
should raise the same question about the 1991 Gulf War. Realizing the
answer, this question could move us, as a nation, to give effect to the
principle nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a punishment).8
Recognizing the right of belligerents to punish as war criminals those
who violate the laws or customs of war, Allied forces declared on Novem-
ber 1, 1943, that "atrocities, massacres and cold blooded mass executions
* Louis Ren6 Beres is a Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Professor
Beres gives special thanks to Betty Hartman of the Purdue University Department of Polit-
ical Science for her expeditious and skillful typing of this manuscript.
1. RICHARD A. FALK, ET. AL., CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS FOR
CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS 81 (1971); See also Benjamin B. Ferencz, 1 Defining International
Aggression: The Search for World Peace 437 (1975).
2. See FALK et. al., supra note 1, at 107. This imperative was reaffirmed in Principle I
of The Nuremberg Principles (1946): "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." The Nu-
remberg Principles were later formulated by the International Law Commission, at the re-
quest of the General Assembly, in June-July 1950. Article 1: "Offenses against the peace and
security of mankind, as defined in this code, are crimes under international law, for which
the responsible individuals shall be punished." Draft Code Of Offenses Against The Peace
And Security Of Mankind, GAOR Supp., No. 9 (A/2693).
3. Punishment is, quite plausibly, the original meaning of justice, and is assuredly one
of its most essential components. For a comprehensive consideration of these concepts, and
their interdependence, see ROBERT C. SOLOMON AND MARK C. MURPHY, WHAT IS JUSTICE?
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (1990); see generally Haim H. Cohn, On the Immo-
rality of Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REV., No. 3-4, 284-291 (1991).
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which were being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces..." should be the
object of criminal prosecution and punishment.4 With this Moscow Decla-
ration, the three allied powers, the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union, announced that the 'minor' Nazi war criminals
would be tried and punished by the courts of the lands where the crimes
took place. As for the major criminals "whose offenses had no particular
geographical location, '" punishment was to be the product of joint Allied
judgment.
Between October 1943 and January 1944, the U.S. and the U.K. es-
tablished a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War
Crimes, commonly known as the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC). The commission, meeting in London during 1944, compiled
lists of war criminals. On August 8, 1945, the London Agreement and its
accompanying Charter6 provided the constitutional authority for an In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The law embodied in this
Charter was "decisive and binding upon the Tribunal"' and provided that
"the Tribunal . . . shall have the power to try and punish persons who,
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individ-
uals or as member of organizations, committed any of the following
crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against
humanity."8
The results of the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals are
now well-known. Among other things, the Tribunal explicitly rejected the
idea that states are the only subjects of international law and declared
authoritatively that individuals are punishable for crimes against interna-
tional law.' As a practical matter, Germany had surrendered uncondition-
ally, and the allies did not encounter any legal problems in gaining cus-
tody over the major Nazi criminals. How comparable, then, is
Nuremberg" to the current situation concerning Iraqi crimes?1 1 Primarily
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL W. INT'L L. J.
208 n.2 (1979), citing Moscow Declaration, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1944).
5. Bassiouni, supra note 4.
6. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945, with accompanying Charter, E.A.S. No. 472, 82
U.N.T.S. 284.
7. See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBURG, Judgment 218 (1947).
8. Supra note 6, art. 61. Crimes of war, crimes against peace and crimes against hu-
manity are defined in the Charter at Article 6 (a), (b), (c).
9. According to the Judgment, "Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced." Supra note 7, at 223.
10. See Persian Gulf: The Question of War Crimes, Hearings Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Congress, 1st Sess., 17-20 (1991). (statement of Anthony D'Amato
on the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent to Gulf War Iraqi crimes) [hereinafter
D'Amatol. In this connection, Professor D'Amato stressed the "educational impact" of trials
of Iraqi war criminals:
The enormity of the crimes committed by various Iraqi leaders in the Persian
Gulf War is a lesson that has to be brought home to the world day after day
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because Iraq, unlike Germany, emerged from war unoccupied, it is im-
probable that a Nuremberg style tribunal could be convened within Iraq
or that custody over Iraqi criminals could be gained without resort to
forcible abductions. Nevertheless, the Principles of Nuremberg, formu-
lated by the International Law Commission (ILC) and adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1950, bind all member states and
should compel timely prosecution of Iraqi crimes against peace,12 war
crimes'" and crimes against humanity.
What crimes were committed in the Gulf War? 14 Persistent and well-
documented reports indicate truly horrendous crimes,' crimes so terrible
and week after week as the trial proceeds in it slowly deliberate way. A war
crimes trial should not be today's news forgotten tomorrow. Rather, it should
be one of the most fundamental lessons in civics that can be taught to the
people of the world, especially young people. The lesson is that there is noth-
ing glamorous about wars of aggression; that the people who wage such wars
are the lowest form of criminals; and that they will be brought to justice just as
common criminals are brought to justice in the courts of all civilized nations.
See also, William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INT'L
L. 391-401 (1991). (Confirming view of the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent).
11. For a comprehensive consideration of Iraqi war crimes and prosecutorial options,
see generally Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hos-
tage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351-380 (1991); Louis Ren6 Beres, The United States
Should Take the Lead in Preparing International Legal Machinery for Prosecution of
Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 381-390 (1991); William V. O'Brien, supra note 10, at 391-
402; and John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 403-415 (1991).
12. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206. Cherif Bassiouni reports that "the first prosecution
for initiating an unjust war is reported to have been in Naples, in 1268, when Conradin von
Hohenstafen was put to death for that reason. See also, Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes:
History and Definition, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559, 560 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
13. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206. Bassiouni also reports that the first international
prosecution for war crimes was the prosecution of one Peter von Hagenbach in Breisach,
Germany, in 1474 before a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from the allied states of the Holy
Roman Empire. See also William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 61
MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973).
14. For documentation of Iraqi crimes, see Amnesty International News Release, "Iraqi
Forces Killings (sic) and Torturing in Kuwait, Says Amnesty International Fact-Finding
Team," Al Index: MDE 14/15/90. Distr. SC/PO (Oct. 3, 1990) (a preliminary report on wide-
spread charges of Iraqi torture, willful killing, rape, pillage and collective reprisals); Am-
nesty International Report, "Iraq Occupied Kuwait Human Rights Violations Since 2 Au-
gust," AI Index MDE 14/16/90. Distr. SC/CO/GR (Dec. 19, 1990). For personal testimonies
of.Iraqi brutalities, see Letter from Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17; and Shafeeq
Ghabra, The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account, 20 J. OF PALESTINE
STUDIES 78, 112-125 n.2. For further documentation, see Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanc-
tions, Diplomacy and War, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 920 (1991); Human Rights Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1991); The Persian Gulf Cri-
sis, Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and
Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations, Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 576 (1990).
15. Any indictments setting forth criminal charges against Saddam Hussein and other
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that they mandate universal cooperation in apprehension and punish-
ment. These crimes, what lawyers call crimen contra omnes, crimes
against all, concern (1) barbarous and inhuman assaults against Kuwaitis
and other nationals in Kuwait; (2) barbarous and inhuman treatment of
coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait; and (3) aggression and
crimes of war against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi Ara-
bia.16 All of these grave breaches of international law are in addition to
the original crime against peace17 committed against Kuwait on August 2,
1990.'" The United States and all other states bound by the 1949 Geneva
unnamed defendants must identify violations, inter alia, of the following three authoritative
codifications: Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhumane Or Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 93d plen. mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984); International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 105th plen. mtg., Annex, Supp. No. 39,
U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979); and Resolution on Disappeared Persons, G.A. Res. 33/173, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Comm., 90th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/33/509 (1978).
16. We must also add here Iraq's commission of new forms of environmental destruc-
tion and environmental manipulation as a form of warfare. The intentional dumping of mil-
lions of barrels of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil into the Gulf and the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells
represent clear and egregious violations of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3553, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See
also International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 29,
1961, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, (regarding Saddam Hussein's "Eco-Terrorism" against
Kuwaiti oil wells).
17. Pursuant to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, the indictment of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal contained two counts concerning crimes against peace and was
founded on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Stimson Note of 1932, the Geneva Protocol and
the Resolutions of the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations and the Sixth Interna-
tional Conference of American states. Moreover, the Weimar Constitution had stated that
"generally accepted rules of international law" were part of German law and that the out-
lawry of aggressive war had been one of the "generally accepted rules of international law"
in 1939. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FoRcE BY STATES (1963).
18. For crimes against peace, or waging aggressive war, see Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 142, Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see also: The
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris); Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57;
U.N. Charter Article 2; Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T. S.
No. 993, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1043 (entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945); The 1965 Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their. Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR 11, Supp. No. 14,
U.N. Doc. A/6014, (1966); The 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR 121,
Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); The 1972 Declaration on the Non-use of Force in
International Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A.
Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR 5, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; and Resolution Affirming the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1 U.N. GAOR
1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
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Conventions are obligated under international law to search out and pros-
ecute, or extradite, individuals alleged to have committed grave breaches
of these Conventions. According to Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War):
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be com-
mitted, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless
of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such
persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case. 9
Between August 2, 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and
October 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted ten resolutions explicitly
condemning the Baghdad regime for multiple crimes of the gravest possi-
ble nature.20 These crimen contra omnes crimes, which are so terrible
that they mandate universal enforcement, jurisdiction and responsibility,
cry out for legal prosecution even absent authorizing resolutions by the
UN Security Council. This is because the prohibition of the now docu-
mented barbarous activities of Iraq falls under a "peremptory" rule of
international law, which is an absolutely binding rule allowing no form of
derogation whatsoever.2 '
Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally
as the "Montevideo Convention"); The Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945,
art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, chs.
II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb.
27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (known generally as the "Protocol of Buenos
Aires"); The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681.,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (known generally as the "Rio Pact"); The American
Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (known generally as the "Pact
of Bogota"); and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II,
III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
19. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 16, at art. 146, 6 U.S.T at 3365.
20. For a comprehensive compilation of authoritative documents pertaining to the Gulf
War, see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, 13 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 281.
21. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of insurgency protected by this peremp-
tory norm would be invalid. Further, "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." The concept is extended to
newly emerging peremptory norms by Article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that
norm becomes void and terminates." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22,
1969, art. 53, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Mar. 26-
May 24, 1968, and Apr. 9-May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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Time is running out! Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of
his Revolutionary Council, by evading prosecution, would defile justice
and leave international law weak and tragically undermined, whatever the
military outcome.
Significantly, the Security Council issued its resolutions before the
most serious Iraqi crimes were uncovered. What does this imply? Our
current system of international law2 2 establishes, beyond any reasonable
doubt, the primacy of justice and human rights in world affairs. The
words used so carefully at Nuremberg, "so far from it being unjust to
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpun-
ished,"23 derive from the very ancient principle: nullum crimen sine
poena. This principle applies with particular clarity and urgency to the
crimes of Saddam Hussein and his henchmen.
It is arguable, of course, that the formal protocol of a trial would
prove manifestly unjust applied to such overwhelming lawlessness. The
concept here is that prosecution of Iraqi crimes under international law
would result in a mockery of civilized law-enforcement, not because of
perceived abuses of power and legal procedure but because such judicial
"remedy" could create an erroneous appearance of proportionality. This
argument, which holds that for certain egregious crimes, no amount of
punishment can produce justice, leads to two diametrically opposite
courses of action: (1) extra-judicial punishment (normally execution), or
(2) leaving the crimes unpunished altogether. The first course of action is
unsatisfactory. It contains all of the elements of infinite regress. When, if
ever, is the amount of extra-judicial punishment finally commensurate
with the crime? There are also tactical difficulties involved in killing an
"adequate" number of perpetrators. Moreover, this option is plagued by
an inadequacy concerning the identification of the wrongdoers, probable
cause and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The second
22. International law, of course, is part of U.S. law. Recalling the words used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, the principal case concerning the incorpora-
tion of international law into this country's municipal law
[I]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
23. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/8771.
24. The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, that has characterized the Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal justice system for more than two hundred years, is a component of the broader
question of the theory of evidence. Evidentiary doctrines are associated with arrest, pretrial
examination, and grand jury indictment. Historically, the study of reasonable doubt has
been linked to the work of juries. English law was affected by John Locke who presented an
ordered account of levels of probability. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDER-
STANDING (1690). Locke's criteria for evaluating testimony emphasized the number of wit-
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course of action is unsatisfactory because it represents flagrant disregard
for expectations of nulum crimen sine poena.
The Nuremberg obligations to bring major Iraqi criminals to trial are
doubly binding to the U.S. as these obligations represent not only current
obligations under international law,"5 but also the higher obligations
found in the American political tradition.2" By their codification of the
nesses, their integrity, their skill at presenting evidence and its agreement with the circum-
stances and the presence or absence of contrary testimony. Samuel Pufendorf links the
concept of "conscience" to notions of moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt. For
Pufendorf, the "satisfied conscience" of a jury required rational, unbiased and unemotional
acts of the understanding. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (C. H.
Oldfather & W..A. Oldfather trans., 1688). Regarding the concept of "probable cause," it is
now the prevailing grand jury evidentiary standard. In the United States, probable cause
has usually not been used as a standard to determine the guilt or innocence of accused
defendants, but rather to determine whether or not sufficient evidence has been produced to
indicate that a crime has been committed by the accused. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 103 (1991). The concept has also been important
in the context of arrest and search standards. This is quite different from our concern with
extra-judicial punishment. One partial "remedy" in assassination decisions would be to re-
place the standard of probable cause with the stricter prima facia case standard. For the
origins of this standard, see THOMAS STARKIE, 1 PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EvI-
DENCE 554 (10th ed., 1876). A coherent and purposeful elucidation of the prima facie evi-
dence standard was offered by Chief Justice Shaw's 1832 charge to a Massachusetts grand
jury that prima facie evidence of guilt ". . . be of such a nature, that if it stood alone,
uncontradicted and uncontrolled by any defensive matter, it would be sufficient to justify a
conviction on trial." SHAPIRO, at 95. As evidentiary standards, prima facie and probable
cause suggest different degrees of probability, with probable cause as a less demanding stan-
dard. Significantly, there is an important connection between the prima facie case standard
and legally admissible/competent evidence, i.e., what grand juries would consider trial-ad-
missible evidence. An advantage of a prima facie case standard in deciding upon extra-judi-
cial punishment is that it demands decisional authorities not to inflict harm on an accused
unless it can fairly predict that the accused would be found guilty by a jury. Needless to say,
this advantage is complicated and undermined by the fact that (a) fair prediction is an
exceedingly complicated calculation; and (b) the jury in question would have been convened
in the municipal context of the assassinating state's court. All of this is complicated further
by the designated victim's incapacity to confront his accusers, what would certainly seem to
be in basic violation of elementary "due process" standards. Moreover, it may be especially
difficult to apply probability calculations in extrajudicial settings, i.e., more difficult than in
constituted legal arenas.
25. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremburg Tribunal (1946) was followed by Resolution 177, adopted November 21, 1947,
directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) formulate the principles of inter-
national law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of
the Tribunal and (b) prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind .. " H.R.J. Res. 177, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 112. For
the principles formulated, see RICHARD A. FALK, supra note 1, at 107-108.
26. The principle of a higher law is one of the enduring and canonic principles in the
history of the United States. Codified in both the Declaration of Independence and in the
Constitution, it rests upon the acceptance of certain notions of right and justice that obtain
because of their own obvious merit. Such notions, as the celebrated Blackstone declared, are
nothing less than "the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator him-
self in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover so
far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions." When Jefferson set to work to
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principle that basic human rights, in war and in peace, are now peremp-
tory, the Nuremberg obligations reflect perfect convergence of interna-
tional law and the enduring foundation of our American Republic."
Worldwide lack of concern for legal protection of human rights grew
out of the post-Westphalian system of world politics. This system sancti-
fies untrammeled competition between sovereign States and identifies na-
tional loyalty as the overriding human obligation. With these develop-
ments, unfettered nationalism and State-centrism have become dominant
characteristics of international relations. The resultant world order has
come to subordinate all moral and ethical sensibilities to the idea of un-
limited sovereignty. Such subordination was more than a little ironic.
Even Jean Bodin, who advanced the idea of sovereignty as free of any
external control or internal division, recognized the limits imposed by di-
vine law and natural law.
It is equally ironic that former President Bush, reacting to the news
of post-war Iraqi crimes against the Kurds and other minorities, 28 spoke
of Iraqi "sovereignty" in ways that placed such crimes within the ambit
of domestic jurisdiction. All such crimes become matters of international
concern because of their international impact and the outrage they invoke
draft the Declaration he drew freely upon Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf,
Burlamaqui, and Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Asserting the right of revolution
whenever government becomes destructive of "certain unalienable rights," the Declaration
of Independence posits a natural order in the world whose laws are external to all human
will and which are discoverable through human reason. Although, by the eighteenth century,
God had withdrawn from immediate contact with humankind and had been transformed
into Final Cause or Prime Mover of the universe, "nature" provided an appropriate substi-
tute. Reflecting the decisive influence of Isaac Newton, whose Principia was first published
in 1686, all of creation could now be taken as an expression of divine will. Hence, the only
way to know God's will was to discover the law of nature; Locke and Jefferson had defied
nature and denatured God.
27. Regarding this foundation, prosecution of war crimes took place during the Ameri-
can Revolution, after the Spanish-American War and after the occupation of the Philip-
pines. After the Civil War, a landmark case was the trial of Confederate Major Henry Wirz
for his role in the death of several thousand Union prisoners in the Andersonville prison.
For discussions of these cases, including the Revolutionary War trial of Captain Nathan
Hale by a British military court and Major John Andre by a board of officers appointed by
George Washington. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206-207. See also 8 AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 657 (J. Lawson ed., 1917).
28. To a considerable extent, these crimes were made possible by U.S. betrayal.
Throughout the war, U.S. forces played an active role in encouraging Iraqi revolt against
Saddam Hussein's rule. Yet, when Iraqi. Shiites and Kurds heeded this encouragement, they
were left to their own devices; i.e., they were slaughtered with impunity. "The Iraqi people
alone have the responsibility and the right to choose their own government-without
outside interference," declared a Voice of America editorial on March 7, 1991, when Shiite
forces controlled almost all of southern Iraq. Bush administration policy, recalled Peter Gal-
braith, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer who visited Iraq in March, 1991, was
essentially as follows: "We're not going to get involved in Iraq's internal affairs." This was,
said Galbraith, "a clear signal to Saddam that he could kill whomever he needed to stay in
power." Tony Horwitz, After Heeding Calls To Turn On Saddam, Shiites Feel Betrayed,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1991, at Al.
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in the conscience of humankind. International law now concedes that lim-
itations on the authoritative competence of each state are imposed not
only by the requirements of international comity, but also by the inher-
ent rights of each individual person to claims of life and dignity.29
International law does not sanctify sovereignty at all costs. Recogniz-
ing the peremptory character of a human rights regime, it has now trans-
ported a broad range of state-inflicted harms from the realm of domestic
jurisdiction to one of international concern. 0 Indeed, in the post-Nurem-
berg world order, international law has substantially enlarged the right of
particular states to intervene within the territory of other states, on be-
half of essential human rights.
The Charter of the United Nations, a multilateral, law-making
treaty, stipulates in its Preamble and several of its articles that interna-
tional law protects human rights. In the Preamble, the peoples of the
United Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small" and their determination "to pro-
mote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."'3
These codified expressions of the international law of human rights,
29. These requirements of comity are normally associated with Emmerich de Vattel's
notion of "mutual aid." According to The Law of Nations, "[s]ince Nations are bound mutu-
ally to promote the society of the human race, they owe one another all the duties which the
safety and welfare of that society require." 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW xii (Charles G. Fenwick, trans., 1758). The core of Vattel's
argument for comity is as follows:
The end of the natural society established among men in general is that they
should mutually assist one another to advance their own perfection and that of
their condition; and Nations, too, since they may be regarded as so many free
persons living together in a state of nature, are bound mutually to advance this
human society. Hence the end of the great society established by nature among
all Nations is likewise that of mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves
and their condition. The first general law, which is to be found in the very end
of the society of Nations, is that each Nation should contribute as far as it can
to the happiness and advancement of other Nations.
Id.
30. These harms include crimes against the environment. For an exhaustive and au-
thoritative assessment of Iraqi crimes against the environment and their consequences, see
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, 102D
CONG., 2 D SEsS., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War (Comm. Print 1992). The
principal concerns of the Senate Gulf Pollution Task Force were: (1) the need to extinguish
the oil well fires as quickly as possible; (2) to examine potential health impacts on U.S.
troops and citizens of the region; (3) to examine the potential global and regional environ-
mental impact; and (4) to review the applicable principles of international law which gov-
erned Iraq's actions. Regarding the fourth concern, Iraqi crimes against the environment
and international law, the Task Force, inter alia, reaffirmed the fundamental principle of
responsibility for transnational harm. This principle is grounded in the expression of cus-
tomary international law that "a State is bound to prevent such use of its territory as, hav-
ing regard to the circumstances, is unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighboring
State." Id.-
31. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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make abundantly clear that individual States can no longer claim sover-
eign immunity from responsibility for gross mistreatment of their own
citizens. Notwithstanding Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which reaffirms
certain areas of domestic jurisdiction, each State is obligated to uphold
basic human rights. Even the failure to ratify specific treaties or conven-
tions does not confer immunity from responsibility, since all States re-
main bound by the law of the Charter and by the customs and general
principles of law from which such agreements derive.
The international regime on human rights also establishes the con-
tinuing validity of natural law as the overriding basis of international law.
This establishment flows directly from the judgments at Nuremberg.3 2
While the Nuremberg Tribunal cast its indictments in terms of existing
positive law, law enacted by States, the actual decisions of the Tribunal
unambiguously reject the proposition that the validity of international
law depends upon its explicit and detailed codification.
Ironically, however, in the most recent case of egregious human
rights violation within a state, the genocide-like crimes committed by
Saddam Hussein against the Kurdish populations in Iraq, the legal com-
munity of humankind stopped short of authentic humanitarian interven-
tion. The fact that such intervention would have taken place in the after-
math of a UN sanctioned war of collective security and collective self-
defense against the regime in Baghdad compounds the irony of this fail-
ure. Indeed, the allies justified the war against Saddam on behalf of, inter
alia, the violation of human rights in Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation.
Why the contradiction? Why does such a glaring gap exist between
the settled tenets of international law and actual state practice? The an-
swer lies in geopolitics. Fearing a power vacuum in the region and the
alienation of U.S. allies, the Bush administration did not comply, in any
serious sense, with the Iraqi opposition.s3 The U.S. viewed the Iraqi Shi'a
opposing Saddam as pawns of Iran seeking to impose a Khomeini-style
regime, in spite of a very different history. The Iraqi Kurds were believed
32. See International Conference on Military Trials, Report of Robert H. Jackson, De-
partment of State, in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 368-369
(1975). The judgment of the International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946 rested upon
the four Allied Powers' London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which was annexed a Char-
ter establishing the Tribunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the Agreement.
33. In earlier cases, the unwillingness of the United States to support codified and well-
established anti-genocide norms derived from its obsessive commitment to anti-Sovietism.
Indeed, at the end of World War II, America shielded large numbers of Nazi war criminals
from prosecution, preferring to enlist their services as spies against East Germany and the
Soviet Union. At a time when the U.S. was involved as the principal architect of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a secret military program-known aptly as "Rat-
line"-used Nazi war criminals as highly-paid intelligence agents against the East. All of
this took place when tens of thousands of concentration camp survivors were denied admit-
tance to the United States. See ABRAM L. SACHAR, THE REDEMPTION OF THE UNWANTED 129
(1983); and Ralph Blumenthal, Nazi Whitewash in 1940's Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1985, at 1.
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to be seeking the complete breakup of Iraq and the creation of an inde-
pendent Kurdistan, an objective judged to be fundamentally dangerous to
our ally Turkey.
The failure of humanitarian intervention on behalf of Iraq's Kurds
dates back further than the end of the recent Gulf War. During the
1980's, this beleaguered population began a rebellion that was crushed
with extraordinary ferocity. Beginning in 1985, Saddam's regime engaged
in a systematic program of destruction of all of the villages of Kurdistan.
In March 1988, the regime used poison gas on the city of Halabja.
Later, Saddam launched a broad chemical attack on more than 70 villages
along the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian borders. According to an au-
thoritative report offered by the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate: with that rebellion taking the lives of more than 100,000
Kurds and costing another two million of their homes, the Kurdish lead-
ership was reluctant to proceed without an assurance of success.3 4
Let us return to the matter of criminal prosecution. Where should
the trials be held? 5 Nuremberg had been expected to be the precursor for
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court for the
prosecution of international crimes. Yet, even today, no such court has
been created. Contrary to commonly held misconceptions, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice at the Hague has absolutely no penal or criminal
jurisdiction, and is therefore unsuitable for the task at hand.36
One obvious jurisdictional solution, would be to parallel Nuremberg
and establish a specially-constituted ad hoc Nuremberg-style tribunal
34. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102d CONG., 1ST SESS., Civil War in
Iraq 2 (Comm. Print 1991).
35. After the Second World War, three judicial solutions were adapted to the problem
of determining the proper jurisdiction for trying Nazi offenses by the victim States, solu-
tions that were additional to the specially-constituted Nuremberg Tribunal. The first solu-
tion involved the creation of special courts set up expressly for the purpose at hand. This
solution was adopted in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Poland. The second solution, adopted in Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Greece and Italy,
involved the establishment of special military courts. The third solution brought the Nazis
and their collaborators before ordinary courts-a solution accepted in Norway, Denmark
and Yugoslavia. This solution was also adopted by Israel, although-strictly speaking-the
State of Israel did not exist at the time of the commission of the crimes in question.
36. The International Court of Justice does, however, have jurisdiction over disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of a number of specialized human rights con-
ventions. Such jurisdiction is accorded by the Genocide Convention, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 9, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1056, art. 10, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, art. 9, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 38, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; and
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 4, 1954, art. 14, A/Conf. 9/15, 1961,
annex. In exercising its jurisdiction, however, the ICJ must still confront significant difficul-
ties in bringing recalcitrant States into contentious proceedings. There is still no way to
effectively ensure the attendance of defendant States before the Court. Although many
States have acceded to the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ, these accessions are
watered down by many attached reservations.
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within the defeated country's territory, (probably in Baghdad).3" Another
acceptable, and far more likely possibility would be to undertake such
proceedings within the country that had been Iraq's principal victim, Ku-
wait. The court could display broad coalition representation, if within
Iraq, or, depending upon the desired range of indictments, be fully
Kuwaiti in representation. The Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide,3 8 among other sources, would provide
legal precedent and justification for these possibilities. Article VI of this
Convention provides that trials for its violation be conducted "by a com-
petent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was commit-
ted, or by any such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction." 9
37. Such a tribunal could be established under articles 22 and 29 of the United Nations
Charter, authorizing creation of subsidiary organs. See Luis Kutner & Ved P. Nanda, Draft
Indictment of Saddam Hussein, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 91 (1991) (a very useful draft
indictment of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, his political, military and economic advisors,
and of other unnamed defendants).
38. This does not mean, however, that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be
contingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as defined at the Con-
vention. Rather, such creation would still be consistent with related "genocide-like" crimes
- crimes that may derive from multiple other sources of international law. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force, April 22, 1954); Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, (entered into
force, July 7, 1976); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into
force, Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into force, Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976); American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into
force, July 18, 1978); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Unrest, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known collectively as the International
Bill of Human Rights, serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
39. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). The Genocide Convention was
submitted to the Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June, 1949. On February 19,
1986, the Senate consented to ratification with the reservation that legislation be passed
that conforms U.S. law to the precise terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was
approved by Congress in October 1988, and signed by President Reagan on November 4,
1988. This legislation amends the U.S. Criminal Code to make genocide a Federal offense. It
also sets a maximum penalty of life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act
defined by the law. The Genocide Convention proscribes conduct that is juristically distinct
from other forms of prohibited wartime killing (i.e., killing involving acts constituting crimes
of war and crimes against humanity). Although crimes against humanity are linked to war-
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Washington and its allies must also decide on how broadly they wish
to prosecute Iraqi crimes. In this respect, the special post World War II
war crimes planning group had a somewhat easier task, focussing primar-
ily on particular Nazi groups defined as inherently criminal. Following
the recent defeat of Saddam Hussein, however, many of the crimes
against humanity committed by Iraq appeared unplanned and individu-
ally conceived. Consequently, coalition lists of suspected war criminals
could become so large as to prove altogether unusable. Alternatively, coa-
lition prosecution could focus essentially or even entirely on Saddam and
his leadership elite. This judicial strategy would permit many or all rank-
and-file Iraqi criminals to avoid punishment, but would at least stand
some chance of far-reaching and practical success.
Regarding breadth of prosecutorial concern, the United States and
its partners must also decide whether or not to include Iraq's crimes
against its own Kurdish populations. During 1987 and 1988, Baghdad un-
dertook a campaign of destruction of Kurdish villages, and the relocation
of large numbers of Kurds to selected areas of Iraq. In 1988, after the
Iran-Iraq war ended, the Iraqi air force launched massive chemical at-
tacks on Kurdish villages.
After the recent Gulf War, Iraq's Kurds were once again the targets
of genocidal assaults by Saddam Hussein's regime. In northern and
southern Iraq, forces loyal to Saddam Hussein shelled Kurdish cities in-
tensely, leveled entire neighborhoods and engaged in wholesale massacres
of Kurdish civilians. According to a report issued by the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate: "more than two million Iraqi
Kurds have sought refuge on the Iraq-Turkey and the Iraq-Iran borders
and they are dying at a rate of up to 2,000 a day."40 In the words of Peter
W. Galbraith, author of the report:
My visit to liberated Kurdistan, over the weekend of March 30-31,
coincided with the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion and the beginning
of the humanitarian catastrophe now overwhelming the Kurdish peo-
ple. I was an eyewitness to many of the atrocities being committed by
the Iraqi army, including the heavy shelling of cities, the use of phos-
phorous artillery shells, and the creation of tens of thousands of refu-
gees. From Kurdish leaders and refugees I heard firsthand accounts of
other horrors including mass executions and the levelling of large sec-
tions of Kurdish cities.41
These crimes continue well up to the present. At the time of this
writing, Iraq continues to launch large ground and air attacks against
Kurdish towns in northern Iraq. An unofficial cease-fire has remained in
time actions, the crime of genocide can be committed in peacetime or during a war. Accord-
ing to Article I of the Genocide Convention: "The contracting parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Id.
40. Supra note 34, at vi.
41. Supra note 34, at v.
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effect. The entire pattern of Iraqi crimes against the Kurds goes beyond
domestic jurisdiction, and must be recognized as a matter of international
concern.
Finally, it should be noted that a coalition agency charged with creat-
ing "another Nuremberg" could adopt the solution favored by the United
States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France in 1945. The coalition
would establish a specially created tribunal for the trial of major
criminals while the domestic courts of individual coalition countries
would provide the venue for trials of "minor" criminals. As in the prose-
cution of Nazi offenses, the separation of major and minor criminals con-
cerns matters of rank or position, and would have nothing to do with the
seriousness or horror of particular transgressions.
From a strictly jurisprudential point of view, crimes of war, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity are offenses against human-
kind over which there is universal jurisdiction and a universal obligation
to prosecute.4 However, the United States should now take the lead in
prosecution of major Iraqi criminals for many complementary reasons.
These reasons include the special U.S. role in military operations sup-
porting the pertinent Security Council resolutions, the historic U.S. role
at Nuremberg in 1945 and the long history of U.S. acceptance of jurisdic-
tional competence and responsibility on behalf of international law.4
42. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidar-
ity between states in the fight against crime. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF
WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kilsey trans., 1925), and EMMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES
GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE 93 (1916). The case for universal jurisdiction
(which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built
into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon
the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules,
regardless of where the infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the
crimes. Cf. Art. 49 of Convention No. 1; Art. 50 of Convention No. 2; Art. 129 of Convention
No. 3; and Art. 146 of Convention No. 4. For further support of universality for certain
international crimes see M.C. BASSIOUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE (1987). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402-404 and 443 (Tentative Draft No. 5, .1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1992).
43. In addition to the territorial principle and the nationality principle, there are three
other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction under international law: the protective
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the of-
fense; the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offense; and the passive personality principle, determining jurisdic-
tion by reference to the nationality of the person injured by the offense. The Genocide Con-
vention itself, however, does not stipulate universal jurisdiction. A recent example support-
ing the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters concerning genocide involves action by
the United States. A Ruling for the extradition to Israel of accused Nazi war criminal John
Demjanjuk, by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1985, recognized the applicability of universal
jurisdiction for genocide, even though the crimes charged were committed against persons
who were not citizens of Israel and the State of Israel did not exist at the time the heinous
crimes were committed. In the words of the court:
"[w]hen proceeding on that jurisdictional premise neither the nationality of
the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant. The
underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of na-
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As noted by the Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, "[t]he law
of the United States includes international law" and "international law
recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses.""" Article VI of
the Constitution, and a number of court decisions make all international
law, conventional and customary, the supreme law of the land. The Nu-
remberg Tribunal acknowledged that the participating powers "have done
together what any one of them might have done singly."4
In exercising its special responsibilities under international and mu-
nicipal law concerning prosecution of egregious Iraqi crimes, the United
States already has the competence to prosecute in its own federal district
courts.46 Pertinent authority for such jurisdiction can be found in sections
818 and 821 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which form part of an
tions or against humanity, and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all
nations.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d. 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 582-83. In all aspects of recent Iraqi crimes, jurisdiction to prosecute is unam-
biguously universal. Traditionally, piracy and slave trading were the only offenses warrant-
ing universal jurisdiction. Following World War II, however, states have generally recog-
nized an expansion of universal jurisdiction to include: crimes of war; crimes against peace;
crimes against humanity; hostage taking; crimes against internationally protected persons;
hijacking; sabotage of aircraft; torture; genocide; and apartheid. For the most part, this ju-
risdictional expansion has its origins in multilateral conventions, customary international
law and certain pertinent judicial decisions. The Second Circuit's statement in Filartiga v.
Pefha-Irala declares: "[tihe torturer has become, like the pirate and slave trader before him,
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 890 (2d
Cir. 1980). The federal district court in United States v. Layton recognized that "nations
have begun to extend universal jurisdiction to.. .crimes considered in the modern era to be
as great a threat to the well-being of the international community as piracy." United States
v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Calif. 1981). For other judicial examples of assertions
of universal jurisdiction, see United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.C. 1988); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. 1985).
45. Apart from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, there have been only two trials
under the Genocide Convention by competent tribunals of the States wherein the crimes
were committed: (1) in Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macis had been slaughtering his sub-
jects and pillaging his country for a number of years. He was ultimately overthrown, found
guilty of a number of crimes, including genocide, and executed. (In a report on the, trial,
however, the legal officer of the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Macis
had been wrongfully convicted of genocide); and (2) in Kampuchea, when the Khmer Rouge
were overthrown by the Vietnamese, the successor government instituted criminal proceed-
ings against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and the Deputy Prime Minister on charges
of genocide, and the accused were found guilty of the crime, in absentia, by a people's revo-
lutionary tribunal.
46. Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international
law within its own courts. The American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
law of nations." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative,
the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute. This statute authorized United
States Federal Courts to hear those civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can
be found in the United States. At that time the particular target of this legislation was
piracy on the high seas.
1993
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
extraterritorial statutory scheme and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. It follows from all
this that international and U.S. law have already established the legal
machinery for bringing Saddam Hussein and his fellow criminals to jus-
tice. The only missing element is the political will to make this machinery
work.
However, we need to be realistic. Before international law can actu-
ally "work" in this matter, its agents will have to acquire custody of Sad-
dam Hussein et. al. Ideally, the coalition could obtain custody via the
long-established mechanisms of extradition"7 or prosecution, and the as-
sociated means of "indirect enforcement" (i.e., prosecution within author-
itative municipal courts in the absence of a permanently constituted in-
ternational criminal court or an ad hoc tribunal). But other possibilities
must be considered, as these prospects remain extremely remote.
One such possibility would involve the reinsertion of coalition mili-
tary forces into Iraq. Although the essential rationale of such return
would ensure Iraqi compliance with authoritative cease-fire expectations,
especially as they concern Baghdad's mandated elimination of weapons of
mass destruction, a reinserted multinational military force could also be
used to identify and apprehend alleged Iraqi criminals. Though entirely
proper from a jurisprudential perspective, reintroduction of appropriate
military forces for the sole purposes of such identification and apprehen-
sion, subject, of course to the limits4 of jus in bello or the laws of war,4 9
47. At this time, the United States has extradition agreements with over 100 countries.
The treaties range in age from an 1856 agreement with the Austrian Empire, which is still in
force with respect to one of its successor states (Hungary) to the protocol with Canada,
which entered into force in November, 1991. The Office of International Affairs in the Crim-
inal Division of the Department of Justice plays an important role in extradition matters.
From OIA's inception in 1979, its attorneys have cooperated with the Department of State
in negotiating all new extradition agreements. According to testimony by Robert Mueller,
III, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:
In general, our goal in extradition negotiations in recent years has been three-
fold: first, to expand the number of offenses for which extradition can be ob-
tained by including all conduct that is criminal under the laws of both coun-
tries and punishable by a specified minimum period of incarceration; second,
to limit the exceptions to extradition, particularly the exception for so-called
political offenses; and third, to improve the way in which extradition treaties
function by simplifying and clarifying provisions that were inadequately ad-
dressed in older treaties.
Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties and Treaties Relating to Mutual Legal Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters (MLATS); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)(Statement by Robert S. Mueller, III).
48. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATU-
RAL LAW 139 (Frank Gardner Moore, trans., 1964) (for an early expression of limits under
the law of war).
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we
should distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and
what we cannot bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he
who has declared himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express
threat to bring the worst of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies,
gives us a free hand against himself, without restriction. Humanity, however,
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would be unlikely for both tactical and political reasons.
Another possibility would involve custody by forcible abduction.5 0
commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more
mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right, and
security for the future, require.
Id.
49. The principle of proportionality, of course, has its origins in the biblical Lex Ta-
lionis, (law of exact retaliation). The "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" expression is found in
three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or biblical Pentateuch. These Torah rules are
likely related to the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 B.C.)-the first written evidence for
penalizing wrongdoing with exact retaliation. In matters concerning personal injury, the
code prescribes and eye for an eye (#196), breaking bone for bone (#197), and extracting
tooth for tooth (#199). Among the ancient Hebrews, we should speak not of the lex talionis,
but of several. The lex talionis appears in only three passages of the Torah. In their se-
quence of probable antiquity, they are as follows: Exodus 21:22-25; Deuteronomy 19:19-21;
and Leviticus 24:17-21. (All have affinities to other Near Eastern codes.) These three
passages address specific concerns: hurting a pregnant woman, perjury, and guarding
Yahweh's altar against defilement. See MARVIN HENBERG, RErRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN
ETHICS, LAW AND LITERATURE 59-186 (1990). In contemporary international law, the princi-
ple of proportionality can be found in the traditional view that a state offended by another
state's use of force, if the offending state refuses to make amends, "is then entitled to take
'proportionate' reprisals." INGRID DETTER DE LupIs, THE LAW OF WAR 75 (1987). Evidence
of the rule of proportionality can also be found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966, supra note 38, at art. 4. Similarly, the American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 38, allows at Article 27(1) such derogations in "time of war,
public danger or other emergency which threaten the independence of security of a party"
on condition of proportionality. In essence, the military principle of proportionality requires
that the amount of destruction permitted must be proportionate to the importance of the
objective. In contrast, the political principle of proportionality states that "a war cannot be
just unless the evil that can reasonably be expected to ensue from the war is less than the
evil that can reasonably be expected to ensue if the war is not fought." DOUGLAS P. LACKEY,
THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 40 (1989).
50. Regarding custody by abduction, two discrete issues present themselves: (1) seizure
of hostes humani generis (common enemy of mankind) when custody cannot be obtained
via extradition; and (2) seizure of hostes humani generis who is a sitting head of state. On
the first issue, we may consider that President Reagan, in 1986, authorized procedures for
the forcible abduction of suspected terrorists from other states for trial in U.S. courts. John
Walcott, Andy Pasztor & David Rogers, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Over-
seas is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 6. The statutory authority for
President Reagan's posture, however, was contingent upon the terrorist acts being involved
with taking U.S. citizens hostage-acts that are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
under the Act on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1992). In 1987, in international waters, the F.B.I. lured a Lebanese national named
Fawaz Younis onto a yacht and transported him by force to the U.S. for trial. His abduction
was based upon his suspected involvement in a 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner at
Beirut airport in which U.S. nationals had been held hostage. G. Gregory Schuetz, Appre-
hending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and International Law: A Case Study of
the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 499, 501 (1988). On the second issue, we may
recall that under international law, there is normally a very substantial difference between
abduction of a terrorist or other hostes humani generis and abduction of any head of state.
Indeed, there is almost always a presumption of sovereign immunity, a binding rule that
exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. Al-
though the rule of sovereign immunity is certainly not absolute in the post-Nuremberg
world order, the right of one state to seize a high official from another state is exceedingly
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Under international law, there normally exists a very substantial differ-
ence between abduction of an ordinary criminal or even an hostes
humani generis, common enemy of mankind, and abduction of a sitting
head of state. Indeed, a presumption of sovereign immunity, a rule that
exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state or transnational authority, persists.5 '
What if neither of these possibilities prove practical? Here interna-
tional law may have to content itself with conducting trials in absentia.
According to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed
to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945:
the Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person
charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter (crimes of war;
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity) in his absence, if
he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it nec-
essary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his
absence.5"
Yet, trials in absentia would not be without serious difficulties.53
Apart from their intrinsic shortcomings, such trials may still run counter
to long-settled principles of justice and due process in national and inter-
national law. In the UN Report of the 1953 Committee on International
limited. In an 1812 case before the Supreme Court of the United States, The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), Chief Justice Marshall went even further, argu-
ing for "the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a
foreign territory." Nevertheless, where the alleged crimes in question are of a Nuremberg-
category and no other means exist whereby to gain custody of the pertinent head of state,
the expectations of nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without punishment) may override
those of sovereign immunity. In the United States, the terms of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (1992), prohibit the U.S. military from undertaking domestic law enforce-
ment. However, this prohibition does not apply outside the United States. See John
Quigley, Enforcement of Human Rights in U.S. Courts: The Trial of Persons Kidnapped
Abroad, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 59-80 (Mark
Gibney ed., 1991). It would appear, therefore, that the United States has authority under its
own and international law to gain custody of Saddam Hussein, et. al., by forcible abduction
if necessary. This argument is all the more compelling in view of U.S. seizure of General
Manuel Noriega, whom Washington regarded as a head of state, from Panama in 1990.
Noriega, it should be recalled, had been charged with violations of U.S. drug trafficking
laws, norms substantially less serious than those revolving around Nuremberg-category
crimes.
51. Historically, the rule of sovereign immunity may be traced to Roman Law and to
the maxim of English Law that the King can do no wrong. Under current United States law,
the authoritative expression of this rule may be found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1992).
52. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
53. Regarding in absentia trials, Professor D'Amato, responding to a question by Sena-
tor Charles S. Robb at the Hearing on The Persian Gulf and The Question of War Crimes,
argued that "there is more psychological impact in having a standing indictment against
[Saddam Hussein], hanging over his head, maybe not a 'Sword of Damocles,' but a 'Sword
of Justice.'" See D'Amato, supra note 10, at 19.
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Criminal Jurisdiction, the Committee reaffirmed the general principle of
law that an accused "should have the right to be present at all stages of
the proceedings."5 4 In the Annex to this Report, in the Committee's Re-
vised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the rights of the
accused to a "fair trial" include, inter alia, "the right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings." 55
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, also stipu-
lates that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right, "to de-
fend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choos-
ing. . . ."" The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which entered into.force in 1976 affirms this right.
5 7
Strictly speaking, however, when a tribunal charges someone with a
criminal offense and offers them representation through legal assistance
of his own choosing, as an alternative to defending himself in person, this
opportunity satisfies essential minimum guarantees under law and does
not deprive the individual of due process. Similarly, anyone who is
charged with a criminal offense and offered but declines the opportunity
to defend himself in person, is normally not being mistreated under law.
Finally, though distasteful, assassination may be.considered as a very
last resort in the matter of Saddam Hussein et. al. Notwithstanding the
normal prohibitions of assassination under international law, especially as
they pertain to a head of state, circumstances exist wherein the expecta-
tions of the anti-genocide regime must override the ordinary prohibi-
tions.58 After all, if the assassination of a Hitler or a Pol Pot could have
saved millions of innocent people from torture and murder, wouldn't jus-
tice have required its application?
From the point of view of international law, assassination as a rem-
edy for Iraqi genocide and genocide-like crimes would be least problem-
atic if it originated within Iraq. Such action would qualify under the right
of tyrannicide. Aristotle, Plutarch and Cicero offer traditional and au-
thoritative support for such a form of assassination. According to Cicero:
[T]here can be no such thing as fellowship with tyrants, nothing but
bitter feud is possible: and it is not repugnant to nature to despoil, if
you can, those whom it is a virtue to kill; nay, this pestilent and god-
less brood should be utterly banished from human society. For as we
54. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 20, 1953,
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
55. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Annex to the Report of
the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Id.
56. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 38.
58. Under United States law, "[p]rohibition on Assassination. No person employed by,
or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination." 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1993).
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amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to
circulate because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who
under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast,
should be severed from the common body of humanity."'
What if the assassination remedy originated outside Iraq? Could
such action be construed as an example of law-enforcement, or would it
necessarily be criminal behavior? The answer to this question depends,
inter alia, upon the presence or absence of a condition of war between the
states involved. When a condition of war exists between states, interna-
tional law normally views transnational assassination as a war crime. Ac-
cording to Article 23(b) of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention
IV of October 18, 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land,
"it is especially forbidden... to kill or wound treacherously, individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army." 0 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-
10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), has incorporated the Hague prohi-
bition, in Paragraph 31: "this article 4s construed as prohibiting assassina-
tion, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an
enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy dead or alive."61
Whether or not a particular state has followed a comparable form of in-
corporation, it is bound by the Hague regulations entered into customary
international law as of 1939, according to the 1945 Nuremburg tribunal.
However, a contrary argument exists. Some maintain that the law
should consider enemy officials, operating within the military chain of
command, as combatants and not enemies hors de combat! This reason-
ing, widely accepted with reference to the assassination of Saddam Hus-
sein during the 1991 Gulf War, views certain enemy officials as lawful
targets, and assassination of enemy leaders as permissible. This contrary
59. Elsewhere, Cicero, citing approvingly to the Greeks, offers further support for
tyrannicide:
Grecian nations give the honors of the gods to those men who have slain ty-
rants. What have I not seen at Athens? What in the other cities of Greece?
What divine honors have I not seen paid to such men? What odes, what songs
have I not heard in their praise? They are almost consecrated to immortality
in the memories and worship of men. And will you not only abstain from con-
ferring any honors on the savior of so great a people, and the avenger of such
enormous wickedness, but will you even allow him to be borne off for punish-
ment? He would confess-I say, if he had done it, he would confess with a high
and willing spirit that he had done it for the sake of the general liberty; a thing
which would certainly deserve not only to be confessed by him, but even to be
boasted of.
This is taken from Cicero's speech in defense of Titus Annius Milo, a speech offered on
behalf of an instance of alleged tyrannicide committed by Milo, leader of Lanuvium. Cicero,
The Speech of M. T. Cicero In Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECT ORATIONS OF M.T.
CICERO 208 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1872).
60. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Reg-
ulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [herein-
after Laws and Customs of War on Land].
61. U.S. ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 27-10 (1956).
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argument, in practice, has simply ignored the position codified at Article
23(b) of Hague Convention IV.
In principle, adherents of the assassination of enemy officials in war-
time could offer two possible bases of jurisprudential support: (1) such
assassination does not evidence behavior designed "to kill or wound
treacherously"' 2 as defined at Hague Article 23(b); and/or (2) a "higher"
or jus cogens obligation allows assassination in particular circumstances
that transcends and overrides pertinent treaty prohibitions. To argue the
first position would focus primarily on a "linguistic" solution; to argue the
second would propose a return to the historic natural law origins of inter-
national law.
Where no state of war exists, international law would normally define
assassination as the crime of aggression and/or terrorism. Article 1 of the
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression defines aggression as: "the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.
63
In view of the jus cogens norm of non-intervention codified in the
UN Charter, ordinarily violated by transnational assassination, such kill-
ing would generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that trans-
national assassination constitutes an example of "armed force," Article 2
of the Definition of Aggression may criminalize such activity as
aggression:
the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facia evidence of an act of aggression although
the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude
that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances." '
In the absence of belligerency, assassination of officials in one state
upon the orders of another state might also be considered as terrorism.
Normally considered a convention on terrorism, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents' particular prohibitions of assassi-
nation are also relevant here. After defining 'internationally protected
person,' at Article 1, Article 2(a) of the convention identifies as a crime,
inter alia, "the intentional commission of (a) a murder, kidnapping or
other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected
person. '66
62. Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 60.
63. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Adopted by the U.N. General Assem-
bly, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975).
64. Id.
65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
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The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism rein-
forces the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons. Article 1(c) of this Convention
considers any "serious offense involving an attack against the life, physi-
cal integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including dip-
lomatic agents as one of the constituent crimes of terror violence. Article
1(e) considers "an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons"
another constituent terrorist crime.
6 6
These arguments notwithstanding, circumstances exist wherein the
expectations of the authoritative human rights regime must override the
ordinary prohibitions against transnational assassination, both the
prohibitions concerning conditions of peace and conditions of war. The
most apparent of such circumstances, such as the present case of Saddam
Hussein, involve genocide and related crimes against humanity.7 Al-
Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 1, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into
force Feb. 20, 1977).
- 66. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, art. 1, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. 90.
67. The utilitarian view is that human actions should be evaluated in light of their
consequences, and that only this consequentialist approach will enable us to deal with com-
plex moral and legal issues in a rational, clear, objective and precise fashion. The principle
of utility, which has its origins with Jeremy Bentham, is "that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question . . .to pro-
mote or to oppose that happiness." Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, in PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 125 (W. Harrison ed.,
1979). A good utility-based argument against those who claim that assassination is imper-
missible because it arouses antipathy is Bentham's statement against the principle of sym-
pathy and antipathy which
approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to
augment the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely
because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: hold-
ing up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and
disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground.
Id. at 138-139. Also, says Bentham:
If we could consider an offence which has been committed as an isolated fact,
the like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would
only be adding one evil to another. But when we consider that an unpunished
crime leaves the path of crime open, not only to the same delinquent, but also
to all those who may have the same motives and opportunities for entering
upon it, we perceive that the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a
source of security to all. That punishment which, considered in itself, appeared
base and repugnant to all generous sentiments, is elevated to the first rank of
benefits, when it is regarded not as an act of wrath or of vengeance against a
guilty or unfortunate individual who has given way to mischievous inclinations,
but as an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety.
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW: THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (J.
Bowring ed., 1962). From the utilitarian point of view, only consequences constitute good
reason for punishing or abstaining from punishment; desert and justice do not count in their
own right. Punishment is an evil which a utilitarian considers morally justified only when it
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though the argument promoting assassination must normally rest on the
presumption that leaving Saddam alive would assuredly result in addi-
tional Nuremberg-category crimes, further destruction of dissident popu-
lations within Iraq and/or additional crimes of war, against peace and
against humanity, such an argument may also stand solely on the juris-
prudential requirement of punishment."9 In this retributive view, 9 law
enforcement rationale for the assassination of Saddam Hussein would lie
not only in the preemption of new crimes but also in the literal claims of
nullum crimen sine poena.
Exactly how ancient is the principle of nullum crimen sine poena,
"no crime without a punishment"? The earliest statement of nullum cri-
men sine poena can be found in the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686
B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 2000 B.C.), the even-earlier code of Ur-
Nammu (c. 2100 B.C.) and, of course, the lex talionis, or law of exact
retaliation, presented in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or
biblical Pentateuch.7 0 At Nuremberg, the words used by the Court, "so
far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished," represented a reaffirmation of this
principle."
The Hebrews viewed the shedding of blood as an abomination that
is a means for securing a greater good. Because of the principle of nullum crimen sine
poena, this is a principle not always accepted by utilitarians. This is the case because there
are occasions, from a utilitarian perspective, where punishment is judged inappropriate.
Where punishment would have worse consequences than non-punishment, punishment
would be unprofitable and declined. According to utilitarian thought, every unprofitable
punishment is ipso facto morally unjustified. Or as Bentham puts it: "It is cruel to expose
even the guilty to useless sufferings." JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 345 (R.
Hildreth ed,. E. Dumont trans., 1871).
68. The permissibility of assassination here is contingent upon the underlying theory of
punishment. Where one holds to a utilitarian view, assassination would not be justified un-
less it were judged to prevent further harm. A retributive view of punishment, however,
could justify assassination even without expected deterrent benefits because injustice should
not be allowed with impunity.
69. A classical supporter of "retributive justice" was Immanuel Kant. Writing in Phi-
losophy of Law, Kant identifies the mode and measure of punishment as follows: "[t]his is
the right of retaliation (justalionis), and properly understood, it is the only principle which
in regulating a public court... can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a
just penalty." Immanuel Kant, Public Right, in Philosophy of Law (Hastie trans., 1887). On
the retributive view generally, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 91-139
(1978); SIR WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 96-120 (1968); C. L. TEN, CRIME,
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 38-65 (1987); ROBERT NOZlCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97
(1981); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); D. J. GALLIGAN, The Return to Ret-
ribution in Penal Theory, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT 154-157 (C. Tapper ed., 1981);
IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 67-110 (1989); TED HONDERICH, PUNISH-
MENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 22-51 (1969); A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 320-326
(G. Paton and Durham eds., 1964); HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
(1975); MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 21-33 (1981). For a broader but
fascinating treatment, see also HENBERG, supra note 49.
70. See supra note 49.
71. For the court statement, see A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 110 (1964).
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required expiation, "for blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be
made for the land, for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of
him who shed it." '2 This ancient Hebrew belief in "pollution" parallels
that of the ancient Greeks. In the words of Marvin Henberg: "The
(Greek) Erinyes do for the Greeks of the seventh to fourth centuries
B.C.E. what Yahweh does for the ancient Hebrews, they demand the
blood of homicides."" The pre-Socratic philosophers, especially Anaxi-
mander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, displayed a metaphysical view of re-
tributive justice as inherent in the cosmos itself.74 Among the ancient
Greeks, homicide pollution extended to those guilty of accidental murder
and, left unpunished, even threatened the community at large. According
to Marvin Henberg:
Homicide pollution entails the following: One guilty of murder, delib-
erate or accidental, contracts a metaphysical stain, invisible save to
the Erinyes and to the gods. Like a deadly disease, pollution renders
the agent a danger to others, for until the stain is purified or the pol-
luted person exiled the public at large stands threatened. Crops may
be blighted (witness Oedipus Rex) as incentive for the populace to
seek out the murderer. Liability to suffering, then, is collective; and in
its nearly allied form of the curse, pollution can be hereditary as well
as collective, visiting each generation of a single family with renewed
suffering. Finally, the doctrine of pollution imposes strict liability for
its offenses. No excuse, justification or mitigation of penalty is al-
lowed: The accidental manslayer must seek purification equally with
one who kills out of greed or passion.75
Aeschylus gives a good sense of the Greek view of punishment. In
The Libation-Bearers (310-14) the chorus intones: "the spirit of Right
cries out aloud and extracts atonement due: blood stroke for the stroke of
blood shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks the voice of the
age-old wisdom. 78
Plato included himself among those who recognize the duty of pun-
ishment. Thinking of vice, the source of crime, as an ailment of the soul,
just as physical disease to the body, he recommends punishment to re-
store order in the soul. The criminal, therefore, derives a positive benefit
72. Numbers 35:33. For a contemporary expression of the "blood for blood" conception
of punishment, see statement of U.S. Senator, now Vice-President, Al Gore on the fourth
anniversary of the gassing of the Kurdish city of Halabja. Offered to the U.S. Senate on
March 18, 1992, Gore called for establishment of a formal war crimes tribunal to prosecute
Saddam Hussein for "cruel, inhuman, unthinkable repression." In justifying such a tribunal,
Gore said it would "perform a sacred duty to the dead whose blood, as the Bible says, cries
out from the earth on which it was spilled." Mass Killings in Iraq, Hearings Before the
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 51 (1992).
73. See HENBERG, supra note 49, at 77.
74. WERNER JAEGER, 1 PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 150-169 (Gilbert Highet
trans., 1945); Gregory Vlastos, Solonian Justice, in 41 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 65 (1946); and
HUGH LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 80-81 (1971).
75. See HENBERG, supra note 49, at 79.
76. AESCHYLUS, THE LIBATION - BEARERS, 310-314.
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from punishment. Discarding the claims of retributivism, Plato views
punishment as just and good only to the extent that it serves the common
good by advancing human welfare. Punishment should turn others from
vice and teach virtue. Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, and
Bentham have taken similar positions. Says Bentham:
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common,
is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore in
the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends to
subtract from that happiness; in other words, to exclude mischief....
But all punishment is mischief; all punishment in itself is evil. Upon
the principle utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil. 7
It follows that utilitarian views of punishment, in contrast to retribu-
tivist perspectives, may or may not support the principle of nullum cri-
men sine poena. As to retributivist perspectives, the philosopher Kant
remains the classic example of this view of legal punishment, but here
retributive justice has nothing to do with revenge. Kantian retribution, an
action of the state against the criminal, is an impersonal action, under-
taken without passion, and as a sacred duty. Kant views legal punishment
of criminals as a distinct categorical imperative. In Kant, we see the
strongest possible reaffirmation of nullum crimen sine poena:
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of
all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island de-
cided to separate and disperse themselves around the world), the last
murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone
will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the blood-
guilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to
insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they
may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal
justice.7 8
Kant returns to the beginning, to the concept of "blood-guilt," and to
the insistence that society has a duty to punish even without resulting
utilitarian consequences..
At the Nuremberg Trial, which concluded with an explicit reaffirma-
tion of nullum crimen sine poena, the Court based its sentencing not on
reformation, not deterrence, but on retribution. In the words of Sir Wal-
ter Moberly, "the principle really embodied at Nuremberg was the princi-
ple of retribution. At the time of the trial public opinion in the victorious
countries undoubtedly demanded and acclaimed it. Rightly or wrongly,
public opinion saw punishment as not only allowable and expedient, but
an imperative duty. '" This instance of retributive justice, undertaken be-
77. Bentham, supra note 66, at 170.
78. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Element of Justice, in THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS. 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965).
79. MOBERLY, supra note 68 at 103.
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cause the malefactors so clearly deserved punishment, also served to en-
sure that, henceforth, the most abominable perpetrators of international
crimes could reasonably expect enforcement of the principle, nullum cri-
men sine poena. This precedent makes the prosecution of Saddam Hus-
sein for Nuremberg-category crimes an indisputable jurisprudential
expectation.
President Clinton has no time to lose. Facing a world described pro-
phetically by the poet Yeats, a world wherein "the blood-dimmed tide is
loosed, and everywhere/The ceremony of innocence is drowned;/The best
lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity,"80 the
new American leader can choose to stand for naked geopolitics or for jus-
tice. Should he choose the latter, as indeed he must, this country would
again be aligned with essential principles of dignity and lawfulness.
Should he opt for geopolitics, as would happen if he decided against pros-
ecution of Iraqi crimes, we would have no choice but to agree that "there
is no longer a virtuous nation, and the best of us live by candle light.""1
80. VATTEL, supra note 29, at 135. It is instructive to recall Vattel's argument on the
observance of justice between nations:
Justice is the foundation of all social life and the secure bond of all civil inter-
course. Human society, instead of being an interchange of friendly assistance,
would be no more than a vast system of robbery if no respect were shown for
the virtue which gives to each his own. Its observance is even more necessary
between Nations than between individuals, because injustice between Nations
may be followed by the terrible consequences involved in an affray between
powerful political bodies, and because it is more difficult to obtain re-
dress. . . .[a]n intentional act of injustice is certainly an injury. A Nation has,
therefore, the right to punish it. . . . The right to resist injustice is derived
from the right of self-protection.
Id.
81. W. B. YEATS, THE LETTERS OF W. B. YEATS 691 (Allan Wade ed., 1954).
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Japanese Banking Reform and the
Occupation Legacy:
Decompartmentalization, Deregulation, and
Decentralization
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
Since the end of the occupation in 1952, Japan has had in place a
rigidly compartmentalized banking system. Banks were divided by fund-
ing source, by activity, and by geography. City banks, the Japanese
equivalent of money center banks, had extensive branch networks and
raised a large portion of funds through deposits. They could not, however,
sell bonds or otherwise access long term funding.
Long term banks, in contrast, could sell bonds but could not solicit
retail deposits. Trust banks, along with insurance companies, managed
pension plan assets. Regional banks, particularly those in rural areas, had
a monopoly over the prefecture in which they operated. Finally, a rigid
separation existed between banks and securities companies.
Compartmentalization had considerable significance. It facilitated
government control of the financial system. It also effectively limited the
ability of foreign banks to compete. Until the mid-1980s, U.S. banks
could not engage in a full range of financial activities within Japan. They
could not engage in trust1 or securities activities,2 had no right to issue
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Of Counsel, Hol-
land & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A. 1978, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1980, Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law; M.A. 1984, Georgetown University, Ph.D 1993, Georgetown
University. This article was made possible through the funding provided by the Hughes
Research and Development Fund.
1. The Japanese government did issue nine trust licenses to foreign banks following the
Yen/Dollar Accord in 1984. The Ministry of Finance, however, made clear that no new li-
censes would issue until Japanese commercial banks received comparable authority. POLITI-
CAL DECISION: NINE FOREIGN BANKS ALLOWED INTO TRUST BANKING FIELD, THE JAPANESE
EcON. JOUR., July 2, 1985. at 1.
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bonds and lacked the branch network to access retail deposits.'
With an almost manicured appearance, therefore, the banking system
resembled a Japanese garden, "rigorously tended and artfully arranged,
with each component fixed in place and all parts combining to form an
agreeably harmonious role.' 4 Although the numbers and relative market
share of each category shifted over time, the essential divisions did not.
The compartmentalized system of city, long-term, trust and regional
banks and securities firms remained intact for 30 years.
In 1992, however, the Diet took a major step toward bringing the
Japanese financial system into closer alignment with other industrial
countries.5 Legislation provided the mechanism for ending the compart-
mentalized financial system by eliminating the distinctions between most
classes of financial institutions.6 The laws enabled banks to engage in se-
curities activities and securities firms to engage in banking activities.7
2. In 1986, the Ministry of Finance allowed foreign banks to engage in securities activi-
ties through a separate subsidiary. The bank, however, could not own more than 50% of the
subsidiary, resulting in some odd pairings. Morgan Guaranty, for example, owned half of the
shares of a securities company with Bechtel owning the other half. Barbara Buell, Deregula-
tion: A Two Way Street, Bus. WK., June 22, 1987.
3. Through the post-occupation period, the Ministry of Finance prohibited the expan-
sion of foreign banks. No new license was issued to a U.S. bank already in the country until
1981 when Citibank received approval to open two additional branches. The restrictions
have largely ended. Citibank, the only foreign financial institution to take advantage of the
authority, now has approximately 20 branches. Letter from John J. Skelly, Vice President
Citibank (April 1991) (providing opening dates of all Citicorp branches in Japan).
4. EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT, Aug., 1986, at 21.
5. European financial institutions operate under a system of universal banking. This
enables banks to engage in a host of related financial activities such as the sale of securities
and insurance. While the United States still separates the banking, insurance and securities
industry, those barriers have been lowered through administrative legerdemain. The Federal
Reserve Board has, for example, permitted banks to engage in securities underwriting. See
In re J.P. Morgan, Etc., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987). Similarly, banks have made some
inroads into the insurance industry. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. App.
1988). Japan's reforms reflect this international trend toward the reduction of barriers sepa-
rating classes of financial institutions.
6. Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law originally prohibited banks from en-
gaging in securities activities. Article 65-3 now authorizes the Ministry of Finance to issue
securities licenses to companies owned by banks. Article 43-2 now authorizes the Ministry of
Finance to allow securities firms to acquire a majority of a banking subsidiary.
See Amendment [Bill] to the Securities and Exchange Law (Pt. I), CaMRI Review No. 25,
Apr. 30, 1992.
7. Specifically, Article 43-2 provides that "[any securities company may, upon authori-
zation by the Minister of Finance, acquire or held a majority of shares or a majority of
equity contribution ... of a bank, trust company, or such other financial institutions in a
foreign country, a foreign company which is engaged in the securities business or such other
companies as may be prescribed by an ordinance of the Ministry of Finance." Article 65-2
provides that "[t]he provisions of Article 65 [prohibiting banks from engaging in securities
activities] shall not preclude the Minister of Finance from issuing a license . . .to a joint
stock company in which a bank, trust company, or such other financial institution as may be
prescribed by a Cabinet order owns a majority of its shares."
While allowing banks and securities firms to enter each other's business, including trust
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Moreover, securities firms and commercial banks could operate trust
subsidiaries.'
The change portended more than a realignment in the classification
of banks. The shift promised to accelerate the process of consolidation
and a return to the pre-war system dominated by a handful of large city
banks.9 Moreover, over the long term, decompartmentalization should re-
duce the government's ability to micro-manage the financial markets.
Less obvious, the changes essentially eviscerated a regulatory ap-
proach developed by United States and more or less imposed on Japan
during the occupation. Allied officials, over the initial opposition of the
Japanese government, wanted to segment the financial system, primarily
to prevent the large Japanese city banks from absorbing smaller competi-
tors."0 Compartmentalization, therefore, had its roots in U.S. policies. The
exegesis was even more notable given the role of compartmentalization a
critical barrier to foreign banking activity in the country.
I. PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT
The Japanese financial system changed considerably after the Second
World War. To be sure, certain characteristics of the pre-war system re-
mained. Both periods saw some degree of segmentation. The distinction
between long term and ordinary commercial banks predated the war. So
did the highly consolidated nature of the banking system, something that
had begun in ernest following financial panics in the 1920s.
When the occupation ended in 1952, however, the banking system
had changed in a number of material respects. Trust companies had con-
verted to banks. Securities and banking functions were separated. Special
banks were eliminated.
These changes resulted in compartmentalization of the banking sys-
tem, something that enhanced government control. Designed to facilitate
economic recovery, the financial system did not allocate capital through
market forces. Instead, capital went where the government thought best.
Targeted industries benefitted from a constant supply of funds while
banking, barriers continued to remain following the legislation. Long term banks still had
the exclusive right to issue bonds and debentures to the public. Commercial banks could
raise long term funds only through private placements. Otherwise they were limited to short
term funds, particularly deposits. In addition, the legislation did not tamper with the barri-
ers separating financial institutions and the insurance industry, although change in that
area is under study.
8. The changes did not completely decompartmentalize the banking system. Barriers
continued to separate long term and other commercial banks and barriers remained between
financial institutions and insurance companies.
9. At least since the 1960s, the Japanese government has encouraged further consoli-
dation in the banking sector. In addition, no new bank has received a license to operate
since the 1950s, with the trust subsidiaries of nine foreign banks the only exception. The
result has been a decline in the total number of banks in Japan.
10. See discussion infra Section IV.
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others such as the consumer sector suffered."
Compartmentalization facilitated this process. Each category of
banks had its prescribed niche in the recovery process. They raised funds
from different sources and funnelled them to designated companies or in-
dustries. Each category of banks found themselves beholden to the gov-
ernment for funds and, concomitantly, more willing to follow the govern-
ment's guidance about the scope and direction of loans.
A. The Early Days
The financial sector evolved contemporaneously with the emergence
of modern Japan and the Meiji Restoration. At the apex of the financial
system rested the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Formed in the 1870s, MoF
represented the single most powerful bureaucracy in a country of power-
ful bureaucracies. In charge of the budget, tax, foreign exchange, customs,
securities activities, insurance companies and banks, the MoF performed
the functions assigned to a dozen agencies and offices in the United
States.'"
Early banking legislation reflected marked outside influence. The ini-
tial pattern was modeled after the national banking system in the United
States.'" Adopted in 1872 and subject to important amendments four
years later, the Bank Act regulated commercial banks and authorized
them to issue currency."'
The legislation initially had little effect; only a small number of
banks formed.'1 Amendments adopted in 1876 sought to encourage the
organization of banks, primarily by doing away with gold denominated
reserve requirements. The amendments accomplished the intended goal,
with 157 banks forming over the next four years.1 6 Some private financial
11. The inability to obtain consumer loans for cars or household appliances further
spurred savings, as did an inadequate system of retirement income.
12. At one time MoF also had control over industry, trade, agriculture, transportation,
communications and supervision of local governments. Those duties were taken away in
1898. See Ministry of Finance, 5 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 186-8 (1983).
13. HUBERT F. SCHIFFER, THE MODERN JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM 15 (1962). See also
generally Thomas F. Cargill, Central Bank Independence and Regulatory Responsibility:
The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, 2 MONOGRAPH SERIES OF FINANCE AND ECO-
NOMICS, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1989). (noting that Japanese
system based upon the National Currency Act of 1863 adopted in the United States).
14. WILLIAM WIRT LOCKWOOD, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN: GROWTH AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 1868-1938, at 13 (1954).
15. The law had a number of problems. As one commentator wrote: "First, it made the
notes issued by the National Banks against the collateral of government bonds redeemable
in metal, which, given the public's attitude toward paper money and the deficits and the
current balance payments, made it very difficult to keep the notes in circulation. Second,
the terms of the law did not provide the banks with a sufficient margin of profit." RAYMOND
W. GOLDSMITH, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1868-1977 (1983).
16. The amendments also lowered the interests charged on borrowed money. National
banks initially had the authority to issue currency. The currency, however, had to supported
by sufficient reserves. By altering the requirement of gold reserves, the Bank Act provided
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institutions also formed during that period. In 1876, Mitsui became the
first private commercial bank and an ordinary commercial bank following
adoption of The Banking Act of 1890.
This early approach to financial regulation, however, ultimately had
to be scrapped. A rebellion in Kyushu demonstrated inadequacies with
the banking system. The government had to increase spending to handle
the emergency, causing rampant inflation. With the need for comprehen-
sive reform clear, the Japanese abandoned the system of national banks
in the 1880s, instead opting for a central banking system based upon the
European model. Specifically, the country focused on the experiences of
Belgium, the country that most recently had set up a central bank.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) came into existence in 1882 and two years
later received the exclusive authority to issue currency.1 7 The government
owned fifty five percent of the central bank's stock and appointed the
Governor, Vice-Governor and a number of other bank officials. The gover-
nor tended to be either a career employee within the central bank, a re-
tired official from the MoF, or a private banker, typically from the YSB.
The modern commercial banking law emerged in 1890."8 Apparently
designed to promote expansion, the Bank Act contained few constraints.19
There were no restrictions on non-banking activities, loan limits, capital
or reserve requirements.2 0 Deposit insurance did not exist. The result was
predictable: rapid growth of rickety financial institutions, an unstable mix
that would haunt the financial system until the war.
21
The number of commercial banks proliferated, at one point climbing
to almost 2,000.22 Most banks were small, with almost half having capital
of less than 100,000 yen.2 3 This number began a gradual decline after the
turn of the century when minimal capital requirements were estab-
considerable impetus for the formation of banks and the issuance of currency. See SCHIFFER,
supra note 13, at 16.
17. The BoJ received the authority with the adoption of the Convertible Bank Note
Act of 1884 (law under which "the authority of such national banks was abolished and all
notes were unified into the Bank of Japan notes."). See also SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 16.
18. FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN [ZENGINKYO], THE BANKING SYSTEM
IN JAPAN 26 (1989).
19. See Recent Developments in Japanese Banking, FED. RES. BULL., July, 1923, at 805
("The reason for the large number of banks to be found in the peculiar banking legislation
of Japan, which, in accordance with the desire of the Government to spread banking facili-
ties all over the country, made the opening of banks dependent upon very few
requirements.").
20. Id.
21. See Fuji BANK, LTD., BANKING IN MODERN JAPAN (2d ed. 1967).
22. The precise number of banks at the turn of the century appears to have been 1867.
See THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 18, (putting number at 1867 in 1901).
23. G.C. ALLEN, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EXPANSION 56 (1965). The largest banks, of course,
had much greater capital. See YASUO MISHIMA, THE MITSUBISHI: ITS CHALLENGE AND STRAT-
EGY 179 (1989) ("In 1915, the capital of the Banking Division [of Mitsubishi] was only Y1
million compared with Y20 million for the Mitsui Bank Y21.5 million for the Dai Ichi Bank
Y10 million for the Yasuda Bank, and Y7.5 million for the Sumitomo Bank.").
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lished, 2 although the total number of branches continued to grow."5
Some of the decline came from bank failures, with 956 becoming insol-
vent between 1905 and 1936.2' Reduction in numbers also resulted from
an increasing number of mergers.27 The larger banks benefitted from the
consolidation process, with deposits and business flocking to healthier fi-
nancial institutions.
The real turning point and the end of atomistic banking occurred
with the panic of 1927. The collapse of the Bank of Taiwan sent shock
waves through the Japanese financial system.2" The Bank had lent con-
siderable sums to Suzuki & Co., the newest industrial group. With Suzuki
tottering, a number of Japanese banks called in short term loans to the
Bank. Unable to raise funds, the Bank of Taiwan turned to the BoJ.
When funds were not forthcoming, the bank collapsed. As one govern-
ment report put it: "This caused great alarm and resulted in runs on
banks throughout the whole country."2 9
With no system of deposit insurance, any threat to the integrity of
the financial sector sparked panic. The failure of the Bank of Taiwan
proved no exception. Depositors began to withdraw funds. The BoJ
pumped money into the system to ensure liquidity, but the need for more
systematic reform was clear.8 0 The government responded with the Bank-
ing Law of 1927.'
The 1927 Law gave the government considerable control over the fi-
nancial sector. All banks operating within the country had to obtain a
license and could not open, close or move a bank branch without approval
of the Ministry of Finance. The Law also attempted to establish a bank-
24. The decree established minimum levels of 500,000 yen for joint stock banks and
250,000 yen for private banks. ALLEN, supra note 23 at 56.
25. By the end of 1920, the number of branches had increased to 5,097. Id.
26. Hugh Patrick, Japanese Financial Development in Historical Perspective, 1868-
1980, in COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES (Gustav Ranis, et al. eds., 1984).
27. Id. at 312 (noting that between 1905 and 1936, 956 banks failed; 1,333 were
merged). But see supra note 19, at 2 ("The collapse of small, unsound banks accounted for a
greater part of the decline, which consolidation was a minor factor.").
28. An earlier run apparently resulted from discussions in the Diet over the govern-
ment's desire to delay payments under guaranties that arose out of the Great Earthquake of
1923. Schiffer, supra note 13, at 20. In addition, competence in the financial system was
shaken by publicity that certain large banks, including the Bank of Taiwan, were unsound
because of a deteriorating loan portfolio. DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PRE-WAR JAPAN 247
(James W. Morley ed., 1971).
29. Annual Report of the Bank of Japan, FED. RES. BULL., May 1928, at 331.
30. See id. at 331 ("When the panic broke out, first in March and again in April, we
disregarded our usual practice and gave liberal accommodation to all banks applying for
funds to meet withdrawals of deposits; we extended credits directly and freely even to insti-
tutions which had no previous business connections with us; and in cooperation with the
Government and leading banks we endeavored to tide over the crisis and stabilize the
situation.").
31. The Law was substantially revised in 1981. See The Banking Law, Law No. 59 of
June 1, 1981, Arts. 8 & 9 (Japan).
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ing system based upon short term loans,3 2 by restricting commercial
banks to limited duration loans, leaving long term credit to special insti-
tutions.-3 Additionally, the law imposed limitations on non-banking activ-
ities, although not securities activities.
The Banking Law of 1927 remained in place, without significant
change, until 1981."' The longevity had one major explanation: ambiguity.
The Law contained little more than an outline of a regulatory scheme,
providing MoF with considerable discretion. With little or no regulatory
augmentation, MoF used the 1927 Law to totally reshape the financial
system after the war.
Commercial banking was not the only financial sector to experience
reform and consolidation. The 1920s also saw efforts to reform trust com-
panies. Subject to almost no regulation, trust companies had proliferated.
As with banks, economic uncertainties in the 1920s precipitated a number
of failures. The adoption of the Trust Law and the Trust Business Law in
1922 subjected the companies to extensive regulation. The 1922 Law gave
MoF authority to license trust companies, and was used aggressively to
pare numbers. Most large trust companies formed during this period, in-
cluding Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Nippon.3 5 Able to pay
higher yields than banks, the companies thrived. They grew in size and
rivaled the large commercial banks.3 "
Following adoption of the legislation, trust companies witnessed a
dramatic decline in numbers. The number fell from 488 to thirty seven by
1928 and to six by the end of the war.37 The decline in numbers did not,
however, mean a diminishing market share. Quite the contrary. Trust
companies, perceived as a haven from the uncertainties confronting banks
and deposits, actually grew as their numbers decreased. s
32. See Henry C. Wallich, and Mabel I. Wallich, Banking and Finance, in ASIA'S NEW
GIANT 279 (1976).
33. Id.
34. See The Banking Law, supra note 31.
35. Mitsui was formed in 1924; Yasuda and Sumitomo in 1925 and Mitsubishi and Nip-
pon in 1927.
36. See The Capital Market, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND KOREA: A
PARALLEL WITH LESSONS 165 (Chung H. Lee and Ippei Yamazawa eds. 1990).
37. See Fujino, A Comparison of Trusts in the United States and Japan, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE REISCHAUER INSTITUTE OF JAPANESE STUDIES 87-17, at 10
(1987).
38. MONEY AND BANKING IN JAPAN, BANK OF JAPAN, ECONOMIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT,
(S. Nishimura trans. L.S. Pressnell ed., 1973). See also Annual Report, supra note 29.
("Following financial panic of 1927, there 'was an active transfer of funds from the second-
ary and minor banks to the larger banks, trust companies, and the Post Office Savings
Banks;"). Three trust companies controlled the bulk of the business. See MISHIMA, supra
note 23, at 253 ("The percentage Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo accounted for among
the total trust properties, also increased from 47% in 1927 to 53% in 1928 and to 54% in
1929.").
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B. Special Banks
In addition to commercial banks and trust companies, the Japanese
financial system rested on a bed of specialized financial institutions. Spe-
cial banks served particular functions such as financial services in occu-
pied territories, foreign exchange, and long term lending to particular seg-
ments of the economy. Special banks represented the priinary vehicles for
government intervention into the financial system.
Representing the first of the special banks, the Yokohama Specie
Bank (YSB), to a large degree set the pattern. The YSB addressed a spe-
cific void in the financial system. Designed to engage in international
trade activity, the bank was intended to weaken the monopoly of foreign
banks over trade finance in Japan.3 9 Formed in 1880, the YSB again
demonstrated the government's willingness to rely on foreign models. The
Bank patterned it's charter after the one used by the Hong Kong &
Shanghai Bank.40 In forming the bank, the government retained consider-
able influence over the institution, appointing the President and Vice-
President,"1 supplying one-third of the bank's initial capital, and provid-
ing advantageous low interest loan financing. "2
The YSB quickly became heavily involved in trade finance, ulti-
mately creating an extensive network of foreign offices. The Bank opened
a London office in 1884 and by 1902 had branches in France, the United
States, India, Hong Kong and China.43 An overseas presence allowed the
YSB to compete with the foreign banks. Particularly during the First
World War, the YSB seized considerable business from European
competitors."
The Hypothec Bank of Japan filled another void in the financial sys-
tem. Authorized to issue long-term debt, the bank primarily made agri-
cultural loans, secured by real property, for terms as long as fifty years.4 5
39. G.C. ALLEN, A SHORT ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 1867-1937 53 (1962).
See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 15, at 50. The bank received the authority to engage in
foreign exchange activity six years after formation.
40. See FRANK H.H. KING AND CATHERINE E. KING, The Hong Kong Bank in the Period
of Imperialism and War 1885-1918, THE HISTORY OP THE HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK-
ING CORPORATION, 94-96 (1987- 1991).
41. ALLEN, supra note 39 at 53. The only serious competition for trade finance came
from branches of foreign banks. Id. at 108.
42. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that 1/3 of initial capital provided by
government with additional funds from Treasury; after government funding ended, Bank of
Japan authorized to make low interest loans).
43. JAPANESE FINANCE DEPARTMENT, AN OUTLINE OF BANKING SYSTEMS IN JAPAN 12
(1905).
44. See FED. RES. BULL., supra note 19, at 804, 806. ("The European war and the fluc-
tuation of most European currency is after the war restricted and hampered to a large de-
gree the activities of the European banking institutions, with the result that their business
was taken over by Japanese banks.").
45. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 18. The Hypothec bank could issue long-term debt,
although not in excess of ten times capital.
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The Hypothec Bank could raise funds by issuing debentures but had only
limited deposit taking authority. 4" This restriction on deposits began the
practice of dividing banks by funding source, something that would re-
main an attribute of the post-war banking system.
The Hypothec Bank also worked closely with the agricultural and in-
dustrial banks, a network of agrarian based financial institutions located
in each prefecture.47 Once again, the government retained considerable
control over the bank and guaranteed the dividend payment for the first
ten years of its existence.
Formed four years later, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) had as
its principal goal the extension of long-term loans to Japanese industry,
typically for five year periods. The IBJ channelled funds to "established
large industries, especially for shipbuilding companies, iron and steel fac-
tories, and public utilities. '4' To obtain the long term financing necessary
for the loans, the IBJ received debenture issuing authority.
In addition to servicing industry, the IBJ to some degree facilitated
foreign investment. A large portion of its capital came from overseas. 49
The bank floated bonds in England and France in 1908 and in New York
in 1924.0 As with the other special banks, the government's guiding hand
was readily apparent, including a dividend guarantee comparable to that
received by the Hypothec Bank."'
Intended to facilitate development of Japan's northern most island,
the Hokkaido Takusiyoka Colonial Bank received debenture issuing au-
thority. The government also formed financial institutions in occupied
territories including the Bank of Taiwan and the Bank of Chosen in Ko-
rea both of which acted as central banks for those areas.52
Special banks maintained close ties with the government. In addition
to dividend guarantees and some financing, MoF typically appointed key
officers.6 3 The banks also performed tasks assigned by the government.
The Bank of Japan conducted activities in overseas territories through
the YSB. MoF, by comparison used the IBJ to implement domestic poli-
cies. Following the great earthquake in 1923, the IBJ at the behest of the
government funneled aid to small borrowers. Similarly, after the financial
crisis of 1927, the government again channeled funds to small borrowers
through the IBJ. At the end of 1929, IBJ had more than Y35 million in
46. Id.
47. ALLEN, supra note 39, at 54. The Hypothec Bank gradually took control of these
banks after 1921, operating them as branches. Id. at 108.
48. SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 18.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Herbert M. Bratter, Japan's Special Bank for Industrial Financing, THE FAR EAST
REV., Oct. 1930, at 574. The article also contains a list of companies financed by the IBJ.
51. ALLEN, supra note 39, at 54.
52. SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 19.
53. ALLEN, supra note 23, at 55.
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loans to "petty merchants and manufacturers. 54
C. Control and Consolidation
In addition to reforming the financial system, the Banking Law of
1927 also accelerated the process of consolidation in the banking commu-
nity. Capital standards were raised and a policy was announced favoring
further "amalgamation" of commercial banks. Over half of the existing
banks did not meet the new capital standards requiring them to either
find the necessary capital, merge or liquidate.55
From a high of almost 2000 banks at the turn of the century, the
number of banks began to fall, a process that accelerated as the war be-
gan.56 The number of commercial banks fell from 683 in 1931 to 377 in
1937 and sixty one in 1945.1' By the end of the conflict, the four zaibatsu
banks, Teikoku (a combined Mitsui and Dai-Ichi), Yasuda (Fuji), Mitsub-
ishi and Sumitomo, held 74.9 percent of all bank loans.58
The trend toward consolidation did not exempt larger banks. Sanwa,
a name meaning three harmonies, formed in 1933 as an amalgamation of
three banks Osaka, Yamaguchi and Konoike.59 Tokai formed in 1941
through the combination of three banks in the Nagoya area. More spec-
tacularly, Mitsui and Dai-Ichi, two of the largest and oldest banks united
under the Teikoku banner in 1943. Nor was the trend limited to urban
centers. MoF continued to push for consolidations outside of cities under
the premise of "One Prefecture, One Bank."'
The consolidation policy was not primarily motivated by efficiency;
control represented the preeminent concern. "The aim was not so much
to consolidate the banks' business as to strengthen financial control, such
as the promotion of the Easy Money Policy, the improvement of govern-
ment bond marketing, and the provision of funds for munitions
industries." '61
54. BRATTER, supra note 50, at 575.
55. JAPANESE FINANCE DEPARTMENT, supra note 43, at 2.
56. Kozu YAMAMURA, ECONOMIC POLICY IN POST-WAR JAPAN 24 (1967).
57. Pressnell, supra note 40, at 26 & 39. Of the five largest banks at the end of the War,
only one, Sanwa, was a non-Zaibatsu bank.
58. Yasuda (1880), Mitsui (1876), Sumitomo (1895), Mitsubishi, and Dai Ichi (1872),
had 28.1 percent of all deposits held by commercial banks in 1930. SCHIFFER, supra note 13,
at 21. See also PATRICK, supra note 27, at 312 (stating that "Big 5" had 30 percent of all
bank loans and deposits by 1930).
59. The bank also ultimately absorbed Sanwa Trust Company.
60. See Takeshi Otsuki, The Banking System of Japan, ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, July 7,
1951, at 521 ("As a result, a financial administrative principle of having only one bank for
each prefecture was set up, and legal measures to facilitate the merger of banks were
adopted."). A number of large banks emerged from the process. Bank of Kobe was formed
in 1936 from a merger of seven banks in Hyogo Prefecture; Saitama in 1943 from the four
largest banks in Saitama Prefecture.
61. L.S. Pressnell, at 38. See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 15, at 118 ("The process of
concentration proceeded through the 1930s and accelerated during the war, being fostered
by the government and becoming practically compulsory during the second half of the pe-
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As the conflict war in accelerated, so did government control over the
banking system. To some degree, the large Zaibatsu banks had repre-
sented counterweights to government influence. They could count on cap-
ital and deposits from member companies and, in an unstable financial
environment, the balance of individual deposits.6" Not dependent upon
the BoJ for funds, these financial institutions had considerable practical
independence from government oversight.63
As Japan shifted to a wartime economy, however, the role of govern-
ment greatly expanded. The government, particularly the MoF, aggres-
sively intervened into the financial markets to pursue war related policies.
Commercial banks became government controlled conduits for funneling
capital to war related industries. The MoF encouraged this process by
guaranteeing loan repayments. While the role of particular banks varied,
the entire financial system generally operated to facilitate the govern-
ment's military exploits. 64
Similarly, the relatively high degree of independence enjoyed by the
BoJ came to an end.6 5 Loss of independence occurred in 1942 with the
adoption of a law acceding to the Ministry the authority to order the BoJ
to implement particular policies.6 In the post-war period, control would
be further tightened through the practice of appointing retired MoF offi-
cials as Governor of the central bank.
Thus, by the time the war ended, certain distinct attributes had ap-
peared that would remain central to the post-war banking system. 7 In-
riod, as the government felt that the financing of rearmament and war could be more effi-
ciently handled by a smaller number of large banks, which could be more easily controlled
by the government.")
62. Samuel E. Neal and Raymond Vernon, Japan Has a Bank Problem, BANKING, Oct.,
1946, at 46 ("And finally the prestige of the Zaibatsu name, bearing with it a reputation for
soundness and stability which carried great appeal for people plagued with bank failures
and defalcations, served the clinch the Zaibatsu position in the competitive race for
deposits.").
63. Some even viewed the Ministry as a captive of the Zaibatsu banks. See id. at 45,
118 ("Until the middle 1930's this control by the Zaibatsu was overt and absolute. The
Finance Minister almost invariably was a career employee of one of the Zaibatsu families.
After 1930, the control of the Ministry by the Zaibatsu was more discrete but hardly less
effective.").
64. For a more detailed discussion of the government subjugation of banks during the
war, see W. TsUTSUI, BANKING POLICY IN JAPAN 13-17 (1988).
65. See TAKAFUSA NAKAMURA, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE ECONOMY 139 (1981) (noting that
prior to the war, "the Bank of Japan had preserved a relatively independent position vis-a-
vis the Ministry of Finance .... ).
66. See Art. 42 of Bank of Japan Law (BoJ "under the supervision of the competent
Minister [of Finance]."). See also RICHARD A. BANYAI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION 1937-1945 (1974); T.F.M. AD-
AMS & IWAU HOSHiu, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN 99 (1972) (noting the MoF received
authority to approve discount rate and fix note issue limit and to "direct the bank ... to
undertake any business, to change its statutes, or to take any other necessary action.").
67. For a discussion of charges in the financial system immediately before and during
the war, see Yasuo Noritake, The Development of Monetary and Banking System in Ja-
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creasingly, banks became divided by function. Long term banks, foreign
exchange banks and trust companies all performed specialized functions.
At the same time, the financial industry emerged from the conflict highly
concentrated and subjected to considerable government control.
II. REFORM AND THE OCCUPATION
The post-war system of financial regulation can only be understood
in the context of the immense capital shortage that occurred in the after-
math of the Second World War. War-torn, an empire sheared away, Japa-
nese industries confronted the herculean task of rebuilding and con-
verting to civilian production. Doing so required capital; capital that
could not be repaid until retooling had finished and markets
reestablished.
Raising capital posed immense hurdles. With individuals primarily
concerned about food and shelter, the thought of investing limited re-
sources into risky ventures such as corporate stock had little appeal."
The ability to sell stock was also constrained by dysfunctional markets
and the absence of a history of this type of investment. In addition, allied
policies designed to break up the Zaibatsu, the large Japanese industrial
complexes, flooded the market with shares, further crowding out compa-
nies attempting to raise funds.
Still, something had to be done. Japanese companies desperately
needed capital. The primary answer was to be banks. Companies had his-
torically relied on banks for most of their capital needs. Resort to bank
financing in the post-war period was not simply a return to the past. Use
of banks as capital purveyors went well beyond earlier levels. Dependency
upon bank financing evolved into a system of credit rationing and govern-
ment control of industrial policy.
During the occupation, a rigid regulatory structure descended. With
other investment alternatives unavailable, individuals had little choice
but to deposit excess yen in banks. The funds were lent to capital starved
companies. The aggregation of small deposits supplied a significant por-
tion of the capital needs of corporate Japan.
Deposits, however, were not enough. Funds had to come from some-
where else. The solution was to be the government, specifically the Bank
of Japan. Through the discount window, the government provided city
banks with considerable additional funding. The practice, however, also
created leverage. The threat of reduced funding enabled the government
to dictate to banks which companies and industries were eligible for
credit. Control of credit permitted control of industrial policy.
Compartmentalization facilitated control. The financial system con-
pan, 1932-1945, 1 KOBE U. ECON. REv. 69 (1955).
68. See THOMAS PEPPER, MERIT E. JANOW & JIMMY W. WHEELER, THE COMPETITION
DEALING WITH JAPAN 146 (1985) ("World War II and the postwar financial difficulties virtu-
ally destroyed private accumulations of capital in Japan.").
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tinued to divide banks both by source of funding and by function. Com-
mercial banks were meant to be a source of short term financing for Japa-
nese industry, although as a practical matter loans were constantly
renewed. They could not sell debentures or otherwise raise long-term
funds.69 Funds came almost entirely from deposits, with loans from other
financial institutions and the BoJ playing an important role.7"
Special banks were eliminated. In their place however, appeared
three long-term banks. These financial institutions arose out of the need
to provide Japanese businesses with longer term financing. They were al-
lowed to sell debt with maturities of one year or five years and were ex-
pected to provide corporate Japan with financing of a more significant
duration.7 1 The authority to sell bonds came at a price. The banks could
not accept retail deposits.7 2 Given the insatiable need for capital, the
three long term banks had commercial relationships with most, if not all,
of the leading Japanese corporations.
The occupation also saw the creation of additional classes of banks.
Specifically, trust companies were given increased authority and allowed
to operate as banks..7  Trust banks raised funds neither through deben-
tures nor, in significant amounts, through deposits.7 4 Instead, the primary
mechanism was the loan trust certificate, funds left with the bank for a
term of three years at fixed interest rates. The funds were then lent to
industries designated by the MoF, effectively providing another source of
long term financing for corporate Japan.71
MoF also segmented banks geographically. City banks generally
69. See 20 MINISTRY OF FINANCE FINANCIAL HISTORY SECTION, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY
OF JAPAN, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION PERIOD 1945-1952, at 65-66 (1982). As a practical matter,
Japanese commercial banks consistently renewed short-term loans, effectively transforming
them into long-term financing. Id. at 33.
70. Id. The call money market involved short-term loans among banks. To the extent a
financial institution had excess, unused funds, they would lend them to other over-loaned
banks, particularly city banks. The government exercised considerable influence over the
market, including the determination of interest rates. Id. at 68.
71. Long Term Bank Credit Law, Law No. 187 of 1962.
72. Id. at 39. They could, however, accept certain government deposits and deposits
from borrowers. The three long-term banks are the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank. Id.
73. Trust banks are commercial banks with trust authority. Commercial banks received
the authority to engage in trust activities during the war. See Commercial Bank's Additional
Operation of Trust and Savings Bank Business Act, Law No. 43 of 1943. Following the
occupation, however, the Ministry of Finance used administrative guidance to force most
city and regional banks out of the area. That left the trust business to a specialized class of
commercial banks.
74. MoF did this in large part by limiting the number of trust bank branches.
75. Only one city and seven trust banks had the power to manage and invest client
funds, eliminating a source of profits for other institutions. Trust banks also managed pen-
sion plan assets, a lucrative business shared with insurance companies. The seven trust
banks are: Mitsubishi Trust, Sumitomo Trust, Mitsui Trust, Yasuda Trust, Toyo Trust,
Chuo Trust, and Nippon Trust. Daiwa represents the only ordinary commercial bank with
trust powers.
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could expand only in the principal urban centers, particularly Tokyo and
Osaka, and only on a limited basis. Regional banks, typically smaller,
tended to operate in a single prefecture. These banks essentially
amounted to conduits for deposits in less urban areas. Often unable to
find sufficient corporate borrowers, regional banks lent excess funds to
cash starved city banks. City banks in turn lent them to industries desig-
nated by the government.
The post-war system also preserved distinctions between domestic
and international banks. The MoF severely restricted the overseas expan-
sion of Japanese banks. The Bank of Tokyo, the successor to the YSB,
became the only bank registered under the Foreign Exchange Bank Law
and obtained the greatest share of overseas offices." Only the largest city
banks could maintain an international presence, and even that occurred
on a limited scale. MoF did not permit long term or trust banks to go
abroad until the early 1970s.7
7
Finally, commercial banks were prohibited from selling securities, an
activity left to the emerging class of Japanese brokers. With origins trace-
able directly to comparable provisions in the U.S., the ban meant that
banks could not sell stocks or bonds for corporate clients.7 8 The loss of
this potential source of profits made the banks more dependent upon
commercial lending and more susceptible to government control. The re-
strictions also helped stymie development of the stock market and gave
rise to a group of securities firms that would ultimately prove fierce com-
petitors of the banks.
Not entirely a Japanese creation, the system of compartments was
implemented with the explicit support of United States officials running
the country during the occupation. Compartmentalization had a dual pur-
pose. Foremost, it increased competition, a noticeable attempt to undo
some of the concentration in the financial sector that had occurred during
the war.
The other purpose was more subtle. Compartmentalization also facil-
itated credit rationing. Credit rationing allowed funds to be directed to
industries considered by allied officials to have high priority in the eco-
nomic recovery process. The U.S., therefore, encouraged and became at
least in part responsible for the shape of the post-war financial system
and the high level of government involvement in the system.79
76. See discussion infra note 211.
77. Long term and trust banks only began opening overseas branches in the 1970s.
Most were concentrated in New York and London.
78. Although the separation was imported from the United States, the purpose was
entirely different. The separation of securities and banking functions in the U.S. arose in
part out of the belief that the intertwining of the two caused the Great Depression. In Ja-
pan, the U.S. separated the two industries entirely to prevent city banks from monopolizing
the brokerage business, thereby creating an additional class of competitors. See text infra
note 183.
79. Government control was consistent with the articulated SCAP policy first of favor-
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A. The Occupation Descends
The United States initially wanted no responsibility for the economic
and social chaos that followed termination of the war. In line with this
early approach, occupation officials received explicit instructions not to
assume control of the financial system.80 The stated goal of the occupa-
tion was "demilitarization and democracy." Military officials, therefore,
had as a primary purpose the denuding of Japan's means to make war
and transformation of the autocratic government into a democracy. In
other words, the early goals did not include Japanese economic
reconstruction."1
Financial sector oversight fell to the Economic and Scientific Section
(ESS) of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers or, more commonly,
SCAP. ESS had responsibility for oversight of economics, labor, finance,
and science and included "[a]ll of industry, foreign trade, price control,
rationing, antitrust activities, and economic statistics . "..."82 With re-
spect to banking, however, the ESS initially had relatively constrained
authority.
The ESS was to take "no steps to maintain, strengthen, or operate
Japanese financial structure except insofar as may be necessary for
achievement of provisions of this directive."8 Officials could shut down
banks involved in the war efforts but otherwise could do so "only for pur-
poses of introducing control, removing objectionable personnel or taking
measures connected with blocking [the] program, . . ." and were in-
structed to "re-open[] these banks as promptly as possible; . . .84
SCAP, therefore, had been told essentially to leave control of the fi-
nancial system to the Japanese. This meant working closely with the BoJ
ing specified industries critical to the country's recovery and later those promoting exports.
80. JCS 1380/15, paras. 13, 13a, and 35a, cited in THEODORE COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN:
THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION As NEW DEAL 139 (1987).
81. See United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan: SWNCC 150-3,
Aug. 22, 1945, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 70, at 65-66 ("The
policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and con-
fronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is
the direct outcome of its own behavior and the Allies will not undertake the burden of
repairing the damage.").
82. COHEN, supra note 81, at 87. The reach of the Section was extraordinarily broad. As
Cohen noted, "[ilts responsibilities reached into every cranny of Japanese everyday life, and
its chief was pulled into almost every problem of significance." Id. Through most of the
occupation (1946-1952), Major General William F. Marquat headed the Section.
83. Id. The ESS also had the authority to take "such financial measures as may be
deemed necessary" including "[t]he closing of banks."
84. Incoming message WX61967 Washington radio, General Headquarters U.S. Army
Forces Pacific, Adjutant General's office. Radio and Cable Center, SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. (Sept. 9, 1945). See also Monograph No. 39, Money and Banking, GHQ, SCAP, at 1
("The basic Occupation directives required the Japanese authorities, rather than SCAP, to
plan and direct the reform of Japan's banking system so that it could make its full contribu-
tion to the development of a democratic, peaceful and stable economy capable of supporting
the Japanese people and maintaining trade relations with the free nations of the world.").
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and MoF. Officials in the Economic and Scientific Section supported the
approach. They knew that anything foisted upon the MoF without its
consent would be undone as soon as the occupation ended. Cooperation
was therefore deemed crucial.8 5
Day to day oversight remained in the hands of Japanese regulators,
although the Finance Division regularly reviewed and often modified the
actions of the MoF and Central Bank. SCAP occasionally intervened di-
rectly. Occupation officials prohibited mergers absent express approval."6
In the end, however, the Japanese exerted considerable influence over the
direction of financial reforms."
MoF retained its position as the critical voice in the financial mar-
kets in large part due to its deliberate decision to deal with SCAP di-
rectly. Most other ministries relied on the central liaison office, an office
primarily staffed by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
spoke English. Unwilling to accept them as intermediaries, the proud
MoF instead set up a liaison office of its own. Lacking sufficient staff with
fluency in English, officials were, for the first time, hired laterally.
Equally unusual, MoF agreed to accept a number of personnel who had
not graduated from an Imperial University.8"
MoF, with considerable assistance of the liaison office, retained a
close working relationship with occupation officials.8 9 The liaison made
frequent visits to the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, with
meetings often occurring twice a day. In addition, the Minister of Finance
met with ESS officials on a weekly basis. Interaction between the two
groups was extensive.
[The staff of the Finance Division] had very close contact [with Japa-
nese banking officials]. We saw representatives of the Ministry of Fi-
85. Interview with Tristan Beplat, Chief, Banking Section, ESS (Mar. 1992). One com-
mentator concluded that the decision to leave the Japanese government in place resulted
from "the grossly insufficient number of Japanese-language personnel among the Allied
powers and because of lack of familiarity with Japanese administrative procedures .... "
ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 67 (1970).
86. See Merger of Financial Institutions, SCAPIN 759, Feb. 21, 1946. MacArthur Mu-
seum, Norfolk, Va. (prohibiting any bank merger, consolidation or amalgamation absent
SCAP approval). See also Memorandum from Walter K. LeCount, Chief, Finance Division,
Re: Merger of Seiwan Savings Bank with Aomori Shogyo Bank, To: Ministry of Finance,
004.2 ESS/FIN, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Jan. 29, 1949) (approving merger).
87. See CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982).
88. By the time the war had begun, the practice of accepting personnel almost exclu-
sively from the University of Tokyo had become entrenched. A handful of exceptions to this
practice had occurred, however. Ikeda Hayato, future Finance Minister and Prime Minister,
joined the Ministry of Finance in 1925 after graduating from the law faculty at Kyoto Uni-
versity. Nonetheless, even these exceptions all involved one of the prestigious imperial uni-
versities. The hiring of Gengo Suzuki, who graduated from a University in Taiwan, to work
in the liaison office was an exception even to the usual practice of hiring from imperial
universities.
89. The liaison office was first headed by Takeo Fukuda, who later became Prime Min-
ister, then Nobutane Kiuchi, who later headed the Foreign Exchange Control Board.
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nance, Bank of Japan and the banks everyday. For example, there was
a group in the Finance Division that was responsible for dealings with
the Trust Banks Association .... It was also in the Finance Division a
special section that dealt with the Ministry of Finance. There was a
group that had daily liaison with the Bank of Japan. When it came
time to reorganize the banks, the Finance Division studied every reor-
ganization plan and then went over it again with the Bank of Japan.
Each proposal that came out of the Finance Division was carefully
gone over before it was approved.90
A weekly meeting was also held between the MoF and General Marquat,
head of ESS. 1
The MoF played a critical role in shaping the banking system. Offi-
cials within the ESS relied extensively on Ministry input. This reflected
in part a lack of expertise and part prudence. Any reforms imposed over
MoF's objection would simply be reversed when the occupation ended.
The ESS, therefore, worked hard at devising reforms that gained the ac-
quiescence of the MoF.
Not surprisingly, the system that emerged preserved many pre-war
vestiges. Special banks survived, albeit in a slightly altered form. Despite
their role in the war efforts, the Industrial Bank of Japan and Bank of
Tokyo (ne Yokohama Specie Bank) survived. Concentration remained
pronounced; comprehensive reform of the entire financial system never
occurred.
B. The Penalty Phase
Consistent with the initial approach toward Japan, early banking
polices were largely punitive. Occupation officials wanted to ensure that
the pre-war system in Japan did not return. Initial efforts focused upon
disbanding the institutions associated with the war effort and expunging
the individuals deemed responsible. Elimination of the Zaibatsu freed the
core banks to make loans to companies not in the industrial complex.
92
Occupation officials also closed and liquidated most special banks.
90. THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: ECONOMIC POLICY AND REFORM, (Lawrence H. Redford
ed. 1978) (statement by Tristan Beplat, former Chief of the Banking Section of the Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section of SCAP).
91. Conversation with Gengo Suzuki, Former Chief, Liaison Office, Ministry of Finance,
Tokyo, (Mar. 1992).
92. In November 1945, SCAP approved a plan in which shares owned by the four larg-
est Zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, were to be transferred to the Hold-
ing Company Liquidation Committee and ultimately sold. The HCLC did not actually begin
selling the shares until August 1946. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 23. Teikoku Bank
was the principal bank for the Mitsui Zaibatsu. The bank formed from an amalgamation of
Mitsui and Dai-Ichi banks in April 1943. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 9 n.2. Until
creation of the Commission, the status of designated companies could not change and share-
holders could not sell stock in the companies. Ultimately, several hundred firms were desig-
nated as "Restricted Concerns." ADAMS & HOSHIn, supra note 66. The Commission began
functioning in August 1946, id., and was dissolved five years later. Id. at 24.
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Application of these policies to the financial sector began almost im-
mediately upon cessation of hostilities. By memorandum dated Septem-
ber 30, 1945,ss allied forces announced the closing of "all banks and other
financial institutions whose paramount purpose has been financing of war
production or control of financial resources of occupied territories."''" The
Japanese government received instructions to "immediately close and not
allow to reopen" the designated institutions. The principle officers were
to be "discharge[d] and summarily remove[d] from office. . ."" MoF had
to "present at the earliest possible date proposals for the liquidation of all
closed institutions,"'96 with the BoJ ultimately overseeing the process.9
The unremarkable decision was dramatized by the method used to
publicize the closings. After the business day ended, military personnel
swiftly occupied twenty one Japanese financial institutions, including The
Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Chosen, BoJ, The Hypothec Bank, the YSB,98
and the only two foreign banks remaining in the country.99 The action
occurred without warning; employees were ordered out of the building
without time to clear their desks.100 The occupying forces also prohibited
overseas communication absent their approval, 10 1 cutting off contact with
93. The closing of the financial institutions in the occupied territories was intended to
be the first step in economically separating Japan from those countries. See Cincafpac-Adv.
to Comgen Usafik-Opnl priority, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Sept. 29, 1945) ("At 1600
hours in 30 September CMA wartime finance banks in Japanese branches of foreign banks
CMA including Bank of Chosen and Bank of Taiwan will be closed by direct action of this
headquarters PD you should insure adequate publication in Korea to emphasize the closing
of Japanese branches of Bank of Chosen is an integral part of the program to separate
Japanese and Korean economy and to divert Japanese of all control over Bank of Chosen
and its assets PD you should keynote the fact that the closing of Japanese branches will
improve the position of the Bank of Chosen in Korea.").
94. Extract of Allocation of Staff Responsibilities for Execution of JCS Directives, SS
Responsibilities in Japan, SCAP Records, Suitland Md. (Mar. 4, 1947). See also Draft Fi-
nancial Directive for Japan, inter-office communication (for information), Treasury Depart-
ment, from Mr. White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Secretary Vinson, Aug. 28,
1945, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 69, 2-23, at 143.
95. Closing of Colonial and Foreign Banks and Special Maritime Institutions, SCAPIN
74, Sept. 30, 1945. MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. See also Supplemental Instructions
pertaining to the Closing of Financial Institutions, SCAPIN 104, Oct. 8, 1945. MacArthur
Museum, Norfolk, Va. (detailing practices with respect to employees of closed institutions).
96. Oral Instructions Given to Ministry of Finance on 30 Sept. 1945, SCAPIN 73 Mac-
Arthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. (Sept. 30, 1945). See also Appointment of a Liquidator of
Branches, SCAPIN 163 MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. (Oct. 20, 1945) (appointing BoJ
as liquidator of closed institutions and directing prompt submission of plan of liquidation).
97. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 15 (noting that by beginning of 1946, BoJ
had become fiscal agent for all closed institutions).
98. Lindesay Parrott, Americans Sieze 21 Banks in Japan and Oust Officials, N.Y.
TIMES., Oct. 1, 1945, p.1, col.8, cont'd at p.6 col.5. For a complete list of the financial institu-
tions closed, see SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 35 n.19.
99. These included the German Deutsche Bank and the Banque Franco-Japonaise, a
Vichy controlled bank, Id. at p. 6, col. 5.
100. JUSTIN WILLIAMS, SR., JAPAN'S POLITICAL REVOLUTION UNDER MACARTHUR: A PAR-
TICIPANT's ACCOUNT 6 (1979).
101. McArthur Extends Curbs on Finance, N.Y.TMES., Oct. 4, 1945, p. 8, col.3.
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correspondent banks and branches located abroad.'02With one swift act,
remaining international operations of Japanese banks ended.
Most of the seized banks were simply liquidated. The YSB, however,
presented a more complex concern. Complicity in the war effort was clear.
During the conflict, the bank became an active participant, advancing the
government interests. Foreign branches "operated under the direct con-
trol of the local military administration . . .",03 Moreover, the bank had,
in the words of occupation officials, "become the principal instrument in
the Government's complicated system of currency manipulation in occu-
pied countries."'"
The bank's international operations, however, played a unique role in
the financial system. The YSB had an extensive overseas network, with
branches in Asia, Europe and the United States. No other Japanese bank
had anything comparable. Moreover, unlike the other special banks
closed by SCAP, the YSB had a significant domestic presence. The Japa-
nese government, therefore, lobbied hard to save the bank.
The circumstances surrounding the attempted closing of the YSB il-
lustrated the often successful tactics used by the MoF to ameliorate occu-
pation policies designed to restructure the financial system. Often un-
happy with approaches developed by SCAP, MoF first tried to delay
implementation. Officials usually engaged in a lengthy debate over the
practicality of a particular policy. They sometimes asserted that various
legal and other barriers prevented execution. Either way they bought
time. Gradually, SCAP abandoned the offensive policy or, in the case of
the YSB, accepted cosmetic changes.105
At the behest of the Japanese government, SCAP temporarily ex-
empted the YSB from the mandatory closings. Thereafter, what to do
with the YSB caused much bureaucratic teeth gnashing, something that
caught the attention of the State Department.'" On the one hand, occu-
pation officers were committed to the elimination of all special banks. On
the other, they were concerned about the impact on the economy of any
untoward activity."
102. MacArthur Extends Curbs on Finance, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 4, 1945, p. 8, col.3. Most
of the occupied financial institutions never reopened.
103. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 4. Although not a government bank, the YSB
had played an important official role during the war, handling many of the Bod's functions
in the occupied territories, see BANYAI, supra note 66, at 8; see also PEPPER, supra note 68,
at 147 n.7.
104. The currency manipulations in part enabled the Japanese to fund the cost of the
military occupation.
105. In general, SCAP in the financial area tried to convince rather than impose. Inter-
view with Sherwood Fine, Head of Finance Division, SCAP (Nov. 1991). This provided con-
siderable room for negotiation.
106. See Incoming Message From War Dept., to CINCFE, NR W 86092, Sept. 12, 1947.
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("State Dept. Inquires Re: Status Yokohama Special Bank
Report Requested").
107. SCAP officials from the Finance Division wanted to eliminate the final vestiges of
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MoF ultimately prevailed. The MoF submitted a liquidation plan for
the YSB in April 1946 that called for the transfer of YSB assets to a new
financial institution. SCAP modified the plan by imposing a number of
cosmetic steps, including the requirement that the resulting bank operate
under a new name bearing no resemblance to the YSB.0 s SCAP also pro-
hibited certain YSB officials from associating with the new institution.10 9
The modified reorganization plan effectively preserved the domestic
assets of the YSB, but in a newly formed entity.110 The Bank of Tokyo
(BoT) emerged from the reorganization as an ordinary commercial
bank.""' The BoT, however, still had the most significant international
experience of any Japanese bank. When the banks returned abroad, the
BoT would be at the forefront, acting as the country's principal interna-
tional agent. 2
Occupation officials, however, made certain that the BoT had no mo-
nopoly over foreign operations by carefully preserving the right of other
banks to engage in overseas activities.' " Moreover, personnel of the de-
funct YSB had scattered among the other banks, ultimately becoming the
nucleus of their international departments. Nevertheless, through the
1970s, the BoT remained the top Japanese international bank, receiving
preferential treatment from MoF in the realm of oversees expansion.
the special banking system that existed prior to the war. See Memorandum from Walter K.
LeCount, Chief, Finance Division to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records,
Suitland, Md. (July 28, 1948) ("It is agreed that the special bank system should be elimi-
nated at the earliest practicable opportunity .... This can be accomplished by each of the
now existing special banks [reorganizing as ordinary commercial or debenture-issuing
banks]."). Moreover, allied officials did so only after determining that reorganization would
have little harmful effect on the financial markets. Id. ("It is not contemplated that this
program if undertaken will have an appreciable effect on the total amount of credit
available.").
108. See Dissolution Plan for Yokohama Specie Bank, SCAPIN 1049 (July 2, 1946),
MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. ("The name of the new institution will bear no similarity
either in Japanese or in foreign translation, to that of the Yokohama Specie Bank.").
109. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 16 (noting that directors and executive
officers of new bank could not be persons associated in similar capacities with YSB since 7
July 1937 or subject to purge).
110. Completion of the liquidation of the YSB apparently did not occur until 1949. See
Dissolution Plan for the Yokohama Specie Bank, SCAPIN 1049/1 MacArthur Museum,
Norfolk, Va. (June 28, 1949) (terminating "Trust Relationship" between YSB and BoJ).
111. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 18. The BoT opened on Jan. 4, 1947. Id.
According to Tristan Beplat, the government submitted a whole list of names, with BoT
ultimately selected.
112. See discussion infra text accompanying note 211.
113. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, to W.J.
Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, (undated), SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("The Yoko-
hama Specie Bank, Ltd., which had monopolized the Japanese Foreign Exchange Business,
had been placed in liquidation prior to the reorganization of the other Special Banks. To
avoid further monopolistic controls by any one institution, plans were made at that time
whereby all Japanese banks properly staffed with foreign exchange specialists would take
over would take over the foreign exchange functions at such time as SCAP would authorize
the reopening of the foreign exchange business.").
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III. FROM PUNISHMENT TO PRESERVATION
A. Firm Financial Footing
Early policies focussed on closing banks and purging officials. By the
middle of 1946 SCAP underwent a pronounced shift in approach. Puni-
tive oriented reform shifted to preservation. The banking sector had
emerged from the war in a precarious state. 14 Without a more benevolent
approach, instability in the financial system likely would impede eco-
nomic recovery.
Bank balance sheets brimmed with worthless assets. Following the
end of the war, they had incurred "the loss of overseas assets, the losses
arising from insurance cancellation on fire and bomb-damaged plants,
and attendant losses following the Japanese surrender."1 5 Lavish loans to
munitions and other "essential" industries during the war remained un-
paid. The banks also held debentures issued by the Wartime Finance
Bank, a lender of last resort for military oriented businesses, with repay-
ment guaranteed by the government."'
The government had agreed to indemnify the banks in the event of
default. By the war's end, claims reached Y25 billion."' Payment, how-
ever, would have resulted in economic disaster. Resorting to the printing
presses to create yen needed for repayment threatened to stoke already
high inflation. Payment also had an unsavory flavor, giving the appear-
ance of rewarding those banks that had financed the war effort. 1
To put the banks on a more sound financial footing, occupation offi-
cials wanted to eliminate the indemnification payments. The Japanese
government fought the proposal. Non-payment appeared to renege on
prior commitments.' 9 Tanzen Ishibshi, the Finance Minister, opposed
the plan, particularly when occupation officials insisted that cancellation
be at Japanese initiative. His efforts irritated SCAP and contributed to
the decision to have him purged later that year. 2 '
114. R. FEAREY, THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN SECOND PHASE 1948-50, 67 (1950) ("These
[zaibatsu] Banks, with a total of about 800 branches through-out Japan, have not been bro-
ken up, mainly because of the injury to the stabilization and recovery programs which their
dissolution would have entailed.").
115. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (undated).
116. ALLEN, supra note 23, at 63.
117. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 20. Others put the figure at three times that
amount. See Memorandum from R. Fearey, Division of Japanese Affairs, to H. Borton, Divi-
sion of Japanese Affairs, Oct. 14, 1946, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra
note 82, at 689 ("The Japanese Government had obligated itself by July, 1946 to indemnify
individuals and corporations for various types of war losses to a total of 75 billion yen.").
118. See, e.g., Memorandum to H. Borton, supra note 117, at 689-90.
119. Opposition arose out of both a desire to make good on prior commitments and a
desire to continue to pump money into the economy. See TsuTsuI, supra note 65, at 28.
120. Interview with Takeshi Watanabe, Former Chief, Liaison Office, Ministry of Fi-
nance, Tokyo (Mar. 1992).
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MacArthur and his staff remained adamant about cancellation of the
indemnity payments. As a compromise, occupation officials allowed the
guarantees to remain in place but imposed a 100 percent tax on amounts
paid.' The net effect was to render the indemnification payments worth-
less.122 With the stroke of a pen, the assets of most banks evaporated.
That left the problem of repaying depositors.
SCAP solved the concern by essentially confiscating deposits. Prior
to indemnity tax implementation, SCAP officials froze yen deposits in ex-
cess of a family allotment, 23 affecting approximately forty percent of all
deposits.124 The deposits were used to offset elimination of the indemnity
payments.
The Law for the Reconstruction and Reorganization of Financial In-
stitutions in October 1946125 required banks to accurately value assets
and to submit to the government a reorganization plan. 2 6 Banks had to
write off loans made to insolvent companies and worthless overseas in-
vestments but could deduct the losses from profits, capital, frozen depos-
its and, if necessary, free deposits.127 Thus, banks expunged assets and
eliminated comparable liabilities, emerging as much smaller but sounder.
With the balance sheets relatively clean, the banks were now in a
better position to contribute to the country's economic recovery. As part
of the reorganization and a symbolic break with the wartime era, most
changed their names. 2 ' While some took back their original appellation
after the occupation, Daiwa 2 9 and Fuji' 30 did not.'
B. Deconcentration
With banks on a firmer financial footing, and the problem of special
bank taken care of, SCAP turned to the matter of competition. The de-
121. See War Indemnity Special Measures Law, Law No. 38 of 1946; see also Mono-
graph No. 39, supra note 84, at 20.
122. Not completely, however. Because of exemptions from the tax, Y18 billion was in
fact paid as indemnities. See Fuji, supra note 21, at 191.
123. Withdrawals from the accounts had essentially been blocked since issuance of the
Emergency Financial Measures Ordinance in February 1946. Under the Ordinance small
amounts could be withdrawn each month.
124. See TSUTSUI, supra note 64, at 30.
125. Law for the Reconstruction and Reorganization of Financial Institutions, Law No.
39 of Oct. 1946.
126. Id. art. 39.
127. Only a handful of banks needed to dip into free deposits. Rather than let this
occur, the government paid these amounts. See Letter from W. F. Marquat, supra note 117.
("A government indemnity was given to those banks unable to absorb the final loss by 100%
reduction of the capital account and the old account deposits, the amount of the indemnity
being based upon the difference between the total asset loss and the total capital account
and deposit reduction."); see also Fuji, supra note 21, at 191-92.
128. Mitsubishi for example became Chiyoda Bank.
129. Known as Nomura Bank before the war.
130. Known as Yasuda Bank before the war.
131. PEPPER, supra note 68, at 147 n.6.
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struction of the Zaibatsu left the core Japanese banks largely unaffected.
While some had changed their names and had high ranking officials
purged,'8 2 the banks largely remained outside the early restructuring of
the economy, despite obvious levels of concentration."'8 To some degree,
they even received preferential treatment. This could be seen most clearly
with the adoption and execution of the two laws designed to promote
competition: The Anti-Monopoly Law and the Deconcentration Law.
The Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and
Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of 1947, or the Anti-Monopoly Law,
attempted to ensure competition among Japanese companies.8 4 To pre-
vent recurrence of the Zaibatsu, the enactment barred corporations from
owning shares of one another, essentially outlawing holding companies. 3'
The law also imposed a number of specific restraints on banks, including
a prohibition on interlocking directors.
In general, however, banks received less onerous treatment than
other industries. Exempted from the prohibition on stock purchases, -they
could own up to five percent of the shares of other companies, although
not financial institutions."8 6 The ability to acquire the shares solidified
relationships with Japanese companies and facilitated the rise, of the
kieretsu system.- 7 According to at least one SCAP official, this result was
not foreseen.'
The first case brought under the Anti-Monopoly Law was against fi-
nancial institutions. On December 22, 1947, the Commission ordered
twenty seven financial institutions in the Tokyo area to "abolish the
132. See Law for Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control, Law No. 2 of Jan. 7, 1948;
see also Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 23 ("Under this law all bank officials were
screened and if they had exerted controlling power on behalf of the Zaibatsu's interest, they
were removed from office and barred from key positions for ten years.").
133. The six largest banks, including the four Zaibatsu banks, made 30 percent of all
commercial loans by private banks. See ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1948.
134. Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and Methods of Preserving
Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of Apr. 12, 1947.
135. Originally, the Law banned corporate ownership of shares entirely, excepting only
banks. This harsh and unworkable requirement ultimately had to be modified. ADAMS &
HOSHII, supra note 66, at 25. The law was amended in 1949 to do away with the prohibition
on intercorporate stockholdings. See The Anti-trust Monopoly Law, Law No. 214 of June
18, 1949. See also HADLEY, supra note 85, at 198.
136. See Article 11 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, Law No. 214 of 1947 ("Any company
whose business is financial shall not own stocks in a company with which it is competing
and which operates in the same field of financial business. No company whose business is
financial and whose total assets (excluding unpaid-up capital stock, unpaid-up partnership
share or claims rights) exceed five million (5,000,000) yen shall acquire stock of another
company in case, by doing so, it holds in excess of five percent (5%) of the total issued stock
of said company."), reprinted in YAMAMURA, supra note 58, at 204-205. The percentage was
later increased to ten percent, id, and returned to five percent in the 1970s.
137. The decision to permit bank ownership of shares in non-financial companies has
been criticized. See HADLEY supra note 85, at 187 ("The toleration of bank holdings in in-
dustrial, commercial, and mining companies was unfortunate,...").
138. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
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agreement on interest rates," a practice that had been going on since
before the war."3 9 At least with respect to deposits, control over rates
transferred to the government with the adoption of the Temporary Inter-
est Rate Law. 4"
Preferential treatment for Japanese banks became more clear, how-
ever, with the implementation of the Law for the Elimination of Exces-
sive Concentration of Economic Power, better known as the Deconcentra-
tion Law. 1 ' The law slated the largest Japanese firms for break-up. 4 "
Administration of the law ultimately fell to the Holding Company Liqui-
dation Commission (HCLC)1 3 Although covered by the explicit terms of
the Act, banks were in practice exempted.
The treatment of the banks under the Law was brought to MacAr-
thur's attention in late 1947. In addition to other objections, Prime Min-
ister Katayama requested that MacArthur exempt banks.'4 4 Although re-
assuring the Prime Minister about the affects of the law, MacArthur
refused the request.
[s]ince a blanket exemption of such [banking] institutions from the
dissolution program manifestly could be construed as tantamount to
preserving one of the major influences from which stemmed the pre-
war monopolistic and militaristic controls, the adoption of your rec-
ommended procedure is inadvisable. The impact of reorganization
upon economic recovery is to be a primary consideration in the reor-
ganization planning for each institution, including financial, and
therefore there should result no serious interference with normal fi-
nancing methods. Further, wholly owned government institutions are
not to be included in the deconcentration program."18
The General had spoken, the issue was closed. The Deconcentration Law
would not exempt banks. MacArthur confirmed the position in a radio
message to the Department of the Army the following January.1 48
With the Law in place, SCAP officials discussed what to do with the
banks. Considerable sentiment within SCAP supported the break-up of
the large banks. Only sixty one commercial banks remained after the war.
Even more concentrated than the statistic indicated, seven banks, includ-
139. Shunsaku Nishikawa, The Banking System: Competition and Control, JAPANESE
EcON. STUD. 3 (Spring 1974). The agreement involved the determination of maximum rates
paid to depositors and charged to borrowers.
140. The Diet adopted the law in direct response to the case. Id.
141. Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power, Law No.
207 of Dec. 18, 1947.
142. For a copy of the law, see THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 81, 6-30, at
386.
143. Supra note 142.
144. Letter from Tetsu Katayama to Douglas MacArthur, SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. (Sept. 4, 1947).
145. Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Sept. 10, 1947).
146. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 163.
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ing those from the defunct Zaibatsu, controlled the vast majority of bank-
ing business.
One proposal was to divide the country into three regions (Tokyo,
Osaka and Northern Japan) with prohibitions on bank expansion into
more than one area. The approach amounted to an import from Ger-
many, where the country had been divided into three separate regions. As
military officials went from Germany to Japan, they brought their occu-
pation experiences with them. 4" Other proposals were more blunt. They
simply wanted the larger banks dismantled. One called for the subdivi-
sion of the banks into "no less than two and no more than three separate,
independent banks.""' 8
None of these proposals ever saw the light of day. A fierce bureau-
cratic struggle occurred within SCAP over the proper treatment of Japa-
nese banks under the Deconcentration Law. In general, the Antitrust and
Cartels Division wanted to divide the Japanese banks, something vigor-
ously opposed by the Finance Division. Welsh, Chief of the Antitrust and
Cartels Division, constantly reminded General Marquat, head of the Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section, of his obligations to subject banks to review
under the Deconcentration Law." 9 To Welsh and others in the Antitrust
Division, concentration threatened to handicap the nascent development
of democracy. 15 0
Welsh, however, ultimately lost, with Marquat siding with the Fi-
nance Division.'15 The General opposed the break-up and favored propos-
als designed to exempt them from the auspices of the HCLC.15 2 The deci-
sion arose out of SCAP's fears over the continued solvency of financial
147. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
148. HAMM, DECONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER. JCS 1380/15, paras 13, 13a, 35a,
quoted in COHEN, supra note 80, at 24.
149. See, e.g., Memorandum from Edward C. Welsh, Chief, Antitrust and Cartels Divi-
sion to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Apr. 26,
1948) ("SCAP is operating under basic directives (ref. JCS 1380-15, FEC 014, FEC 015)
which state: 'You will require plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking
combines .... (and) .... you will establish and maintain surveillance, until satisfactory
plans for reorganization have been approved over (such) Japanese businesses.' ").
150. Conversation with Eleanor Hadley, Former Official, Antitrust and Cartels Division,
ESS (June 26, 1991). She indicated that some within SCAP had the fear that high concen-
trations of wealth would impede the development of democracy.
151. Some have criticized the division of authority over banks between the two Sec-
tions. See id. at 72.
152. See Memorandum for the Record, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Apr. 18, 1948) ("The General [Marquat] stated that necessary steps
should be taken to dissolve such concentrations of power but that this did not necessarily
require a breaking up of the banks themselves. He said that the operating structure should
be looked into on this basis. He further stated that such action should be taken immediately
to clarify the bank situation so that an announcement may be made in the near future to
the effect that banks designated under the deconcentration law have been divested of any
excessive concentration of financial control and were no longer subject to the provisions of
the act.").
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
institutions.15 3 As one SCAP document noted:
Breaking up these banks [Yasuda, Teikoku, Mitsubishi, Sanwa and
Sumitomo] would be almost certain to cause a loss of public confi-
dence. Division of these banks would produce a group of smaller
banks, the deposits in each of which would be insufficient to serve
adequately the loan requirements of large borrowers. The ratio of
money on deposit to money in circulation is already low. Breaking up
these banks would further aggravate this condition. Moreover, each of
these banks is now under-capitalized and is faced with the necessity of
raising additional equity capital. A break-up would increase the diffi-
culties of attracting this capital.'"
With these concerns in mind, SCAP announced that banks would be ex-
empt from application of the Deconcentration Law.' 55 To pay lip service
to the legislation, however, allied officials required banks to take steps to
eliminate "those characteristics which tend to classify them as excessive
concentrations of power."' 56 In practice, however, that amounted to little.
The exemption from the Deconcentration Law did not go unnoticed.
The banking sector remained highly concentrated, generating criticism.
157
The criticism engendered an almost defensive tone from SCAP officials.
[Ilt must be pointed out and emphasized that the development of
large banks, (as well as small banks) based on sound banking princi-
ples and appropriate controls, is most essential in any modern econ-
omy. The objective is not to limit the development of properly man-
aged institutions - be they large or small. The aim since the
inception of the bank reorganization program has been the elimina-
tion of malpractices of all banks. The concept that an institution is
evil merely because it is large is rejected. As an economy expands -
as the tempo of recovery is speeded up with the accompanying in-
crease in the size and activity of its component parts, it is necessary,
normal and desirable that financial institutions serving that economy
153. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 242.
154. Memorandum from Roy S. Campbell, Deconcentration Review Board to SCAP
(July 2, 1948), SCAP, reprinted in THE FINANcil HISTORY OF JAPAN supra note 81, 6-37, at
403.
155. YAMAMURA, supra note 58 ("In July, 1948, SCAP announced that the former
Zaibatsu banks would be excluded from Law 207 [the Deconcentration Law], since, as SCAP
stated, these banks had been divorced from the holding companies and were then in the
purview of the Anti-Monopoly Act.").
156. Memorandum from W. F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, for E.
C. Welsh, Chief, Antitrust and Cartels Division (May 7, 1948), SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. The memorandum further required that "the banking institutions will submit plans for
accomplishment of the above objectives, upon acceptance of which they will be free to con-
tinue operation without being subject to further reorganization under provisions of the
deconcentration law." Id.
157. See Memorandum from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section of
SCAP, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Mar. 4, 1950) ("[That] Japan had 71 ordinary banks
having deposits of Y 705,564 million (Jan. 1950) of which ten banks controlled approxi-
mately 63 percent, as of 1 February 1950, would appear to compare favorably with respect
to both a dispersion of economic power and fair inter-bank competition.").
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should correspondingly develop in size and ability to serve the ex-
panded requirements.6 8
Despite the controversy, SCAP never seriously reconsidered the posi-
tion. '5 The big banks remained big.
IV. COMPARTMENTALIZATION
The fight over application of the Deconcentration Law was not the
last word. Even those officials opposing breakup remained committed to
increased competition. With only a small number of commercial banks,
something had to be done. 60 The Finance Division within SCAP made
the deliberate decision to lessen the influence of the small number of big
banks by encouraging the recovery of a handful of additional financial
institutions and by creating new classes of competitors.
Increased competition had a number of justifications. Despite the
success in saving banks from the Deconcentration Law, SCAP officials
were quite aware that a small number of large banks was prone to govern-
ment manipulation. Competition also promised to ensure a more equita-
ble distribution of loans. Despite elimination of the Zaibatsu, banks con-
tinued to favor preexisting clients and former members of the industrial
groups.
By creating a new class of competitors, SCAP hoped to provide a
source of lending not beholden to these relationships. Unlike the pre-war
Zaibatsu banks, the new classes would have no preexisting business rela-
tionships. Those borrowers not in a Zaibatsu could therefore turn to the
new banks for credit. This was particularly important given the difficul-
ties confronted by small businesses obtaining loans.'
Increased competition was also expected to benefit the city banks.
With other sources of capital, the multitude of companies from a former
Zaibatsu no longer had to look exclusively to the group's lead bank for
158. Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (undated).
159. See Memorandum from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section,
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Mar. 4, 1950) ("Reference is made to an article contained in
the Nippon Times of 2 March 1950 (copy attached) in which it was reported that, at the
108th meeting of the Allied Council, the British Commonwealth member made the following
statements: (a) that his Mission has information that eight of Japan's banks 'control 80% of
the industrial and economic life of this country.' (b) that SCAP 'may have' dissolved the
Zaibatsu but (he asked) whether if (destroying one evil) another one - the bank's - had been
established.").
160. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that in 1949, the ten largest
banks were Fuji, formerly Yasuda (186 branches); Teikoku (100 branches); Dai-Ichi (81
branches); Bank of Tokyo (39 branches); Chiyoda, formerly known as Mitsubishi (158
branches); Tokai (205 branches); Daiwa, formerly known as Nomura (101 branches); Sanwa
(194 branches); Osaka, formerly known as Sumitomo (159 branches); and Kobe (166
branches).
161. See, e.g., Memo from R. E. Phillips, Credit Policy Unit, Finance Division, ESS, Re:
Foreign Trade Financing, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Oct. 9, 1947).
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financing. Not representing the exclusive source of financing for all of the
companies within the industrial complex, city banks could concentrate on
particular industries and particular lenders.
1 6 2
Simply creating additional financial institutions was not, however,
enough. The size and dominance of the city banks meant that new enti-
ties could be easily elbowed aside. SCAP, therefore, embarked on a delib-
erate policy of compartmentalizing the banking system. This essentially
involved the walling off of different areas from encroachment by the city
banks. Under the tutelage of SCAP, city banks found that they could not
engage in securities activities, have trust departments, or sell debentures.
Compartmentalization ensured survival; companies or banks performing
these tasks did not have to fear absorption and domination by the large
commercial banks.
The broad approach of creating new competitors had to overcome the
stiff opposition within the MoF. 6 3 In general, MoF's goal was to oppose
further concentration. Since the 1920s, MoF had been engineering a re-
duction in the number of banks. Ultimately, however, the MoF accepted
compartmentalization, in part because the practice enhanced bureau-
cratic authority.
The first public statement promoting an increase in the number of
competitors apparently emerged from the report of the Edwards Mission.
More formally labeled the State-War Mission on Japanese Combines, the
group consisted of representatives of a handful of agencies and depart-
ments (and one law professor). They descended on Japan in 1946, primar-
ily to study the Zaibatsu. Among other things, the Mission recommended
that "the number of independent sources of credit should be increased
substantially. ... "16" The only specific example provided in the report,
however, was divestiture of banks forcibly amalgamated by the govern-
ment and the division of the largest banks.
ESS accepted the recommendation but not the method of implemen-
tation. Instead of downsizing existing banks, SCAP favored the creation
of new classes of financial institutions. Occupation officials, therefore,
continuously looked for ways to increase the number of participants in
the financial sector. Conversion of savings into commercial banks and the
expansion of the number of regional banks all facilitated competition.165
162. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("The in-
crease of the number of independent sources of credit has broadened the borrower's choice
of selection among the lending institutions. This has made it possible for the large banks,
including the former Zaibatsu banks, to better serve basic industries through being relieved
of the necessity of servicing the numerous industrial affiliates formerly controlled by
Zaibatsu interest.").
163. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
164. See Policy on Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan, Report of
the Mission on Japanese Combines, May 12, 1947, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
JAPAN, supra note 81, at 350, 355.
165. Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
VOL. 21:2
JAPANESE BANKING REFORM
Teikoku Bank, formed through an amalgamation of Mitsui and Dai-Ichi
Bank in 1943, dissolved in October 1948, generating two additional finan-
cial institutions.16 6
International operations represented another area affected by
SCAP's pro-competition policy. Elimination of the Yokohama Specie
Bank paved the way for other Japanese banks into the international
arena. SCAP, however, went to great lengths to ensure that the newly
formed BoT and small handful of city banks did not obtain a strangle-
hold over international activities.'
67
The Japanese government divided banks into two classes. Class A
banks could engage directly in international activities by entering into
correspondent bank relations and opening accounts with foreign financial
institutions. Class B banks, in contrast, had to operate through those in
Class A.' The classification, therefore, amounted to a limitation on the
scope of international activities.
MoF initially attempted to limit those in Class A to eight city banks,
five from the defunct Zaibatsu. SCAP, however, would have none of that.
Designation of Japanese financial institutions as foreign exchange banks
required SCAP approval, providing considerable leverage.1 9 To address
the concerns, MoF added four other banks to the list. 7 0 Occupation offi-
cials also contemplated that, as Class B banks obtained international ex-
pertise, they would move to Class A.'
7
'
Trust activities represented another area compartmentalized as a re-
sult of efforts by SCAP. In the aftermath of the war, trust companies had
largely seen their business evaporate and their assets become worthless.
1 7 2
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland, Md.
166. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 119.
167. See, e.g., Memorandum attached to letter from W. F. Marquat, Chief, Economic
and Scientific Section, to The Honorable W. J. Seabald (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. ("The Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., which had monopolized the Japanese foreign ex-
change business, had been placed in liquidation prior to the reorganization of the other
Special Banks. To avoid further monopolistic controls by any one institution, plans were
made at that time whereby all banks properly staffed with foreign exchange specialists
would take over the foreign exchange functions at such time as SCAP would authorize the
reopening of foreign exchange business.").
168. KEN BIEDA, THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 147 (1970).
169. See, e.g., Memorandum from Chief of Fund Section, Account Bureau, Board of
Trade to Mr. Cleveland, Fund Control Division, ESS, GHQ, SCAP, BOTA # 8825-11-25,
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Aug. 17, 1948) (requesting approval for designation of Hok-
kaido Colonial Bank as foreign exchange bank).
170. Bank of Kobe, Daiwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Nippon Kangyo Bank were all added
at the behest of SCAP officials, THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, supra note 90, at 238. Trust
banks and a number of regional banks were also encouraged by SCAP to become Class B
foreign-exchange banks. Id. at 234 n.48.
171. This amounted to another example of wishful thinking. Once the occupation en-
ded, international expansion remained a monopoly of the Bank of Tokyo and a small num-
ber of city banks, much the way it had been before the war.
172. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 23 ("A large part of their portfolios
consisted of securities issued by closed institutions, restricted corporations and special ac-
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Post-war inflation and a prohibition on securities activities further evis-
cerated their business.7 8 The companies also suffered from the entry of
commercial banks into the trust business during the war.
To ensure solvency, SCAP wanted MoF to increase the powers of the
trust companies by allowing them to engage in banking activities.7 "
SCAP officials ran into a brick wall, with MoF resisting the entreaties.
The MoF wanted the large city banks to absorb the trust companies,
eliminating them as a separate class of institutions.'" The Banking Bu-
reau stonewalled, claiming that legislative changes by the Diet were nec-
essary to implement the plan.
176
With an impending change of personnel at SCAP, however, the Min-
istry had a change of heart. The replacement might not be so accommo-
dating or might insist on unacceptable terms. The Director General of the
Banking Bureau suddenly announced that in fact, MoF had the adminis-
trative authority to extend banking powers to trust companies. With a
wave of the wand, the SCAP reforms were implemented and trust compa-
nies received banking powers.1 7 Six of seven trust companies reorganized
as banks with one opting to become a securities firm.1
7 8
Acceding banking powers to trust companies did not guarantee sur-
vival. The possibility that city banks would dominate the trust area still
remained a concern. Occupation officials encouraged MoF to force com-
mercial banks out of the trust business. 7 9 Furthermore, at SCAP's insis-
tence, trust banks received the authority to issue long term loans. Compa-
nies flocked to the new banks in search of financing.
Finally, the separation of banking and securities functions further il-
lustrated to the compartmentalization process. Adopted during the occu-
pation, Section 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law prohibited banks
from selling stocks, bonds and other securities. The separation repre-
sented an oddity with broad consequences.
Unable to sell corporate stock or debt, banks lost an obvious revenue
source. That in turn solidified dependence upon the BoJ as a source of
counting companies and the utilization of these securities was for all practical purposes
impossible.").
173. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 26. The prohibition was contained in the
Securities Transaction Law of 1948. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 109.
174. Beplat, supra note 85, at 239.
175. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
176. B.C. KOH, JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 208 (1989).
177. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
178. Sumitomo (Fuji Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Mitsui (Toyo Bank and Trust
Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Mitsubishi (Asahi Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Yasuda (Chuo
Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Dai-Ichi (Dai-Ichi Bank and Trust Co., July 12, 1948);
and Nippon (Nippon Bank and Trust Co., July 12, 1948).
179. See FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 18, at 15, ("After the war,
however, the GHQ and the Ministry of Finance intervened with the policy that once again
separated banking and trust businesses.").
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funds. 80 The separation also deprived financial institutions of any incen-
tive to encourage companies to pursue alternative capital sources such as
the sale of stock. The elimination of banks from the securities markets
retarded development of the stock market and contributed to an immense
concentration in the brokerage community."'8
The separation, at first blush, seemed to have an ethnocentric expla-
nation. The United States had in place a comparable requirement. Con-
gress separated securities and banking functions in 1933, having con-
cluded that the Great Depression resulted at least in part from risky
securities ventures by banks. In fact, however, article 65 arose not out of
a desire to replicate the extent regulatory system in the United States,
but to increase competition.'8 2 Prohibiting banks from engaging in securi-
ties activities guaranteed that an independent class of brokers firms
would emerge. The plan worked with unparalleled success. By the 1970s,
brokers had become so successful that they rivaled commercial banks in
financial and political power, generating considerable conflict. '
Occupation officials also approved the division of banks on the basis.
of short term and long term lending capacity, although only after a num-
ber of embarrassing shifts in policy. The three pre-war debenture issuing
banks, Hypothec Bank, Hokkaido Colonial Bank, and the Industrial
Bank of Japan (IBJ), were initially slated for closing.' 3 SCAP had little
interest in preserving the special authority of these institutions. Deben-
ture issuing banks designed primarily to provide long term financing also
seemed unnecessary. Occupation officials expected an invigorated stock
market to eliminate the need for a special class of banks designed to more
long term loans.'8 4
After some thought and government opposition, SCAP decided
against liquidation. Upon "mutual agreement," SCAP gave the banks the
180. Depriving banks of authority to underwrite was also consistent with the separation
of long and short term financing. Permitting involvement in the sale of corporate securities
would have resulted in the anomalous situations of commercial banks prohibited form mak-
ing long term loans but permitted to facilitate long4erm financing through the sale of corpo-
rate stocks and bonds.
181. Four brokerage firms ultimately monopolized the market: Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko
and Yamaichi.
182. Beplat interview, supra note 85. See also FEDERATION OF BANKERS AssOCIATION,
supra note 18, at 16 ("The law was based on a desire to protect and strengthen Japanese
securities companies .... ").
183. See Memorandum from J.R. Allison, Director of Finance (acting), to Chief, Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records, Suitland,. Md. (Mar. 29, 1950) "the initial ap-
proach toward the debenture issuing banks from 1945 was directed toward necessary re-
forms to be applied to the Japanese banking structure - designed to eliminate malpractices
and control devices. FEC 230, 12 May 1947, 1 12d states: 'the functions and powers of spe-
cial banks should be defined and limited by law and these banks should not be allowed to
engage in ordinary banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be re-
viewed in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert to the status
of ordinary banks.' ").
184. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 204.
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choice of reorganizing either as a long term or a commercial bank.'85 In
1948, the Hypothec and Hokkaido Colonial Bank converted to ordinary
commercial banks while the IBJ opted for bond-issuing powers. Viewed
as a transitory measure,186 SCAP expected the IBJ to eventually convert
to an ordinary commercial bank."8 '
When the stock market did not recover Japanese companies, desper-
ate for capital, began to look increasingly to commercial banks. The weak
state of Japanese industry made the loans unattractive. As MoF officials
noted:
Private financial institutions lately are showing a strong tendency to
limit lending to relatively large enterprises in order to avoid troubles
and risk in giving loans to petty business. Such a tendency can be
seen even in small-scale local banks. In spite of the fact that our coun-
try's industrial structure is founded largely on the basis of small and
medium height and size enterprises and farming, forestry and fishing
industries also are operating, in the main, on a small scale, and most
of them are worthy of continued existence, they have been neglected
by financial institutions and been suffering from shortage of money.' 88
For banks to provide capital in necessary quantities, two things had to
occur: they needed funds beyond what could be generated through depos-
its and they needed increases assurances of repayment.
To alleviate the risk and encourage lending, the BoJ provided an im-
plicit guarantee of repayment. To the extent funds went to appropriate
companies, the central bank stood ready to repay in the event of default.
Banks no longer had to worry about risks associated with an uncertain
economy. These policies encouraged banks to step up lending activities. '
The next problem was funding. The deposit base proved inadequate.
185. See Memorandum from Walter K. LeCount, supra note 87, (discussing options of
special banks; to be given choice of reorganizing as ordinary commercial bank or as a deben-
ture issuing corporation).
186. Id. ("Under the prevailing conditions of the debt issuing market, the idea also is
considered inadvisable in relations to the supply of long-term industrial funds. For these
reasons, it is believed advisable to adopt such transitory measures as will be enumerated
below, so that the Industrial Bank may be allowed to bolster its functions as a deposit bank
under certain restriction and at the same time authorized for the time being to issue its
debenture.").
187. See, e.g., Letter from H. Ichimada, Governor, Bank of Japan to General W.F. Mar-
quat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, (July 16, 1948) SCAP Records, Suitland, Md.
("Although it is believed advisable for the Industrial Bank of Japan to develop itself into an
ordinary bank in the future, considerable difficulties will have to be encountered in materi-
alizing such a plan all at once today in view of the present conditions of the same bank.").
188. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FIN., ON SOME MEASURES FOR CORRECTING THE CURRENT
TIGHTNESS IN MONEY MARKET, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (1948).
189. The over loan situation had also been a characteristic of the financial system in
the early Meiji era. By the end of World War I, however, Japanese commercial banks were
no longer dependent on loans from the BoJ. As one writer described, the banks viewed
dependence on the central bank as "shameful." YOSHIO SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 9 (1980).
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SCAP knew about the shortage of yen and favored giving all commercial
banks the authority to issue debentures.1 90 Adopted in 1950, the Law
Concerning Debenture Issues of Banks did exactly that. 9 1 The Law theo-
retically ended the pre-war distinction between short and long term
banks. With the simultaneous abolishment of special banks,'2 Japan
temporarily had "an undifferentiated system of commercial banks. '" '
The legislation did not work as expected. Although permitted to is-
sue debentures, most commercial banks did not.19 4 Moreover, dependent
on deposits and other short term sources of funding, commercial banks
were increasingly asked to absorb greater amounts of long-term debt.195
This threatened to cause financial instability.
In response, SCAP shifted gears. Rather than leave long-term lend-
ing to the banking system as a whole, occupation officials opted for a class
of banks specifically for that purpose.'9 6 Taking the steps required a
somewhat embarrassing policy shift. After all, the decision essentially res-
190. See Marquat Letter, supra note 113 ("The inception of this program [the Dodge
line] brought into sharp focus the shortage of any urgent necessity for a most substantial
volume of long-term credit. The generation of an increased long-term capital funds can most
properly an expeditiously be implemented through full employment of bank debentures.
Accordingly, legislation is currently before the Diet authorizing all banks to issue deben-
tures up to 20 times capital.").
191. Most of the bonds were purchased by the BoJ. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 75.
192. The adoption of the Law Abolishing the Hypothec Bank of Japan Law etc., in
1950 permanently ended the system of special banks. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 48.
193. NAKAMURA, supra note 65, at 140.
194. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 205 (noting that debentures were issued only by
the Nippon Kangyo Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank,
the Central Co-operative Bank of Agriculture and Forestry, the Central Bank for Commer-
cial and Industrial Co-operatives and the Bank of Tokyo). See also G.C. ALLEN, JAPAN'S
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 44 (1958) ("It is true the legal distinction between those banks and the
ordinary banks was destroyed in 1950 when all banks were given the right of issuing deben-
tures within certain limits. In practice, however, the privilege was exercised only by three of
the former Special Banks, and by them only because the government subscribed to there
stocks and debentures form the United States Aid Counterpart Fund and from the Treasury
Deposits Bureau.").
195. See Memorandum from Joseph M. Dodge to Major General W.F. Marquat, Re:
Banking and Bank Credit - Private Debt - Capital Funds Availability, SCAP Records,
Suitland, Md. (Nov. 29, 1950) ("The normal and establisher specialized banking mecha-
nisms for supplying long-term credit (viz., Industrial Bank and others) largely had been
eliminated and the banking system reduced solely to one of commercial banks, the latter
had been forced to absorb a larger amount of long-term credit than their fundamental sta-
tus should require.").
196. By the end of 1950, Dodge had come around to this view. See Memorandum from
Joseph M. Dodge to Major General W. F. Marquat, Re: Industrial Financing, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Dec. 3, 1950) ("I believe that it is generally agreed among the Japa-
nese financial officials and authorities that there is a need in Japan for the Industrial Banks
to resume its exclusive functions of industrial financing of a long-term nature .... I have
told Mr. Ichimada, the head of the Industrial Bank, and Mr. Ikeda that if the idea of re-
establishing this bank as exclusively a long-term loan bank is valid and the initiative for this
move was to come from them rather than from us, I believe it might receive favorable
consideration.").
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urrected the carefully and deliberately eliminated "special banks. 1 97
Nevertheless, economic exigencies and Joseph Dodge compelled the re-
turn of long term banks. 9
Under the auspices of SCAP, the Diet adopted the Long-Term Credit
Banks Law in 1951. The law provided for a class of long term banks to
provide capital needs of companies. Commercial banks simultaneously
lost the power to issue debentures.1 99 The IBJ predictably chose to organ-
ize as a long term bank. The IBJ had been acting in that capacity since
the end of the war.
The other two pre-war banks with debenture issuing authority, the
Nippon Kangyo Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, opted to remain
ordinary commercial banks. They did, however, assist in the formation of,
and contribute assets to, the Long-Term Credit Bank, with Nippon
Kangyo Bank essentially contributing its investment banking operations.
The Nippon Credit Bank, the last of the long term banks, emerged five
years later out of the remnants of the Bank of Chosen to provide capital
for smaller companies.
00
- V. THE AFTERMATH
The immediate post-occupation period saw a flurry of legislation rati-
fying existing division within the banking system. Tilting to reality, the
government codified the de facto distinction between long term and com-
mercial banks.2 ' The Long-Term Credit Law of 1952 authorized desig-
nated banks to issue five year bonds and one year discounted deben-
tures.202 Only banks organized under the law could issue the debt.
197. See id. ("If I am correctly informed, I believe the change of [the Industrial Bank
of Japan's] functions from industrial financial banking was at least partially initiated by this
headquarters. That places us in a somewhat embarrassing position of having to reverse a
previous action, if this is to be done.").
198. Dodge, a Detroit banker, had been sent to Japan to devise a strategy for returning
the country to a sound economic footing. The so called "Dodge Line" called for, among
other things, a balanced budget, something that remained in place until the mid-1960s. See
generally COHEN, supra note 80, at 431.
199. With city banks no longer having the authority to issue debentures, they were
dependent for financing on deposits, loans from other banks and the government. The gov-
ernment did not let them down. The BoJ expanded credit to banks by 60%. COHEN supra
note 80, at 438. As Cohen noted, without the overloans, "Japanese business would have been
left gasping like fish washed up on the beach." Id.
200. YOSHIO SUZIKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 102 (1980). In addi-
tion to government ownership of shares, capital for the bank came from assets of the liqui-
dated Bank of Chosen. The Bank had a slightly different purpose than the other long term
banks. "[T]he chief business of this bank is the supply of equipment funds and long-term
working capital secured by mortgages to small enterprises." Id. at 104.
201. Extending debenture issuing powers to all banks simply did not work. The IBJ did
issue debentures and make long term capital loans, much as it had before the war. Most
other banks failed to take advantage of the authority. Only the Nippon Kangyo Bank, the
IBJ, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the BoT and a handful of specialized institutions is-
sued debentures under the law. See supra note 200, at 128.
202. The BoT eventually received the authority in the 1960s to issue debentures with
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Legislation in the immediate post-occupation period also confirmed
the position of trust banks. With the revival of investment trusts (mutual
funds), trust banks were allowed to act as trustee, a highly lucrative posi-
tion."' 3 More importantly, the Diet adopted the Loan Trust Law author-
izing the banks to collect long term funds (two to five years) to make
loans for a specified purpose.2 0 4 Loan trust certificates resembled certifi-
cates of deposit, something city and regional banks could not issue for
almost 30 years. MoF, of course, carefully controlled the loans, insuring
proper direct flow to "critical industries," 08 primarily shipping, electric-
ity, coal, iron and steel .2 " By 1962, trust banks also received the author-
ity to manage pension plan assets
s
.
2 0
The 1950s also saw completion of the process of separating trust and
commercial banking activities, something begun during the occupation.2 0 8
Four city and seven regional banks had continued to engage in trust ac-
tivities.2 0 9 Although "encouraging" commercial banks to divest their trust
activities since 1954, the Banking Bureau within the MoF ordered com-
plete separation by city banks only as the decade ended. By 1966, the last
redoubts among regional banks disappeared.
210
No legislation decreed the separation. Quite the contrary. City banks
received express authority to engage in trust activities through legislation
adopted during the war. That mattered little to MoF. Trust banks needed
protection. Divestiture also tightened MoF's grip over the banking sector.
Deprived of trust activities, commercial, particularly city, banks lost an-
other source of revenue. This made them even more dependent upon
lending activities and, concomitantly, borrowings from the BoJ.
The early post occupation years also saw the codification of the pre-
eminent international position of the BoT. The Foreign Exchange Bank
Law of 1954 provided for a specially designed foreign exchange bank, pri-
marily for export financing. The law was adopted with the expectation
that only the BoT would register. Having absorbed much of the staff of
the YSB, the BoT presented the only Japanese bank with the expertise
maturity of three years. For a brief discussion of debt issuing authority by long term banks,
see TAKEDI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 160 (1989).
203. The resurgence of the investment vehicles coincided with the adoption of the Se-
curities Investment Trust Law in 1951.
204. Funds raised under the Loan Trust Law were deposited for a fixed period of time.
With minimum deposit amounts of 10,000, the principal and interest of the deposits were
guaranteed. See ADAMS & HosHII, supra note 66, at 111.
205. See NAKAMURA, supra note 65, at 141. See also Pressnell supra note 38, at 225.
206. SUZUKI, supra note 200, at 114 (plan of trust property administration must be sub-
mitted to MoF for approval); see also Pressnell, at 226 (noting that at one time MoF had
restricted loans to industries other than those five).
207. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 110.
208. Beplat interview, supra note 85; See also THE BANKING SYSTEM supra note 18, at
15 ("After the war, however, the GHQ and the MoF intervened with a policy that once again
separated banking and trust businesses.").
209. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 15.
210. Id.
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and depth capable of handling extensive international activities.
By the early 1950s, the BoT had already begun spreading abroad.
The bank had offices in New York, London, California, India and Paki-
stan."1 Designation under the law ensured favorable treatment in open-
ing overseas branches. The MoF also used the bank as an agent for vari-
ous activities abroad. In committing to the international arena, however,
BoT paid a price. Domestic operations were restricted with the bank
forced to close all offices not related to trade finance.
VI. THE PRESENT
Despite some initial opposition, MoF came to agree with SCAP's vi-
sion of the banking system, although with a twist. While originally prefer-
ring increased consolidation, the MoF gradually recognized the value of a
compartmentalized financial sector. The functional divisions gave each
category of banks a particular niche in the financial system, something
that appealed to MoF's sense of order.
Not coincidentally, compartmentalization also increased MoF's abil-
ity to control activities in the financial markets. City banks could not
regain the size and influence of the old Zaibatsu banks, making them less
capable of standing up to MoF influence. In addition, by dividing banks
on the basis of funding, they became dependent upon the government
largess, particularly the BoJ, for additional funds to lend.
MoF used the control to maintain order throughout the financial sys-
tem. Relying upon "administrative guidance" or informal advice, the
MoF insisted that banks pre-clear all major developments.2 1 2 This gave
MoF extraordinary power to control the course of events before they oc-
curred, an opportunity MoF used with vigor. Most notably, MoF invoked
guidance to force commercial banks out of the trust business notwith-
standing express legal authority to emerge in the activity.
Banks followed MoF advice in part because they feared the conse-
quences of not doing so. Primarily through the power to approve or disap-
prove the establishment of new branches, the MoF had the ability to
limit the expansion of recalcitrant banks.2 Daiwa Bank suffered exactly
those consequences after refusing to follow Ministry guidance and divest
211. Interview with Seishichi Itoh, Senior Managing Director, Bank of Tokyo, Tokyo
(Mar. 1992).
212. In Japanese the phrase is gyosei shido. See Allan D. Smith, The Japanese Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth
and the Castle, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417, 418 n. 6 (1984); see also Yoriaki Narita,
Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45, 54 n. 13 (1968) ("Fundamentally, circulars are
employed as a means of direction and supervisor over interior administrative structure, but
they are also issued to inform juristic persons and associations outside the administrative
structure as to definitive matters."). For a legal discussion of the subject, see Young, Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute
Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 953 (1984).
213. See The Banking Law, supra note 31.
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trust activities.214
The banks accepted the stifling degree of administrative control not
only out of fear. A broad consensus existed within the banking commu-
nity and society as a whole that government manipulation of the financial
system to promote economic growth was acceptable. More to the point,
banks flourished under the system.
In return for regulatory submissiveness, financial institutions re-
ceived assured profitability. By restricting available alternative invest-
ment vehicles, individuals had little choice but to deposit surplus funds
with banks. Controls on interest rates ensured depositors an anemic re-
turn. With loan demand kept high, particularly through restrictions on
other types of corporate borrowing, and cost of funds low, Japanese banks
had no difficulty turning a profit.2"5 Even the risks associated with high
levels of corporate borrowing were ameliorated by implicit repayment
guarantees."'
Through the 1990s, little was done to alter this basic framework. Re-
forms occurred in each decade, but they amounted to mere refinements
rather than wholesale revisions.1 Compartmentalization seriously eroded
only with the adoption of reforms in 1992 and only after MoF determined
that segmentation no longer had the same benefits.
The more modern story of the decompartmentalization process war-
rants a story in and of itself. For one thing, the domestic process of
achieving a consensus on the changes entailed an eight-year struggle that
essentially involved a pitched conflict between banks and securities firms.
Brokers rightfully feared that banks, with their close relationships to cor-
porate Japan and extensive branch networks, would provide considerable
competition for securities business.
214. Daiwa's president refused to give up the trust activities, apparently feeling that
they were too critical to.the bank's future. The validity of his reasoning aside, the practical
effect was that he resisted the guidance of the Ministry. Daiwa's approach was not well
received. Future branch applications received a cold shoulder. Daiwa was also effectively
excluded from the Loan Trust Law and appartenly had difficulties getting approval for
branch licenses. The message was clear: ignore the Ministry's guidance at great peril.
215. The system also provided other advantages. As Chalmers Johnson has noted, em-
phasis on lending as the primary source of profits also imposed on banks considerable incen-
tive to uncover growth companies that would provide new sources of loans. JOHNSON, supra
note 87, at 206.
216. James C. Abbelgan & William V. Rapp, Japanese Managerial Behavior and 'Ex-
cessive Competition'. 8 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 430 (Dec. 1970). MoF's control also
extended to the BoJ. Legislation passed during the war gave MoF explicit authority to re-
view the actions of the Central Bank. See Bank of Japan Law, supra note 66. In practice,
however, the authority was never invoked. Control also emanated from the practice of hav-
ing a retired ministry official serve as Governor of the Central Bank every other term.
217. The 1950s saw the addition of reserve requirements; the 1960s laws facilitating
mergers; and the 1970s the inclusion of a deposit insurance scheme. Even in 1980, when the
Banking Act was amended comprehensively for the first time since 1927, the changes did
little to alter the basic regulatory scheme. See generally FRANCIS McCALL ROSENBLUTH, FI-
NANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (1989).
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Foreign pressure also played a significant role in the reforms. As a
result of government pressure, primarily from the United States, foreign
banks were, in the mid-1980s, allowed to engage in trust and securities
activities. They permanently fractured the symmetrical system of bank-
ing compartments. With the changes, extension of comparable authority
to Japanese banks became a foregone conclusion.
The reforms will also, over the long term, impact the relationship
between the MoF and the private sector. In the short term, deregulation
will, ironically, enhance MoF authority. MoF has made clear that the
decompartmentalization process will be carefully managed. While banks
will have the authority to engage in securities activities, initially they will
be limited to primary offerings of debt securities, and they will not be
able to underwrite equity securities or engage in stock brokerage
activities." '1
MoF also imposed firewalls designed to separate the securities sub-
sidiary from the parent bank. This included restrictions on the bank per-
sonnel that could work for the subsidiary and limits on the exchange of
information between the two entities. The securities subsidiary could not
operate out of the headquarters of the bank. Finally, city banks could not
set up a subsidiary for the first year after the effective date of the law,
giving an advantage to trust and long term banks.2 19
With respect to trust bank subsidiaries, banks and securities firms
were allowed to engage in certain designated money trusts. They were,
however, barred from the most lucrative areas, particularly pension
trusts. MoF also imposed firewalls separating the trust subsidiaries from
the parent bank or securities firm.2"'
These restrictions will likely end over time. Until then, however, the
legislation has given MoF additional leverage. Banks and securities firms
seeking expanded authority will need to maintain strong relations with
the Mof and to observe the government's guidance.
Over the long term, however, decompartmentalization will result in a
reduction in MoF control over the financial system. Banks will have
greater operating latitude, capable of obtaining profits from a more di-
verse group of activities, including trust and securities activities. They
will also have additional funding sources, particularly loan trust certifi-
cates. When the decompartmentalization process has been completed,
banks will also end up with some type of bond issuing authority.
All of this will reduce bank dependency on government policies. The
218. Additional restrictions also apply. Initially a securities subsidiary will not even be
able to lead manage a debt offering where the company has less than Y500 billion in net
assets and the parent was the commissioned bank during the previous two years. See JAPA-
NESE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM,
PROVISIONAL UNOFFICIAL SUMMARY, (Dec. 1992).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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additional funding sources will reduce dependency on branch license and
borrowings from the BoJ, two important sources of government leverage.
Additional activities will reduce the need to follow government guidance
in order to ensure adequate levels of profitability.
More intriguing, the growing strength of city banks, a trend arrested
by the occupation-inspired policy of segmentation, may resume. Whether
through competition or acquisition, city banks will have the wherewithal
and the contacts to make considerable inroads into other segments of the
financial markets. 2 ' Some classes of banks, trust banks, for example, may
disappear altogether.
As the size and strength of city banks grows, they remain less perme-
able to MoF influence. Indeed, they may actually emerge as effective
counterweights to MoF authority, a function similar to the one served by
the Zaibatsu banks before the war. The net effect would be a fundamen-
tal realignment in the role of the government in the financial markets.
221. While MoF currently opposes acquisitions, this clearly does not apply in the con-
text of an ailing bank or broker. City banks may be allowed to acquire existing entities if,
necessary to stave off insolvency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Intellectual property" (IP) is a compounding of two things. First, it
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is ideas, inventions and creative expression. They are essentially the re-
sult of private activity. Second, it is public willingness to bestow the sta-
tus of property on those inventions and expressions. The most common
techniques for conferring a protected status are the trade secret, patent,
copyright and the trademark, with one new category for mask works (or
"chips") added in the last decade.'
Though the definition of these terms varies from country to country,
the following is a broad summary definition of terms that is widely ac-
cepted particularly in the U.S., beginning with a basic classification that
differentiates industrial property (patents, trademarks and trade secrets)
from copyright, with mask works as a unique special category.
Patent law confers property rights on new, useful and nonobvious
processes and products. It excludes others from making, using, or selling
the patented invention for seventeen years.2 Patent law provides a more
exclusive monopoly than copyright law. Patent protection extends to
functional features of products and encompasses ideas to the extent that
the ideas are inextricably embodied in the products or process. Unlike a
copyright or trademark, a patent is much more difficult to obtain. To be
patented, an invention must not only be new and original, but it must
also be an improvement over the prior art such that one with ordinary
skill in that art could not consider the invention obvious.3
Trade secrets are industrial or commercial information that enter-
prises wish to keep confidential, but here reliance is placed either on pri-
vate contractual measures with existing employees or on public law or
guarantees where third parties, without contractual relationships, need to
be prevented from engaging in trade secret violations.
Trademarks are marks to distinguish goods or services of an industrial
or commercial enterprise or group of enterprises. They include words,
letters, numbers, drawings, pictures, emblems, monograms, signatures,
colors, and occasionally packaging forms. Most countries require regis-
tration of the mark for protection. Usually there are no time limits on
trademark protection, although many countries require periodic
registration.4
1. R. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (1990). Other
beneficiaries of intellectual property protection include industrial designs, utility models,
marks of origin and plant breeders' rights (PBRs). In the latter case, PBRs are covered
under the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV),
concluded in Paris on December 2, 1961, as amended in 1991. The Convention, which had
21 member states as of January 1, 1992, provides plant protection for between 15 and 18
years though breeders can use an existing protected plant to produce a new variety. As of
1990, UPOV had about 1,000 new plant varieties registered in member states.
2. 17 years is the present period in the U.S. for patent protection from the date of
granting, though for most countries, the period ranges from 15 to 20 years from the date the
patent is filed.
3. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 279 n.31 (1991).
4. ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS - ISSUES AND CON-
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Copyright protection covers original expression but not the ideas be-
hind the expression. Copyrightable material includes artistic, literary,
musical, photographic and cinematographic works, etc. Some countries
require registration formalities while for others protection is available au-
tomatically. The international standard for most works usually extends
for fifty years beyond the life of the author.
Finally, the mask work represents the expression of the design ele-
ments of a semiconductor "chip" for which its creator holds exclusive
rights, and thus can be seen as a hybrid between a patent and a
copyright.'
This paper attempts to assess the impact of a variety of multilateral
and bilateral initiatives with respect to IP reform in three Latin Ameri-
can countries (Mexico, Chile and Argentina), all of which are contemplat-
ing or completing legal reforms in this area. The paper begins with an
overview of the multilateral framework for IP protection, an assessment
from an economic perspective of the costs and benefits of increased IP
protection, followed by a detailed country by country evaluation of IP
reforms to date and their origins, and concluding with an assessment of
possible outcomes in future for both multilateral and bilateral IP reform.
II. THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR IP PROTECTION
Even though IP protection is a function of country specific legislation
and enforcement, a multilateral regime has existed dating back to the
19th century covering at least some elements of IP (trade secrets and
mask works are essentially excluded), but with no real effective dispute
resolution mechanism. Most international agreements that are assigned to
protect IP are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (as of December
1974), established by a Convention signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967,
which came into force in 1970.6 The three most important conventions
under WIPO's responsibility are the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (103 members), established in 1883, and last re-
vised in 1967, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (ninety members), adopted in 1886, and last revised in
1971, and the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registra-
tion of Marks (twenty nine states) adopted in 1891 and amended as of
1979. In all, WIPO administers nineteen Unions and Conventions.'
TROVERSIES 3 (1987).
5. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 12.
6. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), GENERAL INFORMATION
(1992). As of January 1, 1992, there were 128 states that were party to the WIPO
Convention.
7. One of these of special interest is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) which was
concluded in 1970 and as of January 1, 1992 comprised 49 states. The treaty provides for
the filing of an international application which can then be subject to an "international
search" by one of the major patent offices thereby facilitating the examination of patent
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The Paris Convention covers inventions, trademarks, service marks,
industrial designs, etc. (article 4) and provides for national treatment (ar-
ticle 2) whereby each Contracting State must grant the same protection
to nationals of other Contracting States as it grants to its own nationals.
Furthermore, the Paris Convention (article 4A) provides for a right of
priority of filing (relating back) in a second member country for periods
of one year from filing in the first member country for patent and utility
models, and six months for industrial designs and trademarks (article 4 C
(1)).
Compulsory licenses (article 5) are of great interest to both developed
and developing countries. These licenses are available for lack of working
a patent by the owner within four years from the date of filing or three
years from the date of granting the patent, whichever is later, in the ab-
sence of legitimate reasons. In addition, no proceeding for actual forfei-
ture can be made prior to the completion of two years from the grant of a
compulsory license (article 5(3)), and an assessment that the compulsory
license did not eliminate the cost of not working the patent. Developed
countries have tended to object to compulsory licenses particularly if they
were coupled with mandatory fixed royalty payments while developing
countries have favored compulsory licenses without such a time delay.
Finally, the dispute settlement mechanism (article 29) appears to be
particularly ineffective in that any country at the time of accession can
declare itself not bound by the dispute settlement provision (article
28(i)). But even in the absence of such a declaration, the dispute goes to
the International Court of Justice, after which the losing party could
leave the Paris Convention to avoid the sanction.8
The Berne Convention encompasses literary and artistic works in-
cluding every production in the literary and artistic domain whatever the
mode or form of its expression (article 2 (1)). The Berne Convention re-
quires that protection be given to published or unpublished works of an
author who is a national of a member state. Berne protection also is re-
quired for a work of a non-national of a member state if the work is first
published in a member state or simultaneously published in a non-mem-
ber and a member state. A work is published "simultaneously" if it is
published in a member country within thirty days of its first publication.9
The Berne Convention explicitly rejects the requirement that works
applications in the patent office of another member country. This facility could be of value
in the future to developing countries. Id. at 26-29.
8. The Madrid Agreement, revised seven times since 1891, is open to States party to
the Paris Convention, and provides for the registration of both trademarks and service
marks at the International Bureau of WIPO in Geneva. This can be accomplished once the
owner of the mark has registered it in the national trademark office of the country of origin
(provided it is a Contracting State). By the end of 1991, the number of international regis-
trations affected by the Agreement was 280,000 covering on average 10 countries. See
WIPO, supra note 6 at 32-33.
9. C. JOYCE, W. PATRY, M. LEAFFER, P. JASZI, COPYRIGHT LAW 927 (1991).
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be protected by formalities outside the country of origin (article 5(2)),
and has established a minimum term of protection of life plus fifty years,
or fifty years from publication for anonymous and pseudonymous works
(articles 7(1) and 7(3)). Moreover, a large number of "exclusive" rights
are to be protected including those of translation (article 8), reproduction
(article 9), public performance (article 11) and adaptation (article 12),
though distribution and display rights are not included unlike the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976 (article 106). Berne provides for a fair use privilege
(article 9(2)) and for moral rights (article 6 his) independently of eco-
nomic rights particularly with respect to the right of attribution and in-
tegrity. In the latter case, the U.S. has long opposed such a provision, and
even when it acceded to the Berne Convention at long last in 1988, the
implementing legislation 0 did not include such a clause on the grounds
that such a provision was already available under the common law, a
questionable argument. Finally, the dispute settlement arrangements (ar-
ticle 33) are similar to those of the Paris Convention, with the same
shortcomings.
Given the perceived weaknesses in the WIPO framework for IP pro-
tection, particularly from the perspective of developed countries, and the
fact that during the 1980s, a number of developed countries, particularly
the U.S., began to run substantial trade deficits, it is not surprising that
more attention from developed country policymakers began to focus on
the need to strengthen the international framework for IP protection."
Thus, at the inauguration of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
under the GATT 2 in Punta del Este in 1986, the Ministerial Declaration
included for the first time, largely at the insistence of the U.S.,"3 a man-
date to address Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), including Trade in Counterfeit Goods:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and ade-
quate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate on appropriate new
rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of princi-
10. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
11. However, it should be pointed out that WIPO has taken the initiative to attempt to
harmonize patent and trademark law through the preparation of a draft Patent Law Treaty
and a Draft Treaty on the simplification of administrative procedures concerning marks. In
addition, WIPO is also considering a multilateral treaty on the settlement of IP disputes
between states.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 43, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
13. For a detailed background to the talks that led up to the Uruguay Round, see A.
Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uru-
guay Round: Laying the Foundation, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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pies, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counter-
feit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the
GATT.1
4
Over the next five years, negotiations continued on this and many
other issues with no immediate resolution in sight given the obvious link-
ages of most issues since concessions would be expected in one area by
developing countries (e.g., TRIPs) in exchange for concessions in another
by developed countries (e.g., agriculture, textiles). A complicating factor
was that many developing countries saw no need to include TRIPs as
part of the GATT Round, even though article XX(d) of the GATT makes
a brief reference to IP, when an existing UN agency (WIPO) that had
been clearly established for that purpose was already available. Devel-
oped countries, particularly the US, were unwilling to support further ne-
gotiations under the auspices of WIPO given the lack of results in the
past, and the alleged bias of WIPO against the enforcement of IP rights,
particularly against a backdrop where developed countries had considera-
bly more voting strength in the GATT than in WIPO.
As a result of the impasse, the GATT Secretariat itself drafted a
compromise document" based on earlier competing texts covering all as-
pects of the Uruguay Round with the hope that all parties would agree,
though this to date has proven to be premature given the subsequent lack
of progress in negotiations, particularly initially in the agricultural area
between the European Community and the U.S. Given the recent change
in the U.S. administration, it is unclear if and when a successful Uruguay
Round will be achieved.
Even before the inauguration of the Uruguay Round, however, the
U.S. moved to proceed unilaterally to increase pressure on its trading
partners, primarily developing countries (eg. Korea), to improve their IP
protection legislative and enforcement frameworks, in the light of the
mounting U.S. trade deficit. In March 1987, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) at the request of President Reagan asked the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to prepare quantitative esti-
mates of the distortions in U.S. trade caused by inadequate IP protection,
and to identify the products and countries that were the major culprits.
The results, 6 qualified by limitations due to lack of statistical validity,
estimated worldwide losses to U.S. industry from inadequate foreign IP
protection ranging from US$43 to US$61 billion per annum. Whatever
14. Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este of September 20, 1986, reprinted in LAW
AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT 31 (Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian H.W. Hill eds. 1988).
15. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, December 20, 1991 (Dunkel Draft) reprinted in THE
DUNKEL DRAFT, FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT (The Institute for International Legal Infor-
mation ed., 1992).
16. USITC, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT
ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INVES-
TIGATION No. 332-245, at H-3 (1988).
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the accuracy of the numbers, they were sufficient to persuade the U.S.
Congress to include "tougher" provisions in its 1988 Trade Act" which
requires the USTR to identify, within thirty days after submission of
the annual National Trade Estimates (foreign trade barrier) report to
the Congress, those foreign countries that (1) deny adequate and ef-
fective protection of intellectual property rights or fair and equitable
market access to U.S. persons that rely upon intellectual property
protection, and (2) those countries under (1) determined by the
USTR to be priority foreign countries. The USTR identifies as priori-
ties only those countries that have the most onerous or egregious acts,
policies or practices that have the greatest adverse impact on the rele-
vant U.S. products and that are not entering into good faith negotia-
tions or making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negoti-
ations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property right
protection.18
In May of 1989, the USTR announced no "Priority Foreign Coun-
tries" but instead developed a "Priority Watch List" of eight countries
(including Mexico) and a "Watch List" of seventeen countries. The "Pri-
ority Watch List" was reduced to five when the USTR reported to Con-
gress on November 1, 1989 (Korea, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia had been
removed based on substantial progress). "In January 1990, Mexico was
removed from all "Special 301" lists after outlining a program for im-
proved protection for patents, trademarks, and trade secrets as well as
improved enforcement of the laws in these areas."' "
In addition, the U.S. government had begun negotiations initially
with Mexico on the possibility of joining the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), a step that would require an improved Mexican IP
environment which in fact occurred even prior to the NAFTA agreement.
In August 1992, provisional agreement was reached amongst the U.S., Ca-
nada and Mexico 0 on NAFTA. Similarly, other Latin American coun-
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (amend-
ing Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to include a "special 301" to deal with priority IP
protection).
18. Committee on Ways and Means, Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statis-
tics, H.R. Doc. No. 102-5, 102nd Congress, 1st Session. 76 (1991).
19. Id. at 77.
20. The broad outlines of the agreement are contained in a "Description of the Pro-
posed" prepared by the three governments dated August 12, 1992 and which contains at 26-
27 the following provisions on IP protection:
Building on the work done in the GATT and various international intellectual
property treaties, NAFTA establishes a high level of obligations respecting in-
tellectual property. Each country will provide adequate and effective protec-
tion of intellectual property rights on the basis of national treatment and will
provide effective enforcement of these rights against infringement, both inter-
nally and at the border.
The Agreement sets out specific commitments regarding the protection of:
copyrights, including sound recordings; patents; trademarks; plant breeders'
rights; industrial designs; trade secrets; integrated circuits (semiconductor
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tries, as part of the Enterprise for Americas Initiative (EAI), anticipated
similar possibilities, particularly Chile. Thus, the U.S. took the lead in
attempting to reform IP protection at the multilateral level through the
TRIPs negotiation, while at the same time, moving aggressively to negoti-
ate bilateral concessions from developing countries particularly when
trade benefits (or denial of existing benefits) were at stake.
III. ECONOMICS OF IP PROTECTION
Until recently, most of the literature on the economics of IP protec-
tion concentrated on developed countries and in a "closed" economy, ig-
noring the international trade and investment dimension. Under a domes-
tic analysis, IP would be viewed as an
asset generated by creative action, such as invention or authorship. As
with more tangible forms of private property, the owners of intellec-
tual property are, in most countries, allowed to garner its returns
through commercial exploitation. It is the ability to appropriate these
returns that provides the necessary incentive for further creative ac-
tivity, a big factor in an economy's commercial and cultural growth.
Unlike tangible property, however, intellectual property derives from
the creation of new information, which is essentially a public good.
Among the characteristics of public goods that would influence eco-
chips); and geographical indications.
Copyright. The Agreement's obligations include requirements to: protect com-
puter programs as literary works and databases as compilations; provide rental
rights for computer programs and sound recordings; and provide a term of pro-
tection of at least 50 years for sound recordings.
Patents. The NAFTA provides protection for inventions by requiring each
country to: provide product and process patents for virtually all types of inven-
tions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals; eliminate any spe-
cial regimes for particular product categories, any special provisions for acqui-
sition of patent rights and any discrimination in the availability and enjoyment
of patent rights made available locally and abroad; and provide patent owners
the opportunity to obtain product patent protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical inventions for which product patents were previously
unavailable.
Other Intellectual Property Rights. This section also provides rules for protect-
ing: service marks to the same extent as trademarks; encrypted satellite signals
against illegal use; trade secrets generally, as well as for protecting from dis-
closure by the government test data submitted by firms regarding the safety
and efficacy of pharmaceutical and agri-chemical products; integrated circuits,
both directly and in goods that incorporate them; and geographical indications
so as to avoid misleading the public, while protecting trademark owners.
Enforcement Procedures. The NAFTA also includes detailed obligations re-
garding: procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, includ-
ing provisions on damages, injunctive relief and general due process issues; and
enforcement of intellectual property rights at the border, including safeguards
to prevent abuse.
A more detailed statement of agreement of the parties with respect to intellectual property
is contained in The North American Free Trade Agreement, September 6, 1992, U.S.T. 17-1
to 17-29.
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nomic behavior is the problem that market participants have little in-
centive to compensate the inventor once the information underlying
the invention becomes known. . . .This problem necessitates the es-
tablishment of a set of protective devices that go beyond forms of pro-
tection for ordinary property. These devices assign and preserve the
rights to exploit intellectual property. In general, intellectual property
rights (IPRs) refer to the legal authority of a creator to control the
means by which the new information or idea is disseminated and com-
mercialized and to the enforcement mechanisms to which the creator
may appeal to prevent unauthorized use.2
1
Before examining the special economic dimension of IP protection in
developing countries, the following is a brief summation of the economic
arguments underlying each of the major forms of IP protection. In the
case of patents, governments have traditionally emphasized two primary
objectives in adopting a system of patents for inventions, namely to pro-
vide economic incentives to encourage investment activity and to have
inventors disclose their "secrets" to society thereby encouraging the
speed in the use of technology. The dilemma facing policy-makers is that
inventions are "public goods", and in the absence of any form of protec-
tion, it is problematic whether "consumers" can be prevented from using
such goods without appropriate remuneration, thereby creating a free-
rider problem. This is compounded by the fact that the costs of invention
can be substantial while the cost of disseminating that knowledge is close
to zero. Thus,
the distribution of an additional unit of knowledge goods does not di-
minish the stock of those goods. The marginal cost of an additional
unit will therefore be influenced not by production cost but only by
distribution cost, which are insignificant. According to static economic
criteria, the optimum market price for the knowledge or invention,
once produced, should be roughly zero. The normal function of the
market thus poses a problem of appropriatability for the inventor. At
a normal selling price of near zero, there is no incentive to produce
knowledge goods.2 2
In order to avoid the appropriatability problem, the patent provides for a
temporary monopoly (but only with respect to the specific invention but
not to the market it serves since there is often competition from similar
competing substitutes) leading to quasi-rents that provide sufficient in-
centives to investors faced with market failures to continue both to invent
and disseminate their inventions to the public. The optimal policy pack-
age may be to strengthen IP protection, but lower tariffs and other barri-
ers to competition that naturally work on the non-technology barriers in
the competitive advantage package.
There is little empirical evidence available that could categorically
21. Keith Maskus, The Economics of International Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights: Background and Analysis 5-6 (June 1989) (unpublished).
22. BENKO, supra note 4, at 17.
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document the impact of the availability of patent protection on levels of
investment in technological innovation though this would certainly vary
with the type of industry involved (pharmaceuticals and chemicals having
among the highest correlation)." This raises the question as to whether
normal competition provides, in many industries, a sufficient basis for in-
novation or where market imperfection in terms of the rapidity with
which competing firms could imitate the technology in the absence of
patent protection negates the need for such a device. In any event, firms
must constantly make the trade-off between filing for patent protection
to gain a "monopoly" advantage for seventeen years but with ultimate
disclosure of its invention, versus the option of using trade secret protec-
tion which can be infinite unless violated where either breach of contract
or tort remedies are available (though in the case of pharmaceuticals,
trade secret protection is not an option given the ease with which such
products can be copied). However, trade secrets also run the risk of being
lost either through reverse engineering or through normal independent
commercial developments. 24 A related issue for which there is again no
conclusive evidence available is whether seventeen years constitutes an
appropriate length of time for protection, with the expectation that the
longer the period, the more likely that "monopoly" profits or quasi-rents
more than offset the development costs of the invention.
In the case of copyrights, the economic justification for providing
protection is similar to that of patents with respect to industrial property.
Creative literacy and artistic works require an investment of time, the
application of originality, and the benefits of training which, without pro-
tection, would permit others to "free ride" particularly in an environment
where advances in copying technology worldwide has made the mecha-
nism of copying relatively simple and cheap.
The traditional economic and welfare implications of this trend are
well-known. Clearly, the greater use of copying technologies delivers
creative goods to consumers at lower costs. The reduction in demand
for originals lowers the gap between price and marginal production
and distribution costs, raising social welfare. Stronger laws against
copying would increase this distortion, reducing welfare. However,
copying also diminishes incentives for creative activity and the legiti-
mate dissemination of new creations, resulting in a welfare decline
that would be offset by greater performance of property rights. Copy-
right policy should presumably be designed to effect an optimal trade-
off between these impacts.2
In addition, the evolving nature of technology with the growth in the
23. E. MANSFIELD, PATENTS AND INNOVATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, MANAGEMENT SCI-
ENCE, 1986.
24. For a more detailed treatment of the economic justification for trade secret laws at
the State level in the U.S. see D. Friedman, William Landes & Richard Posner, Some Eco-
nomics of Trade Secret Law 5 J. EcON. PERSP., No. 1, 61-72 (1991).
25. Maskus, supra note 21, at 26-27.
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use of software, semiconductors and satellite transmissions has raised ad-
ditional questions as to whether patents or copyright is the more appro-
priate form of protection. In a few countries (U.S. and Japan), this has
led to the creation of new categories of protection such as for computer
chips (mask works2 6) or special measures such as compulsory licenses for
broadcasters (U.S.) who transmit satellite signals to cable operators at
rates set by a government regulatory agency (Copyright Royalty
Tribunal) .27
Trademarks are one of a variety of means (including brand names
and marks of origin) that are used to identify and provide protection for
goods or products from firms, and at the same time, protect consumers
from false advertising and fraud.
Like patents and copyright, trademarks carry legal authority to en-
force the exclusive use of an asset created by human thought. In this
case, the asset is a symbol or other identifier that conveys information
to the customer about the product being purchased. If consumers view
the mark as an indicator of some desirable product characteristic,
such as high quality, they will be willing to pay a premium price for
the good. This premium price compensates the firm for the cost of
developing and advertising the trademark. If competitors were al-
lowed to duplicate the mark or use a confusingly similar mark these
costs could not be recovered. Unlike patents and copyrights, however,
trademarks do not protect the creation of additional human knowl-
edge, but rather the identification of a product. Such identification is
not a public good. Thus, trademarks serve in part to augment the
ability to differentiate products and to sustain, associated monopoly
profits.2"
However, consumer preferences in the light of disappointments in
quality choice can offset such monopoly profits as can legal remedies in-
volving false advertising as well as the availability of other trademarks to
reduce market power.
IV. THE PROTECTION OF IP FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
With the recent prominence of TRIPs negotiations as part of the
Uruguay Round, increasing attention has been paid by economists to the
tradeoffs at the international level of increased IP protection particularly
including the perspective of developing countries.
.Given the paucity of data on such matters in developing countries
and the fact that in most developing countries, recent legislative reforms
involving increased domestic IP protection provide insufficient time in
which to make a "with" and "without" assessment, nevertheless, a num-
26. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1984).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1); 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A).
28. Maskus, supra note 21, at 32-33.
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ber of recent efforts have been made to develop models to analyze29 the
problem or to itemize the various pros and cons that developing countries
should consider in general in deciding on an appropriate level of
protection. 0
In the latter case, Primo-Braga has assembled a reasonably compre-
hensive list of factors that developing countries should consider in their
IP policy.
On the cost side, any acceleration of IP protection may involve in-
creased royalty payments based on licensing agreements which would be
particularly important for countries at the earlier stages of development
that are largely dependent upon imported technology,8 1 while many of
those at a more advanced stage are already facing substantial outflows
due to large debt service. However, without protection, those who are
willing to license will tend to charge higher royalties because of the higher
risk of loss. This is an area on which further empirical research would be
helpful.
Secondly, tighter enactment and enforcement of IP laws could dis-
place to a variable extent, depending upon local circumstances, local "pi-
rates" for on-patent products on the assumption that most excess de-
mand would be obtained by foreign IP holders. An attempt to quantify
the impact of this across seven countries (Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, In-
dia, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) was made in 1985 for a variety of
industries using somewhat questionable assumptions of price elasticities
of demand, market size and the fact that private domestic firms would
not survive a tightened level of IP protection.12 This resulted in revenues
foregone to IP holders in 1985 for all seven countries of $1.7 billion for
the pharmaceutical industry and $0.5 billion for the software industry,
with lesser amounts for a range of other industries (e.g., agrochemicals,
book publishing, audio, video, etc.). Nevertheless, these numbers should
be looked at with some caution given the questionable methodology
employed.
A third perceived cost of strengthened IP protection would be the
risk of fostering anti-competitive effects through the exercise of market
power to reduce output, raise prices, and repatriate the producer surplus
29. ISHAC DIVAN AND DANi RODRIK, PATENTS, APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY, AND NORTH-
SOUTH TRADE, (PRE WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 251 The World Bank 1989); R.M. Fein-
berg et al., The Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS, Jan. 1990, at 79-80.
30. C. Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for or Against Intellectual Property
Protection in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 69-87 (World Bank 1990).
31. Less than one percent of existing patents are held by nationals of developing coun-
tries in OECD, Economic Arguments for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, TC/WP
(88)70 (1989).
32. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 378-407,
(R. Michael Gadbaw and Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS].
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beyond consumer price increases that might be expected as part of ad-
ding IP costs to products which, for an industry like pharmaceuticals,
could have a substantial impact on the poorer segments of the society.
However, in practice this effect could be mitigated in many cases by the
availability of a competing substitute that may already be off-patent, par-
ticularly with respect to pharmaceuticals.
An additional consideration would concern the non-use of patents,
for example, in a particular country which could lead to the use of com-
pulsory licensing under certain circumstances (e.g., reasonable time pe-
riod for non-use without adequate explanation) though these devices in
turn are subject to abuse by developing countries particularly with the
setting of-artificially low royalty payments. Moreover, where a patentee
satisfies the working requirement through importation, there should be
little justification for a compulsory license.
Finally, arguments have been made to the effect that IP reform could
result in the bidding up of the price of domestic R&D capacity as a result
of greater protection thereby having a counterproductive impact on in-
come distribution, though hard evidence is not available to support such
a theory.
On the benefit side, the most common argument given for increasing
IP protection has been its expected impact on technology transfer on the
assumption that multinationals would be more likely to license technol-
ogy and/or engage in joint ventures where their technology is adequately
protected.3  A more recent survey undertaken by E. Mansfield 4 shows
similar results for multinationals though with a clear distinction between
industries such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals where R&D costs are
high but subsequent entry costs lower causing high reluctance to invest
vs. other industries with opposite characteristics.
A second reason given for strengthened IP protection involves its al-
leged impact on domestic R&D in developing countries. However, strong
empirical evidence to support this proposition is not yet available partly
because it is too early to measure the impact of IP reform on domestic
R&D in countries such as Mexico and Brazil.35 Nevertheless, some anec-
dotal evidence suggests that many domestic firms welcome strengthened
IP protection as a result of greater confidence in greater investment in
R&D and affiliations with research parks and universities in addition to
less concern that domestic employees will be hired away in the absence of
33. 75 percent of respondents of multinational manufacturing enterprises cited inade-
quate IP protection as a significant problem for licensing to developing countries; see
OECD, International Technology Licensing: Survey Results, mimeo, table 40, (August
1987).
34. E. Mansfield, research project funded by the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) to be completed in May, 1993.
35. However, the case of Italy is instructive in that prior to 1979 it provided no patent
for pharmaceuticals, but since that time, Italy has become one of the leading producers of
new pharmaceutical products in the world.
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trade secret legislation, for purposes of a competitor obtaining secret for-
mulas, customer lists, etc.36
A third rationale for IP protection has been the greater likelihood
that more information would be diffused in the domestic economy con-
cerning technology developments though it is not clear that a developing
country could not avail itself of good library facilities overseas dealing
with patents to achieve the same objectives as in the case of Brazil.3 7
While a number of less important benefits are sometimes cited,38 the
most important remaining factor concerns the trade impact of IP protec-
tion (the so-called "marriage of convenience") which arises as a result of
the threats and/or actual actions that developed countries have taken
(e.g., the U.S. and the EC) on a bilateral basis in the face of inadequate
IP protection. While this element goes beyond purely economic argu-
ments, the practice of imposing tariff penalties on even unrelated export
goods from developing countries is -of sufficient importance to warrant
considerable weight in the policy debate of developing countries and
which has already resulted in substantial IP reforms particularly in the
Far East.
V. MEXICO
Over the past fifteen years, the legal regime providing for IP protec-
tion in Mexico has undergone radical changes in the direction of enhanc-
ing such protection to the point where it substantially exceeds the level of
protection provided by most other developing countries, and indeed, be-
gins to match, at least in some initial areas, the kind of protection pro-
vided in the U.S. The evolution of such reforms 9 can be traced to a num-
ber of factors including: (a) the aftermath of the debt crisis that Mexico
experienced in the early 1980s when it became clear that a substantial
opening up of its economy both with respect to trade and foreign invest-
ment, including technology transfer, was required to improve interna-
tional competitiveness of its domestic industry, and in the late 1980s to
reduce levels of inflation; (b) as part of that process, Mexico's accession to
the GATT in August 1986 as a developing country and its consequent
effect on overall trade reform and in Mexico's participation in the Uru-
guay Round begun in 1986 in Punta del Este including TRIPs negotia-
tions; (c) Mexico's receipt of technical assistance from WIPO to reform
its IP regime, which oversees the Paris and Berne Conventions to which
36. SHERWOOD, supra note 1, at 132-149.
37. Id. at 56.
38. See Braga, supra note 30, at 83.
39. See Gretchen A. Pemberton and Mariano Soni, Jr., Mexico's 1991 Industrial Prop-
erty Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103, 104 (1992); John McKnight and Carlos Moiggenburg,
RN., Mexico's New Intellectual Property Regime: Improvements in the Protection of In-
dustrial Property, Copyright, License and Franchise Rights in Mexico, 27 INT'L LAW. 27
(1993) (for a detailed discussion of the background to the recent legal reform in the IP area
in Mexico).
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Mexico is a signatory; and finally (d) bilateral negotiations with the U.S.
on trade and investment culminating in Mexico's inclusion in USTR's
"priority watch" list under Section 182 of the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (Special 301), all of which subsequently led to
the major legislative reforms in all areas of IP protection in Mexico in
1991. Thus, it was a combination of both external and internal pressures
(including domestic industries who saw advantages from their own per-
spective in increased IP protection)' 0 that led to the IP reforms in Mexico
in the past year.
A. Patents, Trademarks and Trade Secrets
Until July of 1991, Mexico's overall IP regime was governed by the
Law on Inventions and Trademarks' which was subsequently amended
in 1987,42 and clarified as part of regulations issued to implement the
1987 amendments. Overall, this law and its amendments were considered
to be deficient in a number of respects.4
3
Mexico provided protection for inventions through patents (both
process and product) and through what were called certificates of inven-
tion which provided royalties to the holders of the certificate from anyone
using the invention under a non-exclusive license. Up until July 1987, no
certificate of invention had ever been granted in Mexico.4 4 With respect
to product and process patents, the 1987 amendment provided for inclu-
sion of the following but only after 1997:
1. Biotechnological processes to obtain the following products: phar-
maceutical and chemical products, medicines in general, beverages
and food for animal consumption, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides,
fungicides or biological-activity products;
2. Genetic processes to obtain vegetables and animal species or vari-
eties thereof;
3. Chemical products;
4. Chemical and pharmaceutical products, medicines in general, bev-
erages and food for animal consumption, fertilizers, pesticides, herbi-
cides, fungicides, and biological-activity products.'3
The 1991 law46 both did away with the 1997 target date and ex-
40. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 238-244.
41. Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, D.O. [Official Federal Diary of Mexico] (10 February
1976) [hereinafter 1976 LAW].
42. SECRETARIA DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL, Decreto por el que se Reforma y
Adiciqna la Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, D.O. (16 January 1987) [Directive to Reform and
Amend the Law on Inventions and Trademarks].
43. For an assessment of the IP laws prior to 1991, see USITC, RzvIEw OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES-MEXIcO RELATIONS, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-282, 6-3 - 6-5, (1990) [hereinafter USITC,
U.S.-MExico REVIEW].
44. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 253.
45. USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-2.
46. Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad Industrial, D.O. (June 27, 1991)
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panded coverage to include:
alloys; chemicals in general; pharmaceuticals, drugs, agriculture chem-
icals and products with a biological activity; foods and beverages in
general, including those for human consumption, biotechnological
processes to obtain pharmaceuticals, drugs, food and beverages, agri-
culture chemicals, and products with a biological activity (these were
previously protectable under a certificate of invention, but these cer-
tificates have disappeared from the Mexican law); peanut varieties;
microorganism-related inventions; genetic methods to obtain plant va-
rieties; and compositions of matter in general .... The new law pro-
vides for restrictions to patentability in the case of the following types
of inventions, all relating to living matter: essentially biological
processes involving plants, animals and their varieties; genetic meth-
ods regarding biological material capable of self-replication; plant spe-
cies and animal brands and species; biological material, as found in
nature; genetic material; and inventions regarding the living matter of
the human body.' 7
Complementing this broadened scope of coverage of the new law is
the inclusion, for the first time of a definition of invention namely "every
human creation that allows matter or energy existing in nature to be
transformed, for exploitation by man, through the immediate satisfaction
of a specific need. Included among inventions are processes or products
for industrial application.' 8 Inventions must also meet a test of novelty
and be the result of inventive activity. Novelty is preserved for up to
twelve months, provided that within twelve months prior to the filing
date of the patent application, or in such case, of the recognized priority
date, the inventor or his assignee had disclosed the invention by any com-
munication medium or had exhibited it at a domestic or international
exhibition.49 Specifically excluded from inventions are theoretical or sci-
entific principles, discoveries consisting of making known or disclosing
something that already existed in nature; schemes, plans, rules and meth-
ods to perform mental feats, games or businesses; computer software,
forms of presentation of information; aesthetic creations and artistic or
literary works; the methods of surgical or therapeutic treatment or diag-
nosis applicable to the human body . . . ; the juxtaposition of known in-
ventions or mixtures of known products.5" The duration of the patent has
been increased to twenty years from the date of filing though given the
long time to process an application (three to five years under the old sys-
tem), the net effective life of the patent may be substantially less. The
term of the patent for pharmochemical or pharmaceutical products may
be extended by three years if the patent owner grants a license to a cor-
poration with majority Mexican capital subject to other procedural re-
[hereinafter 1991 LAW].
47. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT (BNA), 236 (Sept. 1991).
48. 1991 Law, supra note 46, Art. 16 (translation).
49. Id. arts. 15 & 18.
50. Id. art. 19.
VOL. 21:2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
strictions.51 The new law also provides, for the first time, for the protec-
tion of utility models with ten year protection and industrial designs and
models with fifteen year protection but only covering domestic novelty, a
distinction not explained or justified. 5
Another major area of reform has been in the area of compulsory
licenses, which are permitted under the Paris Convention under certain
circumstances but can be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction for
legitimate reasons.5" Under the 1976 law, as amended, the Mexican Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (MPTO) could issue a compulsory license to a
third party:
(1)where a patent holder has not satisfied the working requirements
(2)exploitation of the patent has been suspended for six months
(3)exploitation of the patent does not satisfy the national market, and
(4)the patent is not being used in the export market and someone has
expressed an interest in using the patent for exports. 4
The provisions for compulsory license now come closer to the provi-
sions of the Paris Convention (though there is still a public interest basis
for a compulsory decision) in that there is no obligation to work a patent
but compulsory licenses are available to third parties under the same
Paris Convention conditions with the addition that the patentee would
have an additional one year following notice of the request for a compul-
sory license to begin working the patent.55 However, of considerable sig-
nificance is the provision in Article 70 of the amended 1976 law which
recognizes the act of importation as precluding the use of compulsory
licenses.
With respect to trademarks, most of the objectionable features in the
1976 IP law were removed by the 1987 amendment including the compul-
sory linkage of foreign marks to Mexican marks.56 Under the new law, the
term of registration is increased from five to ten years, the registration
will lapse if the mark is not used for three consecutive years at any time
during the ten year period, without adequate justification, and marks
would be non-registrable that are confusingly similar to well-known
marks in Mexico. Further, under the new law, nullity actions have been
foreclosed based on the fact that the registration was granted in violation
of any provision of the law at the time the registration was granted,
thereby removing great uncertainty amongst mark owners.5 7
With respect to trade secrets, prior to the 1991 law, protection was
very limited as a result of a vague definition of what constituted a trade
51. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORt, supra note 47, at 236.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
54. USITC, U.S.-MExlco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-2.
55. 1976 Law, supra note 41, art. 71.
56. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 263.
57. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 239.
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secret and by deduction a violation of such, a threshold of burden of
proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate a violation against third parties,
cumbersome procedures through the MPTO to investigate violations, and
finally the absence of preliminary remedies such as injunctions to prevent
injury while a trade secret investigation is underway.5 8
The 1991 law includes significant changes in the trade secret protec-
tion regime. To begin with, trade secrets are now more clearly defined to
include any information having industrial utility that is kept in confiden-
tial fashion, regarding which sufficient means or systems have been un-
dertaken to preserve its confidential nature and limit access thereto. The
trade secret must necessarily relate to the nature, characteristics or pur-
poses of products, production methods or processes, the means and forms
of distribution or trade or the rendering of services.5 9
Secondly, both the firm hiring an employee that is allegedly "bring-
ing" the trade secret to this new position as well as the employee would
be liable for trade secret violation. Furthermore, technology transfer
agreements would be permitted to include confidentiality clauses6" which
in the past required special government approval if the agreement ex-
ceeded ten years. 1 On the other hand, protection is only provided for
trade secrets that are reduced to documentary form (i.e., no intangible
protection). Moreover, no specific provision was made for preliminary in-
junctions to reduce the impact of the violation.
While the above measures have certainly strengthened the legal
framework for IP protection, unless this is accompanied by improvements
in enforcement effectiveness, the impact of such changes will be seriously
undermined.
Under the previous law, which provided for both civil and criminal
penalties for patent and trademark violations, the time required to pur-
sue civil or criminal actions was so lengthy that the vast majority of suits
were settled to avoid years of delay involving administrative review
within the MPTO followed by a layer of appeals through the court system
(including a substantial number of recourses necessitating a restarting of
proceedings). Moreover, even though criminal prosecutions could be com-
menced simultaneously with civil action, the prosecution could only pro-
ceed once the civil actions were completed.2 On the other hand, the law
did provide for temporary relief in the form of the prohibition of sale of
infringing products by the MPTO and/or the seizure of the infringing
products and closure of stores selling such items under certain circum-
58. USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-16.
59. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 238 (reflecting a transla-
tion of art. 82 of the 1991 law).
60. Id. art. 84.
61. USITC, U.S.-MExIco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-16. The Law on the Control and
Registration of the Technology Transfer (D.O., January 11, 1982) has been repealed.
62. For a more detailed treatment of the enforcement problems under the old 1991 law,
see USITC, U.S.-MExico REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-8 to 6-9.
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stances." Nevertheless, the inadequate staffing, both legal and technical,
of the MPTO contributed substantially to the general delay in enforce-
ment. As of 1988, MPTO had 330 employees in its patent examination
division to handle roughly 500 applications, of which ninety percent were
foreign.6
4
Under the new law, enforcement measures have been strengthened
through stronger procedures for inspection authorized by the MPTO to
seize infringing goods, a simplified system of launching criminal prosecu-
tion whereby only an opinion from the MPTO rather than a time-con-
suming administrative declaration is required, and the inclusion of trade
secrets violation as a criminal offense. 65 Specific fines, shutdowns and ad-
ministrative imprisonment for infringement have been included.6 Finally,
the new law proposes the creation of a new Industrial Property Institute
which would provide support for the promotion of technology develop-
ment and research and development as well as begin to take on some of
the functions of the understaffed and underresourced MPTO. A special
study financed by the World Bank is underway by WIPO to ascertain the
appropriate role for the new Institute in addition to examining the need
for judicial reform in this area.
While all these measures are welcome, it is still too early to judge
their efficacy, particularly since accompanying regulations are still tobe
issued, though they represent a significant step in the right direction.
B. Copyright
Copyright protection is provided by Article 28 of the Mexican Con-
stitution and the Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright of Decem-
ber 23, 1956 (as amended up to December 30, 1981).67 On July 3, 1991 the
law was again amended to deal with some of the weaknesses of the earlier
law. Mexico is already a member of the Rome, Berne, Universal Copy-
right and Geneva Phonogram Conventions. Overall, Mexico's Copyright
Law, even prior to the latest amendments, was considered to be quite
comprehensive, and as elsewhere in Latin America, more so than its cor-
responding laws on patents, trademarks and trade secrets.6 8
Nevertheless, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)
estimated losses to piracy by U.S. firms (excluding, of course, other non-
U.S. foreign firms and domestic firms) at US$263 million per year com-
posed primarily of losses for the recording industry (US$75 million), mo-
tion pictures (US$88 million) and most importantly computer software
63. Id. at 6-8.
64. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 253, 256.
65. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, supra note 47, at 240.
66. Pemberton, supra note 39, at 103; Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad
Intellectual, Art. 214, supra note 39.
67. Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright, D.O. (11 January 1982).
68. USITC, U.S.-MExIco REVIEW, supra note 43, at 6-10.
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(US$100 million). 9 Though these numbers may represent negotiating
tools, they can be largely explained by discrete lacuna in the Copyright
Law which, for the most part, have been filled by the most recent amend-
ments but whose enforcement is still found to be lacking. These involve
for the first time the inclusion of sound recordings as protected works as
well as the producer of records"0 and computer programs.7 1 Moreover, in
order to overcome the losses to movie owners in the U.S. as a result of
unauthorized reception and retransmission of broadcast signals from U.S.
and Intelsat satellites by hotels and resorts in Mexico for the benefit of
paying guests, the definition of public performance has been tightened to
include representatives or performances when it is presented by any
means to audiences or spectators without restricting it to persons belong-
ing to a private group.72 However, probably the most important change in
the new law was the significant increase in the level of criminal penalties
for copyright infringement with many violations carrying prison terms of
six months to six years and fines up to 500 times the minimum daily
general salary or US$2,000, which is still small but a substantial increase
over the historical fine of US$4.00 which had eroded over time due to
inflation.7 3 Nevertheless, for these reforms to have an appropriate impact,
they will have to be accompanied by the strengthening of the Prosecutor's
Office, Mexican police and the Copyright Office.
VI. CHILE
As in the case of most of the rest of Latin America, Chile struggled
through most of the 1980s as a result of a legacy of excessive foreign debt,
insufficient exports to compensate for the fluctuation in export earnings
from copper, its primary export item, and insufficient foreign direct in-
vestment partly the result of the presence of a military dictatorship for
most of the decade. Nevertheless, Chile was one of the first Latin Ameri-
can countries to launch an "adjustment" program partially funded by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank involving sub-
stantial cuts in public expenditures, reductions in tariff protection and
measures to boost exports, further privatization efforts, and special incen-
tives to attract foreign direct investment through such measures as debt/
equity swaps. The process of adjustment has been completed for a num-
ber of years, and as a result, Chile has enjoyed average growth rates of
GDP in excess of six percent over the past two to three years, coinciding
with a return to democracy in 1989.
69. IIPA, REPORT TO SECTION 301 COMMITrEE OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, February 25, 1992 at 61 in which it recommended that Mexico be
placed once again on the Special 301 Watch List from which it was removed in January
1990 when the Mexican government first outlined its planned reform in its 18 regions in its
"Industry and Trade Sectoral Plan."
70. Law Amending the Federal Law of Copyright, art. 83 D.O. (July 9, 1991).
71. Id. art. 7.
72. Id. art. 72.
73. Id. arts. 135-143.
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As part of its more outward looking strategy, Chile has sought more
direct trading ties With its major trading partners, particularly the U.S.
As a result of the Enterprise for Americas Initiative (EAI) announced by
the U.S. in 1990, Chile signed a framework agreement with the U.S. on
October 1, 1990 which established a U.S.-Chile Council on Trade and In-
vestment with the objective to monitor trade and investment relations,
open markets between the two countries and negotiate agreements when
appropriate. The Council's agenda includes cooperation in the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT, increased market
access, adequate and effective protection for IP rights, investment policy,
and the reduction of barriers to trade and investment in the hemi-
sphere."4 The backdrop to this initiative is that both countries have been
exploring the possibility of concluding a free trade agreement following
the lead provided by Mexico. Chile has made a conscious decision to seek
closer trade ties with the U.S. rather than with its immediate neighbors
that make up the proposed Mercado del Cono Sur (Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay and Paraguay) to take effect in 1994/95 on the grounds that it
wishes to associate itself with the more stable policy environment of its
potential North American FTA partners.
As with the rest of Latin America, Chile has also actively partici-
pated in multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT, and on January 23,
1991, Chile's Parliament approved Chile's accession to the Paris Conven-
tion.7 5 Nevertheless, it is clear that the accelerated bilateral discussions
with the U.S. have been instrumental in promoting recent reforms of
Chile's IP laws.
A. Patents and Trademarks
Up until this year, Chile's patent and trademark protection had been
governed by the 1931 Law. 76 However, through a major change in its leg-
islative framework, the Chilean Parliament passed a new IP law on Janu-
ary 25, 199117 followed by detailed regulations on September 30, 1991
which signalled the formal effectiveness of the law. While the old law cov-
ered many of the traditional elements of a typical IP law, the new law is
noteworthy for a number of significant major reforms.
To begin with, for the first time, the new law includes the possibility
of protection for pharmaceuticals by virtue of it not being included in a
list of negative items (articles 38 and 39) such as scientific theories or
inventions that are contrary to morality or public order. As in many other
countries, the inclusion of pharmaceuticals in an IP law was hotly con-
tested, particularly by the domestic Chilean pharmaceutical industry
(ASILFA) which saw the inclusion as a threat to its own livelihood as well
74. 4 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, 245 (1990).
75. Id. vol. 5, at 55.
76. Decree Law 958.
77. Law 19.039.
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as from the public at large which feared that the cost of pharmaceuticals
would skyrocket making them unaffordable to the poorer segments of the
population.7 8 Partly to deal with the possibility of monopoly pricing once
protection was established, the law provides (article 51) for compulsory
licenses with a guaranteed minimum royalty when abuse of market power
is evident. Moreover, when a pharmaceutical patent has been filed
abroad, an application may be filed only when the foreign application
postdates entering into force of the new law.79 Finally, the duration of all
patents is fifteen years from the date a patent is granted, or less than the
seventeen years from the date a patent application is granted as in the
U.S.
A further significant change in the new law involves the establish-
ment of an Arbitral Tribunal (article 17) to hear appeals of some of the
administrative decisions of the Industrial Property Office, the agency re-
sponsible for administering the law. The Tribunal is composed of three
members (two ministerial appointments and one lawyer elected by the
Court of Appeals in Santiago) for two year terms with an arrangement to
meet as often as necessary. This should speed up the process of adminis-
trative review of patent decisions.
With respect to trademarks, minor improvements have been included
(articles 23 to 26) involving improved protection for well-known marks
and the extension of the period of cancellation from two to five years. As
before, there would be no compulsory licensing of unused marks.
Finally, fines of between US$4,000 and US$40,000 would be available
for any kind of infringement (articles 28 and 52). However, no implicit
treatment is given for trade secrets in the new law, though as in Argen-
tina, this is covered under the Penal Code.
B. Copyright
Chile is a signatory to the Berne Convention, the Universal Copy-
right Convention, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, and the Ge-
neva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication."°
Chile's copyright protection is contained in Law No. 17.336 as re-
cently amended by Law No. 18.957 of February 22, 1990 and the accom-
panying Regulations. The law protects seventeen different categories of
78. A detailed study prepared by the Universidad Catolica de Chile, EFECTOS DE LAS
PATENTES DE MEDICAMENTOS SOBRE EL MERCADO FARMACEUTICO Y SU IMPACTO SOBRE LA
SALUD Y EL GUSTO FISCAl (1987), concluded that patenting of pharmaceuticals would entail
an additional cost of between US$5 to US$18 million for royalty payment per annum as well
as up to US$7 million per year in government subsidies and other expenditures. There is
considerable dispute within Chile, however, over some of the assumptions of the study.
79. Law 19.039, supra note 77, arts. 34-38.
80. For a detailed assessment of the Chile Copyright laws, see IIPA, COPYRIGHT PIRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA 48-57 (1991).
VOL. 21:2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
works (article 3) including for the first time, as a result of the most recent
amendment, computer programs and videograms, a significant develop-
ment. As in the Berne Convention, the Chilean law also provides for
moral rights (articles 14 to 16). However, unlike the Berne Convention,
the duration of protection extends only to the life of the author plus
thirty years rather than the more typical fifty years, though a bill is now
pending to achieve the latter.
The copyright owner enjoys the exclusive right of publication
(broadly defined), reproduction, adaptation and performance (article 18).
Moreover, in a somewhat unusual feature, a Chilean author of a painting
or sculpture has the inalienable right to receive five percent of any in-
crease in price realized when the work is sold at a public sale or through
an established dealer.8 The present law protects the rights of all Chilean
authors and of foreigners domiciled in Chile. The rights of foreign authors
not domiciled in Chile enjoy the protection to which they are entitled by
virtue of the international conventions that Chile has subscribed to and
ratified.82
Violations of the law are punishable by fines for a maximum of
$1,900 (article 78) as well as the possibility of minor imprisonment (arti-
cle 79). However, for a copyright owner to avail to these rights, registra-
tion with the Register of Intellectual Property is mandatory (article 72).
Overall, Chile's copyright protection, particularly with the inclusion
of computer programs, appears to be broadly satisfactory with the excep-
tion of the life plus thirty duration requirement, the need for some
greater precision in the definition of what is covered, and more effective
penalties for infringement.
VII. ARGENTINA
Unlike Mexico and Chile, Argentina is still in the process of undergo-
ing a substantial adjustment program to deal with high levels of foreign
debt, a stagnant economy and excessive amounts of external protection
that permitted the survival of inefficient domestic industries that also
benefitted from special subsidies. Whereas Mexico and Chile have largely
completed their adjustment programs and fashioned more outward look-
ing economies in anticipation of adherence to free trade agreements with
the U.S. and Canada, Argentina is still in the process of improving the
public fiscal position through a massive program of privatization, cuts in
fiscal expenditures, elimination of special tax incentives for industries,
and reduced tariff protection to allow for greater import competition to
improve domestic efficiency.83 Moreover, Argentina has decided for the
81. Law No. 18.457, art. 36.
82. Id. art. 2.
83. Despite these lags in adjustment, Argentina has begun to enjoy the substantial flows
of foreign direct investment and repatriation of capital which Mexico and Chile have been
enjoying for some time.
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time being to pursue a regional economic trade bloc, the Mercosur, as
part of its new outward looking strategy as opposed to seeking direct free
trade links with the U.S. and Canada as Mexico and Chile have, though
the Mercosur countries signed the EAI Framework Agreement on Trade
and Investment in June 1991. Moreover, on November 14, 1991, Argen-
tina signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the U.S. which
guarantees equal treatment between foreign and domestic investors in ad-
dition to provision for international arbitration. Given Argentina's
predominantly agricultural base, which provides for the bulk of its ex-
ports, in its trade relationships with developed countries, it must face a
very elaborate set of protectionist barriers in economies such as the Euro-
pean Community and the U.S. which clearly affect its willingness to offer
concessions in other areas such as IP. Nevertheless, Argentina was subject
to a Section 301 investigation on pharmaceutical patent protection in
1988 which was withdrawn in 1989 based on expectations of legislative
reform, though Argentina was placed on the "Special 301" watch list in
1989 and remains there.84 As in most Latin American countries, the
evolution of IP protection has been more pronounced in the case of copy-
right rather than patent law, though both still have shortcomings as dis-
cussed below. This is particularly true in Argentina, an agriculturally-
based economy that would benefit from biotechnology applications to its
animals and crops and which also has a long tradition of literacy and cul-
tural development.
A. Patent Protection
Argentina's patent law protection dates back to October 11, 1864
with the passage of its first patent law8 which, aside from minor amend-
ments, has not been substantially modified despite the fact that Argen-
tina acceded to the Paris Convention in 1966s s but has not made changes
in its legislation to conform to the Convention's obligations. Nevertheless,
over the years, new patent laws have been proposed to the Congress, none
of which has yet been adopted. However, partly in response to the Special
301 pressure, the Menem government recently (October 10, 1991) sent a
new law to the Argentine Congress which addresses many of the long-
standing objections to the Argentine Law.8 7
The existing law provides patent protection for inventions and de-
signs based on novelty criteria, covering both product and process pat-
ents. However, the law (article 4) specifically excludes product patent
protection for pharmaceuticals in addition to computer programs and, of
84. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE DIVISION 8.
85. Patent Law No. 111.
86. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 125.
87. Draft patent law and accompanying explanatory statement submitted to Congress
by Domingo F. Cavallo, Minister of Economy and Public Works and Services, and Avelino
Jose Porto, Minister of Health and Social Action, on October 10, 1991.
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course, items which violate Argentine law or morals. However, under the
proposed new law, the restrictions on product patent protection on
pharmaceuticals is being eliminated (by simply not explicitly mentioning
it)."8 Given Argentina's long standing hostility to such a move, this repre-
sents a major change in thinking, though respected independent think
tanks in Argentina such as the Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas
Latinoamericanas (FIEL) had already reached similar recommendations
based on an economic analysis.89 Specifically, since over ninety percent of
pharmaceutical products sold in Argentina are off-patent, any price in-
creases resulting from enhanced protection would only apply to a small
fraction of the products on the market.
The present law provides for patent protection for up to fifteen years
(no extension) while design patents are good for five years with the possi-
bility of two to five year extensions. The new law is proposing an increase
to twenty years from the date of filing.
Another aspect of the Argentine law that has been criticized90 was
the provision (article 47) whereby a patent lapses if not worked within
two years from the date of issuance, or if there is more than a two year
interruption in working the patent. This was not in conformity with Arti-
cle 5A(3) and (4) of the Paris Convention, and as a result of the proposed
new law (Article 46) provides for compulsory licenses only after three
years following patent issuance or four years after filing where the inven-
tion has not been exploited (barring force majeure) and no serious effort
has been made to exploit it. Nevertheless, the proposed law goes on to
suggest that compulsory licenses will be granted when there is an abuse of
market position or price discrimination that could itself lead to abuse. It
is also unclear as to whether parallel imports would be permitted, a par-
ticular concern in the light of developments concerning Mercosur. On a
positive note, the proposed law contains "pipeline" protection (Article
101) for patent applications that are covered under the proposed law but
not under the existing law provided they are submitted within a year of
the effectiveness of the proposed law and that exploitation of the inven-
tion or importation on a commercial scale has not begun.
A further area of criticism of the present law has been in the area of
remedies and their enforcement. Specifically, the present law does not al-
low for preliminary injunctions in infringement cases, the burden of proof
lies with the infringed party and remedies include only a maximum crimi-
nal sentence of one to six months, and a fine of 500 pesos (US$500).
While the contours of the proposed new law still must await its passage
and the promulgation of the companion regulations, the proposed law
88. Process pharmaceutical patents are already available but this provides very little
protection since pharmaceutical products can be manufactured in many different ways that
such protection can be circumvented.
89. FIEL, PROTECCION EN LOS DOS DERECHOS DE PROPRIEDAD INTELLECTUAL - EL CASO DE
LA INDUSTRIA FARMACEUTICA EN LA ARGENTINA, (1990).
90. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 126-7.
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does include (Article 76) a modest increase in penalty from six months to
three years incarceration in addition to an unspecified level of fine.91
Finally, although Argentina is a signatory to the Patent Cooperative
Treaty (PCT), the treaty has not been ratified and thus has no effect in
Argentina.
It is worth noting that neither the existing or proposed law provides
any protection for trade secrets, nor for mask works. However, trade
secrets and know-how are recognized as property rights under article 2312
of the Civil Code and are in theory protected under article 156 of the
Penal Code.
Argentina registers both trademarks and service marks, and trade-
mark registration is valid for ten years and renewable for additional ten
year periods, though violations are subject to imprisonment of one month
to one year and a fine also of 500 pesos.
B. Copyright
The protection of copyrights in Argentina is based on Law 11,723
enacted on September 23, 1933 and since amended, supplemented by spe-
cial laws, and clarified in case law, remains in effect.92 Argentina acceded
to the Buenos Aires Convention in 1950, the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion in 1958, the Berne Convention in 1967 (the 1948 Brussels text but
not the 1971 Berne text), the Geneva Phonograms Convention in 1973,
and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations in 1992.11
Article 1 of the Copyright Act covers writings of any nature or length;
dramatic works, cinematographic, choreographic and pantomime works;
drawings, paintings and works of sculpture; works of architecture and of
art or sciences applied to commerce or industry; printed matter, plan and
maps; plastic works, photographs, engravings and phonograms; and all
scientific, literary, artistic or educational productions regardless of me-
dium.9' To be copyrightable, the work must contain a minimum amount
of originality and novelty, and be expressed in a material form which can
be perceived by others.95 Excluded from coverage are computer programs,
though the National Registry of Copyright has accepted applications to
register computer programs, as well as compilations and databases which
tend to be granted protection under case law though two bills are now
pending in Congress which would include protection for computer
91. In addition, the administrative machinery that is responsible for the examination
and granting of patent applications needs to be substantially improved.
92. MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE §1, at 8 (1992).
93. For a detailed evaluation of the Argentine Copyright Law, see IIPA, supra note 80,
at 21-30.
94. NIMMER, supra note 92, §2(2) at 20.
95. Id. § 2(2) at 10-11.
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programs."
Foreign works are eligible for protection in Argentina as long as the
author belongs to a country which recognizes copyright and the author
of the foreign work meets any formalities of the country of origin.
Such unilateral protection provides full protection to works published
in the United States after 1933 as long as those U.S. works comply
with U.S. formalities.9
Article 2 of the Copyright Act provides for the exclusive rights of
publication, public performance, translation, adaptation and reproduc-
tion. But the definition of public performance refers only to the radio
telephonic transmission, cinematographic exhibitions, television transmis-
sions, or any other method of mechanical reproduction of any literary or
outside work but does not include any express provision for communica-
tion to the public by wire.
With respect to duration, the Copyright Act provides for protection
for the life of the author plus his heirs for fifty years (Article 2), a "nor-
mal" period by comparative standards, but photographic works receive
only twenty years while cinematographic works only thirty years (Article
34).
Article 57 requires publishers of works to register and deposit copies
of their works at the Argentine National Copyright Registry within three
months of the date of publication, or face a fine and suspension of the
author's economic rights (Article 63).
With respect to enforcement, the Copyright Act (Articles 72, 73 and
75) provides for preliminary injunctions and confiscation of infringing
works as well as criminal sanctions involving imprisonment from between
one month to one year, and a fine of 1,000 pesos. Estimates of U.S. trade
losses due to piracy of motion pictures, sound recordings and musical
compositions in Argentina are estimated at US$43.6 million9" involving
primarily computer software, video, cable and audio-cassette piracy.
Thus, while Argentina has a long record of IP protection in the copy-
right area, its legislation should be brought more up to date (in line with
the 1971 text of the Berne Convention) to include provision for the cover-
age of computer programs, compilations and databases, right of public
performance to include retransmission by wire, protection against the
parallel importation of works, and enactment of stiffer fines.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Any cost benefit analysis of the merits of strengthening IP protection
must necessarily be country specific though a broad range of factors on
both sides of the argument can be identified. On the cost side, developing
96. Id. § 2(3)(b) at 22.
97. IIPA, supra note 80, at 24.
98. Id. at 22.
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countries might anticipate increased outflows of royalty payments on pat-
ent licenses for the patents on products which have not yet expired and
formerly pirated copyright works, some displacement of local "pirates",
and the somewhat remote risk of abuse of market power by virtue of
granting of foreign "monopolies". These monopolies, in the absence of
compulsory licensing following the expiration of "grace" periods, might
lead to higher domestic prices to segments of the local population. The
importance of these factors would vary from country to country, but
should be the subject of further empirical research.
On the benefit side, evidence suggests that there is a causal connec-
tion between levels of investment including licensing of technology, par-
ticularly for industries with high R&D costs such as pharmaceuticals, and
adequate IP protection. Furthermore, this should lead, in the case of pat-
ents, trademarks and trade secrets, to greater confidence by domestic pro-
ducers that their own R&D efforts would not be lost through infringe-
ment. Indeed, in the course of the Uruguay Round talks over the past six
years, many developing countries have come to recognize the benefits of
increased IP protection for their own economic self-interest. The case of
copyright laws is less clear, though by and large, the three countries ex-
amined have been more forthcoming in copyright protection given their
long established literary traditions. Nevertheless, in the newer areas such
as protection for computer programs, external pressure has been required
to achieve improved results.
Applying this broad framework to Mexico, Chile and Argentina, all of
which are highly indebted but have either completed (Mexico, Chile) or
are in the process of completing (Argentina) major economic adjustment
efforts that, amongst other things, involve a liberalization of the trade
and investment regime, can help explain the recent IP initiative. Thus, in
the final analysis, it is probably the "marriage of convenience" between
trade and investment reform on the one hand and IP protection on the
other, that has had the greatest impact on the IP reform in the three
countries.
Specifically, Mexico's desire to enter into a NAFTA agreement with
the U.S. and Canada, with the obvious benefit that would entail, was a
contributing factor in encouraging adoption of the very "modern" IP law
in Mexico in 1991. Chile, and to a lesser extent Argentina, have similar
long-term objectives (though for Argentina this may be done in the con-
text of the Mercosur). Moreover, all three countries have been responding
to bilateral pressure from the U.S. as part of its "Special 301" initiative.
In the short run, the direct impact of such new legislation (depend-
ing, of course, on the extent to which it is enforced) may entail some
increased outflows of payments for IP benefits perhaps partially compen-
sated by increased investment flows. However, the recent inclusion of
pharmaceutical protection in the laws of Chile, unlike Mexico and Argen-
tina (proposed), would probably not have significant implications for do-
mestic prices particularly in the short run since patents will be enforced
only for products not currently manufactured (no "pipeline" protection)
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and prices of imitation products produced by local companies in develop-
ing countries are sometimes higher than the price of the original product
produced by foreign companies. Finally, benefits should also accrue to
consumers in the form of higher quality products based on tightened cer-
tification requirements.
Nevertheless, in the medium-term, multilateral solutions under a
TRIPs agreement as part of the Uruguay Round appear to show the
greatest prospect for sustainability in that they provide a forum for devel-
oping countries to offer concessions in some areas that have significant
financial and balance of payments implications (such as enhanced IP pro-
tection) though accompanied by benefits domestically as well, in ex-
change for concessions by developed countries such as in agriculture, tex-
tiles etc. which would provide compensatory export revenue potential for
developing countries. Though bilateral pressure, particularly from the
U.S., has clearly accelerated the process of IP reform in these countries, a
multilateral framework is far more likely to yield long-term benefits to all
parties.
In any event, the optimal policy package may be for developing coun-
tries to strengthen IP protection while simultaneously reducing other bar-
riers to competition that relate to the non-technical aspects of competi-
tive advantage which would include further liberalization of trade regimes
and focussing on antitrust implications of licensing technology. Finally,
for such new laws to achieve the results that were originally intended,
they will have to be vigorously enforced with appropriate penalties which
in turn would require judicial reform in many developing countries in-
cluding better court administration, reform of procedural and civil codes,
and more relevant training for lawyers and judges.
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COMMENT
Concealing Justices or Concealing
Injustice?: Colombia's Secret Courts
MICHAEL R. PAHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent escape of Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin drug car-
tel, from his luxury "maximum security" jail represents another sad chap-
ter in the long history of a criminal justice system in crisis. For decades,
judges have been threatened or bribed into compliance with the demands
of criminals from both left and right. Further, Columbia's antiquated
criminal justice system, with little emphasis placed on criminal investiga-
tion, has produced one of the highest impunity rates in the world.'
Colombia desperately needs to reform its criminal justice system.
The existing judicial crisis is an abdication of the state's fundamental and
primordial function-to protect its citizens from a Hobbesian state of
war.' Without an adequate criminal justice system, Colombia will remain
one of the world's most violent democracies, unable to achieve what
Alexis de Toqueville called in Democracy in America the "great aim of
justice . . . to substitute laws for the idea of violence."
Fortunately, Colombia is a country ripe for reform. In 1991, Colom-
bia ratified a new constitution, affecting numerous areas of Colombian
political life. The rights of indigenous peoples have been recognized, and
important human rights reforms have been adopted.' Equally important,
the new constitution promotes pluralistic participation in political life by
eliminating the power-sharing agreement between the two main political
parties. This agreement was adopted in the mid-1950s in order to end the
decade-long civil war known as "la violencia" in which an estimated
* B.A., Creighton University, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1992.
1. See Gabriel Gutierrez Tovar, Reflexiones sobre la Impunidad, in JUSTICIA, DERECHOS
HUMANOS E IMPUNIDAD 225 (Hector Pefia Diaz, ed.,1991).
2. See Armando Borrero, Constitucion y Orden Publico, 13 REViSTA FoRo 34 (1990).
3. See generally CONST. COLOM. arts. 11-94.
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200,000 Colombians were killed.4 As a result, former leftist guerrillas and
other traditionally marginalized and powerless groups'-workers, peas-
ants, and indigenous peoples-have played an active role in the new gov-
ernment. The 1991 Constitution is thus seen by many as a political and
social revolution, a commendable exercise in the re-creation of constitu-
tional democracy in a country long bled and drained by civil strife.'
In 1991, Colombia enacted important changes in its criminal justice
system. One of the most interesting changes was the creation of a secret
court system for drug and terrorism cases. The hope is that judges who
are granted anonymity by having their identities concealed will be pro-
tected from threats or assassination, enabling the judges to bring
criminals to justice. The crucial question, however, is whether these secret
courts can achieve the twin goals of protecting the judiciary and increas-
ing the conviction rate, without sacrificing the rights of criminal defend-
ants which are guaranteed in the new constitution.
The short answer is that these rights are sacrificed. Although the se-
cret court system has increased the conviction rate and provided some
protection to the judiciary, it has done so at the cost of basic rights of the
criminal defendant. Moreover, the secret court system has been used for
political ends, punishing legitimate political protesters as "terrorists." As
such, the secret court system should be abandoned, as the pursuit of jus-
tice is too precious a jewel to be bought with authoritarian coin.
II. BLOOD ON THE ROBE: COLOMBIA's EMBATTLED JUDICIARY
Violence against the Colombian judiciary has been pervasive, persis-
tent, and deadly. According to a recent study' by the Andean Commission
of Jurists, a human rights group in Bogota, an average of twenty-five
judges and lawyers have been assassinated or have been attacked each
year since 1979. In all, 515 cases of violence against judges and lawyers
have been reported between 1979 and 1991, 329 of which have been
murders or attempts to murder.' And, of the approximately 4,500 Colom-
4. In Colombia, Killings Just Go On and On, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1987, at 10.
5. See HERNANDO VALENCIA VILLA, THE GRAMMAR OF WAR 1-2 (1986).
6. For a less sanguine view, see William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colom-
bian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. OF MIAMI INTER-AM L.
REV. 39, 85-86 (Fall 1991) ("It is unclear whether the invocation of popular sovereignty to
legitimate the reform process in BogotA reflects a genuine public demand for a new set of
societal rules and institutions. Instead, it could simply be another episode of constitutional
reform serving as a shield to protect the less populist and shorter term political goals of
those in power. Legally, it makes no difference. The Colombian electorate indicated by pleb-
iscite that they wanted a chance to vote for a constitutional assembly, and did just that by
conferring their primary sovereignty upon a popularly elected body").
7. For a thorough description and in-depth analysis of the violence facing Colombia's
judiciary, see Guido Bonilla & Alejandro Valencia Villa, Justice for Justice: Violence
Against Judges and Lawyers in Colombia: 1979-1991 (1992) (on file at the Andean Commis-
sion of Jurists: Colombian Section, BogotA, Colombia).
8. COLOMBIAN SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, JUSTICIA PARA LA JUSTICIA: VI-
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bian judges, roughly 1,600 have received threats to themselves or their
families. 9
Although Colombia is popularly perceived as a country besieged by
drug-related violence (narcoterrorism), it is important to note that judi-
cial intimidation has been neither exclusively nor primarily linked to
drugtrafflcking.10 According to the Andean Commission study, of the 240
cases of violence against the judiciary with a known author or cause,
eighty have been linked to paramilitary groups, fifty-eight to drugtraffick-
ers, forty-eight to state agents (including the military and the police),
thirty-two to guerrillas, and twenty-two to other factors.11 Corruption and
violence, like blood, runs thick in Colombia, and few have kept their
hands clean.
Violence to the judiciary is as widespread as it is deadly. No sector of
the judicial hierarchy has been untouched. While criminal trial court
judges are the most effected, Justice Ministers and Supreme Court jus-
tices have been threatened or killed as well. Perhaps the most graphic
and poignant illustration of Colombia's embattled judiciary occurred in
November of 1985, when M-19, a leftist group, stormed the Palace of Jus-
tice, taking twenty-four Supreme Court justices hostage. The government
refused to negotiate, choosing a military option instead. In the ensuing
raid, involving over twenty-eight hours of intense fighting and the bomb-
ing of the Palace of Justice by the government, thirty-five members of M-
19, several dozen hostages, a dozen soldiers, and eleven Supreme Court
justices were killed."
What has happened to those who kill members of the judiciary? Vir-
tually nothing. According to the Andean Commission study, in over
eighty percent of the cases reported, there is no evidence of criminal ac-
tion being carried out.'3 As a result, criminal sentences have been im-
posed in only 2.1 percent of cases." The inability of the justice system to
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed against it reflects the dire
situation of Colombia's judiciary: how can the judiciary protect others if
it cannot protect itself?
III. JUECES SIN ROSTRO: FACELESS JUDGES
In response to this drastic situation, Colombia has created a special
jurisdiction of secret courts with jueces sin rostro, or faceless judges, to
protect the judiciary. These courts are known as Courts of Public Order,
dealing with crimes disproportionately affecting the public order, such as
OLENCIA CONTRA JUECES Y ABOGADOS EN COLOMBIA: 1979-1991, 1992 [hereinafter JUSTICIA].
9. Colombia Struggles to Seal Its Judges' Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at 10.
10. ,JUSTICIA, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COLOMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY
298 (Dennis M. Hanratty & Sandra W. Meditz eds., 1990).
13. JUSTICIA, supra note 8.
14. Id.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
drug trafficking, terrorism, kidnapping, and the illegal transportation of
arms.
These special courts were established in 1984 for drug cases and were
expanded in 1987 to include "political crimes" - rebellion, sedition, and
other acts of violence committed with criminal intent.15 In November of
1991, the current President Cesar Gaviria unified both systems under the
Statute for the Defense of Justice. These courts were originally imple-
mented under state of siege legislation and considered "exceptional", as a
scaffolding to be used only until a solid structure of criminal justice could
be constructed. However, with the passage of the New Code of Criminal
Procedure on November 30, 1991, they became a permanent fixture in
Columbia's criminal justice infrastructure16
Eighty-two judges (of which forty-nine are trial judges and thirty-
three are investigative judges) currently sit in these secret courts. All
communication is done either through two-way mirrors using Darth
Vadaresque voice distorters, or in writing. Witness statements are au-
thenticated by a complex system of fingerprints in lieu of signatures.
Opinions are unsigned, with only a judicial number affixed to the deci-
sion. The identity of police agents and informants may be kept secret as
well.' 7 As a final protection, a chief of security is assigned to each court to
coordinate threat assessments, and the judges are provided with armed
escorts to and from work.
The Colombian secret court system, with no known analogue in the
world, has received accolades from the international law enforcement
community, who finally see Colombia cracking down on drugs. 8 Indeed,
in terms of effective law enforcement, the secret court system is to be
commended. After all, the conviction rate is estimated to have jumped
from approximately 10% in ordinary courts to 70% in the secret courts.1 9
And, according to the Andean Commission study, threats against judges
have dropped dramatically, by eighty percent. But at what cost?
IV. PROCEDURAL NIGHTMARES IN COLOMBIA'S SECRET COURTS
The high conviction rate in these special courts should come as no
surprise, given the absence of basic constitutionally-protected procedural
rights that criminal defendants in the United States take for granted. If
one were to red-line the U.S. Bill of Rights and drastically reduce or elim-
inate many protections for criminal defendants, the result would be simi-
lar to the situation facing the accused in Colombia's secret courts.
15. AMERICAS WATCH, POLITICAL MURDER & REFORM IN COLOMBIA: THE VIOLENCE CON-
TINUES 98 (1992).
16. Id.
17. COLOMBIAN SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, UNA JUSTICIA AMENZADA:
COMMENTARIOS AL ESTATUTO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA JUSTICIA 2 (1991).
18. See Steven Flanders & Ana Maria Salazar, Colombia's Purgatory, N.Y.L.J. 2 (Jan.
21, 1992).
19. Colombia Struggles to Seal Its Judges' Armor, supra note 9.
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For example, the criminal defendant in the Colombian secret court
system has no 8th Amendment right to a bail hearing. 20 Under U.S. law,
by contrast, pre-trial detention through the denial of bail is considered
the exception rather than the rule. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
prohibited the imposition of excessive bail in the Bill of Rights to prevent
the recurrence of the harsh treatment suffered by colonists in British jails
during the Colonial Period.2 ' From this constitutional basis, U.S. law has
developed to the point that in the federal system, pre-trial detention is
only available if the government can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction, or that no
release conditions "will reasonably assure. . .the safety of any other per-
son and the community.'
2
In Colombia's secret courts, by contrast, the accused must suffer the
indignity of incarceration, separated from family and friends, with abso-
lutely no burden on the government to justify this deprivation of liberty.
More importantly, the absence of 8th Amendment protection may seri-
ously prejudice the criminal defendant in the preparation of his defense.
Stuck in jail with no hope of release, the criminal defendant may find it
difficult to contact and prepare witnesses for his defense, or confer with
his lawyer at his leisure.
At the trial stage the treatment of the accused turns from bad to
worse. Secret proceedings eliminate the 6th Amendment right to a public
trial,"2 ensuring that violations of constitutional rights are concealed from
20. See COLUMBIA SECTION, ANDEAN COMMISSON OF JURISTS, SISTEMA JUDICIAL Y DEE-
ECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA 43 (1990).
21. Ironically, the "bail clause [adopted by the Framers] was lifted with slight changes
from the English Bill of Rights Act." See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952), reh.
den., 343 U.S. 988. The right to a bail hearing, however, has not been extended to state
prosecutions. See Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 59 L.Ed. 1071, 35 S.Ct. 649 (1915).
22. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987)
("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the care-
fully limited exception."). Expressed in a different vein, the Federal Bail Reform Act, codi-
fied in 18 U.S.C.S § 3142(f), requires that a judge inclined in the first instance towards the
release of an accused on his own recognizance or upon unsecured bond.
23. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial has been made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92
L.Ed. 682 (1948). Exceptions to a right to the public trial have been held permissible in
certain exceptional circumstances. As stated by the Supreme Court, "the party seeking to
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the
closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings ade-
quate to support the closure." Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31
(1984). As an illustration, see United States v. Hernadez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979) (ex-
clusion of spectators allowed when witness had been subjected to pretrial threats); United
States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (exclusion of spectators who
threatened witness at trial); United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 296, 46 L.Ed.2d 269 (exclusion of spectators dur-
ing the testimony of an undercover agent engaged in ongoing investigations proper); United
States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (exclusion of spectators permissi-
ble when necessary to preserve order in the courtroom).
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public scrutiny.2 4 On the political level, secret courts also militate against
the openness in government reflected in the new Columbian Constitution.
Through public trials, citizens may learn about the machinery of their
government, acquiring confidence that the judicial process is not being
used for abusive ends. 5 Further, as a practical matter, public trials make
the proceedings known to possible witnesses who otherwise might be un-
known to the parties.26
The system of secret witnesses, violates the 6th Amendment right to
confront witnesses, one of the most valuable defense tools. In these
courts, defense lawyers may neither question witnesses before trial nor
cross-examine them at trial. This prevents the defense from calling a wit-
ness' demeanor, credibility, or bias into question (although a conviction
cannot be based on a single secret testimony). As a result, a central prin-
ciple of the U.S. trial system-that truth is best revealed through an ad-
versarial process in which both parties present their case, with witnesses
subject to cross-examination and evidence subject to contradiction-is se-
verely curtailed.
Colombians may be familiar with the adversary system in action
through the popular television show "Las Leyes de Los Angeles," or
"L.A. Law." But the adversary system's utility extends far beyond mak-
ing exciting television episodes. Rather, on the philosophical level, the ad-
versary system attempts to check what Weber called the modern state's
monopoly on force 2 -its power to investigate, prosecute, and pun-
ish-through giving the defense the opportunity to put into question the
government's evidence and witnesses. Regrettably, in Colombia's secret
courts, there is little to control the Leviathan. The danger is that the
judge will consider only the evidence and uncontroverted testimony
proferred by the government; tipping the scales of justice in their favor.
The criminal defendant is further prejudiced by the massive system
of protection provided for government informants. The cornucopia of
benefits provided those who collaborate with the authorities by testifying
against the accused include pecuniary compensation, a new identity, exit
from the country, immediate conditional release, and exemption from
punishment.2" While the Federal Witness Protection Program" in the
24. See In re Oliver, supra note 23 ("The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret
trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inqui-
sition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French Monarcy's
abuse of the lettre de cachet. . .[Wlhatever other benefits the guarantee to the accused that
his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been
recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
persecution").
25. See Ravinsky v. McKaskle, 772 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1984).
26. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
27. For a discussion of the moral justification of the modern state's monopoly on force,
see ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 89-119 (1974).
28. Id.
29. The Federal Witness Protection Program, established by Congress in 1984, autho-
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U.S. provides similar benefits and protections, 0 there is a crucial
difference.
In the U.S. system, the witness must still be present at trial. This
subjects the witness to the moral constraint of lying in front of the ac-
cused, and, more importantly, to the cross-examination of an aggressive
defense attorney.3 ' Further, having the witness present at trial tends to
assure testimonial trustworthiness by inducing fear that any false testi-
mony will be detected. 2 The danger in Colombia is that the government,
in its zealous pursuit of convictions, may play the role of the serpent in
the Garden of Eden-tempting witnesses and informants to lie with the
fruit of governmental goodies-unchecked by the power of a probing and
thorough cross-examination.
In short, the Colombian secret court system amounts to a criminal
defendant's nightmare. Colombia has its Gabriel Garcia Marquez to de-
scribe the realismo fantastico of Colombian life; what it lacks is a Franz
Kafka to describe the judicial absurdity its many Joseph K's face in the
secret court system. Criminal defendants are being convicted by unknown
witnesses paid by the state, absent from the trial, and immune from
cross-examination. Further, if the judge decides the evidence must be
kept secret, the "judicial decision" may be a mere piece of paper, contain-
ing only the judge's number. The concept of feeling guilty without know-
ing why may make for interesting existential novels, but it has no place in
criminal law-especially when one is being punished for crimes that carry
penalties of up to thirty years in jail. A system that cripples a solid crimi-
nal defense, and leaves judicial decisions unexplained, reflects a process
of judgment more reminiscent of the Medieval Inquisition than of mod-
ern 'standards of criminal justice.3 3 The "miracle" of the Colombian secret
court system is not that seventy percent of those accused are convicted,
but that thirty percent go free.
rizes the Attorney General to take such action as he deems "necessary to protect the person
involved from bodily injury and otherwise to assure the health, safety, and welfare of that
person [or an immediate family member or close associate], including the psychological well-
being and social adjustment of that person, for as long as, in the judgment of the Attorney
General, the danger to that person exists." 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1).
30. Among these include new identification documents, housing, moving expenses, em-
ployment assistance, and "a payment to meet basic living expenses." 18 U.S.C. §
3521(b)(1)(A)-(H).
31. For a sample of an effective cross-examination, see Frank Rubino's cross-examina-
tion of Federal Witness Protection Program participant Danny Martinez in Dealing with
the Devil (and Lesser Imps), 20 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 464 (Sept. 30, 1992); see also
Expert can show how Sweet Cooperating Witness's Deal Is, 5 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 465
(Oct. 2, 1991).
32. See WIGMORE, supra note 26.
33. See Alejandro David Aponte, Como matar a la justicia en la tarea de defenderla:
"Estatuto para la defensa de la justicia," 11 ANALISIS POLITICO 77 (1990).
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V. CASTING THE CRIMINAL NET: POLITICAL ABUSE OF COLOMBIA'S SECRET
COURTS
The lack of procedural rights in the secret court system are problem-
atic; however, its potential for political abuse is even more concerning.
Latin America is notorious for its caudillos or dictators of both left and
right, from Castro to Pinochet, who have abused power to strengthen
their regimes while violating basic human rights. Accordingly, any in-
crease in the state's power, particularly the removal from the public eye
of the state's power to discipline and punish, must be subject to the
strictest scrutiny.
The Colombian government has claimed that the purpose of the se-
cret court system is two-fold and inter-related: to protect judges and to
combat terrorism. While fighting terrorism is a valid and essential goal, a
wide criminal net can be cast over that rubric. The danger is that the
Colombian government, seeking a surcease of the violence that has made
Colombia one of the world's most violent democracies, will use an over-
expansive definition of "terrorist" to mask prosecutions against political
dissidents or to cover daily arbitrary violations of human rights."'
The problem of interpretation is essentially one of language. As An-
glo-American legal theorists from H.L.A. Hart to Albert Saks have noted,
restricting legal terms to one fixed literal meaning is difficult, for words
are inherently ambiguous. Continental deconstructionists such as Michel
Foucault or Jacques Derrida would go even further, claiming that the
meaning of the written word eludes even the author herself, and must be
interpreted in a sociological and contextual framework.
While this presents problems for a judge seeking the "literal" mean-
ing of a statute, it can have grave consequences when applied to a slip-
pery term such as "terrorist" or as manipulable a phrase as "acts of rebel-
lion or sedition." For, as Montesquieu sagely noted, ". .. not defining
what is meant by treason is enough for the government to become
despotic."
Who has been caught in Colombia's terrorist net? Human rights ad-
vocates report that student protestors, peasants, and others critical of the
present regime have been convicted in these secret courts for legitimate
acts of social protest.35 Indeed, the irony is that a liberal interpretation of
the phrase "acts of rebellion or sedition" could be applied to the very
grass-roots student movement which led to the important constitutional
reforms of 1991. An over-broad net has been cast in the fight against
narcoterrorism as well, dragging in both major drugtraffickers such as
Pablo Escobar, with millions to spend in his defense, and mere consumers
34. See Fernando Velasquez V., EL ESTATUTO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA JUSTICIA: UN
RETORNO A LA INQUISITION!, 51 NuEvo FORO PENAL 4 (1991).
35. Interview with Alejandro David Aponte, Professor of Law, Universidad de Los An-
des, at the Andean Commission of Jurists, BogotA, Colombia, Aug. 18, 1992.
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too poor to afford their own lawyer."
By punishing acts of political protest, the Colombian government is
frustrating the purpose of the new constitution, which seeks dialogue for
the resolution of social conflict. Voices muted in the past by a de jure
power-sharing arrangement between the two main political parties and de
facto class stratification, will remain silent if the government continues to
abuse the secret courts for political ends. Further, expanding the criminal
net in this manner violates a time-honored and internationally-respected
principle of criminal law,. nulla poena sin lege ("no punishment without a
crime"). According to this doctrine, criminal statutes are to be narrowly
construed as a check on the government's power, to protect citizens from
arbitrary and unanticipated incarceration. No one should be judged and
punished without conforming to the preexisting law for which he is pun-
ished.3 7 Regrettably, such is the situation facing these erstwhile pplitical
protestors turned "terrorists" by the secret court system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Colombian secret court system has been a moderate success.
Supporters of the system point to the degree of security it provides to a
beleaguered judiciary, helping to remove the death sentence under which
many judicial officials worked in the past. They note as well that criminal
convictions have risen dramatically, helping to lower the high impunity
rate plaguing the country.
Supporters of the system fail to recognize two critical points, how-
ever. The first is the limited efficacy of the protection the system pro-
vides. The second is the tremendous cost to personal liberty and political
participation of the secret court system.
The argument that the secret court system provides greater protec-
tion for judges is specious in several aspects. First of all, security is lim-
ited to a minority of judges-jueces sin rostro and Supreme Court jus-
tices-while the great majority of judicial functionaries go unprotected.
Even the protected judicial elite is only safe from 9 to 5. Further, it ap-
pears that the efficacy of the secret court system will be of limited dura-
tion. As recently as September 19, 1992, a jueza sin rostro and her three
bodyguards were assassinated in front of her home by sicarios in Medel-
lin.ss As critics had predicted, the veil of secrecy has been irreparably
torn. Finally, the decrease in violence to the judiciary should not be too
quickly accredited to the secret court system. The ban on extradition of
Colombian nationals and the inclusion of leftist groups in the new consti-
36. Id.; see also Aponte, supra note 33, at 79.
37. In the United States, constitutional due process requires that the statute which
defines a substantive crime must "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162,
92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).
38. Asesinada una jueza sin rostro, EL TIEMPO, Sept. 19, 1992, at IA; see also Narcos
amenazan a jueces sin rostro, EL TEMPO, June 6, 1992, at 1A.
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tution have played an equally important role in the recent cessation of
attacks on the judiciary.
The second argument in favor of the secret court system, that it has
increased the conviction rate, is equally troubling. High conviction rates
can always be achieved by clipping the rights of criminal defendants. Fur-
thermore, troublesome political "enemies" can always be more easily
dealt with through the long arm of the law rather than through thie long
and arduous process of negotiation and dialogue which, democracy de-
mands. Colombia is a country seeking to create itself anew, to secure a
respite from the violence which has plagued the country for years on end.
The 1991 Constitution, promoting pluralistic participation in political life
and the laying down of arms, is a step in the right direction. The secret
court system, with its clipping of procedural rights and criminalization of
dissent-is not. Justice, like the beautiful emeralds for which Colombia is
renowned, is too precious a jewel to be bought with authoritarian coin.
STUDENT COMMENTS
The Denationalization of Kazakhstan
I. EMERGENCE OF A MARKET ECONOMY
Privatizing state property represents a critical yet unfinished step in
building prosperous market economies throughout the former Soviet
Union. As one Russian scholar noted, with the collapse of the former So-
viet economy the most effective tool to combat economic decline is to
privatize inefficient, state-dominated enterprises which will in turn nur-
ture a growing private sector.' Kazakhstan, the second largest of the for-
mer Soviet Republics, was the first to legislate privatization laws and es-
tablish a State committee to oversee the privatization program.' Last
May, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev released his "Strat-
egy for Kazakhstan's Emergence and Deyelopment as a Sovereign State"
setting forth his plan for moving Kazakhstan toward a market economy.
In the strategy, Nazarbayev identified as the Republic's primary task re-
moval of property from State control through privatization. The strategy
established a three-stage economic plan with its main objectives to: 1)
build a socially-oriented market economy; 2) saturate the domestic con-
sumer market; 3) introduce a national currency; 4) attract and efficiently
utilize foreign investment; and 5) enter the world market independently.3
The first stage called for normalization of the consumer market and
overall economic stabilization over a three year period by denationalizing
and privatizing, as well as developing, a sufficient supply of consumer
goods.4 The second stage involved the development of the necessary in-
frastructure by modernizing transportation and telecommunication net-
works, and forming adequate commodity, currency, capital, labor, stock
and intellectual property markets." At the third stage, Kazakhstan would
1. See Leonid Grigoriev, The Former Soviet Republics Confront Privatization: A Rus-
sian Analysis, Heritage Found. Rep., No. 859, Oct. 11, 1991.
2. Kazakhstan: Economic and Demographic Structure, Euromoney Supplement, Feb.
15, 1992, available in Reuter Textline, at 26, Feb. 15, 1992.
3. See B. Kizmenko, Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Outlines Economic Targets, EKONOMIKA
I ZHIZN, June 7, 1992, available in Novecon-Reuter Textline, at 5, June 11, 1992.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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move towards an open economy to gain a firm position in international
trade and join the industrially developed countries of the world.
The Kazakh privatization laws, as reflected by the above strategy,
incorporate a strong State role providing for a more managed transition
to a market economy. In all, Kazakh privatization efforts offer an inter-
esting alternative to the widely publicized privatization legislation of Rus-
sia. This paper introduces the denationalization and privatization laws
and policies, and analyzes the impact they will have on establishing the
basis for a market economy and attracting foreign investment.
II. DENATIONALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION
In June of 1991, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on
Denationalization and Privatization (Denationalization Law). 7 The law
set forth the legal basis, rules and procedures for the transformation of
state-owned property to private property and the creation of conditions
favorable to the emergence of a socially oriented market economy. The
same month, President Nursultan Nazarbayev approved the first Priva-
tization Program that established the details for implementing the dena-
tionalization efforts." President Nazarbayev subsequently amended the
Denationalization Law by issuing a decree aimed at speeding up the con-
version of Kazakhstan to a market economy.9 This decree, entitled "On
Measures to Enhance the Activity Towards Denationalization and Priva-
tization of Property in Material Production Industries" (Privatization
Decree),1" was passed April 29, 1992. An additional decree, entitled "On
Urgent Measures for the Privatization of Procurement, Processing and
Servicing Enterprises of the Agroindustrial Complex" (Agro Measures)
was recently adopted to similarly provide for the rapid privatization of
agricultural enterprises. 1
These legislative acts set forth the basic laws governing the denation-
alization and privatization of Kazakh state property. The Denationaliza-
tion Law establishes the critical basis for Republic jurisdiction to govern
those lands, enterprises, and objects on its territory.'2 This law as
6. Id.
7. Kazakh Parliament Approves Privatization Law (Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Net-
work, June 24, 1991) (transcript in FBIS-SOV-91-124, June 27, 1991, at 74).
8. See V. Ardayev, Privatization Program Approved, IZVESTIA, Sept. 19, 1991, at 2,
available in SovData DiaLine-BizEkon News, Sept. 19, 1991.
9. Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Issues Privatization Decree, IZVESTIA, May 5, 1992, at 1,
available in Reuter Textline, May 5, 1992.
10. Kazakhstan Begins Privatization (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast) (tran-
script in Federal News Service, May 5, 1992).
11. Kazakhstan: Privatization Begins in Agroindustrial Complex, EcoTAss, Apr. 13,
1992, available in Reuter Textline, Apr. 13, 1992.
12. Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 'On Denationalization and Privatiza-
tion,' KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Aug. 1, 1992, at 2, translated in NAT'L TECHNICAL INFO.
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amended establishes a unified system of managing public property with a
centralized State commission to oversee privatization transactions. 13 The
Privatization Decree calls for the implementation of large-scale, regulated
'destatization and privatization' programs of enterprises and outlines the
procedure for doing so. The Privatization Decree gives the government
majority control over all enterprises and limits foreign investment. The
Agro Measures emphasize privatizing agricultural industries under collec-
tive management.
In addition to these broad measures, the Privatization Program
adopted annually by the Kazakh Cabinet of Ministers, and approved by
the Kazakh Supreme Soviet and President, sets forth the details and the
areas of emphasis for the denationalization and privatization of Kazakh
property."
III. GOVERNING BODIES
Three state and quasi-state administrative bodies directly govern
privatization efforts: the Kazakh State Committee for State Property,
commissions for privatization, and privatization bureaus. The Denational-
ization Law establishes the Kazakh State Committee for State Property
(Committee) as the main regulating body that represents the interests of
the State in relations involving Kazakh property." The Committee has
the authority to convey the rights of possession, use and management of
Kazakh property to other state organs and economic interests within and
outside the territory of the Republic.16 Committee decisions bind on all
levels of state administration.1 7
Commissions for privatization empowered by the Denationalization
Law, govern enterprise and property privatization. These commissions
are organized by the seller of a state-owned object once the decision is
made to denationalize and privatize1 8 The commission, made up of prop-
erty owner representatives, the Local Soviet of People's Deputies, enter-
prise administrations, organs for state statistics, trade union organiza-
tions and other specialists, is the organizing body that develops and
submits to the seller a plan for privatization."
SERVICE, U.S. DEPT OF COMM., KAZAKH LAW ON DENATIONALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF 4/
91, PB92-966801, [hereinafter Denationalization Law].
13. Passions Over Property Will be Restrained, EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN, No. 28, at 2, avail-
able in SovData DiaLine-BizEkon News, July 11, 1992. The Denationalization Law origi-
nally divided Republic and Communal property. Subsequent legislation abolished this divi-
sion to eliminate the conflict between republic and municipal government bodies over
privatized industries. Id.
14. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 11.
15. Id. art. 8.1.
16. Id. art. 8.2.
17. Id. art. 8.3.
18. Id. art. 13.1.
19. Id.
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However, specifically regarding industrial enterprises, the Privatiza-
tion Decree amends this process bypassing all-together the commissions
for privatization. Privatization bureaus now organize the task of dena-
tionalizing industrial enterprises.2 0 The privatization bureaus, established
across the Republic, act as mediators between State property owners and
potential buyers.2 These self-financed bureaus examine the privatization
project and recommend a particular legal structure to the enterprise. The
Privatization Decree legislates that the bureaus shall emphasize and rec-
ommend the creation of open joint-stock companies.
IV. OBJECTS OF DENATIONALIZATION
The Denationalization Law describes entities and properties of the
State as state-owned objects. As specifically provided in the Law, state-
owned objects subject to privatization include: all branches of the produc-
tion and nonproduction spheres, enterprises, associations, organizations,
and their structural units and subdivisions, objects of cultural and domes-
tic significance, the social sphere, state housing fund, and other valuable
objects.2 2 Pursuant to the Denationalization Law, the Committee, in con-
junction with the Local Soviets of People's Deputies, designate those en-
terprises not subject to privatization for reasons of defense, security, so-
cial development, environmental protection, popular health, cultural
interests or the necessary state monopolization of certain activities.22 The
Denationalization Law further prohibits the privatization of objects that
are the exclusive property of the Kazakh SSR, a categorization primarily
applicable to land.24 Although the Denationalization Law establishes the
right to acquire land for life for agricultural and housing purposes, the
Privatization Program specifically limits agricultural enterprises and
farms to obtaining land by perpetual tenure or lease.2 5
Pursuant to the Privatization Decree, the privatization process envis-
ages a first phase of privatizing shops and other trade organizations, ca-
tering centers, services, municipal facilities, small factories, small building
organizations, public transportation system, farms and housing run by the
State.26 Large and medium state industries will be converted to joint
stock companies or business partnerships. Those objects not subject to
denationalization and privatization during the first phase include major
medical and educational institutions, communication facilities, power
plants, telecommunications and radio stations, railways and civil aviation.
20. See Decree Outlines Procedures in Kazakhstan, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, June 1992.
21. See Tatyana Jurbenko, Kazakhstan Boosts Privatization of State Property, THE
TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF THE SOVIET UNION (TASS), Apr. 29, 1992.
22. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 9.
23. Id. art. 9.3.
24. Olga Babiy, Privatization Programme Published in Kazakhstan, THE TELEGRAPH
AGENCY OF THE SovIEr UNION (TASS) Sept. 17, 1991.
25. Id.
26. Decree Outlines Procedures in Kazakhstan, supra note 20.
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V. PARTIES TO THE PRIVATIZATION TRANSACTION
Of specific importance to the development of a market economy is
the recognition of individual citizens and legal entities as lawful parties in
the privatization process. The Denationalization Law identifies Kazakh
citizens, citizens of other republics, citizens of foreign states, and individ-
uals without citizenship as well as Kazakh legal entities as parties eligible
to participate in the denationalization and privatization of Kazakh state
property.27 However, the Privatization Decree, recently limited the role of
foreign buyers. The Decree specifically states that during "the transi-
tional period of the formation of a market economy, the taking of state
enterprises and organizations into private ownership by persons who are
not citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan is not permitted." 8 Thus, for-
eign investors may participate in privatized property, but only on a minor
level during the transitional periods.
The Privatization Program recognizes residents of Kazakhstan as its
citizens except for chronic alcoholics, drug users and people repeatedly
charged with serious crimes.29 The Denationalization Law specifically rec-
ognizes that labor collectives or a group of workers of a state enterprise,
may be a collective buyer in purchasing state enterprises.2 0 Finally, the
seller is the State in all cases, with the Committee representing State
property and Local Soviets of People's Deputies representing communal
property.3' It is unsure what role a new centralized State commission will
play in eliminating the division of State property. With regard to
purchase transactions, either party may utilize and enter agreements with
intermediaries operating as brokers for the purchase or sale of State
property.2
Kazakh law loosely governs the relationships between buyer and
seller and among collective purchasers. The terms and relations negoti-
ated between parties, are recognized as legally binding. For example, a
labor collective, including the rights and liabilities of its individuals, is
governed by regulations adopted at its general meeting. These regula-
tions, as negotiated between the members of the collective, are recognized
as binding on the members' business relations.
However, the Denationalization Law allocates liability between buy-
ers and sellers. The seller bears the burden of liability for property condi-
tions and warranties made by the seller until the, time the buyer assumes
the right of possession, use, or control or the right of ownership in the
privatized property. The liability then shifts to the buyer, although prop-
27. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 10.1.
28. Privatization Decree in Kazakhstan Sharply Limits Role of Foreigners Acquiring
Enterprises, 3 RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., No. 4, June 12, 1992.
29. Babiy, supra note 24.
30. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 10.2.
31. Id. art. 10.3.
32.Id. art. 10.4.
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erty damage may occur prior to making the final payment pursuant under
an installment plan. 3 The buyer is liable for damages to the seller if the
buyer fails to pay for the acquired object.
VI. PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Pursuant to the Denationalization Law, the privatization process
commences with the filing of an application for privatization with the
Committee. " Privatization may take the form of: leases, concessions, auc-
tions, tenders, competitive bids, joint stock companies, and a privatiza-
tion voucher system. Any labor collective or group of workers, citizens,
legal entities, seller or organ of state government may initiate the dena-
tionalization process by filing the application. Upon filing, a seller then
has thirty days to decide and inform the buyer of whether the enterprise
will denationalize."5 The decision must be based on standards established
by legislation. Those State-owned objects selected for denationalization
and privatization, however, shall start privatization efforts irrespective of
applications filed by prospective purchasers. 6 Pursuant to the Privatiza-
tion Decree, industrial enterprises shall mainly take the form of open
joint-stock companies. The Decree, in efforts to streamline and speed up
privatization of industries, implements a three-step process to transform
state enterprises into other ownership formats. First, the enterprise files
an application and has it registered. This allows superior state bodies of
management to immediately release control of the enterprise.37 Second, a
privatization bureau examines the project in terms of its financial and
economic activity, values its assets and drafts the required papers. The
bureau then recommends a specific ownership arrangement for the enter-
prise. Third, the enterprise employees have one week to discuss the pro-
posal, develop and adopt the charter and other foundation documents.
A. Coupons
In order to create equal economic conditions among the Kazakh citi-
zens, the Denationalization Law originally called for the use of privatiza-
tion coupons as a means of payment for acquiring State property.38 Citi-
zens would receive coupons based on work tenure and the number of
minor children. The coupon system was originally conceived as the best
method for the Republic since it would allow all adult citizens to partici-
pate in privatization. The first Privatization Program based its privatiza-
tion process on a coupon system. However, just last October, the Kazakh
government announced that it will not introduce privatization vouchers
in the Republic. The Government explained that giving a voucher to
33. Id. art. 28.2.
34. Id. art. 12.
35. Id. art. 12.3.
36. Id. art. 12.2.
37. See Jurbenko, supra note 21.
38. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 16.
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every citizen of Kazakhstan is not "expedient." 9 The government fur-
ther clarified that it will continue to privatize its own way by starting
with small businesses and finishing with selling shares of medium-size
-and large business."'
B. Payment Restrictions
The Denationalization Law recognizes lawful payment for purchases
of State-owned property if made with legal tender of the former Soviet
Union, with privatization coupons, or with any funds not the property of
the State. There are no restrictions on making payment with borrowed
funds or on an installment plan. With regards to installment payments,
the State as the seller shall establish the amount of the down payment,
the length of the payment period, the conditions and procedure for mak-
ing the payments, and the liability for the satisfaction and timeliness of
the payments.4" Finally, the Denationalization Law mandates that install-
ment payments may not extend beyond ten years and that a minimum
down payment must equal at least twenty percent of the purchase price.
C. Valuation of Properties
Under the Denationalization Law, the privatization commission set
up by the seller recommends an appropriate -value and selling price for
the privatized object. The commission evaluates the privatized enter-
prises by considering several factors including, but not limited to: 1) the
basis of the residual value; 2) actual prices; 3) demand for the product or
serves; 4) competitiveness; 5) profitability; 6) development prospects for
the enterprise; and 7) global market prices.42 However, pursuant to the
Privatization Decree specifically relating to industrial enterprises, the in-
dependent privatization bureaus conduct economic and financial analyses,
value the enterprise's assets and prepare the required documents for
privatized industrial enterprises. It is assumed that the state enterprises
will be evaluated based on the same criteria and factors as set out in the
Denationalization Law.
D. Registration and Transformation Documents
The Denationalization Law requires the buyer and seller to enter a
contract addressing specific provisions before making final payment to ac-
quire the property. The required provisions include clauses generally re-
quired to find a valid transfer of property under common law. The con-
tract must stipulate: 1) the transfer of rights of ownership, use, and
39. Kazakhstan: Government Decides Against Issuing Privatization Vouchers,
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Oct. 23, 1992, at 4, available in Reuter Textline-Novecon, Oct. 23,
1992.
40. Id.
41. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art 15.4.
42. Id. art. 17.2.
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control of the property to the buyer; 2) the composition and price of the
acquired property; and 3) the funding sources and method of and time
tables for payment.43 The contract may further stipulate commitments
binding upon the buyer or other provisions regulating production per-
formance, including: 1) the maintenance of production profile and volume
and type of products produced or services rendered; 2) the delivery of
products to particular consumers; 3) price setting conditions or maximum
price levels; 4) environmental protection measures; 5) preservation or de-
velopment of new work locations; 6) maintenance of existing procedures;
and 7) standards for the use of production objects and social infrastruc-
ture. Once a buyer has paid in full for the privatized State property, the
seller issues a State document certifying the transfer of ownership
rights." The new owner thus becomes the legal successor to the property
rights, responsibilities, financial and other obligations of the privatized
State enterprise.45 The Denationalization Law mandates that the new
owner must meet the provisions of the purchasing contract and any other
conditions stipulated in a competitive bid, failure to do so shall incur
property liability and loss of ownership rights as enforced by the State."'
VII. GENERAL TOOLS FOR DENATIONALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
A. Bidding
Sales sometimes involve competitive bidding."' Pursuant to the De-
nationalization Law, competitive bidding is used when the seller places
certain conditions on a purchaser's bid to meet demands for further use
of the property.48 For instance, a seller may require that the new owner
accept certain commitments of delivery of products to particular consum-
ers. The procedures for conducting the competitive bidding are estab-
lished by the privatization commission and approved by the State Com-
mittee.49 The passage of the Privatization Decree presumes that the
privatization bureaus shall establish this process for State enterprises.
B. Auction
State property is auctioned the sole purpose of obtaining the highest
price. Sellers organize the auctions and either the privatization commis-
sion, privatization bureau for industrial enterprise, or an intermediary
may implement them. An initial designate price is set at the State-owned
object's estimated value and the final price may not fall lower than fifteen
43. Id. art. 27.2.
44. Id. art. 27.1.
45. Id. art. 30.1.
46. Id. art. 30.
47. Id. art. 23.1.
48. Id. art. 23.
49. Id. art. 23.3.
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percent below the initial price.50 The State Committee determines and
approves the auction procedures.
VIII. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
A. Joint Stock Companies
The Denationalization Law provides for the transformation of State
enterprises into joint-stock companies or other forms of ownership associ-
ation or partnership. Joint-stock companies are required to grant a prior-
ity right to workers and pensioners to acquire up to twenty percent of the
overall number of shares with a discount of thirty percent of the nominal
value of the shares.5 ' These advantages for workers of a State joint-stock
company are only available for three months once the sale of shares has
commenced and such shares may not be resold for two years.
5 2
Pursuant to the Privatization Decree with a joint-stock company, in-
vestment vouchers (differing from privatization coupons) are distributed
free of charge to the work force and pensioners of the enterprise based
upon the worker's term of service.5 Under the Decree, such vouchers will
total a maximum of twenty-five percent of all stock of the enterprise.5 4
The twenty-five percent employee investment stock shall consist of fif-
teen percent common stock and ten percent preferred. The first manage-
ment officers of the privatized enterprise will be retained on a contractual
basis and shall receive investment vouchers five times the amount given
to an average employee.55 All employee stock is nontransferable and may
only be passed to legal successors. An enterprise is prohibited from
purchasing stock from a dismissed employee for five years from date of
termination. The remaining seventy-five percent of stock may be distrib-
uted as follows: five percent sold at par value to members of the worker
collective, ten percent at par value or stock market rate to business rela-
tions, ten percent to foreign shareholders or "outside" investors, and a
controlling interest of not less than thirty-one percent of stock that re-
mains with the State through the State Property Committee and its terri-
torial branches.56 Thus as noted above, even as the Kazakh government
moves towards a market economy, this decree establishes that a State
monopoly on control over enterprises is preserved to guide State enter-
prises through the transition period.5 7
50. Id. art. 23.4.
51. Id. art. 25.2.
52. Id. art. 25.4.
53. See Jurbenko, supra note 21; Kazakhstan Begins Privatization, supra note 10.
54. See Kazakhstan Begins Privatization, supra note 10.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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B. Leasing
Since privatization of land is prohibited, most enterprises must oper-
ate on leased land. The land code of the Republic of Kazakhstan governs
property law regarding leases. The Kazakh law "On Leasing" governs
State enterprises released for leasing.58
C. Labor Collectives or Other Collective Enterprises
Labor collectives may purchase the property of the State enterprise.
Similar to partnership agreements, the regulations adopted by the labor
collective govern distribution of property interests between collective
members.
The Denationalization Law provides the following advantages as in-
centives to organizing labor collectives for purchasing privatized enter-
prises: 1) a preferential right to purchase the enterprise, 2) the right to
use some of the enterprise consumption funds to purchase State property
conditioned upon the consent of the majority-of members of the labor
collective, 3) a discount of thirty percent of the cost of the acquired prop-
erty for autonomously financed enterprises and up to fifty percent dis-
count for budget enterprises and organizations and those enterprises
planned to operate at loss, and 4) profits from the enterprise may be used
to meet part of the purchase price.59 These sums are then deducted from
the taxable profit. Finally, with regards to any other property interests
such as social infrastructures that existed on the books of a State enter-
prise, such objects may be transferred free of charge to the labor collec-
tive that has acquired it.60 The State entity as the seller makes this trans-
fer decision.
IX. AGRICULTURAL
The Denationalization Law originally recognized the right of a pur-
chaser to acquire land for the purpose of operating an agricultural enter-
prise. Subsequent legislation now mandates that land will remain the
property of the State under the Privatization Program and farmers will
gain land rights through leases. The Agro Measures, like the Privatization
Decree, were implemented to clarify and speed up denationalization ef-
forts in the agroindustrial enterprises. This decree sets the goal of priva-
tizing all agroindustrial enterprises of Kazakhstan by March 1, 1993."1 In
addition, those companies showing little profit or losing money are
targeted for privatization during the first half of the current year. This is
recognized as an effort to bring such enterprises up to efficient operating
58. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 18.
59. Id. art. 25.1.
60. Id. art. 25.5.
61. See Kazakhstan: Privatization Begins in Agroindustrial Complex, supra note 11.
VOL. 21:2
KAZAKHSTAN
standards by ensuring their rapid privatization. The methods available
for privatizing agricultural enterprises include joint stock companies and
associations of farmer economies.6 2 The preference emphasized by the
Agro Decree is the creation of collective forms of management. By the
first half of 1992, 217 collective State farms were privatized, in addition
to another 556 individual farms.6 3 Also developing out of the privatization
of agroindustry are farming associations. To date farmers have formed
over thirty farming associations.
X. URBAN PROPERTIES
Kazakh citizens may purchase State and departmental apartments
and houses using privatization coupons or other means of payment. A
system of privatization vouchers was introduced by the Denationalization
Law to distribute housing interests. As a result of these efforts, 305,000
apartments were privatized during the first half of 1992, with nearly
70,000 families now owning their apartments. 4 These apartments were
privatized free of charge or purchased with special coupons. Besides indi-
vidual housing ownership, cooperatives may organize to operate the State
residential buildings. Such cooperatives are formed by purchasing more
than half of the apartments in a State residential building.6 5 Kazakhstan
plans to maintain rapid housing privatization with the goal of privatizing
its housing sector by mid-1993. s
XI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The Denationalization Law recognizes certain governing bodies re-
sponsible for the resolution of any disputes arising during the course of
denationalization and privatization. With a dispute between the Kazakh
state organs and the former USSR and other former Union Republics,
Kazakh and USSR legislation shall govern. Any disputes arising between
Kazakh state organs and legal entities or citizens are governed by the
courts, the State arbitration board, or with agreement of both parties, a
court of arbitration.6" Citizens, legal entities and the State are protected
from losses caused from the denationalization and privatization process
by holding parties guilty of illegal actions responsible for the full reim-
62. See id. (First Deputy Chief of the Alta-Ata Regional Agricultural Agency Fyodor
Ashenbrenner commenting on the preference to create collective forms of management in-
stead of small private enterprises between raw material producers and processing enter-
prises for this will help prevent monopolization).
63. Kazakhstan: Agricultural Privatization - Report, ZEMLYA I LYUDI, Oct. 15, 1992, at
3, available in Novecon-Reuter Textline, Oct. 15, 1992.
64. See 0. Stefashin, Kazakhstan: Privatization of Apartments - Report, IZVESTIA,
Sept. 3, 1992, at 1, available in Novecon-Reuter Textline, Sept. 4, 1992.
65. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 22.2.
66. See Gail Fitzer, Kazakhstan Signs Deal with Rothschild Inc., Reuters (Money Re-
port), BC cycle, May 21, 1992.
67. Denationalization Law, supra note 12, art. 31.1.
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bursement of such losses.68 In all cases, decisions of officials and organs
responsible for denationalization and privatization measures are appeala-
ble in court. The same applies for unreasonable delays for considering
applications for privatization.
XII. LABOR LAW
The Denationalization Law sets forth regulations mandating that the
administration of the State enterprise must observe provisions of previ-
ous collective and labor agreements during the period of implementation
of privatization." A new collective agreement must be signed between the
new owner and the labor collective within six months from the time of
transfer of ownership rights.7" This new agreement is the basic normative
act regulating relations between the owner, workers and trade union or-
ganization of the enterprise. A collective agreement is required for all en-
terprises regardless of their form of ownership. Lastly, Kazakh labor leg-
islation restricts the termination of workers by the new owner or
administration of the privatized enterprise. Any discharged worker termi-
nated within six months of the time of transfer of ownership rights, use,
control or possession of the property, is awarded severance pay in the
amount of three months' average earnings.
7
1
XIII. CONCLUSION
From a legal standpoint, the current Kazakh laws governing priva-
tization provides only the most basic groundwork to facilitate the Repub-
lic's transition to a market economy. The laws recognize freedom of con-
tract and individual property rights. Most importantly, business relations
are left to the parties involved and the State will respect and enforce such
agreements. As already illustrated in the discussion above, decrees
amending prior legislation are published on a regular basis as the Kazakh
government strives to maintain stability, respond to Republic interests
and provide the greatest impetus for reform. Although these laws thus far
are inadequate to address all issues, they certainly establish a solid
framework with which to convert State property into private hands. The
Republic is probably better off enacting these general guidelines for
privatization than to enact elaborate codes which could all too quickly
become unenforceable due to incompatible rigid legal structures in a rap-
idly evolving market and social structure.
The one weakness of the privatization laws is the prohibition on pri-
vate ownership of land. Anglo-american law was built on property law.
Property law, based on the alienability of land, provides the basis for con-
68. Id. art. 31.2.
69. Id. art. 29.2.
70. Id. art. 29.3.
71. Id. art. 29.4.
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tract and tort law. Without this basic foundation, Kazakhstan will be
forced to develop a body of law based on property rights to enterprises
and objects merely attached to the land. This may not create a great ob-
stacle, though the same Anglo-american law may prove to be inapplicable
for borrowing as the Republic continues to look to the west for consulta-
tion and guidance. 72 As such, provisions restricting alienability of prop-
erty interests and the flat prohibition on land ownership will most likely
dampen market forces. However, given the condition of the Republic,
such laws should provide for the development of a strong internal market,
albeit at a slower pace, without the shocks experienced by her northern
neighbor.
Kazakhstan consists largely of rural communities. The Republic lacks
adequate infrastructure, not to mention communication facilities. While
the Republic may be lacking in industrial development, it is rich in natu-
ral resources and abundant agricultural land. Due to these conditions spe-
cific to Kazakhstan, the government is wise in maintaining a controlling
interest in privatized enterprises and restricting land ownership to leasing
interests only. Otherwise, without the basic infrastructure or consumer
market available for reinvestment, foreign investors could easily enter the
Kazakh market and merely export their rich mineral resources. A market
must be created in Kazakhstan before the government can withdraw com-
pletely to private interests. Maintaining government involvement should
only help emerging enterprises in their establishment as viable industries.
What are the prospects for successful privatization in Kazakhstan?
Foreign observers project that Kazakhstan may experience a slower path
towards a market economy through 1992 and 1993 as a result of its most
recent legislation restricting foreign investment. Fear of unemployment,
lack of an overall legal infrastructure and an aversion to challenge vested
industrial interests are all reasons noted as factors handicapping the
privatization process in the near future." More importantly, however, the
Kazakh laws appear to have popular support and they continue to create
a politically stable investment environment. Political stability is one of
the largest determining factors influencing foreign investment decisions in
the Republics of the former Soviet Union. As it is, Kazakhstan is one of
the most publicly stable Republics of the former Soviet Union 4 and is
expected to remain the most stable of the Central Asian States which will
maintain foreign investor confidence. As such, political stability will play
an important role in Kazakhstan's privatization efforts and more impor-
tantly, influence foreign attitudes towards Kazakh investment. Western
observers believe that Kazakhstan will attract foreign investments due to
72. "Kazakhstan: Government Concludes Contract with U.S. Legal Firm," ECOTASS, in
Reuter Textline, May 18, 1992. (making Kazakhstan the first republic to hire the services of
a western lawfirm as counsel on reform measures).
73. Denis McCauley & Adam Dixon, Business Outlook: CIS Kazakhstan, Bus. E. EUR.,
Sept. 21, 1992.
74. See Kazakhstan: Economic and Demographic Structure, supra note 2.
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its political stability, vast mineral resources, realistic economic policy of
its leadership and Nazarbayev's personality. 5
Christine M. Grzesiak
75. See French Investors are Offered Easy Terms by N. Nazarbayev, IZVESTIA, No. 214,
Sept. 25, 1992 at 1, available in SovData Dialine - BizEkon News, Sept. 25, 1992.
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The Kurdish Crisis: An International
Incident Study
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two years, the leading democratic nations increasingly
feel it was their responsibility to interfere in what has traditionally been
considered the internal matters of other states. The largest intervention
since the Gulf War occurred when western states intervened in Iraq on
behalf of the Kurds. The western democracies, encouraged by nations
from all corners of the world, provided humanitarian relief and a degree
of security so that the Kurdish refugees could come down from the moun-
tains on the border of Iraq, where starvation and intense cold threatened
their survival. Invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, these
states acted to protect international peace and security but met resistance
in the fundamental notion of state sovereignty.
As a term of art, humanitarian intervention traditionally refers to
interference on behalf of nationals or inhabitants of foreign countries "in
cases where a State maltreats its subjects in a manner which shocks the
conscience of mankind."' The doctrine purports to allow a state to inter-
vene in what would otherwise be an unlawful action, but, as its definition
suggests, the doctrine is full of ambiguities. The approximately ten major
actions ventured under the modern doctrine have met with a mixed re-
sponse from the international community.' Scholars have been no less di-
vided over whether, and in what circumstances, the United Nations Char-
ter authorizes humanitarian intervention.3
1. Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA
L. REV. 325, 332 (1967) (quoting H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
32 (1950))..
2. The modern doctrine predates the U.N. Charter and is usually traced from the early
nineteenth century. W. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Interven-
tion to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 179
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973). For an analysis of humanitarian interventions undertaken in
the past, see Reisman and McDougal, supra, at 178-87; see also Nigel S. Rodley, Human
Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38. INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 321 (1989).
3. Some scholars believe that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which re-
nounces "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," and
Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention by the United Nations "in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," forbid humanitarian intervention
entirely. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 98, 104-08 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) (arguing that humanitarian intervention
is illegal); Thomas B. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humani-
tarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
Others believe that hunianitarian intervention is well-grounded in the United Nations
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Following the Gulf War, Iraqi treatment of the Kurds aroused, for
the first time, a substantial world response. Some countries suggested the
removal of Saddam Hussein, while others offered proposals for restructur-
ing Iraq, including a plan to create autonomous enclaves for the Kurds.
Indeed, the Kurdish situation provided the international community with
a prime opportunity to expand the contingencies for and the scope of
humanitarian intervention.
Despite calls for a New World Order and an increased interest in
human rights, however, the world's most effective actors failed to broaden
the doctrine and sustained only a moderate intervention on behalf of the
oppressed Kurds. This result may be understandable given the exigent
political realities. The United States was reluctant to become involved in
what the President viewed as a potential military "quagmire." The En-
glish, who led the European Community's response, expressed a greater
willingness to interfere but could not act without U.S. support. The
United Nations had among its members too many potential targets for
accusations of human rights violations to take aggressive action. The
weak response was particularly unfortunate, however, because the need
for aid was so extreme and clear-cut. Moreover, respect for human dignity
and minimal human rights standards demanded more aggressive action.
A brief look at the history of the Kurdish community in Iraq and the
history of international interference on their behalf provides a back-
ground for an evaluation of the humanitarian intervention which has oc-
curred in Iraq since the Gulf War.
II. HISTORY OF THE KURDS
A. The Iraqi Population
Although Saddam Hussein and his government publicly maintain
that Iraq is one nation and all of its inhabitants Iraqis, Iraq is a country
of deeply divided ethnic and religious sects. Approximately 73.5 percent
of Iraq's population is Arab, a figure which perhaps belies Hussein's claim
to be the leader of the Arab world, as in few other Arab states is there
Charter and subsequent conventions. These scholars argue that the use of force for the pur-
poses of humanitarian intervention not only is consistent with the Charter's purpose of pro-
tecting human rights but also does not fall within Article 2(4)'s proscription against the use
of force. They note further that an important qualification is added to Article 2(7), which
excepts enforcement measures under Chapter VII, including action with respect to threats
to the international peace and security. The latter exception may be particularly relevant to
interventions in matters of human rights, because the international community has increas-
ingly recognized the interdependence of the preservation of international peace and security
and the protection of fundamental human rights. See Lillich, supra note 1, at 326-38; Reis-
man & McDougal, supra note 2, at 171-72, 177.
Several scholars have suggested criteria by which one may evaluate the legitimacy of a
particular humanitarian intervention. See Lillich, supra note 1, at 347-51; Reisman & Mc-
Dougal, supra note 2, at 187.
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such a high percentage of non-Arabs.' The Kurdish population consti-
tutes Iraq's second most prominent ethnic group, the nation's largest eth-
nic minority.' The Iraqi Kurds have historically been an economically in-
dependent, non-Arabic speaking minority group in Iraq, who are linked
by cultural, religious, community, and linguistic ties which have stretched
over thousands of years.6 They survive a history of persecution. Mass
murders and forced exodus have been the preferred methods of Saddam
Hussein and his government of Sunni Arab elites for dealing with this
ethnic minority. And the Kurdish struggle for autonomy has been punc-
tuated by little international effort on their behalf. The Kurds have never
received more than partial recognition, from the time of the creation of
the modern state of Iraq to the present.
B. Early Hope for Self-determination
At the close of the First World War, the fall of the Ottoman Empire
offered the Kurds their first great hope of self-determination in this cen-
tury. The Allied powers envisaged a partitioned Turkey, from which they
hoped to carve an independent Kurdish state to be called Kurdistan.
President Woodrow Wilson expressed this hope in point twelve of his
Fourteen Point Program for World Peace which stated that non-Turkish
minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be "assured of an absolute un-
molested opportunity of autonomous development. '7
The Treaty of Sevres, the 1920 armistice agreement between Great
Britain and Turkey, stated that a commission of Allied appointees would
"prepare for local autonomy in those regions where the Kurdish element
is preponderant."' In 1923, however, the British were forced to renegoti-
ate the terms of the Treaty at Lausanne, after Kemal Ataturk, the
4. SIMON HENDERSON, INSTANT EMPIRE: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AMBITION FOR IRAQ 26-27
(1991).
5. Although the Iraqi government refuses to provide population figures, one 1989 esti-
mate places the Kurdish population at 21.6 percent. Id. at 26.
6. In the Middle East, the Kurds constitute the fourth largest ethnic group, behind the
Arabs, Persians, and Turks, boasting a population of approximately twenty to twenty-five
million. They are thought to descend from Indo-European tribes who settled many years
ago in the mountains of what is now broadly referred to as Kurdistan. Although the Kurds
speak a common language, no universal written and spoken form of Kurdish has evolved,
and numerous dialects make communication between some groups difficult. Religiously, ap-
proximately eighty-five percent of the Kurds are Sunni Muslim, and strong religious loyal-
ties exist among them. They have traditionally been a tribal and agricultural people and
remain so to some extent today. Vast differences exist, however, between the often nomadic,
mountain Kurds and the urban Kurds, a group that generally views traditional Kurdish
tribalism as backwards. In any case, tradition remains a large part of Kurdish life, and the
Kurds struggle to protect a unique cultural identity. DAVID McDoWELL, THE KURDS: THE
MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP REPORT No. 23, 5-9 (1985).
7. Woodrow Wilson, Address on the Conditions of Peace Delivered at a Joint Session
of the Two Houses of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918), in PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY:
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, PAPERS 361-62 (James B. Scott ed., 1918).
8. Treaty of S~vres, Aug. 20, 1920, art. 62, quoted in McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 11.
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founder of modern Turkey, came to power. By the terms of the Treaty of
Lausanne, the Kurdish population was split largely among the five coun-
tries of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the U.S.S.R., reminiscent of their
split before the war, between the Persian and Ottoman Empires. After
some debate, the League of Nations ultimately awarded the Kurdish area
of Mosul and the oil-rich land surrounding it to Great Britain.9
Choosing to rule the Kurdish region under its control through tradi-
tional Kurdish leadership, the British government appointed Shaikh
Mahmud Barzinji to act as governor in 1919. Barzinji was immediately
challenged, however, by other tribal leaders who resented their loss of
power. Troubled by Turkish attempts to re-establish control of the area
by inciting Kurdish rebellion and unable to work through tribal leader-
ship, the British ultimately incorporated the Kurdish area into Iraq
under a provisional Kurdish administration. In doing so, the British de-
fined the territory of the modern state of Iraq."
C. An Independent Iraq
The British surrender of political control of Iraq in 1932 signalled the
beginning of the oppression of the Kurds. The Arab leadership of Iraq
had encouraged the British hope that the Kurds could be reconciled to
incorporation with Arab Iraq, by promising to honor the League of Na-
tions stipulations to the grant of Mosul to Iraq in March 1925-that
Kurdish should be the official language of the area and that the Kurds
should be placed in administrative and educational positions in their re-
gion. Neither pledge, however, was recorded in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of
1930 (implemented in 1932) that granted Iraq its independence."
The weakening of British ties, the lack of written guarantees in the
Anglo-Iraqi treaty, and the failure of the Iraqi government to take any
steps to implement its oral promises caused the Kurds to fear for their
status in Iraq. Led first by Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji and later by Mulla
Mustaf Barzani, the Kurds revolted. The series of revolts have alternately
been termed tribal uprisings and the first popular movement for an inde-
pendent Kurdistan.1 2 Kurdish rebellions in the North did not die down
until the Second World War, at which time the Kurds became increas-
ingly integrated with Arab society.1"
9. The entire area of the modern state of Iraq was placed by League of Nations man-
date under British control. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 16.
10. MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT & PETER SLUGLETT, IRAQ SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION
TO DICTATORSHIP 14-15, 24-25 (1987).
11. Id. at 26-27.
12. See PHEBE MARR, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ 43, 51, 54 (1985); FAROUK-
SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supra note 10, at 26-29. Compare Sa'ad N. Jawad, The Kurdish
Problem in Iraq, in THE INTEGRATION OF MODERN IRAQ 171 (Abbas Kelidar ed., 1979) [here-
inafter Jawad, Kurdish Problem] with McDoWELL, supra note 6, at 19.
13. MARR, supra note 12, at 146.
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D. The Beginnings of the Republic of Iraq
The next stage of Kurdish history began with the establishment of
the Republic of Iraq in July of 1958, when a group called the Free Officers
overthrew the Iraqi monarchy and established Abdel Karim Qasim as
prime minister. The Kurds initially greeted the revolution with enthusi-
asm, expecting the new government to be more sympathetic to their
cause. Mulla Mustaf Barzani, the Kurdish leader who enjoyed a larger
tribal following than any other tribal leader, came back from twelve years
of exile and quickly took an active role in the Kurdish Democratic Party
(K.D.P.), the urban, professional wing of the Kurdish movement founded
by Barzani and others in 1946. A new constitution promised the Kurds
equality with the Arabs."
When Barzani and the Kurds demanded further government conces-
sions and became increasingly aligned with Communist forces, however,
Qasim began to realize the extent of the Kurdish goals. He responded to
Barzani's demands with the first major offensive of what became a
lengthy conflict. Qasim's bombing of Barzan, Barzani's homeland, and his
banning of the K.D.P. escalated the situation to an all-out war for Kurd-
ish autonomy and, ostensibly, for democracy in Iraq. Barzani's rebels
made formidable opponents. Gaining widespread support from other anti-
republic Kurdish tribal leaders, they adopted guerilla tactics and main-
tained mountain strong-holds."5
Plagued by defections to the Kurdish army, betrayal by officials in
his own government, and scant support left in the Army, Qasim was de-
feated in 1963 by the Ba'ths, who were in turn overthrown that same year
by Abdel Saslam Arif. Despite periodic cease-fires, the Kurds remained in
a state of civil war for nearly the entire period between 1961 and 1968, as
successive military governments attacked the Kurdish uprisings. These
governments called the Kurdish revolts attempts to achieve separation
and sought a military solution to the problem. In doing so, they failed to
acknowledge the experience, magnetism, and military experience of
Barzani and the tenacity of the Kurdish fighting forces known as pesh
merga, or "those who face death."' 6
E. The Ba'th Rise to Power
1. The March Manifesto
When the Ba'th party regained power in July 1968, they intended to
find a more permanent solution to the Kurdish issue but were plagued by
14. Id. at 176-77; McDoWELL, supra note 6, at 19.
15. MARR, supra note 12, at 177-79; McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 19-20; SA'AD JAWAD,
IRAQ AND THE KURDISH QUESTION 324-31 (1981) [hereinafter JAWAD, KURDISH QUESTION];
Jawad, Kurdish Problem, supra note 12, at 175-76.
16. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 20; JAWAD, KURDISH QUESTION, supra note 15, at 51-52;
Jawad, Kurdish Problem, supra note 12, at 177.
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the obstacles familiar to previous regimes. Among the obstacles were the
extensive following of Barzani, the Iraqi army's resistance to peaceful set-
tlement, and public opinion in the Arab world that autonomy for the
Kurds was equivalent to separation."
Despite inflexibility on both sides, the government and the Kurds
reached an agreement, in March of 1970, that recognized the Kurds as
free and equal partners of the Arabs and promised them full recognition
of their national autonomy within four years. The Manifesto granted the
Kurds several specific rights, including government posts, economic con-
cessions, and rights to use and be taught the Kurdish language. The en-
forcement of these rights, however, quickly became subject to disputes."8
International involvement intensified the problems between the
Ba'th regime and the Kurds both during this period and later, because
the Ba'ths resented interference in what they viewed as a sovereign mat-
ter.'9 Among the Kurds' supporters were the governments of Iran and
Turkey, whose aid was granted contingent on understandings that the
movement for Kurdish separatism would not be spread into their coun-
tries.'0 The Israelis also allegedly provided the Kurds with assistance.'
Foreign support, however, did not exist to liberate the Kurds but
rather to encourage the Kurds to wage war against the Ba'ths, in order to
neutralize the danger of the Iraqi regime in the Middle East."8 The Kurds
were repeatedly betrayed by temporary supporters. The Soviets, for ex-
ample, after helping the Kurds negotiate the March Manifesto, allied
themselves with the Iraqi government, whom they began supplying with
arms.
2 3
2. Autonomy Law and the Civil War of 1974-1975
The crisis culminated in 1974, when the Ba'th invited K.D.P. support
of an Autonomy Law, to be announced March 11, 1974, and gave them
fifteen days in which to respond in order to participate in the National
Patriotic Front (N.P.F.). The Kurds found the law insufficient to meet
their demands. They felt that they had not been provided with solid
guarantees of meaningful participation in their government, they differed
17. JAWAD, KURDISH QUESTION, supra note 15, at 331.
18. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 20-21; Jawad, Kurdish Problem, supra note 12, at 179-
80.
19. Saddam Hussein, who became president in 1979 after rising to power through the
Ba'th, commented: "Looking at it within its national framework, the Kurdish question is a
purely internal matter which sometimes takes dubious forms because of the intrusion of
foreign influences, and stands aggressively in the way of the national movement and struggle
for the construction of a new society." Interview with Sakina al-Sadat, Egyptian journalist
(Jan. 19, 1977), in SOCIAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN IRAQ 95 (Khalid Kishtainy trans., 1979).
20. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 20.
21. FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETT, supra note 10, at 104.
22. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 21; Jawad, Kurdish Problem, supra note 12, at 180-81.
23. JOHN BULLOCH & HARVEY MORRIS, SADDAM'S WAR: THE ORIGINS OF THE KUWAIT
CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 178 (1991) [hereinafter SADDAM'S WAR].
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over the interpretation of the Manifesto and the extent of the govern-
ment's efforts to implement it, and they disagreed with the government
as to the extent of the Kurdish area, particularly concerning the city and
environs of Kirkuk.
24
Full-scale war soon developed, and by the end of the summer, the
Iraqis controlled much of Kurdistan. Only when Iran increased aid to the
Kurds, providing long-range heavy artillery support and perhaps even
troops, did the Kurds stage a serious comeback.
25
Kurdish prospects were soon thwarted, however. Arab governments
brought the Shah of Iran and Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein to-
gether in Algiers, and the two leaders reached a settlement. In return for
a new delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway at the deepest naviga-
ble channel, Iran sealed its borders to the Kurds and withdrew their field
guns from Iraq. The Iranians then proceeded to threaten to join the
Iraqis in a combined attack, if the Kurds did not accept the Agreement's
terms.26 After the Agreement, Mulla Mustaf Barzani went into exile,
where he died.
Samir al-Khalil, in his book Republic of Fear: The Politics of Mod-
ern Iraq, describes what he views as a decline of the army under the sec-
ond Ba'th regime, which evidenced itself in increasingly violent behav-
ior A major escalation in violence against the Kurds was particularly
evident towards the end of the civil war in 1974, when the principle func-
tion of the army was internal repression. In 1974 and 1975, the army
napalmed and bombed Kurdish villages and districts systematically, leav-
ing many thousands of civilians homeless. Al-Khalil describes the arrests,
deportations, executions, assassinations, and public hangings to which the
Kurds were subjected, including the summary execution of one thousand
pesh merga fighters after they surrendered to government troops. 28
3. The Resettlement Program and the Kurdish Refugees
The violence continued after the civil war in the form of continued,
massive Kurdish resettlement conducted by the Iraqi army. The army
24. FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLE-r, supra note 10, at 166-68; McDOWELL, supra note 6,
at 21-22. Both the Kurds and the government maintained that they were conforming to the
March Manifesto. Jawad, Kurdish Problem, supra note 12, at 180. Estimates suggest, how-
ever, that the "autonomous region" designated by the Ba'ths excluded half of the area of
Iraqi Kurdistan and that the provinces of Kirkuk were redrawn to ensure that the city had
an Arab majority. Furthermore, a detailed study indicates that few of the benefits set forth
in the Agreement were implemented. FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETr, supra note 10, at 188.
25. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at 21-22.
26. FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETr, supra note 10, at 170.
27. In one 1969 incident, for instance, in the village of Dakan in Northern Iraq, sixty-
seven women and children were knowingly burnt alive, while hiding in a cave which they
had entered to seek protection from an artillery shelling. The incident was brought to the
attention of the United Nations. SAMIR AL-KHALIL, REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLrTICS OF
MODERN IRAQ 22-23 (1989).
28. Id.
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forced Kurdish inhabitants to new cities easily accessible to the Iraqi
army and then to settlements nearer major Kurdish cities. Al-Khalil de-
scribes massive deportations to the southwestern desert region of Iraq, an
area vastly different in climate than the hills of Kurdistan. Families were
taken to the south by truck, to destinations where they were left, supplied
only with a tent. The Ba'th relocated Kurds from the provinces of Diyala,
Kirkuk, and Mosul. 29 Al-Khalil estimates that eighty-five percent of those
who returned to Iraq on the strength of amnesty or because they were
expelled by the Shah's army were sent to these camps.
Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdisan (P.U.K.),
and others, say that the Iraqi army dynamited twenty-eight Kurdish cites
and at least four thousand villages from 1974 to 1990, as part of "Sad-
dam's plan to depopulate rural Kurdistan and relocate its people in the-
more easily controllable big cities. '30 Kurdish villages were reduced to
rubble in Saddam's campaign, as the Iraqis forced evacuation and dyna-
mited the remaining towns. Iraqi soldiers sealed off and guarded, at nu-
merous checkpoints, what remained of the towns. 1 By demolishing vil-
lages along the borders of Iran and Turkey, the Iraqi government created
a cordon sanitaire in those areas most susceptible to infiltration of aid
from other countries."
F. The Iran-Iraq War
The Algiers Agreement of 1975 not only led to the end of the Iraqi-
Kurd civil war but also precipitated an eight-year war between the parties
represented by the signatories. Iraq's casus belli was an alleged violation
of the Algiers Agreement by the Khomeini regime and an allegation that
Iraq had been forced to cede control of the Shatt al Arab waterway under
duress. 3 After Saddam Hussein tore up the Algiers treaty in a symbolic
gesture, the war started in September of 1980. For the Kurds, the war
created yet another opportunity for rebellion. They maintained a revolt
throughout the period with aid from Ayotollah Khomeini.3 4
Ultimately, a curtailed ability to obtain arms (in large part due to the
U.S.-led Operation Staunch), the command of the Gulf sea lanes by
American ships, and a collapse of morale after years of conflict forced
Iran to accept United Nations Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire. Al-
though Iraq had accepted the agreement a year earlier, it sought to im-
pose new conditions, delaying negotiations long enough for the Iraqi army
29. Id. at 24; see also HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 199-200.
30. Michael Kelly, Back to the Hills, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3, 1991, at 23, 24.
31. Id. at 25.
32. FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETr, supra note 10, at 188.
33. The dispute over the waterway, however, went back hundreds of years to a dispute
between the Persian and Ottoman Empires. See JOHN BULLOCH AND HARVEY MORRIS, THE
GULF WAR 33-38 (1989), for a history of the conflict. [hereinafter GULF WAR].
34. SADDAM'S WAR, supra note 23, at 87-88.
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to turn their arms on the Kurdish dissidents in the north.3 5
On July 19, 1988, the Iraqi army proceeded to drop poison gas on
Kurdish villages, starting a campaign of bombing and forced exodus by
which the government eliminated Kurdish resistance and forced one hun-
dred thousand refugees into Turkey and Iran. Concerned with the Geneva
cease-fire accords and anxious to do nothing to threaten negotiations, the
West did not criticize Iraq's actions.3 6 Nor did the United Nations pub-
lish details of the Kurdish incidents until negotiations were under way,
after Saddam dropped his demands on Iran on the sixth of August.3 7
The campaign against the Kurds which followed the war had been
foreshadowed by an incident which received widespread press coverage in
March of 1988, when some five thousand Kurdish civilians were killed at
Halabja. The deaths resulted from a gas attack which occurred immedi-
ately after the town switched hands, allowing Iranian television crews to
capture the horrors. 8 The incident represented not only Iraq's first chem-
ical attack against its own civilians but also the first recorded use of nerve
gas. The international community, however, fell short of condemning Iraq
at this time.
Two staffers sent by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Peter Galbreith and Christopher Van Hollen, went to Iraq and returned
with reports of Iraq's use of chemical weapons to depopulate Kurdistan
and relocate the population. Their report led to the introduction of the
Prevention of Genocide Act 1988, which, despite unanimous Senate ap-
proval was deemed premature and counterproductive by the White House
and ultimately failed.39
Britain attacked Iraq's policy of using chemical weapons but, like
other Western states, preferred to maintain relations with Iraq, in what
the government saw as its best means of wielding influence over future
Iraqi behavior. The Soviet bloc made no comment on the events. At the
United Nations, Saddam's half-brother succeeded in accumulating the
votes necessary to remove Iraq from a list of persistent human rights
offenders."'
35. GULF WAR, supra note 33, at 258; SADDAM'S WAR, supra note 23, at 20.
36. Although George Shultz, in a meeting with Saddam's deputy prime minister, pub-
licly condemned Iraq's actions, the nation's Middle East experts urged him to take a "less
emotional position." He consequently approved a recommendation for an administrative
policy opposed to sanctions against Iraq for the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.
ELAINE SCIOLINo, THE OUTLAW STATE: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S QUEST FOR POWER AND THE GULF
CRISIS 171 (1991).
37. GULF WAR, supra note 33, at 259.
38. There is some debate as to whether the Iranians were also involved in the gassing,
as two different types of gas were used. Cf. GULF WAR, supra note 33, at 262 with THE IRAN-
IRAQ WAR: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS (Efraim Karsh ed., 1989). See also FAROUK-SLUGLETT &
SLUGLETT, supra note 10, at 114 (maintaining that Iran initiated the use of chemical
weapons).
39. SADDAM'S WAR, supra note 23, at 88-89; GULF WAR, supra note 33, at 263-64.
40. GULF WAR, supra note 33, at 89. Nevertheless, Arab states criticized western states
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III. THE GULF WAR
A. The Invasion of Kuwait
Significantly, Saddam Hussein emerged from the Iraq-Iran war as a
victor, at least in the eyes of his own people. This status encouraged his
aggression. Attempting to gain in regional supremacy and the Arab lead-
ership ranks, Saddam no doubt saw the invasion of Kuwait as a means of
furthering his goals."1 In seeking to build Arab support for the invasion,
Hussein appealed to gawmiya, Arab loyalty which transcends the national
boundaries imposed by western imperialists."2 He no doubt also hoped to
play on the dislike of the northern Arab world for their oil-rich neighbors
on the Arabian peninsula.
Saddam also faced economic problems. Recognizing that Kuwait
threatened Iraqi livelihood by driving down the world oil price, Saddam
painted the Kuwaitis as aggressors. He announced that the Kuwaitis had
lied and broken agreements with the Iraqis, a complaint perhaps originat-
ing in the Kuwaitis' refusals to forgive Iraq's loans as had the government
of Saudi Arabia.
43
Iraqi soldiers began the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and by
August 8, Saddam had annexed the country.
B. The Fighting
Clearly U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq War would have created
the threat of opposing Soviet military intervention. Such an intervention
might have resulted in a nuclear attack, since the U.S. did not have a
large number of forces in the Gulf region at that time. By the summer of
1990, however, the situation had changed. The U.S.S.R. had retreated
from the international scene in an effort to deal with the collapsing Soviet
empire. The terms of the Iraqi invasion likewise differed from the inva-
sion of Iran. Unlike Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, which was on fairly equal
for what they termed intervention in the internal matters of the Iraqi government. At least
three of these countries-Syria, Libya, and Egypt-had obtained or were in the process of
obtaining the capacity to produce chemical weapons. As such weapons are cheap and easy to
produce, these countries no doubt had their own futures in mind. Turkey, while opening its
borders to the Kurds, refused to furnish international bodies with evidence that its own
doctors found use of gas. Likewise, the Turkish government actively discouraged outsiders
from gathering evidence. Many Iraqi civilians returned to Iraq. Of those that did, many
were separated into male and female groups, and the males were never again heard from. At
the end of the war, Republican Guard units went into the marshes north of Bassra, and
called for the surrender of the many deserters known to be hidden there. Those that gave
themselves up were imprisoned or shot, and gas was used in the marshes, killing those that
remained. Id. at 264-66.
41. SADDAM'S WAR, supra note 23, at 74.
42. For a further discussion and an excerpt of a letter to this effect from Tariq Aziz,
then foreign minister of Iraq, to the leader of the Arab League, see Out of Joint; A New
Arab Order, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 4.
43. SADDAM'S WAR, supra note 23, at 13, 21.
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footing with Iraq in what could be characterized as a regional border dis-
pute, Kuwait appeared to be an innocent victim of an aggressive
takeover.""
Thomas R. Pickering, the chief U. S. representative to the United
Nations called for the Security Council to condemn the invasion. On Au-
gust 6, the Council voted to impose a worldwide trade embargo on Iraq,
sanctions of unprecedented scope.48 Resolution 678 authorized the Ameri-
can-led coalition to use force if necessary, setting a deadline for Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait of January 15 at midnight, New York time.4
In early January, last minute negotiations in Geneva between Tariq
Aziz and James Baker dissolved. Therefore, on January 17, 1991, shortly
after the United Nations deadline passed, Operation Desert Storm began
and President Bush proclaimed that "the liberation of Kuwait" had be-
gun. By the time the war started, the U. S. had the support of a coalition
of twenty-eight members, a coalition that grew to thirty-seven members
by the end of the war. The American-led force, commanded by General
H. Norman Schwartzkopf, began a massive air campaign which was to
include one hundred thousand sorties, the primary destination of which
were military command and control targets.4
Saddam responded by attacking Saudi Arabia and Israel with im-
proved Scud missiles, failing to distinguish between military and civilian
targets. He also used an environmental weapon. By opening pumping sta-
tions ten miles off of Kuwait, he unleashed ten million barrels of crude oil
into the Gulf. He did so, perhaps, to complicate an amphibious landing
off Kuwait, to cloud the atmosphere making bombing more difficult, or to
disrupt water supplies in Saudi Arabia.
The hundred-hour ground war began six months and two weeks after
the invasion of Kuwait and ended quickly with Iraq's surrender. Soon
after the surrender, Iraq accepted the United Nations' twelve resolutions
and arranged a cease-fire with General Schwartzkopf and Saudi Arabian
Prince Khalid bin Sultan.
48
C. Post-war Civil Fighting
With the end of the war came widespread civil fighting in Iraq. Op-
ponents of Saddam's regime, predominantly the Shia Muslims in the
south and the Kurdish population in the north, seized the chance to try
to topple what was perceived as an already vulnerable government.49
44. Id. at 3-6.
45. SCIOLINO, supra note 36, at 221-22.
46. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess. (1990).
47. SciOLINO, supra note 36, at 25-30.
48. Id. at 255-62.
49. Religiously, the Iraqi elites represent what is alternately estimated to be the domi-
nant branch of Islam in their country, the Sunni Muslims. The Sunnis have a twelve hun-
dred year history of conflict with the Shia Muslims, the other prominent Islamic sect in
Iraq, whose members dominate the population of the territory stretching from Baghdad
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The Kurdish uprising, like the Shiite rebellion, ended quickly. Al-
though broadcasts on Voice of Free Iraq, a covert radio station alleged to
be C.I.A.-supported, called for the destruction of Saddam's regime as late
as March 29, Iraqi troops quashed the main of the Kurdish resistance in
about five days.6 In violation of the cease-fire agreement, the Iraqi gov-
ernment used helicopters to shoot down the resistance fighters. Many
were killed and hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled the country.
Fighting has persisted intermittently on the border of Kurdistan. In
October, Massoud Barzani, the son of Mulla Mustaf Barzani and current
leader of the P.U.K., and Hussein Kamal al-Takriti, the then Iraqi de-
fence minister, arranged a cease-fire, albeit too late to stop a new mass
exodus of Kurds from the fighting area. 1
D. The Status of Kurdistan
After the war, Kurdish guerrillas reclaimed large parts of Kurdistan.
Refugees and Kurdish businessmen and their families alike seized the
chance to return to their homelands and rebuild the towns destroyed by
the Iraqi army under the government's policy of forced mass relocation
which began in 1976 and peaked at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. On
March 18, 1991, the pesh merga reclaimed the city of Halabja, the scene
of one of Saddam's greatest crimes.2 The Kurds continue to reclaim their
cities in northern Iraq and, in doing so, have discovered new evidence of
the cruelty of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Journalists report that the
Kurds have uncovered "mass graves, torture chambers, elaborate prison
systems and comments from secret police files that attest to the inner
workings of one of the region's harshest dictatorships." 3 Some of the
newly-discovered mass graves appear to be of recent origin.""
The Kurds returned to their homelands under the protection of al-
lied forces. As of this writing, military observers continue to monitor the
security zone in northern Iraq, whose southern boundary approximates
the thirty-sixth parallel, that the American-led forces established after
the war. Overflights by allied warplanes based in Turkey continue to pa-
trol the skies. 6
Due in part to the security zone, the Kurds maintain de facto control
in many of the towns in northern Iraq, although the towns are supposed
southeast along the Tigris and Euphrates to Basra. HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 26-27.
50. See Michael Wines, Kurd Gives Account of Broadcasts to Iraq Linked to the
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1991, at Al.
51. The Kurds; The Horror at Sulaymaniyah, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 43.
52. Kelly, supra note 30, at 25; Patrick E. Tyler, In Town Iraqis Gassed, Kurds Now
Breathe Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at A4.
53. Chris Hedges, Kurds Unearthing New Evidence of Iraqi Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1991, at Al.
54. Id. at A7.
55. Chris Hedges, As Kurds Enjoy Freedom, They Wake Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1992, Sec. 4, at 6.
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to be run by the Kurds and the Iraqi army jointly.5 6 In July, the Kurds
swore in a new, popularly elected government, intended to fill the admin-
istrative vacuum created by Baghdad's withdrawal from the area after the
arrival of the American-led forces." Although Saddam denounced the
elections as illegal, the presence of Western forces has thus far prevented
military retaliation."' Additionally, the two main Kurdish political par-
ties, the K.D.P. and the P.U.K., have agreed to combine their guerrilla
units into a single force under Kurdish Government command. Negotia-
tions with smaller Kurdish parties that have their own guerilla forces are
expected to add to the new force. 9
Despite the allied presence, Saddam's forces continue to wage harass-
ing attacks on the Kurds as well as U.N. relief workers.60 The government
has imposed an embargo on the north which the Secretary General of
P.U.K, Jalal Talabani, described as a policy of starvation of the Kurds in
Kurdistan meant to force their surrender."'
Defying Saddam's refusal to renew its aid agreement with the United
Nations, the Security Council has ordered United Nations aid agencies to
continue efforts to supply food and medicine to Iraqi citizens. Iraq has
succeeded in hampering international relief efforts, by refusing to renew
expiring visas or to issue the travel permits that allow relief workers to
travel around the country."I
Saddam ostensibly welcomes the Kurdish refugees back to Iraq, after
their mass exodus during the civil strife which followed the Gulf War.6
Thousands of Kurds, have not yet returned to their homes. Saddam has
attempted, as of yet unsuccessfully, to negotiate a deal with the Kurds to
guarantee them a degree of autonomy and national rights.6 4 Although
56. See Tyler, supra note 52, at A4.
57. Hedges, supra note 55.
58. Kurds Convene Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at A9.
59. Two Kurdish Parties Agree to Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at A15. Reports
indicate that Kurdish leaders have also met to negotiate with other Iraqi opposition groups,
from Shiite Muslims to Arab nationalists, in attempts to consolidate their efforts against
Saddam. Iraq Opposition Says Parley In North Unifies Its Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1992, at A5.
60. Hedges, supra note 55; The House the UN Built, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992, at 38;
Paul Lewis, U.N. Agencies Ordered to Continue Efforts in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1992,
at A10.
61. Kurdish Leader Talabani Warns of New "War of Extermination" (British Broad-
casting Corporation broadcast, November 12, 1991) [hereinafter "War of Extermination"].
62. Lewis, supra note 60.
63. Such promises have held little meaning in the past, however. For instance, in June
1990, when Kurdish refugees were promised amnesty in returning from Turkey, Amnesty
International reported that the Iraqi government had executed at least seven Kurdish refu-
gees and that several hundreds of returning Kurds had disappeared. Amnesty Claims Iraq
Killed Returning Kurds, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 1990, at A2.
64. Kurdish leaders say they had little choice but to begin these talks, as they lack
consistent international support. Tim Post et. al., A Nation in the Valley of the Three
Frontiers, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 42.
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Saddam promised democracy, 5 Kurdish leaders maintain that he persists
in silencing anyone calling for democratic measures."6
For the present, the Kurdish refugees are forced to rely on the pro-
tection of a United Nations security force and the allied presence in Tur-
key. The Iraqi Kurds, however, are understandably skeptical that the
United Nations forces will provide them with adequate security and are
painfully aware that troops will not monitor the situation forever. Fur-
thermore, allied attention has recently turned to the Shiites in the South,
and indeed to crises elsewhere in the world, deflecting attention from the
plight of the Kurds.
IV. EXAMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE
KURDS
A. Historical Analysis
Historically, the Kurdish movement has been unable to use interna-
tional force for its protection. Unlike other minority groups, such as the
Blacks in South Africa or the Palestinians, the Kurds have not histori-
cally benefitted from United Nations resolutions for their protection.
Lacking a representative at the United Nations, the Kurds have been un-
able to find a state willing to promote their case and thereby prejudice its
relation with Iraq.67 Events following the Gulf War suggested that the
situation was about to change.
B. Intervention After the Gulf War
1. World Reaction
Engaging Saddam Hussein's forces militarily forced the international
community to acknowledge the extent of the violence committed by the
Iraqi leader's regime. After the war, the international community finally
65. Saddam stated, "Our decision to build a democratic society based on the constitu-
tion, the rule of law and political pluralism is irrevocable." In the same speech, however, he
ominously warned that the Kurds were "repeating the same fateful error... and facing the
same fate as those who came before." In the Backwash of the Gulf, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23,
1991, at 43.
66. War of Extermination, supra note 61.
67. After being told in 1961 that they could not bring their own case to the United
Nations, the Iraqi Kurds persuaded the Mongolian Soviet Socialist Republic to do so in
1963, perhaps in response to the overthrow of Qasim and the persecution of his communist
supporters. The Soviet delegation sent a letter to the President of the Security Council
which accused the Iraqi army of violence against the Kurds and threatened to introduce the
topic for discussion. ADNAN PACHACHI, IRAQ'S VOICE AT THE UNITED NATIONS 1959-69: A PER-
SONAL RECORD 378 (1991). The Republic withdrew, however, before doing so, perhaps fearful
of hostile Arab pressure. The USSR brought the Kurdish case up in the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations the same year. In the sixties and seventies the Kurds
sought sponsors in both the Arab and non-Arab worlds but were unsuccessful in their con-
sultations, including those with Cyprus, Ireland, and Iceland. McDOWELL, supra note 6, at
27.
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recognized not only the suffering that Saddam inflicted on the Kurds fol-
lowing the end of the war but also the fact that the regime had a long
history of oppressing the Kurdish people.
The Allies, however, stopped the war short of ending Saddam's re-
gime. In fact, the quick cease-fire following the hundred-hour ground war
left the Iraqi government with sufficient force to oppress resisters. A real-
ization of the significance of the Gulf War in creating the Kurdish trag-
edy intensified public pressure to respond to the Kurds' plight. No doubt
revelations of the role played by some western democracies in instigating
the Kurdish rebellion also contributed to a feeling of moral responsibility.
After the war, it became clear that the C.I.A. supported a radio campaign
over Voice of Free Iraq calling for a Kurdish rebellion, although President
Bush surely never thought such a rebellion would succeed. Furthermore,
British special forces reportedly worked with the Kurds to instigate an
uprising.6 8
Although the official British position was that no country or coalition
of countries should send troops to Iraq for any reason other than to pro-
tect relief missions, politicians, including Members of Parliament, were
not insensitive to the implications of having provided British support for
a Kurdish uprising and the growing public pressure to protect the Kurds.
One M.P., Nicholas Budgen, added his query to more than an hour of
hostile questioning of Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary:
"Wouldn't it be truly dreadful if they [the Kurds] were encouraged to
fight on by vague talk about the use of forces on their behalf, when Presi-
dent Bush has already said the forces of the U.S.A. will not be engaged in
a civil war in Iraq?' 9
The media likewise contributed to the call for intervention by bom-
barding viewers with images of a starving people, ravished by war and
seeking safety across the Iraqi border. The images reinforced a near uni-
versal recognition of the gross human rights violations which Saddam had
committed and the resulting precariousness of the Kurds' plight.
The world's leaders ultimately responded to public pressure, albeit
slowly, and through a series of complex signalling suggested an intent to
68. See Wines, supra note 50; Tom Mathews et. al., A Quagmire After All: How the
Bush Administration Trapped Itself While Trying to Wage Peace, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29,
1991, at 24. Talabani reported in an interview:
After the appeal of the Americans, spontaneous and unorganized demonstra-
tions erupted everywhere. The Peshmerga fighters were outside the town, and
only later did we decide to support the demonstrators. It is also forgotten that
the 150,000 allegedly loyal Kurdish militia and large parts of the Iraqi Army
defected to us. Therefore, one cannot claim that the political forces initiated
the uprising.
Kurdistan Front Leader Criticizes U.S., Allies (Wochenpresse broadcast from Vienna, in
German, Apr. 14, 1991).
69. Judy Jones, Parliament and Politics: MPs Demand More Action by West in Sup-
port of Kurds; Kurdish Refugee Crisis: Commons Statement, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 16, 1991,
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intervene on behalf of the Kurds. It appeared for several weeks as if the
traditional notion of humanitarian intervention might be expanded to en-
sure the Kurds' security. Comments by international leaders reflected this
possibility. Douglas Hurd, Britain's Foreign Secretary, announced that
the division between a country's external and internal affairs is not abso-
lute. 0 Roland Dumas, the Foreign Minister of France, stated that he be-
lieved, "the Kurdish crisis could act as a detonator" for re-thinking of the
concept of non-intervention, a concept which the French have long ar-
gued to redefine. Similarly, Austria pledged that it would call on the in-
ternational community (in the United Nations General Assembly) to
state unequivocally that defence of human rights does not constitute in-
terference in a country's internal affairs."
2. The European Community's Response
On April 8, the European Community (E.C.) held an emergency sum-
mit meeting in Luxembourg to respond to the crisis. In addition to voting
for one hundred eighty billion dollars in aid, the European leaders sup-
ported a plan to create a Kurdish safe haven. It was the British Prime
Minister, John Major, who proposed the creation of enclaves, something
close to an international protectorate for the Kurds. The area involved
was to cover northern Iraq, presumably including most mountain towns,
the city of Irbil, and the city of Kirkuk, an oil-producing city over which
the Kurds have long argued for control. 2 The British originally appeared
to be prepared to use force if necessary, in order to establish and main-
tain the enclaves. 3 Major emphasized the need not only for relief but also
for "a degree of protection which the average United Nations relief
worker cannot do." '74 There was even some mention of sending over Brit-
ish bobbies .7 The enclave idea was accepted within three hours, and
Francois Mitterrand, the French president, offered to co-sponsor it at the
United Nations. 6
The plan that the E.C. endorsed was novel, indeed so novel that it
appeared to be almost deliberately unworkable. The plan contemplated
the division of Iraq and the removal of a block of territory from Iraq's
sovereign control. Its enforcement would likely have led to a long-term
70. Sarah Helm, Sovereignty Law May Be Stretched But Not Broken, INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 12, 1991, at 10.
71. G-7 Backs Greater U.N. Role in Internal Conflicts, REUTERS (BC cycle), July 16,
1991.
72. See, e.g., That Slippery Slope, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13th, 1991, at 39; William Tuohy &
Rone Tempest, Europeans Seek Haven for Kurds; Refugees: Britain's Plan to Create a
Shelter Zone in Northern Iraq Wins EC Endorsement, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A6.
73. William Drazdiak, Europeans to Press Bush to Back Enclave Plan; EC Responds
to Outrage Over Kurds' Plight, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1991, at A34.
74. Hurd on UN Police Plan (Press Association Broadcast (London) Apr. 28, 1991).
75. Id.
76. R.C. Longworth, Wrong Turn: Europe's Effort to Aid Kurds Had Too Many Holes,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1991, at D1.
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allied commitment in the region if not, ultimately, to an independent
Kurdish nation. Once the Kurds tasted such independence, they would no
doubt find permanent independence a more attractive alternative than a
renegotiated autonomy agreement with an untrustworthy regime.
The land considered for inclusion in the enclave plan included at
least one city, Kirkuk, over which the Kurds and the Iraqi government
had long struggled for control. The creation of enclaves would have cre-
ated complex problems not only concerning the delimitation of borders
but also involving the international legal status of the zones and the rela-
tionship of the zones to the Kurds in the neighboring countries of Turkey
and Iran. The E.C. surely did not believe that Saddam would have ceded
his sovereignty over this broad expanse of Iraq without any military resis-
tance. Simultaneously, the leaders knew of Bush's desire to withdraw all
American troops from the area.
One commentator suggested that the plan "grew from a compost of
Western guilt, European ambition, British politics and Luxembourg's ma-
chismo, plus the concern of two powerful women in London and Paris
[Margaret Thatcher, who called on John Major to aid the Kurds quickly
and 'without standing on legal niceties,' and Danielle Mitterand, wife of
the French president and long-time champion of the Kurds]."' " Indeed,
the British Prime Minister faced pressure to act on the Kurd's behalf not
only from his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, but also from the entire
E.C. He undoubtedly felt the need to cooperate with and even lead the
E.C, having spent several months attempting to mend rifts created under
Thatcher, when Britain was repeatedly the lone dissenter to E.C. initia-
tives. Also, the E.C. likely felt the need to restore its push for unity after
the Gulf War, and indeed, to show its outrage at Saddam's behavior. 8
The U.S. entertained the idea of safe havens outside the authority of
the Iraqi government but reconsidered when Iraq expressed its outrage at
the plan, thereby suggesting that an attempt to implement the plan
might have entailed further military intervention. Iraqi Prime Minister
Saddoun Hammadi claimed that the idea had been "engineered and con-
ducted by the C.I.A." and vowed Iraqi resistance to it by all possible
means. 9 Similarly, Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari called the en-
clave proposal a "wild idea," proclaiming that "[t]he whole of Iraq is a
safe haven to everyone."8 0
On April 15, the twelve members of the E.C. met again in Luxem-
bourg and, at Germany's initiative, agreed to ask the United Nations if
Saddam could face a war crimes tribunal. They maintained that the Iraqi
leader should be charged for attacking other states, using chemical weap-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ann Devroy & John M. Goshko, U.S. Shifts on Refugee Enclaves; Safe Zones In-
side Iraq Seen as Unrealistic; Aid Increase Stressed, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1991, at Al.
80. William Drozdiak & David B. Ottaway, U.S., Allies Want Refugee Havens Estab-
lished in Iraq; Europeans Back Protective Zone for Kurds, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,1991, at Al.
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ons against his own civilians, and carrying out genocide against the
Kurds. The members also endorsed a French plan calling for the creation
of humanitarian aid centers in the northern part of Iraq and United Na-
tions-protected "corridors" to allow the safe return of the refugees.8 '
In response to the call for a war crimes tribunal, the U.S. argued that
the Arab states would support Saddam against allegations for war crimes,
thereby preserving his power and causing Western pressure to be ineffec-
tive. Furthermore, U.S. officials felt that such a tribunal would preempt
Saddam from seeking exile abroad. 2
3. United States Action
The U.S. was slower than the E.C. to offer a proposed plan of re-
sponse to the Kurdish emergency. President Bush had repeatedly pledged
during the build-up of troops in Iraq that the deployment would be only
temporary. The decision to end the ground war quickly was made without
considering the implications for the Kurds or the possibility of a civil war
but rather out of concern for public opinion. Bush told the press: "All
along I have said that the United States is not going to intervene milita-
rily in Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style
quagmire.... Nor will we become an occupying power with U.S. troops
patrolling the streets of Baghdad." 3
International pressure, however, particularly from Turkey's Presi-
dent Turgut Ozal, forced the U.S. to compromise and begin an open-en-
ded relief plan. On April 6, the U.S. began relief efforts contained to the
Iraqi-Turkish border in a mission labeled "Operation Provide Comfort."
As the name implies, the U.S. operation was deemed humanitarian and
not political. The President warned the Iraqis against using gas and flying
aircraft in the area of Northern Iraq, thereby creating a de facto zone of
safety around the Kurds. 4 The United Nations Security Council
promptly voted to dispatch its own peacekeeping observers and soldiers
to the Iraqi-Kuwait border to help expedite the withdrawal of allied
troops.85 The original relief efforts, proved insufficient. On April 16, Bush
81. Adam Kelliher & Robin Oakley, Iraq Allows UN Access to Aid Starving Kurds,
TIms, Apr. 16, 1991, at 1.
82. Laurie Mylone, The Way to Fell Saddam: Trial and Error, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3,
1991, at 17.
83. John E. Yang & Barton Gellman, U.S. Forces to Set Up Refugee Camps in Iraq;
Expanded Kurdish Relief Effort Represents Fundamental Shift, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,
1991, at Al.
84. The United States did in fact destroy one Iraqi fighter violating this ban; however,
it seems not to have been strictly enforced. Mathews et. al., supra note 68, at 24. Kurdish
leader, Jalal Talabani, testified that in violation of the cease-fire agreement, Saddam used
planes, helicopters, heavy artillery, gasoline, and napalmphosphorous bombs. Kurdistan
Front Leader Criticizes U.S., Allies (Wochenpresse broadcast from Vienna, in German, Apr.
11, 1991).
85. Stanley Meisler, U.N. Approves Dispatching of Peacekeepers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1991, at A4.
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committed U.S. forces to establishing five or six relief camps inside Iraq
as an "interim measure," despite a deep reluctance to do so.86 The United
Nations eventually took over this relief effort, and the U.S. was quickly
satisfied that its role was no longer necessary. As early as June 25, a De-
partment of Defense spokesman announced that the U.S. mission was
complete, referring to the mission of bringing Kurdish refugees safely
down from the mountains and emphasizing that the goal of the U.S. was
never ensuring the long-term well-being of the Kurds.87
Although they declined Kurdish requests to maintain a stronger mili-
tary presence in northern Iraq, the U.S. and its allies agreed to leave a
"brigade-sized" rapid-response military force in Turkey. The force was
left to be used in the event it was deemed necessary to intervene on be-
half of the Kurds.88
4. The Role of the United Nations
Although Iraq had been negotiating with the United Nations for aid,
talks broke down abruptly when relief from U.S., British, and French
sources appeared imminent. The advantage of the United Nations plan as
originally discussed between Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Na-
tions special envoy, and Ahmed Hussein, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, was
its scope. The plan contemplated the establishment of special centers,
manned by United Nations officials, throughout Iraq. The Iraqis pre-
ferred Bush's proposed plan, which limited protection to special enclaves
for the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq, despite heavy fighting, severe
casualties, and great destruction in the country's southern cities.89 The
Iraqis, of course, condemned even Bush's plan as "'foreign meddling.'-90
Instead of condemning interference by other states, the United Na-
tions signalled to member states that interference was appropriate and
indeed appealed to the international community to contribute to humani-
tarian relief efforts. By passing Resolution 688, on April 5, the United
Nations Security Council approved for the first time "the right to inter-
fere" on humanitarian grounds in the internal affairs of a member state.
As one jurist, from the Universit6 de Paris-Sud, noted following the vote:
"Although cross-border humanitarian aid long has been tolerated if not
legally binding activity by nongovernmental organizations for moving
food, medicines and other help to the needy, the Security Council vote
marked the first time governments openly gave their seal of approval to
86. Yang & Gellman, supra note 83.
87. R. Jeffrey Smith & Barton Gelman, U.S., Allies Agree to Form Force for Protec-
tion of Kurds; 5,000 Troops Would Be Stationed in Turkey, WASH. POST, June 26, 1991, at
A9.
88. Id.
89. Patrick Cockburn, Iraq Backs Off Signing Accord for UN Centres, INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 18, 1991, at 14.
90. Russel Watson et al., A Lifeline in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 18, 21.
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such practices.""1 Indeed, it looked as if the United Nations was going to
allow a redefinition of humanitarian intervention.
Resolution 688 was worded in terms of a response to the threat to
international peace and security posed as a consequence of Saddam's op-
pression of the Kurds. By focusing on the consequences of Saddam's ac-
tions rather than on his human rights violations per se, the Security
Council stayed clearly within its jurisdiction under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. The Resolution demanded that Iraq, "as a con-
tribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in
the region, immediately end this repression" and "[i]nsist[ed] that Iraq
allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all
those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and ... make available all
necessary facilitates for their operations." '9 2
As for Iraq's treatment of the Kurds, in particular, the Resolution
condemned the repression and "express[ed] the hope . . . that an open
dialogue w[ould] take place to ensure that the human and political rights
of all Iraqi citizens are represented." ' The Resolution, made repeated
reference to principles of sovereignty, including a specific reference to Ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter.
As the debate concerning Resolution 688 underlined, the massive
flow of refugees into Turkey and Iran, and even Saudi Arabia, indeed
threatened interstate relations and regional security.9 ' The border coun-
tries lacked the resources to handle such a massive influx of destitute
people. The number of refugees vastly surpassed those of the 1988 exodus
which followed the end of the Iran-Iraq War.99
Iran and Turkey feared that the refugee population would instigate
Kurdish uprisings in their own countries. Noting Turkey's respect for the
territ6rial integrity of other states, the Turkish representative to the
United Nations argued that the scale of human tragedy and its interna-
tional implications made the events in Northern Iraq beyond the scope of
an "internal affair."96 He pleaded with the Security Council: "[W]e are
91. The writer traced the progress of United Nations support for humanitarian inter-
vention back to the General Assembly's adoption by consensus of Resolution 43-131 on De-
cember 8, 1988, "which formally recognized the role of nongovernmental organizations in
'natural disasters and similar emergency situations.'" This concededly soft law, a political
and moral statement, was followed two years later by General Assembly Resolution 45-100,
which provided for catastrophe evaluation teams and specific access corridors for workers
providing humanitarian relief. Mario Bettati, The Right to Interfere, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1991, at B7.
92. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. For a description of the Saudi refugee problem, see Drozdiak & Ottaway, supra
note 80.
95. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 6-7, 13-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982 (1991)
(comments of the Representatives of Turkey and Iran respectively) [hereinafter Security
Council Record].
96. Id. at 6.
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duty bound to take whatever measures we deem necessary to prevent the
anarchy and chaos reigning on the Iraqi side of the border from spilling
over into our country." 9 The representative requested that the Security
Council demand that the Iraqi government demonstrate respect for inter-
national borders as well as human rights.
Furthermore, Iraq's military attacks on the fleeing Kurds extended
beyond the Iraqi borders. Iran's representative to the United Nations tes-
tified concerning the Iraqi shelling of Iranian border towns, in which at
least three Iranian border guards were killed.98 Likewise, the Turkish rep-
resentative reported that Iraqi mortar shells were landing on Turkish
territory. 99
The three states that voted against Resolution 688-Cuba, Yemen,
and Zimbabwe-argued, predictably, that the issue was an internal politi-
cal matter over which the Security Council had no jurisdiction. 0 0 China
and India abstained from the vote.
Iraq denounced any intervention. In a letter to the Security Council,
Iraq's representative to the United Nations deplored what he called
"abominable criminal acts" committed by "groups of saboteurs" and
stated that certain Iraqi citizens, presumably the Kurds, "ha[d] been vic-
tims of the campaign of terror and lies disseminated by the saboteurs or
have been compelled by armed force to leave the country ... serving as a
shield for the above-mentioned groups or a means of facilitating their es-
cape abroad."'0 1
C. Evaluation
Ultimately, the limited reading which member states gave to Resolu-
tion 688 did not stretch the meaning of humanitarian intervention. The
U.S. maintained that another United Nations resolution would be neces-
sary in order to ensure longer-term protection for the Kurds, a resolution
which Bush suggested was unlikely.' Resolution 688 was certainly not
read to permit military intervention on behalf of the Kurds, an arguably
supportable reading that would have made it truly precedent-setting.
Then Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuel-
97. Id at 7.
98. Letter Dated 3 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22436 (1991).
99. Letter Dated 2 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR 46th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/22435 (1991).
100. See Security Council Record, supra note 95, at 27-30,31-32, 42-53 (reporting com-
ments of the Representatives of Yemen, Zimbabwe, and Cuba respectively).
101. Letter Dated 3 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/
22440 (1991).
102. Yang & Gellman, supra note 83, at Al.
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lar, spoke prematurely when he said, following the adoption of Resolution
688: "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in
public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the
name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."103
The defense of the Kurds was not accomplished. Ultimately, sovereignty
triumphed over civil rights. Several factors no doubt mediated against
stronger action.
First, as discussed above, the U.S. in particular wished to avoid an
extension of the war. In democratic countries, prolonged and bloody wars
cause politicians to lose votes, and Bush did not want to threaten the
widespread national support for the military operation that he had just
completed. Therefore, Bush reacted hesitatingly to British and French
calls for the continued use of force in the region.
Second, there are many reasons why the U.S. wished to avoid an in-
terference on behalf of the Kurds that would have led to the creation of
Kurdish enclaves or even an independent Kurdish state.
The U.S. has commitments to a number of Arab states. Among the
Arab nations, there is a strong feeling of a Arab unity that transcends
state boundaries.'" There is a common concern for Arab security which
extends to protecting Arab land against alienation. The U.S.' Arab allies
would no doubt have viewed the creation of, or the facilitation of the cre-
ation of, a permanent Kurdish enclave or state as the usurpation of Arab
land.
President Bush did not wish to provide a base for Kurdish guerilla
activity, in Iraq or abroad. The U.S. feared the creation of a permanent
Gaza-strip like area. The creation of such a zone would no doubt have led
to the need for an extended military presence in the Gulf for its
protection.
Nor did the international community wish to create an independent
Kurdish state and thereby drastically alter the balance of power in the
region. As it has been traditionally, the international community was
wary of supporting a movement for Kurdish autonomy because of the
Kurdish populations in other middle eastern states. A Kurdish enclave in
Iraq could lead to new demands for a Kurdish homeland, threatening the
stability of Turkey, Syria, and Iran.
Kurdish support has always been risky, because it is likely to lead to
criticisms of other states with Kurdish populations. The Kurdish popula-
tion in Turkey, for example, has historically enjoyed fewer rights than the
Iraqi Kurds. The inherent tension of this situation was perhaps most re-
cently exemplified by the fact that President Bush did not meet with
Jalal Talabani, secretary general of the P.U.K. and president of the Kur-
103. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, As Borders Come Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1991, at A27
(quoting De Cuellar).
104. See A New Arab Order, in ECONOMIST, Sept. 28 1991, at 4 (discussing the new
dimensions of Arab unity and the threats to traditional Arab alliances).
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distan Front, on his recent visit to the U.S., probably for fear of angering
Turkish president, Turgut Ozal.
Part of Ozal's reluctance to allow Iraqi Kurds into his country has
been his fear of feeding the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. Al-
though Ozal met with Iraqi Kurds, including Talabani, and plead for in-
ternational aid on their behalf, he would not support an independent
Kurdish state or a divided Iraq.'0 5 In fact, the Iraqi Kurds' relations with
Turkey have become strained since Ozal's initial call for relief on their
behalf, because so many Turks feel that a power vacuum in Northern
Iraq threatens Turkey's ability to control its own radical Kurdish separa-
tist movement in southeast Turkey.106 The allies no doubt were fearful of
the implications of a Kurdish secession in such a volatile region.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was a general fear
among the member states of the United Nations, of creating a precedent
for indiscriminate intervention based on human rights violations. No
doubt it was this fear that prompted the drafters of Security Council Res-
olution 688 not only to reiterate the Council's respect for territorial sover-
eignty throughout the resolution but also to focus on the threat to the
international community posed by the flow of refugees to other countries
rather than the Kurdish repression itself.
Setting a powerful precedent was particularly a fear of countries with
their own secessionist minorities, such as China and the U.S.S.R., as they
could be the next countries to become the object of an attack on human
rights measures. Yevgeniy Primakov, then a member of the U.S.S.R. Se-
curity Council, said that he would be "shocked" if American, British, and
French forces remained in Iraq on a long-term basis to protect the Kurds,
expressing the general Soviet take on the situation.' Even many West-
ern countries would have feared such a precedent. For instance, Great
Britain would not want interference in its control of Northern Ireland.
105. Trying to Please, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30th, 1991, at 38.
106. The Turkish government claimed, in fact, that guerrillas from the Kurdish Work-
ers' Party (PKK), which has fought for seven years for independence from Turkey, were
hiding in "safe havens" in Northern Iraq. Although Ozal has tried to use the Kurdistan
Front, the coalition of Kurdish parties in northern Iraq, to keep the PKK under control, the
Turkish army responded to PKK raids, in the past, with retaliation on Kurdish enclaves
across the border. Turkish-Iraqi Border: Eye for an Eye, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1991, at
42; Wages of Defeat, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1991, at 36. In return for Turkey's support
for the allied security zone, however, Iraqi Kurds have shut down northern border camps
belonging to Kurdish rebels in Turkey. In retaliation, the Turkish Kurds have imposed a
retaliatory ban, supported by attacks, on trucks headed into northern Iraq. Hedges, supra
note 55.
107. Primakov in Paris on the Middle East and Internal Affairs (BBC broadcast, Apr.
30, 1991). In a routine briefing, Mr. Ignatenko, the U.S.S.R. president's aide and leader of
the USSR President's Press Club, stated: "For us to be drawn into someone's interethnic or
civil war is inconceivable. In addition it is well known that the problem of the Kurds is
complex. It also applies directly to our own country, where there are about 160,000 Kurds
living." Ignatenko Cited on Georgia, Kurdish Refugees (Izvestiya broadcast, Apr. 11, 1991).
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V. APPRAISAL
Several political factors could have facilitated a larger response on
behalf of the Kurds. A growing concern about human rights could have
made a larger international response more palatable. The international
human rights movement of the past decade and a half would seem to
have prepared the international community for some sort of political in-
terference to hold states to their human rights commitments. Moreover,
the end of the Cold War has provided a climate in which interference is
less likely to be viewed as motivated by the naked self-interest of the
intervenor.'0 s
At the time of the Kurdish crisis, the U.S.S.R. faced a crumbling em-
pire and severe economic problems. From that position, it was unlikely to
seriously object to a unanimous intervention by the western democracies,
particularly while it was appealing to those same nations for economic
aid. Dissent to Security Council Resolution 688 was minimal. Even China,
a country among those most likely to fear a more intrusive standard for
humanitarian intervention, merely abstained from voting on the Resolu-
tion, rather than offering emphatic protest. Thus the political climate at
the time of the Kurdish intervention appeared ripe for an expansion of
the doctrine.
More importantly, the Kurdish issue was extremely clear cut. There
was near universal consensus that Saddam was waging, and had in the
past waged, a racially based campaign of terror against the Kurds. As
Germany's representative to the United Nations declared during the de-
bate of Security Council Resolution 688: "The brutal use of weapons and
other agents of destruction against the Kurdish minority and other parts
of the Iraqi population, and the mass exodus it has precipitated, harbor
the danger of genocide."' 0 9 As the representative from France maintained,
human rights violations of the proportion of those waged against the
Kurds "assume the dimension of a crime against' humanity."1 10 Under
such circumstances, an intervention is not only allowed but would appear
to be required.
By failing to intervene in a more meaningful way, the allies ulti-
mately failed to uphold the most minimal human rights standards. When
the fighting ended, the U.S. prematurely ended its watch over Saddam
Hussein and allowed the massacre and forced exodus of over a million
civilians. Entire towns were emptied as the residents fled, under intense
mortar fire, to the cold, remote mountains on the Iraqi border. The Kurd-
ish plea for help was unmistakable. Saddam's human rights violations
called for a response that transcended borders and political interests.
Human dignity demanded an intervention to protect the Kurds from
108. Rosenfeld, supra note 103.
109. Security Council Record, supra note 95, at 71.
110. Id. at 53.
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Saddam's massive killing. In order to maintain a civilized community, the
international community must not tolerate such blatant extermination of
civilians. The responsibility is only intensified where international inter-
ference has contributed to the unrest. The U.S. owes more to the Kurds
than simple encouragement to rise up against Saddam.
Sarah E. Whitesell
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Advances in space science and technology have led to the evolution
of a new rubric of international law that impacts upon public, private,
and comparative law. In order to deal with the growing demands imposed
by humankind on this embryo branch of jurisprudence, Professor Mau-
rice Andem has selected the vital topics of international and regional co-
operation in the use and exploration of outer space for peaceful
purposes.'
Within the time frame in which the study was composed, the ever
present threat of conflict in space continued to dominate legal and politi-
cal efforts to assure global security. From this vantage point, the author
examines the uses of space in various fields, including space communica-
tions, meteorology, and remote sensing.' Andem also raises subsidiary is-
sues, such as the significance of resolutions by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. Indeed, the significance of resolutions from the Assembly
* A.B. San Jose State University; M. A. University of Southern California; Ph.D Uni-
versity of Denver; J.D., L.L.M. George Washington University; M.Int. - Comparative Law,
D. Jur., Free University of Brussels; L.L.D. Victoria University of Manchester. Member of
the District of Columbia and United States Supreme Court bars. Formerly, Leverhulme and
Simon Fellows, University of Manchester, England.
1. MAURICE N. ANDEM, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION
OF OUTER SPACE 7-8 (1992) (hereinafter cited as OUTER SPACE.)
2. Id. at 8. As Judge Manfred Lachs observes in the Preface, "This study is one of the
most detailed analysis of progress made in developing rules of conduct for States and indi-
viduals to, in and from outer space. Reading it one becomes aware how instruments circling
round the globe had first been a romantic experience and have finally become an important
chapter of man's activities." Id. at v.
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is one of the recurrent themes of the book. In this regard, Dr. Andem has
unyielding faith in the potential of the United Nations and its efforts to
promote world peace, the new international economic order, human
rights, environmental protection (by means of space satellites and space
stations), along with this newer rubric - the law of outer space.s
The legal nature of this contemporary branch of law, and its evolu-
tion is examined in Chapter Two. Beginning with a series of resolutions
from the United Nations General Assembly,' eventually leading to the
1967 Space Treaty,5 the world community embarked on a period of coop-
eration (even though the two superpowers dealt with each other at "arms
length") that had the potential of strengthening experiments directed to-
ward world peace. For instance, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) and its sub-committees adopted the effective
consensus procedure for voting.6
The author acknowledges states are the primary subjects of space
law, 7 but argues that international organizations should be recognized as
subsidiary subjects, because of the missions they must fulfill. In the field
of space law, the sovereign state remains supreme, and the changes per-
fected in public international law8 have yet to be transferred or incorpo-
rated into the law of outer space. Though rejecting the view of individuals
and groups as subjects of international law, the author softens his view in
the concluding chapter when he speaks of mankind and humanity.9 In-
deed, Dr. Andem notes the role to be assumed by individuals, private
enterprises and the human race when they utilize space for peaceful
purposes.
3. Maurice N. Andem, International Law as an Evolutionary and Dynamic Legal Sys-
tem - With Special Reference to the New International Economic Order, 2 FINNISH Y. B.
INT'L L. 395 (1992); and Maurice N. Andem, The 1985 NIGA Convention and the Promo-
tion and Protection of Foreign Investment, 3-4/1987 KANSAINOIKEUS lus GENTIUM 237
(1987).
4. From 1958 through 1966 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a series of
resolutions that are still binding on U.N. members. See G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), G.A. Res.
1802 (XVII), and G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), discussed at pp. 16-20.
5. Treaty on Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
6. OUTER SPACE, supra note 1, at 27-29.
7. I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor and W. Paul Gormley, The Future Legal Status of
Nongovernmental Entities In Outer Space: Private Individuals and Companies as Sub-
jects of International Law, 5 J. SPACE L. 125 (1977). MYRES S. McDoUGAL, HAROLD D. LASS-
WELL, AND IVAN A. VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963).
8. W. PAUL GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNA-
TIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNAs 7-126, 127-184 (1966).
9. The imperative of his position must not be minimized, for as he concludes, "It is
necessary to emphasize that their present and future participation in outer space activities
either individually or jointly with states and international organizations, will not in any way
grant them the status of subjects of international law of outer space. They, as a matter of
fact, shall continue to be subjects of the applicable domestic law of states," OUTER SPACE,
supra note 1, at 39.
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In support of this position, Chapter Three examines the future im-
pact of emerging international law, state practice, the legal force exerted
by resolutions from international institutions, and judicial decisions. Spe-
cial attention is devoted to the potential role of the International Court of
Justice"0 to resolve outer space and environmental disputes.
The substantive portion of the book begins with Chapter Four, where
Dr. Andem discusses significant areas of agreement between sovereign
states on the differences between air and outer space. While outer space
is governed by the 1967 Space Treaty," air space above a state's territory
is regulated by the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of 1944.2 Here
then, is an area in which states have cooperated for the purpose of facili-
tating communication and transportation. However, a major impasse re-
mains unresolved, i.e. the delimitation between air and outer space. De-
spite cooperation between the members of COPUOS, the boundary
remains unsettled. The author proposes 80 kilometers as the upper limit
of air space in his final chapter. This limit needs to be set, since some
supersonic aircraft can fly into outer space, whereas space vehicles and
satellites must necessarily pass through air space. Moreover, multi-pur-
pose vehicles are, being developed by the United States and Russia.
In order to deal with this unresolved subject, the opening portions of
the chapter present a historical review of the main theories governing air
law. Next, Andem analyzes the evolution of the United Nations' concept
of freedom of outer space. Necessarily, the major issues to arise center on
the exploration of outer space. Proposals for joint undertakings between
the United States and Russia, along with other industrialized states, are
currently being considered. Dr. Andem argues that comprehensive solu-
tions are sought in order to create a zone of peace in outer space.
From this premise, Chapter Five delves into the above mentioned is-
sues, particularly by discussing the Bogota Declaration 3 in relation to the
geostationary orbit. A valuable survey of the viewpoints offered by states,
international organizations and scholars are reexamined in order to deter-
mine the limits of outer space and its future potential. Once again Dr.
Andem returns to one of his categorical imperatives when he argues that
the' "exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment, and shall be the province of mankind. .. "" Underlying this theme
is the norm of non-appr6priation, as embodied in the Space Treaty.
10. Id. at 62-64.
11. See Treaty, supra note 5.
12. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. See I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AIR LAW (3ed. 1988).
13. ITU, Broadcasting Satellite Conference, Doc. No. 81-E, Annex 4 (Jan. 17, 1977).
See also, CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SPACE 466-69, 514-31
(1982); OUTER SPACE, supra note 1, at 159 if.
14. OUTER SPACE, supra note 1, at 177.
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Chapter Six deals with the demilitarization of outer space, the moon
and other celestial bodies. In support of his premise that the common
interests of mankind will hopefully guide the conquest of the universe,
Dr. Andem presents a detailed analysis of germane United Nations treaty
articles and views of jurisconsults. The immediate goal is broader partici-
pation of states in applications of space sciences such as remote sensing
of earth resources, protection of the environment, meteorology, space
medicine, and joint projects (i.e. the construction of solar transportation
systems and space stations).
With Chapter Seven, the focus shifts toward the primary application
of space technology. Specifically, the final three substantive chapters
(seven through nine) deal with earth based satellites, the use of communi-
cation satellites and technology in space, and the resulting corpus of law.
Beyond question, the employment of communication satellites continues
to be one of the most important aspects of this newer division of commu-
nications law, which has evolved from the regulation of air waves. Space
communication is a field within a larger entity (i.e. space law), however,
that acts concurrently with other categories of international law. For ex-
ample, the employment of artificial earth satellites has necessitated a net-
work of agreements, the creation of major international satellite systems
(INTELSAT, INTERSPUTNIK and IMARSAT), and proposals seeking
an umbrella international agency within the structure of the United Na-
tions. Incorporated within the scope of these umbrella institutions, na-
tional and regional satellite systems have been perfected for the benefit of
maritime and aeronautical sensing. In excess of one hundred and twenty
countries have cooperated in these regional and world-wide ventures. The
success of the Indian satellite instructional television experiment, based
on an agreement between the United States and India is one example.
Additional examples from Africa and the Andean sub-region illustrate the
extensive scope of national and regional satellite undertakings.
Numerous legal questions arise from direct television and radio
broadcasting, owing to ITU regulations imposing some limitations on
states and private parties. Steps have been taken to regulate broadcasts
by the United Nations General Assembly under the provisions of Resolu-
tion 37/92 of 10 December 1982, which carries the text of the Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Interna-
tional Direct Television Broadcasting.15 These principles are in fact
guidelines that may in the future be implemented by the ITU. Professor
Andem concludes that these IDTBS principles will contribute to the pro-
motion and strengthening of mutual understanding by facilitating the
free flow of information through the exchange of scientific and educa-
tional ventures.
The underlying theme of international cooperation is carried forward
into Chapter Eight, Satellite Meteorology, an area of particular impor-
15. Id. at 280 n.93, citing U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (4 Feb. 1983).
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tance especially to the developing world. States have cooperated and re-
frained from imposing defenses of sovereignty in the field of weather fore-
casting, as evidenced from the high level of cooperation between the
United States and the USSR in the early days of satellite monitoring.
With the perfection of satellite technology, it became possible to predict
impending atmospheric changes. Hence, advanced warning made it possi-
ble for regions, states and individuals to take preventive measures. As a
result, damage from severe storms and hurricanes could be reduced. Ad-
vanced warning are especially helpful to developing countries, which pos-
sess limited resources to deal with the aftermaths of natural catastrophes.
Numerous programs of WHO are examined (World Weather Watch
(WWWP) and the Tropical Cyclone Programme (TCP), along with re-
lated efforts by other U.N. and multinational organs (e.g. UNESCO,
ICAO, ITU and ESA). These numerous organizations have perfected an
effective system for the utilization of space technology. The primary ex-
amples cited in the book involve NOAA of the United States, METEOR
of the Russian Republic, INSTAT of India and GMS of Japan. Other
national satellites, along with METEOSAT (of EUMETSAT) form por-
tions of this global meteorological structure. Dr. Andem proposes the ex-
isting meteorological satellite system be improved, rather than attempt-
ing to create additional regional organs.
The message emerging from this chapter (and similarly from the
three chapters dealing with space satellites) is that this area has achieved
the highest level of multinational cooperation and coordination. Valuable
political and legal precedent has been created that can be employed in
the future when bolder attempts are made to establish a functional order
for both inner and outer space. Here then is guidance not only for states,
but likewise for COPUOS.
Although sensing by meteorological satellites is one of the oldest and
most successful applications of space science, one of the newer fields -
and presently the most controversial - is the sensing of earth resources.
Interestingly, considerable overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction exists
between meteorological and resource sensing. The author observes these
systems are complementary. In fact, he concludes that at some point
other systems will overlap with remote sensing.
Ever present throughout Dr. Andem's discussion is the partially re-
solved, though potentially dangerous, clash between state sovereignty and
the unrestricted use of space. Non space powers, especially developing
countries, strongly oppose the remote sensing of their territories (i.e. land
masses and territorial seas) because the acquisition of such data places
the sensed state at a distinct disadvantage. A defense of sovereignty is
imposed without success since the norm of freedom of outer space pre-
dominates. Against this background, Dr. Andem supports the free dis-
semination of sensed data and refined information. However, he seeks so-
lutions that will protect the poorer and less industrialized states by
means of cooperation within a United Nations framework that incorpo-
rates the participation of specialized agencies. That is, the concept of the
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free dissemination of data must be applied in such a fashion as to protect
the privacy and confidentiality of sensed states and regions.
Following a review of earlier conventions,16 Dr. Andem bases his posi-
tion to a considerable degree on the Principles Relating to Remote Sens-
ing of the Earth From Space, 7 which are the result of fifteen years of
sustained study and negotiation by COPUOS. Dr. Andem implies these
fifteen principles can serve as the basis for future action, as for example
in the area of peaceful settlement of disputes. 8
The author's detailed analysis serves as the groundwork for his final
conclusions. As was typical of the preceding chapters, he has the ability
to select those international and regional instruments that are contribut-
ing to the evolution of a complete corpus of international space law. Con-
sistently, current (and historical) accomplishments are employed as step-
ping-stones to ultimate objectives, the main one being the perfection of a
new "specialized international agency similar to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
to coordinate and monitor all remote sensing activities."' 9 This new spe-
cialized agency would be responsible for dealing with, and possibly dis-
seminating, data and information received from remote sensing, and also
strive toward the eventual unification of existing remote sensing programs
and projects.
Recommendations are offered in an effort to firmly base this new
corpus of international space law in reality. One major step will be a more
aggressive and far-reaching approach by COPUOS and its two sub-com-
mittees (the "Scientific and Technical" and "Legal") in the search for
new solutions. Their prior record, as demonstrated in the book, is out-
standing. Not only has COPUOS achieved considerable success during
the prior decade in developing space science and law, it has also served as
a model for organizations dealing with other rubrics of law.
Concerning the future status of the geostationary orbit, including ra-
dio frequencies, Dr. Andem proposes that satellite operators comply with
the provisions of the ITU Convention and the Final Acts of the World
Administrative Conferences. Within this context he recommends that
new systems be established within the orbit on a regional and global ba-
sis, with the participation of all states.
Recommendations such as the verification of disarmament measures
are set forth, and as could have been anticipated from the underlying
theme of the implementation of environmental protection throughout the
16. Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of Remote Sensing of the Earth From
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/33/162 (June 21, 1978); discussed in MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, OUTER
SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 184-85 (1982); W. Paul Gormley, Outer Space and Legal Liabil-
ity, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 581 (1984) (book review).
17. For a discussion of the draft articles, see OUTER SPACE, supra note 1, at 387-401
(and the sources cited).
18. See, e.g., id. at 400-01.
19. Id. at 402-03.
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book, recommendations are advanced that are designed to protect the
earth's fragile ecology.
Dr. Andem's final thoughts are directed toward future regimes, as
mankind seeks to utilize the resources of the universe. Central to his pro-
posals is the increasing position of the United Nations, "as the center of
international cooperation and for codification and progressive develop-
ment of contemporary international law."20 As a counterpart, COPUOS
will periodically review the effectiveness of existing outer space conven-
tions in attempting to achieve the final regime for peaceful purposes that
have been advanced throughout this excellent study.2
20. Id. at 426.
21. Manfred Lachs, Preface, id. at x (footnote omitted). Lachs concludes, "This impact
of scientific and technological progress has also led to some radical changes in the classical
concepts and theories in contemporary international law and international relations."
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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT; Ed-
ited by Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury; Clarendon Press; New
York (1992); ISBN 0-19-827778-4; 492 pp. (hardcover).
This book contains sixteen essays analyzing the relationship of par-
ticular issues, institutions, and aspects of the international arena to global
environmental problems. In their introductory overview, Hurrell and
Kingsbury identify the common issue addressed by each essay: whether a
highly fragmented political system consisting of over 170 sovereign states,
and numerous actors, can achieve the high levels of cooperation necessary
to manage environmental problems on a global scale. A nuts and bolts
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing international
community and its ability to address current transnational environmental
concerns follows.
The book is divided into several sections: Standard Setting and Im-
plementation, Institutions, and Power and Conflict of Interest. Two of
the essays in the Standard Setting and Implementation section, by Birnie
and Richardson, provide an analysis of existing international law and
mechanisms for rule promulgation, implementation and enforcement. No-
table for its insight is a chapter by List and Rittenberger analyzing inter-
national regimes (institutions created by the collective action of states to
limit individual states' actions in certain areas in efforts of overcoming
environmental problems.) Further chapters in this section address the
role of non-governmental organizations in relation to oceanic environmen-
tal problems, different approaches and limitations of the negotiation of
international agreements, and the cooperative problems posed by global
warming.
The second section, Institutions, discusses the United Nations, the
World Bank and the European Community in separate essays. Thatcher's
discussion of the U.N. charts its development of environmental concerns,
including the emergence of the concept of sustainable development and
the problems of funding assistance programs. Piddington provides an
overview of the World Bank and its treatment of environmental concerns,
including its influence on environmental goals through economic policy.
Finally, Haigh traces the development of the European Community's in-
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ternal and external environmental policies, concluding that the Member
States must take practical actions to achieve environmental goals.
The final section, Power and Conflicts of Interest, turns the focus of
the analysis to several specific environmental issues and state policies.
State discussions include essays on the deficiencies of Japan's global eco-
nomic policies and U.S. policy on climate change. Other issues range from
deforestration to the distribution of power in the international
community.
Attention to detail is evident throughout the text, resulting in a com-
prehensive discussion of the economics and politics of global environmen-
tal problems. By analyzing specific and sometimes seemingly unrelated
aspects of this topic, the book, as a whole, provides a unified and compre-
hensive view of the international community's current position on global
environmental concerns.
William G. Klain
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPORT CONTROL-JURISDIC-
TIONAL ISSUES; Edited by Karl M. Meesen; Graham & Trotman/Mar-
tinus Nijhoff; London, England (1992); ISBN 1-85333-483-9 (hardcover).
The Queensland Conference of the International Law Association,
held in August, 1990, has generated the publication of a volume on the
jurisdictional issues involved in the international law of export controls.
The book does not represent a comprehensive study of the law of
export controls. Rather, it is a series of reports prepared by members of
the International Law Association International Committee on the "Legal
Aspects of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction." The reports, initially submitted
to the Committee, were edited and brought together by Professor Karl
Meesen, the Committee's Rapporteur.
Professor Meesen also wrote the helpful General Report which
preceeds the different national reports. The General Report describes the
incidents, in 1982 and 1984, that highlighted the dimension of jurisdic-
tional disputes arising out of export control laws. For example, the pipe-
line dispute of 1982 involved the United States' prohibition on the sale of
pipeline equipment to the former Soviet Union, especially from European
subsidiaries of American companies. With the support of their European
hosts, American subsidiaries refused to obey the prohibition and contin-
ued to sell pipeline equipment to the former Soviet Union. The U.S.
blacklisted these companies for several months before retracting the pro-
hibition. Meesen theorizes that export control laws give rise to such
situations.
Ten national reports follow the General Report, each focusing on a
particular country's export control laws. The ten nations are Argentina,
Austria, Canada,the European Economic Community, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Of
special interest is the report by Francesco Francioni and Andreas Bianchi
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on Italy. Italian export control laws are currently in the process of being
completely rewritten by the Italian legislature. The approach taken in the
writing of the new laws is almost opposite to the spirit behind the old
1956 laws. The best example of this radical change lies in the principle of
freedom of commerce (i.e., of export) passed in a law of 1988 after 30
years of a 1956 law based on the denial of freedom of commerce (every
export had to be approved by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Commerce).
The article describes the old rules but carefully includes the new ones as
well, thus providing a comprehensive look at the Italian export control
legal system.
Another national report, written by Oskar Weiss-Tessbach and Franz
J. Heidinger about Austria is especially interesting. Austria's main con-
cern in export control legislation lies in the export of technology to cer-
tain nations and the export of its cultural heritage. Because the 1918 law
covering these areas continues to function well, the authors decided to
focus on the new 1988 laws forbidding the export of technology to certain
nations. The Austrian system appears both free and responsible, allowing
for no restrictions in exports of technology except for certain goods listed
in the 1988 Act passed by the Austrian legislature.
One of the major critiques of the book is that the reports mainly
concern Europe and the United States. Neither Asia, a major business
partner of both the U.S. and Europe, nor South America (except for Ar-
gentina) or the African continent, are the subjects of reports. Although, as
its Foreword made clear, this book never intended to represent a compre-
hensive study of international export control laws, the limited geographi-
cal area covered by its reports renders the book of limited interest.
Geraldine Cummins
WATSON, ADAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCI-
ETY: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS; Routledge, New
York, NY (1992); ISBN 0415 06998 X; 337 pp. (softcover).
Adam Watson has been a British Ambassador and Assistant Under-
Secretary of State, Chairman of the British Committee for the theory of
International Politics and, since 1978, Professor of International Rela-
tions at the University of Virginia. In order to appreciate the system of
international order present today, Watson believes in the importance of
understanding previous systems in history. The Evolution of Interna-
tional Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis attempts to further this
understanding through a methodical historical analysis of international
societies. The book begins with a discussion of the systems of ancient
states, and then moves to the two distinct Asian systems in India and
China. After developing a historical understanding of these systems, Wat-
son explains the European systems and concludes with a discussion of
contemporary systems of international society. At the outset, the author
does poses tow important questions, which he discusses throughout the
text: one is the idea of cultural unity in each of the systems, and the other
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of hegemonical and imperial authority.
The discussion of the ancient systems begins with the Kingdom of
Sumer, the nation with the earliest written records. An analysis of As-
syria, Persia, Classical Greece, and the Macedonian systems continues the
discussion of the ancient systems. Watson creates the cultural and politi-
cal framework to analyze each of these societies. The book then shifts to
the Indian system of societies that developed as multiple, independent
unities with a diversity of peoples, and a variety of languages present
even today. The Indian systems are contrasted with the Chinese system,
which developed in isolation, but later became multiple independent sys-
tems. The author easily shifts his discussion of Asia globally by next ana-
lyzing the Roman and Byzantine systems. He concludes his discussion of
the ancient systems with a look at Islam.
The author's discussion of European systems is limited to those
which have influenced our present system. Beginning with Medieval soci-
ety, where later European states are rooted, the book expands into the
Renaissance. He discusses the spread of the Italian Renaissance through-
out Europe in the sixteenth century and its influence on the evolution of
contemporary systems.
The next section explores three aspects of sixteenth century struggles
to replace the Renaissance and Reformation with a new organization in
Europe. The first struggle is the Reformation, the second is the consolida-
tion of the independent states, and the final struggle is the establishment
of the hegemonical authority and a move towards the imperial end of the
spectrum. Watson proceeds into the seventeenth century, which featured
the settlement in Westphalia after the Thirty Years War. The settlement,
according to the author, began "the age of reason and balance," leading
into European expansion prior to the nineteenth century.
This propels the reader into the final leg of Watson's journey with a
look at the contemporary system of states. In the last few pages of the
book, the author provides a brief account of two major phases in the
emergence of the global international society: first, the two decades be-
tween the wars and the collapse of European domination, and second, the
four decades following the Second World War - the age of the super-
powers and decolonization. Watson covers this extensive amount of mate-
rial in a methodical and informative manner, giving the reader a firm
background in the history of international state systems. His historical
accounts are detail specific, and his method of comparisons enlightening.
Manisha Dave
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